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ABSTRACT 
 
Thesis Title:  “An institution-based enquiry into concepts of proficiency, 
automaticity and second-language learning among dyslexic students”. 
 
Yves Le Juen 
 
It is, for some, „common knowledge‟ that dyslexic students cannot master a 
foreign language „because‟ they cannot master their own.  This study enquires 
into the assumption, and the „because‟, above, and seeks other explanatory routes 
for dyslexic university students‟ difficulties with foreign language learning.  
Building on earlier work concerned with notions of „automaticity‟ in relation to 
concepts of „proficiency‟ in proficiency and dyslexia literatures, it relates these 
directly to second language teaching/learning concepts and discusses this in 
relation to „phronetic‟, „professional‟ and „tacit‟ views of knowledge.   
 
The empirical part of the study comprises cross-comparison of four narrative 
sources:  the narratives of a dozen dyslexic students engaged in a semi-structured, 
in-depth interview concerning their language difficulty and how they view it;  a 
second narrative relating the voices of the advisors most directly linked to 
dyslexic language learners in the institution, also including past and future 
difficulties of some dyslexic students who may face a study year abroad, e.g. on 
Erasmus and similar schemes;  a third interview with the then current head of the 
unit dealing with both English as a Foreign Language, and Modern Foreign 
Languages;  and the over-arching narrative of the researcher – his story in 
conducting this study.  Within this framework, the research uncovers  how, at a 
practical level as well as theoretically, phronetic, teaching-learning and 
exceptional language-acquisition „knowledge‟ may be open to subversion from 
several quarters:  the pragmatics and economics of 3
rd
-level EFL and MFL
1
 
language teaching;  transposing child language acquisition concepts onto adult 
language learning ones;  the cross- and/or mismatching of these with dyslexia 
ones;  and the possible collision between some areas of professional knowledge – 
tacit or otherwise.   
 
                                            
1 A list of abbreviations and acronyms is provided below this Abstract, between the Statement and 
the acknowledgements. 
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The research shows how for the „institutional dyslexics‟ concerned, and 
sometimes despite their advisors, the unit‟s academic director and the institution, 
automaticity is anterior to proficiency and agency is anterior to automaticity.  
Moreover reversing this, discovering or rediscovering their sense of agency 
allows certain of the dyslexic participants to attain a qualified measure of 
automaticity in their language studies and hence, of proficiency. These findings 
have important implications for those engaged in second language teaching and 
learning.   
 
The organisation of the thesis is as follows:  in a first chapter which the researcher 
introduces with a short autobiography and an account of how the research came 
about, a broadly descriptive and factual introduction to the piece then summarises 
previous work in the doctoral degree particularly the critical analytical study, 
focusing the research questions, and discussing the relationship between 
methodology and methods, and begins a consideration of what a „case‟ is, and 
what is the case here.  Chapter 2 expands the theoretical focus with a discussion of 
the notion of coherentism and the notion of „fit‟, and introduces issues in 
narrativity and in phronesis.  Chapter 3 addresses understandings and 
terminologies in „communicative‟ language teaching, cross-mapping these to both 
dyslexia and „proficiency‟ issues previously discussed.  Chapter 4 explores the 
data, and begins an assessment of the „fit‟ between the respondents.  Finally, 
Chapter 5 summarises and discusses the „findings‟ of the research – what emerges 
from the research questions and what from their interpretation; how theoretical 
understandings now „fit‟, or not; what else emerged during the study;  what 
constitutes a finding;  and returning to Chapter 1, asks to what extent the study is 
a foundationalist „case‟ which can or should be „generalisable‟.  A short 
discussion of further research avenues is presented.
10 
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A Table of abbreviations and acronyms in use in the Thesis  
 
Items with an asterisk are further referenced in the Bibliography of works and sources cited, 
pages164-173.  
 
ADD Attention Deficit Disorder 
AL2 Adult Second Language Acquisition/Learning 
ALTE Association of Language Testers in Europe, a UN-recognised 
International Non-Governmental Organisation or INGO 
ASD Autistic Spectrum Disorder 
CAQDAS Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data AnalysiS 
CAS Critical Analytical Study (an earlier component of the Ed.D 
doctoral programme) 
CC Conscious Compensation hypothesis (Nicholson and Fawcett 
(1990) 
CL1 Child First Language Acquisition 
CLA Child Language Acquisition 
CLT Communicative Language Teaching 
DAD Dyslexic Automatization Deficit Nicholson and Fawcett (1990) 
DDA 1995 Disability Discrimination Act*  
DTFLA RSA (Royal Society of Arts)  Diploma in Teaching of Foreign 
Languages to Adults 
EAP English for Academic Purposes 
EFL English as a Foreign Language 
ELT English Language Teaching 
GCSE The General Certificate of Secondary Education - an academic 
qualification in a specified subject, one of several taken in the 
United Kingdom – except Scotland - by school students, typically 
aged 14–16 
GP General Purpose (teaching) 
H.E. Higher Education 
IALS Institute for Applied Language Studies, Edinburgh University  
JTB Justified True Belief, a foundationalist espistemological avenue 
L1 Language 1 or First Language 
L2 Language 2 or Second Language 
LAD Language Acquisition Device (Chomsky) 
LASS Language Acquisition Support System (Bruner) 
LCDH Linguistic Coding Differences Hypothesis (Ganschow and Sparks) 
MFL  Modern Foreign Languages  
MLAP Modern Languages for Academic Purposes 
NVivo 8 A trade name of a CAQDAS (q.v.) package by QSR International 
Pty Ltd 
NV An abbreviation of NVivo 8, used to indentify quotations in the 
thesis (e.g. “Carmen, NV21”). 
PLD Primary Linguistic Data (Chomsky) 
SENDA 2001 Special Educational Needs and Disability Act* 
SKILL 1988 (SKILL = non-acronymmic replacement title for the National 
Bureau for Students with Disabilities)* 
UNCRC 1991 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
ZPD Zone of Proximal Development (Vygotsky) 
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Chapter 1 An introduction, a reprise, and an extension 
 
1.1 Introducing the researcher 
Given the methodological and philosophical stance I will go on to outline in this 
thesis, and its naturalistic ambitions, I offer here a short account of my own 
background, notably how my research emerged, and how I am engaged in the 
context – my positionality, my linguistic background, and my own teaching and 
learning experiences. 
I am an accidental teacher, an accidental French-English bilingual, and an 
accidental linguist. Having studied at school, in France, in my birth language of 
French, a family posting to the United Kingdom coincided with quite severe chaos 
in the French university system and in the early 1970s, I became a U.K. 
undergraduate in Modern Languages.  During and immediately after my B.A., I 
worked as a trainee translator and subsequently qualified as a conference 
interpreter – having French, English, Russian and Spanish at various levels.  
French is my birth language, English a family language (making me passively 
bilingual from birth), Spanish emerged informally, and Russian was a language of 
formal study at my British University.  It was acquired with some pains – and a 
return to my „French‟ way of learning a language:  grammar-translation, rather 
than what was on offer in the British Russian class I attended.  I had discovered 
pro-active, remedial self-tuition, and re-discovered my agency – which I will 
discuss below. 
Some time into my Interpreting career a friend asked whether, “being a French 
native speaker” (a term I discuss below), I would take over her French for Adults 
evening class, during her pregnancy.  These adult students were generally retirees, 
were something of a club which socialised outside the French courses, and were in 
some cases owners of property in France.  They did not care too much that they 
did not progress linguistically but were, without exception, Francophiles with 
extensive literary, cultural, musical and political knowledge of France. And quite 
prodigious oenophiles.  I was hooked. 
More teaching followed, as a formal Lecteur in a French Department, and I took 
the RSA DTFLA (or Diploma in teaching foreign languages to adults).  Later, I 
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completed a two-headed MSc in Applied Linguistics and TEFL – with the focus 
on English, because distance-learning masters‟ degrees in modern foreign 
language teaching were then limited in number, and quality.  Of relevance here is 
that I found myself working in an environment where many of my colleagues had 
originally been teachers of English from (and trained in) France and conversely, 
many EFL colleagues were modern languages specialists who had changed career 
paths.  My Masters was funded for me, on the then assumption that I could, and 
would, teach in EFL also, be it only on applied linguistics and psycholinguistics 
topics, in order to increase the elasticity and „efficiency‟ in staffing; „synergies‟ 
were invoked. I taught in Linguistics for some eight years.  Later, I would be 
required to teach French „content‟ rather than purely „language‟ courses, and 
generally in lieu of the Linguistics, whose department was „closing‟.  I describe 
this literature and philosophy „content‟ offering below: it provides a useful 
vignette concerning my own language use in this thesis. 
 
1.2 Beginning to think about research:  first inklings 
Offered a tenured fellowship in my present institution, I began to muse on what 
would become the general topic of this thesis: that various of my students 
appeared incapable of learning French. 
My older evening-class students progressed little, with exceptions.  They were at 
ease, communicated very adequately, were unashamed of having an English 
accent, were in love with all things French, and made this generally evident.   
Other mainstream undergraduates came into my ambit, who struggled to acquire 
simple French spelling, could not learn grammar rules or indeed, the principles 
underlying them, occasionally had handwriting difficulties (illegibility, tiny 
writing) and very quickly became „blocked‟ at a certain level beyond which it felt 
inhumane to push them. 
Another type of student began to appear in classroom registers and in student 
information files:  „diagnosed‟ dyslexics, who had first-language difficulties with 
their English (and therefore, by extension, in the institutional view, might not be 
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ideal second-language students). Furthermore, they were said to be disabled and 
had certain remedies and entitlements available to them. 
My early question was quite simple: was there any link between my older, 
„fossilised‟ (discussion of this term follows) evening-class students;  the younger 
„blocked‟ ones;  and the general category of „dyslexics‟ beginning to emerge? 
This was the point of entry into my formal research in this area, though the focus 
would in time narrow down to the specific areas of the title – proficiency and 
automaticity in areas of theory and practice in the fields of teaching, language 
acquisition, dyslexia, and relating these to notions of professional knowledge. 
I have never been tested for dyslexia. 
 
1.3  My language use in the thesis 
As I explained earlier, in addition to my career profile and developing research 
interest which I have discussed, it came about that I was required to teach 
„content‟ as well as „language‟.  I found myself in an „academic‟ and no longer, 
„support‟ unit, which now taught its own modern languages degrees, and not 
simply serviced institution-wide language needs.   
The appointment of a „world-class‟ research specialist on Sartre and twentieth-
century existentialist thinking led to my being asked to research, develop and 
teach a parallel course on Simone de Beauvoir.  Beauvoir adds numerous slants 
and interpretations to Sartre‟s philosophy – notably, an egalitarian-feminist one.  
A principal concern in her writing was the relegation of women to the status of 
„other‟, of inessential relatively to the male‟s essential condition in life.  Her 
anxiety is to make women their own subject.  Thankfully, one of her under-
researched earlier novels (L’Invitée, 1947) left me a clear field for original 
research and teaching. 
This is by way of an informing anecdote, for my thesis title originally referred to 
dyslexic subjects rather than dyslexic students.  Hence, reflexively, I have had to 
re-label throughout the thesis, or include in single quotation marks, many  terms 
which derive from the literatures I cross-analyse – dyslexia, language teaching, 
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proficiency and its testing, professional knowledge – but do not necessarily agree 
with in all instances; or whose local understandings in those disparate subjects do 
not coincide.  In my anecdote, far from being in the existentialist context an 
individual who is not determined – as in the Beauvoir example - a subject is often 
the very opposite:  indeed in laboratory parlance, the passive recipient of the 
attentions of an empiricist experimenter engaged in positivist knowledge-creation.  
I go on to argue, later in the thesis, that the students in my study do indeed 
become „subjects‟ in the existentialist sense,  in that they recover, and explore, 
their own agency.  The ambiguous word „subject‟ in my thesis title could easily 
have estranged half my readership. 
In addition to the abstruse language of existential phenomenology, there were 
other examples of terms which need reflection, and qualified use.   
I have already mentioned in my small biography above the „native speaker‟ who 
is, in some accounts, an abstract, idealised, adult, educated user of a particular 
language, and „unexceptional‟ in „presenting no particular language pathologies‟, 
to adopt deliberately psycho-medical terms.  This „native speaker‟ heuristic is 
often also a norm - or yardstick for the measurement of others, overtly or covertly.  
In other accounts, however, and notably colonial ones, a „native speaker‟ was 
perhaps something to be improved upon or eradicated so that the „benefits‟ of 
English, Portuguese, French or another language of empire could be more readily 
imposed on this „native‟ – who may well possess highly developed and 
internalised metalinguistic and metacognitive skills but was still that:  a „native‟, 
and somehow less than a (white) man or woman, and probably „unenlightened‟.  
Unless they were useful in their own rights, as interpreters. 
I also wish to problematise the notion of „modern languages‟.  Hindi, Punjabi, 
Bontoc and Vietnamese are all „modern‟ languages, in daily use by sizeable 
numbers of people – both in their places of origin, and in Hackney (London) and 
La Courneuve (Paris). I develop this theme and that of „prestige‟ or „elite‟ 
languages, and the purpose of teaching and indeed, funding them, in the following 
section, an early look at CLT or Communicative Language Teaching.  But the use 
of this expression „modern languages‟ is very often Eurocentric, and capitalistic in 
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the sense of the „intellectual capital‟ which education is supposed by some to 
enhance in the individual and, by extension, in the national economy. 
Finally, I have already discussed the notion of „dyslexic students‟ and their 
profound existential and ontological ambiguity, whereby in mandatory education, 
they exist as such;  but on transferring out of it and into further or higher 
education, their dyslexia status needs to be circularly induced (with extra-
institutional help) by proving that they have certain dyslexia-related needs so 
therefore, must be dyslexic. My references to dyslexic students in the thesis try to 
remain mindful of this distinction between general, everyday parlance; and the 
dyslexic students who formed my cohorts in the institution under study.  I have 
resisted calling them „my‟ dyslexics, on a number of grounds, or simply 
„dyslexics‟ in the dehumanising way of much dyslexia literature. 
My use of single quotation marks around certain terms therefore denotes that, for 
all that they are current terms in areas and disciplines I cover in this thesis, these 
terms may be loaded. 
 
1.4 A preview:  a central terminological and theoretical issue 
In order to clarify why CLT – communicative language teaching – comes so 
strongly into my later discussion in Chapter 3, I pause here to address the ways in 
which CLT appears to be privileged in the institution I go on to present – and its 
dedicated EFL/MLF language teaching unit. 
Some advocates and practitioners of CLT may consider it to be a useful 
ontological recapitulation of recent and current ideas in second language learning 
and acquisition.  Both psycholinguistically and pedagogically, it is the 
culmination of structuralist, situational and functional-notional thinking regarding 
syllabus design and implementation. Many core tenets of CLT became established 
when the Council of Europe‟s pedagogical master-plan – Un niveau seuil, Coste 
et al. (1976) for the teaching of English was generalised to other languages.  This 
document offered a painstaking, exhaustive survey of language needs and 
linguistic tools which could be resolved handily into syllabuses.  These, in turn, 
could find their way into increasingly computerised solutions which lent 
themselves to language teaching/learning use.  Various models were proposed for 
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operationalising syllabus design according to these „communicative‟ precepts, and 
on the basis of a synthesis of theoretical ideas, notably by Munby (1978).  A 
generation of „communicative‟ method and handbooks was born – or more 
cynically, „rebadged‟ as such. 
CLT was privileged also in the sense that it proposed avenues not only for „solo‟ 
study, but for progressive learner autonomy and learner success:  previous studies 
of classroom anxiety, motivation and other affective variables had stressed 
autonomy and success as keys to language learning;  Bailey (1983) being a much-
cited example of such a study . 
A second view also needs to be taken of CLT – the political.  As I discussed in 
interrogating the notion of „modern languages‟, foreign language learning has 
itself long been considered in economic discourses as a key to European 
integration – and social mobility.  Social mobility is, in turn, is considered a key 
to economic growth.   
Herein lay a certain danger, because certain key aspects of CLT – the idea of 
intercultural competence and communicative success, worthy objects as they were 
- became confused and conflated.  Few people might disagree that there is a 
correlation between second language learning/acquisition and intercultural 
competence and communicative success. But a dangerous assumption can arise 
that the link is both causal – and reversible.  Reversible in the sense that, in the 
absence of more solidly theorized accounts in CLT of such learning/acquisition 
issues, and despite nods to Chomsky whom I discuss later, intercultural and 
communicative success became understood in some teaching/learning situations 
and institutions as causal generators of language learning, and not the reverse.  
Hence, „communication‟ became, in parallel, reduced to the oral/aural route:  no 
need for „grammar‟, any more. Combined with increasing computerisation, 
though pre-Internet, task-based learning and syllabuses which stepped away from 
more cognitive or psycholinguistic accounts at the expense of learners‟ own, 
idiopathic internal syllabuses came to the fore. Under pressure from other subject 
areas in the school curriculum, CLT lent itself – on the Modern Foreign 
Languages side (I discuss this term later) – to a „bite-sized‟, rote-learnt language-
learning experience.  While this version of CLT can appeal to institutional seekers 
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of „efficiencies‟ (in this account, the „language teacher‟ can be virtually anyone) 
and „synergies‟, some early syllabuses derived from CLT notions in modern 
languages did little to generate what I describe in the thesis as automatic and 
exponential acquisition and growth.  Notably at GCSE level, a wave of exam 
„successes‟, and grade-inflation, seemed unrelated in reality to the examinees‟ 
capacity to study at higher levels. 
Expanding on the assumptions of CLT in the Modern Languages field, a further 
problem was its focus, in the hands of inexperienced or indeed, unqualified 
teachers, on the oral route, as I mentioned in the previous paragraph.  Whereas the 
intention might have been to effect rotations between the 4 „basic‟ skills (listening 
and reading as inputs; and speaking, writing as outputs), giving each learner a 
degree of individuated over-learning and cross-modal reinforcement, the oral 
route and situational learning (rather false dialogues in the manner of  “Allons au 
supermarché”) became prized.  In this way, CLT became unbalanced in favour of 
rote-learnt outputs which were geared less towards acquisition and more towards 
exam passes.  In consequence, CLT methodology in the wrong hands side-stepped 
many of the discoveries of discourse and conversation analysis which had come to 
clarify understandings of the communicative act, text construction by the 
reader/speaker herself, as well as intercultural, gender, power and a myriad other 
issues.  There was little to engage with, or help develop, the learner‟s 
metalinguistic awareness, which even the classical, but élite, grammar-translation 
model had afforded because it was calqued on Latin, Greek or occasionally 
Hebrew. Instead, this form of teaching found itself back with the worst of 
audiolingualism of the „You say it, you learn‟ variety used to train US operatives 
during the Korean War.   
Leaving aside the question of whether and to what extent teaching leads to 
learning, two other essential flaws underlay this situation.  The first, basic error 
may have been to assume that input is equal to uptake in language teaching, this is 
a flawed assumption which „observationalist‟ child language acquisition scholars 
had pointed out decades before, as I will illustrate later in Chapter 3.  The second 
basic flaw was to assume that whilst CLT appears to be tenable for EFL teaching 
in the target culture itself (with students attending courses in English in the U.K., 
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for example), the Modern Languages classroom may be a very poor replication of 
the target culture and in the jargon, „demotivating‟ – if motivation ever existed.   
This second flaw is, I have come to feel, at the heart of  the „schisms‟ I describe 
later in the thesis in discussing a teaching unit delivering versions of CLT in both  
its EFL and MFL expressions, and which emerge clearly in the data. 
 
1.5 A reprise 
 
By way of introduction to the present study, and to introduce the reader to its 
concepts, this chapter offers a short reprise and expansion of my Critical 
Analytical Study (Le Juen 2006), in which I considered issues relating to 
proficiency and automaticity and the dyslexic modern language learner. 
 
I will consider how certain key notions were introduced and problematised in the 
CAS; but first, I will review the original findings so that in the final chapter here, I 
will be able to reflect on the evolution of my understandings overall in the thesis. 
 
1.6 What I argued in the CAS Study  
 
The CAS reviewed both the literature on modern language learning in higher 
education, and documentation produced by one university concerning teaching 
and learning of languages.  Both in the CAS and in this thesis the university 
concerned is referred to as „the Institution‟. 
 
1.6.1 Chapter 1 of the CAS proposed that dyslexic students studying in the 
higher education institution are often undifferentiated in terms of the precise 
nature and source of their difficulty.  The delicate ontologies offered by dyslexia 
authors and dyslexia bodies are, in institutional terms, an irrelevance to the 
conferral of the status of „dyslexic‟ in the first instance, though individual 
remediations may vary thereafter.  Secondly, the institution requires such students 
to be re-consecrated as „disabled‟ - in fairly stark terms, and the starker the better, 
in terms of obtaining state and university-internal assistances and allowances.  
There is an implicit choice, thirdly, to be made by such students between 
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„assistances‟ and confidentiality – in other words, they cannot refuse to disclose 
their condition and expect to receive help – though confidentiality from other 
students is offered.  Fourthly, these students are, like others, offered campus-wide 
modern languages teaching to access Year Abroad courses in which classmates 
are non-dyslexic (and even some bilingual) modern languages undergraduates.  
Lastly, the classroom teachers are, on average, less qualified than those in the 
secondary modern languages sector to deal with exceptional students – being 
trained overseas, if at all.  If untrained, they often adopt what they claim as 
„naturalistic‟ approaches, a subject to which I will return in a later chapter.  
 
I noted, in terms of teaching methodologies espoused, that „communicative‟ 
approaches are appealed to, at least nominally.  These are often designed to 
produce re-engagement of child language acquisition mechanisms through e.g. 
spontaneity, improvisation and peer-to-peer and group work, supposedly to induce 
an automaticity which I glossed in the CAS as „exponential and progressively 
autonomous learning of materials‟ (Le Juen 2006, p. 50).  I shall return to 
„automaticity‟ in the present chapter, and later in the thesis (Chapter 3, §3.3) to a 
critical analysis of the origins and claims of such „communicative‟ teaching. 
 
In mainstream modern languages teaching, successful students are ultimately 
declared „proficient‟; the examinations they will sit will be modelled on ones 
similar to the EFL Certificates of Proficiency approved by the British Council, not 
least because the British Council audits the institution and accredits it. 
  
1.6.2 In Chapter 2 of the CAS, I established that proficiency is, however, a 
problematic concept.  Indeed, there is a clear distinction to be found in the 
literature between views of proficiency which can be „thresholdist‟ and those 
which are „holistic‟.  The distinction establishes that in some views, proficiency is 
a gradable concept, i.e. one can become „more‟ proficient by crossing various 
thresholds.  Implicit in this concept is the view that progression in the language 
taught is a) possible, b) linear, c) relatively constant, and d) cumulative.   
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In contrast, there is a „holistic‟ view, implicit in some forms of testing and, a 
posteriori, teaching
2
, which presupposes that there can be an agreed end-point, an 
abstract idealisation of the „proficient native speaker‟ and that one therefore is 
either proficient, or one is not.  If one is „proficient‟, then a „proficiency‟ 
qualification can be granted.  This might render teaching something of a 
redundant activity.  The circularity is compounded by the view – drawn from the 
language acquisition literatures reviewed here later - that there exist both language 
acquisition mechanisms which are partly innate and also, an internal and 
individuated language learning „syllabus‟ which can be rekindled and lead the 
learner to proficiency.   
 
I also noted that such a concept of proficiency developed in the literature is further 
problematic in that what is being described may be an expectation of child first 
language acquisition (CL1) - whereas quite often, these views have been taken 
from experimental neurolinguistics sources such as Lenneberg (1967), and 
mapped onto CL1.  This expectation can then be generalised to L2 – second 
language acquisition, often without due differentiation between child and adult 
second language learners (White 1989).  Differences between first and second 
languages in scripts – Roman, Cyrillic, Arabic - or in phonology, for example 
clicking or tonal languages, can complicate matters further.  In such accounts, the 
„successful‟ proficiency „testee‟ must, by some means, have extracted and 
exponentially woven sufficient language through some individual mechanism to 
cope linguistically with anything or everything.  This expectation covers reception 
and production but somehow, at the same time, prediction.  Thus, the entire notion 
of proficiency is deeply problematic even before taking into account 
teaching/learning assumptions in the field of unexceptional language learning in 
general, and dyslexic Modern Languages students in particular. 
 
1.6.3 I considered dyslexia in Chapter 3 of the CAS.  Like proficiency, dyslexia 
also suffers from dichotomies and circularities.  I argued that some of these 
dichotomies are, in fact, allied to the very notion of proficiency. A major 
ontological difficulty in dyslexia is that there is a broad and current consensus in 
                                            
2 If we can even assume that teaching leads to learning; I shall consider Krashen‟s dichotomisation 
of certain terms here, in Chapter 3, later. 
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regarding it as „constellated‟ or „symptomological‟ syndromes.  However, owing 
to the propensity in mainstream social sciences to avoid viewing individuals as 
aggregates, there are many and various symptoms which can be ascribed to 
dyslexia.  This, together with the infinite number of personal, affective, 
educational and other factors attributable to dyslexic students themselves, is used 
in turn to confirm inductively the existence of something describable as dyslexia - 
and not something else.  All of this has proved too much for some authors and 
critics.  Where it has not just been flatly denied, dyslexia as a concept has been 
sub-defined out of existence, in their view.   
 
Dyslexia as a concept is also subject to some intercultural and some 
methodological caveats.  Even within English-speaking research communities, 
terminologies which on the surface seem cognate prove, on closer inspection, not 
to be equivalents.  Attempting to translate French, German or Japanese research 
findings throws open further intercultural chasms, witness the disparity between 
illiteracy and illettrisme
3
.  Proof-based, hypothesis-testing, opportunist and large-
scale studies can be offered equal „shelf-room‟ with small-scale, qualitative 
narratives and these - although they too seek to increase understanding - are 
sometimes single-case and personal.  All can then re-emerge in several printings 
of popularising books and across several publishing houses - but averaged into 
non-synthesised macro-studies, with or without any update.  Epistemological and 
ontological difficulties of this nature are hardly restricted to dyslexia, and the 
phenomenon may be quaintly characteristic of the evolution of human knowledge.  
 
Within this discussion, the concept of automaticity has been alluded to.  It is 
invoked directly in some sources, but only implicit in others.  Indeed, a number of 
influential authors including Uta Frith (1985) describe dyslexia in deficiency 
terms:  the non-development of automaticity.  To describe „automaticity‟, 
Nicholson and Fawcett more recently hypothesised a “dyslexic automatization 
deficit” (or DAD) (Nicholson and Fawcett 1990, p.161) allied to an associated 
conscious compensation hypothesis (or CC) (ibid, p. 162).  They propose that 
unexceptional learners become progressively more fluent until they no longer 
                                            
3 Where illettrisme is a cultural deficit – absence of knowledge of, or engagement with, literature, 
and illiteracy = analphabétisme. 
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need to process their work consciously.  Hence automaticity is characterised by 
fast speed of learning, and a relative lack of conscious effort.  Conversely, in 
conscious compensation, automaticity is thwarted by demands on conscious 
attention
4
. My CAS referred further to exponentiality (Le Juen 2006, p.10 et seq.) 
in developing automaticity, i.e. the availability and use of what is earned in order 
to learn more. This deficit - a lack of automaticity - is treated as both an indicator 
for and a marker of dyslexia.  But to what extent are automaticity and proficiency 
interchangeable terms, or even associable ones?  
 
Cross-comparing what is said in the two domains of proficiency and of dyslexia 
and their respective literatures, I felt that the notions of „holistic proficiency‟ and 
„automaticity‟ are closely interlinked and indeed,  this was the major claim of my 
CAS.  In the proficiency field, the „holistic‟ view with its testing and syllabus 
consequences is an on-off, yes-no, proficient/non-proficient binary.  Likewise, the 
requirement for a dyslexic / non-dyslexic binary has as its fulcrum the notion of 
the possibility or impossibility of automatic and exponential language 
development.   
 
I also showed in the CAS how extremely delicate and increasingly sophisticated 
descriptions of sub-types of dyslexia have been evolved and are used extensively
5
. 
These descriptions have value in opening access to practical and financial relief 
from disablement and other social inequities.  However, some of the authors 
considered in my review feel the very delicacy of definition in fact describes 
dyslexia out of existence (Elliott 2005; Mills 2005).  
 
For my CAS, I set up the notion of the „Institutional Dyslexic‟, a heuristic stripped 
of sociological variables and specific diagnoses but interacting with the 
                                            
4 
Nicholson, R.I. and Fawcett, A.J.  (1990) cite Shiffrin & Schneider (1977, p. 127): “Automatic 
processing is well learnt in long term memory, is demanding of attention only when a target is 
presented, is parallel in nature, is difficult to alter, to ignore or to suppress once learned, and is 
virtually unaffected by load”.
 
5 Notable inclusions in Le Juen (2006) were Aaron and Phillips (1986); Brittain (1981); Coltheart 
et al. (1987); Crombie (1997, 2000); Dechant (1981);  numerous papers by Ganschow, Sparks and 
their colleagues [e.g. Sparks, Ganschow, and Patton (1995) and Sparks et al. (1998); Ganschow, 
Sparks and Javorsky (1998)]; Klasen (1972); Snowling and Stackhouse (1996); Snowling (2000); 
Sasanuma (1980);  Thomson and Watkins (1998); Zangwill (1974). Subsequently, Nijaknowska 
(2010) addresses dyslexia and foreign language issues but without an overt H.E. focus. 
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Institution.  An obvious problem, for this catch-all category of institutional 
dyslexic is that automaticity/exponentiality and proficiency come together as one 
single, menacing concept.  The double bind is that with the label „dyslexic‟, the 
Institution presumes, on the student‟s behalf, that automaticity in language 
learning is not available to them.   But just in case, the legislation also allows the 
students‟ institution to disregard their dyslexia status, and this point was made 
clear in Chapter 1 of Le Juen (2006) in references to the SKILL (1988), Disability 
Discrimination Act (DDA) (1995) and SENDA (2001) exclusions which protect 
„course goals‟ and „examination validity‟.  On the one hand, the dyslexic student 
has the right to be on a proficiency language course. But on the other, the 
Institution nurses a legally-watertight expectation of their failure. Yet the same 
Institution is willing to qualify them, if they should disprove its own confirmatory 
diagnosis and pass a proficiency examination. 
 
My CAS study also asked what, conversely, it says about dyslexia status, the 
validity of the proficiency exams or the professional integrity of the teaching 
faculty if the student „fails to fail‟, that is, if she becomes „proficient‟ in the 
foreign language to somewhere near native speaker level.  Is this the „second bite 
at the apple‟ effect proposed by Miller-Guron and Lundberg (2000), or are the 
students and the tutors merely brilliant examples of expertise and assiduity, 
respectively, in a top-rate language-teaching department? 
 
In previous piloting work I had undertaken in this research field, semi-structured 
interviews with dyslexic and non-dyslexic (but „blocked‟) second language 
learners in a higher education setting provided, in both categories, rueful but 
unsolicited and unprompted references to the lack of automaticity in their 
learning.  At least subliminally, the concept of automaticity exists in the mind of 
some learners keen to obtain a proficiency qualification; and it is in this light that 
I sought to find clarification of the interplay between certain of these concepts in 
the present thesis. 
 
1.7 Local, „institutional‟ issues 
 
My CAS closed with several cautionary remarks.   
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1.7.1 Firstly, I had noted that issues around power and professionalism were 
both implicated, and any extension of the study would need to focus on these.  
The CAS had been in some part about professional knowledge:  at that time, the 
researcher‟s, and also how this cohered with his experiential knowledge.  The 
present thesis will indeed discuss both these forms of knowledge, but as 
intermediated though phronesis and other forms of tacit or implied knowledge. 
 
1.7.2 Secondly, I had become aware that if creativity and action prevailed in a 
Language Teaching department, then collegiality was the norm, and the informed 
training of one‟s successors was an agreeable, non-threatening occupation, and 
not grave-digging.  In this positive case, a wider and ongoing contribution to 
knowledge was an expectation, not a chore.  However, both institutional central 
„direction‟ and financial stringency have forced a return to orthodoxies, notably 
across-the-board compliance with British Council accreditation requirements.  
Posts in modern languages faculty have been „saved‟ – but by incorporating 
faculty into an income-generating facility with British Council accreditation.  The 
resulting merged unit is indeed a cash-producer.  However, it but brooks little 
research activity, let alone differentiation (outside the ELT field) between student 
cohorts of various types.  British Council accreditation certainly requires language 
teachers to be holders of British Council accredited language teaching 
qualifications.  These include Royal Society for Arts and Cambridge EFL 
qualifications, and insofar as university modern language teachers have any direct 
and recognised modern language teaching qualifications, they tend to be derived 
from such EFL sources.  The DTFLA or RSA Diploma in Teaching Foreign 
Languages to Adults, which had the institutional weight of a Graduate Diploma in 
Education, was long deemed a desirable minimum.  It was also a franchised 
operation, for many years, across a number of higher and further education 
centres.  One such was the Edinburgh University Institute for Applied Language 
Studies, IALS, which was also the generator of many of the theoretical (and some 
classroom-based) units, as well as qualifying generations of future teacher-trainers 
a Masters level and above. A major influence in IALS was the Alan Davies to 
whom I referred in connection with proficiency testing (Davies 1968, 1977) in 
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Chapter 2.  His observations, challenges and own assumptions on proficiency will 
have spread extremely far, in time as well as in place.   
 
1.7.3 My CAS proposed that many EFL practitioners would also agree that the 
British Council is perhaps one of the last, but strongest, bastions of 
„communicative language teaching‟.  I stated earlier that, leaving aside the 
question of whether „communicative language teaching‟ is a) theoretically well-
founded or b) delivered within its own precepts in the Institution, major aspects of 
„communicative‟ teaching methodologies are both anecdotally and in the 
literature, repellent to dyslexic modern language students – see for example 
Ackerman and Dykman (1996) and the selective counter-arguments of Schneider 
& Crombie (2003, pp. 57-58, 63).  It may indeed compound some of the other 
difficulties of the „institutional dyslexic‟ considered in heuristic form in Le Juen 
(2006) and personalised in the present thesis in the narratives of Lin, Freesia, 
Petey, Pat, Carmen, Aggie, Jake, Jess, Sandy, Sam, Millie, and Chris. 
 
1.8 Bridging from CAS to thesis:  what was proposed 
 
The CAS closed by stressing that in any study of professional knowledge, and 
most notably in a doctoral enquiry, into any attempts at consequential validation 
of how that professional knowledge is used must remain aware of the time-space 
in which that knowledge originated (Messick  1989;  Shepard 1993).  
Consequently, it must remain conscious of the „half-life‟ of some teaching and 
learning concepts embodied in certain power-brokers within the academy.  Most 
crucially, I felt, such a study needs to acknowledge the very existence of such 
power-brokers and power-mechanisms because these may, in more than one sense 
of the word, petrify dynamic professional knowledge into professional orthodoxy.  
So among other things, the present thesis considers the fit between various 
stakeholders‟ narratives  in order to return to, examine and expand this 
embodiment.  In doing so, I will refer to notions derived from more recent writers 
on narratology and phronetic knowledge in educational and allied fields.  
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1.9  Approaching the present study 
 
My „subjects‟ were opportunistically-gathered students at Wealdston University.  
The advisors (who would in turn contribute their views here, and be interviewed) 
were initially approached and sent out an e-mail to a „reserved‟ list of dyslexic 
students. Owing to an incident I describe below, a further call was made by the 
advisors, again by email. These respondents suggested other names and in due 
course, 12 students with an institutional dyslexia classification contributed to the 
research.   Further technical remarks concerning their „selection‟ are offered in 
Appendix 1A, § 1.6, of the Ethics Statement;  in essence they were rewarded very 
modestly for participation, but not for recruiting fellow-dyslexics, and are in no 
sense a „sample‟. 
 
1.9.1 Two informing anecdotes 
 
In the context of this study, and though their implications are wider, I have 
decided to include two stories of my own before meeting the respondents, as they 
illustrate both the evolution of this thesis and the larger narrative of its unfolding. 
The coincidence of two (borrowing computing parlance) „fatal incidents‟ served 
to shift the focus of my study in a way which profoundly affected its methodology 
and methods.   
 
First, at the end of a recording session with one member of the dyslexic students 
cohort (whose narrative has not been used here, for reasons which follow), and as 
soon as the microphone had been switched off, she leaned back in her chair, blew 
off imaginary steam, grinned, and said:  “Well, do I pass, then?”  This led me as 
the interviewer, to reflect on my methodology and on „other‟ interview(s) which 
may have been co-occurring simultaneously with the one I thought I was 
conducting.  Which should I now „analyse‟ into „data‟?  As I said earlier, and in 
common practice, a small sum of money had been offered to students 
participating in the project.  Had this student somehow assumed the money was 
conditional on passing the interview? Or was the expression ironic, revealing of 
affective issues relevant to dyslexics and their coping strategies, for example? 
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Further, the term „pass‟ can have several meanings.  For example, you pass or fail 
an examination.  You can also „pass as‟ a member of a community, or as a 
transsexual or, institutionally, as someone worthy of a disability grant or other 
„assistances‟.  Was the Interviewer being regarded as an Informant?  Were there 
Foucauldian power issues emerging? Had I, the interviewer, stumbled on a fake 
dyslexic, a grant-chaser?  Would this lead back
6
 into ontological directions – who 
is, and who isn‟t, „dyslexic‟? What else might the respondent have been trying to 
convey, with her quip? How would I know, as a researcher, given my interview 
format?  Did this matter?  What would be the ethics of leaving the tape running, in 
future, at the supposed end of interviews, to see what else emerged?  The entire 
interview situation and the various relationships intrinsic to its organisation, 
unfolding and reporting and analysis were in need of review.   
 
The second coincidence which was a trigger to broadening the theoretical and 
hence, methodological understandings of the research occurred when the 
Institution offered another employee a Small Grant
7
 to „buy remission8‟ and look 
into practice in other universities regarding the marking of dyslexic students‟ 
work in modern languages.  The grant recipient never previously having 
conducted research, the work was farmed out to a post-graduate and a computing 
technician.  The first action of the funded „researcher‟ was to access a disability 
listing, through her management role, and summon various students to discuss a 
„dyslexia project‟, indirectly cancelling the promise of confidentiality and 
anonymity which this researcher had offered to some of the very same students 
before recording them.  Their data were excluded from the study, and another 
cohort used.   
 
The positive outcomes of these incidents were the present researcher‟s discovery, 
though supportive supervision, of phronetic and narrative research literatures, and 
the salutary revelation that one does not just do research; it can also do for its 
subjects.  Or for the researcher.  
 
                                            
6
 Previous research work having intended to compare „dyslexic‟ and „frozen mature‟ learners; see 
Le Juen (2006):47 (fn. 34), et seq. 
7 £4000, through an institutionally-funded Teaching and Learning Development Fund 
8 This process usually funds replacement teaching assistants; here, it bought a researcher. 
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1.10 Refocusing the research questions 
 
The questions originally used in the semi-structured interviews forming the data 
for the present study have been included here as Appendix 3A. 
 
The research questions forming the basis for the analysis of the data here, and 
which serve also to frame the concluding discussion in Chapter 5, are as follows: 
 
1. My overall question is to ask:  to what extent is studying a foreign 
language at university to proficiency level incommensurable with 
being dyslexic? 
 
2. What theoretical coherence is there between literatures on second-
language proficiency, on dyslexia and on professional knowledge? 
 
3.1 What empirical evidence emerges from institutional dyslexic 
students‟ narratives on issues related to second-language 
proficiency such as automaticity? 
 
3.2 What views on these issues are expressed by the advisors assigned 
to such dyslexic students? 
 
3.3 What views are expressed on these issues by the academic director 
of the unit charged with delivering this teaching? 
 
3.4 What coherence is there between the views expressed by the 
dyslexic students, the advisors and the academic director? 
 
3.5 What other information or indications emerged from the data and 
its analysis and interpretation? 
 
3.6 In sum, what coherence, theoretical or empirical, informs the 
„incommensurability‟ question in the Institution concerned? 
 
4. Finally, what avenues does the research suggest that the actors 
concerned in the study (including the institution and, by extension, 
others) might explore to refute the „incommensurability‟ notion? 
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1.11 Methodology and methods:  theoretical and operational issues 
1.11.1 Theorising the methodology and methods 
 
In broad terms, I have taken the epistemological position in my study that the 
researcher is not primarily in the business of assembling quantities of facts so that 
their underlying laws are known.  Such a view would presuppose that there should 
be underlying laws, that they exist, that they can be “discovered”, and that is 
somehow the business of educational research.   
 
A further argument against my using an approach which relied on hard positivist 
and reductionist procedures is their deification of means over ends; objectivity, 
replicability, generalisability and prediction can deflect from the particular and the 
subjective, which interest me.  Methodologically, I felt that ascribing explanatory 
and predictive powers to a purely inductive procedure - even if this is everyday, 
commonsensical and pragmaticist „inference to the best explanation‟ or 
„abduction‟ (Pierce), would be unhelpful and antihumanistic.  In non- or anti-
positivist working, each human cannot in any case be at the same time both an 
aggregatable entity, owing clearly defined dependent and independent variables, 
and one who can be mechanistically reduced.  Inducing central human noumena 
from a set of human phenomena would, were it even possible, also imply that I 
could get to understand so complex a system by reducing it to its components. I 
also aimed in this study to allow not only the complexity of individuals to show 
through, but the sheer variability between them, to emerge from my later analysis, 
and sustain it.  
 
This approach presents interpretive opportunities, but constrained how I analysed 
and reported my findings, though generalisability is not the sole prerogative of 
positivists (see discussion in Stake 1995 and my own discussion of the ontological 
status of my findings, in Chapter 2 below).  It is for this reason that I first discuss 
the uses of narratives in Chapter 3, and narratives are then adopted interpretively. 
 
Methodologically, I have used a broadly interpretive or naturalistic set of 
methods. Powney and Watts (1987) suggest that analysis of data is a limited view, 
chosen for a purpose:  analysis has some ulterior motive which the data doesn‟t 
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share, and hence “the very task of the analyst is to work through the data and to 
re-present it in a form that can be appreciated by the intended audience” (Powney 
and Watts 1987, p. 161).  Even before assessing the overall coherentist alignment 
of the respondents, there are first and second-order perspectives to my data 
analysis (Marton 1981), the first factual/contextual and the second, interpretive of 
the subjective meanings of the informants.  
 
It is for this reason that my methodology allows each interview to be analysed at 
least twice and more frequently, three times.  First reflexively, during recording 
and transcription, using contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous annotations 
and memos and researcher queries. Secondly, reducing and condensing the 
situated and contextualised propositions of the respondents into a „story told‟ for 
each interviewee. Thirdly, the inbuilt recursivity of this method together with a 
subsequent use of NVivo 8 during data-handling and text-search operations, 
added a further level of penetration and exploration of the data in a manner not 
dissimilar to the  „constant comparative‟ method of Strauss and Corbin (1998), 
though CAQDAS working is more often serial than parallel.   
 
The working method I adopted was also mindful of caveats expressed by Thomas 
and James - “signposts to investigatory avenues borrowed from natural scientific 
endeavour” should not emulate “inductive-predictive theory ... commended by 
grounded theorists” (Thomas and James, 2006, p.772).  Lincoln and Guba also 
have expressed reservations regarding the “hollowness of the putative ends, 
namely, prediction and explanation” (Lincoln and Guba 1985, p. 339) of earlier 
„tabula rasa‟ grounded theory approaches (Glaser and Strauss 1967) on the one 
hand, and the „imposed understandings‟ for which Thomas and James chide 
Charmaz (2000), and certain other qualitative theorists, in Denzin and Lincoln 
(2006).  
 
Conversely, the present methodology and methods allowed me some emulation of 
Geertz‟ 1973 notion of „thick description‟ in moving from a comparison of 
theoretical issues with a heuristic case (as it did in Le Juen 2006) towards an 
extension study using situated persons.  Whereas more positivist statistical models 
may pay little attention to outriders and more to trends and centrality, my 
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methodology and methods here favour the individual and the particular above 
aggregates and statistical models.  Likewise, the reflexivity, recursivity and semi-
structured nature of the data-gathering allowed me some degree of comparison 
and contrast of respondents at a narratological level, and helped identify meta-
narratives which may be „narrating‟ the respondents.  As we shall see, this 
methodology also enables a measure of cautious comparability at other levels, not 
least the phronetic. Finally, the methodology has tried to be mindful of  the 
Thomas and James (2006) reworking of Oakeshott (1967):  “Interpretations are 
built […] on what it is to be human” [Thomas and James 2006, p.779]. 
 
1.11.2 Making a case – I: A case, the case, my case:  the ontological status of 
the study 
 
My case, briefly stated, is that what is understood to „be the case‟ in the 
institution, literatures and individuals studied as regards automaticity, proficiency, 
dyslexia and their interrelationships, is neither coherent, in the first instance, nor 
does the Institution studied seem mindful of this fact. 
 
So I set myself a task of problematising, for myself and for the reader, certain 
apparent understandings and specificities which, in the institution, literatures and 
individuals I am studying, might otherwise be understood a-critically to be „the 
case‟; whereas coherentist cross-examination suggests that they are not so, outside 
their own bounds.   
 
My casing, also briefly stated, is to use a triple-nested and recursive scheme in 
which the outer „case‟, in the sense of „valise‟,  is a study of an institution and its 
practices; within which, there is a cross-comparison of  the theoretical and 
empirical issues at stake;  the recursivity comes in cross-application (derived from 
NVivo 8 labelling and modelling) of the emerging discoveries of the theoretical-
empirical comparison to further, individual „cases‟:  my cohorts of dyslexic 
students, the dyslexia advisors, and the academic director.  The cross-application 
at this third level allows comparison of individual students, each as a case in their 
own right;  of the student cohort with the dyslexia advisors, another case;  the 
dyslexia advisors with the academic director, himself a case;  and the academic 
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director with the dyslexic student cohort.  This casing is represented, in flattened-
out form, in my Research Questions. 
 
Why have I done this?   
 
My naturalistic approach requires that my casing should exist – in the sense of 
being a heuristic transparent enough to become an aid to the reader‟s 
understanding, though not the ultimate determinant in it, as I discuss in Section 
5.4.   
 
Beyond medical and legal usages of the term „case‟,  Ragin (1989), Ragin and 
Becker (1992), Hammersley and Atkinson (1993), Miles and Huberman (1994), 
Stake (1995), Cohen et al. (2000), and George and Bennett (2005) offer overviews 
from numerous disciplines and sub-disciplines in education and social sciences, 
and trace the evolution and problematic of the case.  Stake (1995) proposed a 
differentiation between „intrinsic‟ case studies of interest for their own sake, and 
„instrumental‟ case studies which attempt to aid understanding of something else.  
In coherentist working then my study operates at both these levels, and makes 
Stake obvious.  
 
A more recent avenue for interpreting a case, and the one I adopt here, is that a 
case reveals itself to be so at the end of a research process:  it is a product 
embedded in a process, not an a-priori.  But questions of reality need to be 
addressed.  Is any case I derive in this way empirically discoverable and 
verifiable; or is it merely an exploratory construct which is not necessarily „out 
there‟ but a useful aid to understanding?  I opt for both, though I share the 
verifiability with others. 
 
In addition, Ragin (1992) writes, “Asking “what is a case?” questions many 
different aspects of empirical social science” (Ragin 1992, p. 3).  He appears to 
stress that it is necessary to distinguish not so much what a case study is, but how 
it should not be understood – in the sense that, to use his words, “virtually every 
social scientific study is a case study or can be conceived as a case study, often 
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from a variety of viewpoints [...] every case study is a case study because it is an 
analysis of social phenomena specific to time and place” (Ragin 1992, p. 2).  
Conversely, presenting results by „casing‟ creates a need for both an empirical and 
theoretical case to be handled, while at the same time, it allows for the 
investigatory outcomes to be channelled into constructing many possible different 
cases substantively.  In this, there is a further caveat to be expressed.  Cohen et al. 
(2000) propose that „case studies can establish cause and effect‟ (p. 181), with the 
possibility of using case-studies for theory-testing (Yin 1994) which can lead 
towards more positivistic, inductive-deductive iterations - which I have eschewed. 
 
I found more use in Nisbet and Watt (1984), in Cohen et al. (2000):  taking the 
Wealdston University and its dyslexic language learners as a „single instance‟, my 
study “provides a unique example of real people in real situations, enabling 
readers to understand ideas more clearly than simply by presenting them with 
abstract theories or principles.  Indeed a case study can enable readers to 
understand how ideas and abstract principles can fit together” (Nisbet and Watt 
1984, p. 72-73, emphasis added).  In this sense then, my study is a case-study. 
 
These factors explain here and in Section 5.4 my construction both of what a 
„case‟ is and of the study as such a case.  It follows that the case which I have not 
so much „found‟ (Harper 1992, in Ragin and Becker 1992) by winnowing, 
pruning and abstraction, but „constructed‟ (Wieviorka 1992, ibid.), can be 
appealed to when I discuss what my „findings‟ are -  in closing the thesis, but also 
in suggesting avenues for further research, by myself and/or others  and on these 
or other substantive issues. In other words, I use the notion of „case‟ 
methodologically for the reader and for myself as thesis-builder; but in a 
coherentist deployment also, to provide a locus for discussions of the „fit‟ of 
interrelations between theoretical and empirical evidence, and wherein to discuss 
notions of generalisability and scope.  I discussed both „fit‟ and „coherentism‟ 
separately, in section 2.1 above.   
 
 In working through my understandings of „case‟ and „casing‟ I found that the 
issue of generalizability needed further analysis.  I found early work in this area 
still to be informative.  Robert Donmoyer (1990), whose work was paralleled and 
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expanded by Schofield (1990), offered me a point of entry into discussions of 
generalizability and single-case studies.  And although formally, I have not 
offered a bounded and longitudinal single-case study here, I feel their comments 
are still pertinent.  
 
Donmoyer (1990) eschewed a traditional view of positivist, „proof-giving‟ 
research in which notions of random selection and statistical significance are 
brought to bear on observed (but thus, a priori observable) “lawful regularities” 
(Donmoyer 1990, p. 177) said to hold between causes and effects in order to 
“discover and validate generalizations about these effects” (ibid), particularly 
where the purpose is to derive general statements which can be imposed, 
template-fashion, onto particular situations and produce a modus operandi for the 
practitioner in a given applied social sciences field.  This is not Donmoyer‟s 
purpose, nor mine, in my case-making. 
 
It was these considerations, and the naturalistic approach I have espoused 
throughout the thesis, which suggested that I should follow Ragin (1992) in 
returning finally (Section 5.4) to the question of whether my overall „case‟ is 
generalisable;  and by whom.   
 
1.11.3 Reflecting on methodology before operationalisation  
In reflecting upon my research methods, I feel it is important to stress that my 
thesis is supported by both interview data and observation – though not by 
observational data as such, because my observations were very much fact-finding 
and involved with establishing links, procedures and institutional practices around 
„consecrating‟ students as dyslexic.  Illustratively, this institutional observation 
work allowed me the following discovery in my CAS work, which I reproduce 
here: 
Though the Educational Psychologists referred to by the University 
confirm that there is a problem for a given student as a 
symptomological level, it is the Assistive Technology Unit which, 
in performing appraisals of needs, in effect reconfirms the 
diagnosis and by identifying assistances, makes concrete this 
disability.  Thus the student passes from „having dyslexia‟ to 
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„being a dyslexic‟, institutionally, because it is recognised they 
need screen enlargers, coloured overlays, book-readers, and so 
forth – and not because dyslexia inheres in the student. (Le Juen 
2006, p. 7) 
 
 Given the focus of my study, I do not present direct observational data on 
HE/EFL/MFL teaching practices beyond the anecdotal, nor use these to 
triangulate with respondents‟ perceptions or my analysis of these.  I did, however, 
explore this area using the (tonally ironic) heuristic of the „Institutional Dyslexic‟ 
in my Critical Analytical Study (Le Juen 2006).  An indirect observation (by one 
early respondent, during piloting work) of HE/MFL teaching practices which can 
thwart a dyslexic student informed this extract from the CAS.  (Pertinently also, 
for my later discussion of „schisms‟ in the institution I was, even then, able to 
identify a disparity between pedagogic practice and professional dyslexia advice 
in the same institution): 
Institutionally, the teaching is EFL-inspired and still 
“communicative”. This can be accompanied by sometimes 
infantilising assumptions about the possibility of re-triggering child 
first language acquisition (CLA1) mechanisms in order to deal 
with adults (ALA2, or Adult Language Two Acquisition).  The 
„house‟ version of Communicative Language Teaching relies on 
freshness, surprise, and „informed eclecticism of approach‟.  
Anecdotally, this happy-clappy „spontaneity‟ is sheer poison to 
many dyslexic students.  It is actively discouraged by the 
institution‟s own Dyslexia Advisors.  (Le Juen 2006, p. 12) 
  
 
1.12 Data reduction:  methods and issues 
 
I would like to make it clear, firstly, that in the body of the thesis, the quotations 
used are drawn from transcripts of the interviews, though whole transcripts are not 
presented in the thesis as such. 
 
The interview transcription process itself was completed by me - and not a 
transcriber.  Though the cost of a transcriber might not even have been an issue, I 
felt that the penetration, reflexivity and analysis afforded by undertaking this 
process for myself far outweighed time and money costs. 
 
37 
I have included in quotations, as far as I could hear them and recall them from the 
tapes and transcripts, the exact words of the respondents.  Also included, 
systematically though far more subjectively, were pauses and hesitations, facial 
and body movements, laughter, incidents during recording (passing lawn-mowers, 
forgotten mobile phones) which helped me as touchstones and milestones in 
recalling the event of the interview, as well as the respondents‟ actual words.   
 
Also, while transcribing the semi-structured Interviews using the protocol I have 
included in Appendix 3A, I made electronic marginal notes and aide-memoires, as 
in the pink-coloured boxes of Figure 1 below (for readers in black and white, 
these boxes are the ones entitled “The Analyst Comments”): 
 
 
 
Subsequently, for analytical rather than synthesis purposes, I reconfigured the 
“Comment” marginalia (blue-coloured entries) as ones in the 1st person voice of 
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the Respondent (“R” above), assembled into very wide themes (as in Figure 2 
below) using verbatim citations or propositions as directly close as possible.  I 
wanted a denser and in its own way, equally „true‟ narrative which I could 
compare with others in a more holistic way, and one with which readers with a 
preference for continuous prose over dialogue might engage – and generalise from 
naturalistically - more readily: 
 
So:  what‟s my problem? 
I have a „late‟ diagnosis of dyslexia.  This diagnosis took place at University; the psychologist‟s 
diagnosis was of “mild dyslexia” and “fluency problems”. Indeed, my dyslexia is a knock-on 
effect of another cause, the working memory difficulty – this emerged in general diagnostic 
work. I do not have automaticity and have to learn by rote BUT I can‟t learn by rote too well, 
with my Working Memory problem.  I have a Working Memory problem with the interrupted 
numbers test. My numbers problem has never been salient in daily life, unlike my language 
difficulty. I don‟t have acalculia, just working memory problems. 
   
I have never had a problem with actual reading:  I have always been a keen reader. I feel a bit iffy 
about this, but I come from a family of avid generalist readers.  My problem is more productive 
than receptive. I have problems with fluency in writing: I have difficulty in expressing, in 
writing, what I‟m thinking. I have great difficulty in assembling and structuring for another 
reader the orderly ideas that are there in my head.  Academic text is new to me I need time to 
read academic text. 
 
Figure 2, from the „Carmen‟s Story‟ compilation 
 
 
My personal, pink-box researcher‟s „marginalia‟ included items not only from the 
sound recording but also its context:  not only extra long hesitations, rolled 
eyeballs, gaze-avoidance, blushing and similar features „invisible‟ in a recording, 
but also drawing attention to utterances and idea-associations, misunderstandings 
and other items which the I felt, subjectively, to be of possible future interest;  not 
least where these opened up paradoxes, dilemmas, or re-assessment of categories 
and classifications.  Iteratively, I added further marginalia but always identified 
these as those of  “The Analyst” in deliberate „epoché‟-type bracketing and 
neither the direct voice of the respondent nor, totally, of the Interviewer – but the 
interviewer-as-researcher.   
 
I feel that this phased stratification of immediate/direct, then transcription-excited 
and finally, reflexivity-induced comments allowed me not to disappear 
disingenuously from the transcription process.  It will be seen also that in my 
dealings with the academic director and with the advisors, I added slash-marks (/) 
to denote inter-cuttings and over-speaking between myself and the academic 
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director, on the one hand;  and to mark how the (apparently unrelated) advisors 
seemed to complete each other‟ sentences. 
 
1.12.1  Propositional ranking, and clarification 
 
The derived Propositions were of first- and then second-order
9
:   
 
First-order, direct, indicative mood declarative statements were used, e.g. “I am 
the only dyslexic in the family”10, but  
 
Second-order items included linguistic items such as modals, negatives, 
contraries, what-ifs, interrogatives, and similar linguistic features in addition to 
the paralinguistic ones mentioned above. 
 
I effected some minor tidying of first order propositions, to allow for later 
comparison with other narrators (for example, “I were right brassed” = “I was 
very angry at this”;  though I will discuss the drawbacks of this below in some 
closing reflective paragraphs).  But in second order examples a question about a 
teacher like “How would she know how I felt?” was rehandled as the proposition 
“I thought my teacher didn‟t know how I felt”, appealing to (my own) 
contextualised judgment.  
 
Propositions derived from the Interview were in the first instance simply listed, 
then linked into prose and united under larger themes. They were further reduced 
in cases of apparently casual repetitions by the same respondent. 
 
1.12.2  Transfer to NVivo 8 
 
Instead of working pragmatically to an ITBE (Inference to the best explanation) 
epistemology, a more phronetic, narratological and coherentist procedure was 
adopted. I describe this briefly in Chapter 4, before presenting the data analysis 
and linking it back to my research questions. 
                                            
9
 This order of interpretation is respected in Chapter 4, the data analysis. 
10
 The 3 examples here are all invented. 
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1.13 The Interviews:  some specific closing reflections 
 
1.13.1 Gains, and losses 
In conducting interviews, and particularly my semi-structured ones, there were 
gains and losses and these need to be considered, reflexively.  Re-reading the 
transcripts, there were points where I clearly dominated the conversation, and this 
has become apparent in my choice of excerpts – which are included in the thesis 
to illustrate quite different points.  But as I show below, this apparent dominance 
was usually balanced out later, using other techniques. The important lesson for 
me was one which is not always stressed enough in interviewing literatures, I 
came to feel, and that is the value of the probes used, and indeed, secondary, 
unplanned probes.  While there is a need for structure in the interview, so that the 
event is generally comparable with other interviews, there also needs to be room 
for individuality of response and for the unplanned to emerge.  Keeping this 
balance is difficult.  Positivistic notions of replicability, in qualitative working, are 
otiose.  But more humanely, respondents who are young university students may 
not yet be inured to working sessions requiring over 30 minutes‟ attention span, 
let alone an hour.   
Three methods in particular evolved in my interviewing, notably the „actor 
question‟ (I hold up my Equity card), which was along the lines of “If I had to 
play a dyslexic, how would I (feel) (think) (act)…”  
A second technique which evolved was the appeal to expertise:  “You will know 
more about dyslexia than I do, so tell me…”  This proved to be particularly 
fruitful with social science and natural science respondents, who generally had a 
„learned‟ interest in themselves and had (ironically perhaps) read up extensively 
on dyslexia.   
The final technique, which had evolved through earlier piloting, was to turn the 
microphone over to the respondent at the end and ask, “What should I have asked 
– and didn‟t?”  All three provided rich streams of response in which the 
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respondents were more active and less passive, indeed leading the interview at 
times. 
I refer later, in my Ethics protocol in Appendix 1A, to the problematic of valuable 
information which emerges after the microphone has been switched off, and may 
not have been intended to be included.  There was therefore an ethical learning 
process for me, as the researcher, and reflectively, I note that I have stuck with my 
decision to keep the interviews as one-offs and not risk over-writing them by 
follow-up interviews of the same candidate, however tantalising off-microphone 
comments and post-interview e-mails appeared.  
 
1.13.2  The Interviews:  a final limitation – and my solution 
Given my aspiration as a researcher for my text to be recognised as a case study, 
and a case study with a narrative which will support naturalistic generalisation by 
the reader, it is necessary to acknowledge a limitation, and explain the solution I 
proposed.  The respondents‟ narratives in themselves do not make a thesis; but to 
make a thesis, it is incumbent upon me to present things though a particular lens – 
my own.  I have explained earlier that as an analytic strategy I have tried to 
capture and frame respondents‟ narratives by transforming these into „stories‟, 
included in Appendix 2, in a format which also brooked electronic handling, and 
comparing with other similar „stories‟.  The danger here is that removing 
expressions such as „brassed off‟ [an invented example] might strip out local 
colour that could have illuminated the social location of that respondent.  
Conversely, treating „brassed off‟, „a bit miffed‟, „gutted‟ and „screamingly 
infuriated‟ as separate search entities and research terms might swell a database to 
pointless effect; judgement and transparency are required.  My solution, as a 
reminder,  has been to use verbatim selections of transcript in the body of the 
thesis (adapted to NVivo 8 presentation, which does not reproduce the original 
line-numbers), as well as presenting the more holistic „stories‟ which are my 
researcher‟s assemblage of the original transcripts. 
I now turn, in Chapter 2, to the epistemological approach I have adopted, and to 
the theoretical influences which underscored my research.
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical influences in the present study  
 
My ambition, in this study, is coherentist; that is to say, I have espoused a post-
foundationalist epistemological model which seeks to contrast certain actors‟ 
understandings of terms and practices in the domain of teaching foreign languages 
to dyslexic university students in the Institution I describe – „Wealdston 
University‟. 
 
As I will explain below, I have adopted the coherentist model for reason of the 
inconclusiveness, post-JTB and post-Gettier, of both rationalist and empirical 
foundationalist models.  It is a deliberate distancing from positivist treatment of 
human affairs where the search for certainty, incorrigibility and indefeasibility of 
knowledge may receive pre-eminence over understanding.  Adapting Spender‟s 
terms, “Verstehen being not to „explain‟ the nature of the world but to take part in 
the more general activity of making sense and searching out the meaning of our 
experiences” (Spender 1998, p. 34). I therefore had a positive, though not 
positivist, purpose here, which was to allow stories to be told, and compared, to 
see how they fit.  This I believe will suggest more informed practice by 
questioning local understandings of apparently „shared‟ terms in language 
acquisition, dyslexia literatures, and areas of professional knowledge. 
 
2.1 Exploring the notion of „fit‟ 
 
The attractions and distractions of coherentism are succinctly described in 
Cardinal et al. (2004), though more usefully (holistic versus linear coherentism) 
in Audi (2003, pp. 193 et seq.), and can be briefly summarised as follows.  For 
many theorists, the „indubitability‟ of rationalist justifications of knowledge, and 
the „incorrigibility‟ of empirical justifications, have both proved inadequate.  
Empirically, the incorrigibility of sense-data, for example, can be queried and its 
justificatory mechanisms, revised. Likewise, rationalism and its rootedness in a 
priori or analytical truths (“all nieces are female”) may lack interest or utility.  
Further, both of these avenues of justification may, if they fail, re-enable radical 
scepticism and lead to the abandonment of criticality.  Hence, my position has 
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been that philosophical certainty for the grounding of knowledge may not exist 
nor, in any case, be necessary.   
 
In such post-foundationalist views, knowledge, justification and certainty are 
matters of degree.  Thus the coherentist eschews epistemic foundationalism in 
favour of an epistemological stance which (negatively) seeks non-
contradictoriness and (positively) identifies beliefs which support and explain 
other beliefs without flagrantly denying the world-as-it-is, or relying on 
coincidences.  
 
The advantage of coherentist positions, particularly holistic ones, is their 
pragmatism and workability.  They don‟t dogmatically reject the less-than-certain; 
they are dynamic in accepting best explanations and allowing some predictions; 
and they tolerate notions of common sense and reality which unalloyed scepticism 
would put in doubt.   
 
Disadvantages of coherentism may be pointed to, notably by more positivist 
disciplines in which relativism and revisability are not acceptable because they are 
not founded on sense data or percepts, for example in mathematics.  Indeed, there 
is a logico-philosophical impasse for certain anti-coherentists. For them, 
coherentism must be false because, if two rival and equally-justified sets of belief 
exist, and there is no reason for a preference, both cannot be true, therefore neither 
is true, therefore the whole concept is false. 
 
Reliabilism, a rival non-foundationalist candidate, fails on account of the 
problems of regression which also beset foundationalism.  Reliance on the beliefs 
of reliable authorities requires authentication and acceptance of the reliability of 
the reliable authorities themselves, and so on backwards.  Justification, in 
reliabilism, is external to the believer and thus, in some accounts, „more 
objective‟.  However, seekers of such objectivity not unusually espouse positivist, 
proof-seeking, verifiable a-posteriori avenues, and are using probabilism as a 
springboard. 
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Conscious of these reservations, my purpose now is to gauge the fit between 
notions of proficiency and automaticity I discussed in Chapter 1, and will 
considered further in Chapter 3.  I ask how current notions of „proficiency‟ in 
language teaching, learning and testing sit alongside notions of „automaticity‟ in 
the field of language acquisition in general, AL2 acquisition in particular, and 
within AL2, second language acquisition by dyslexic students. 
 
The present and subsequent chapters also focus on the „fit‟ between these notions 
and their treatment in other types of knowledge.  Issues are discussed in 
narrativity and epistemology, as are issues in practical knowledge, including 
professional knowledge and practice. Can, for example, an „intuitive‟ teacher also 
hold „tacit‟ knowledge as a professional manager and at the same time, be 
sensitive to „exceptional‟ narratives from students with an „invisible‟ disability?  
Or will questions of power and expediency join with terminological confusion and 
unwarranted conflations from disparate pieces of theory (language acquisition and 
testing, professional knowledge and practice, dyslexia literatures)? 
 
I will also discuss, in Chapter 4, the pragmatic aspects of using narratives as the 
medium through which to approach a coherentist study.   
 
But first I needed to consider:  what is a narrative?  And in addition to what it 
says, what does it do?  Narratives being of both substantive and methodological 
interest, I consider some sources and discussions below. 
 
2.2 Narratives, narratology, and narrativity 
 
Writing
11
 on narratives, narratology and narrativity is now extensive and diverse, 
branching into sub-topics such as the systematic theorisation of narrative time, 
order, duration, frequency, mood and voice (Genette 1972, trans. 1980);  narrator, 
narratee, metanarrative signs and relative narrativity (Prince 1982);  the identity of 
the narrator (Bal 1997); and narrative articulation and socially-situated narrative 
(Toolan 2001). In sometimes parallel nomenclatures, Rumelhart (1980) reviews 
                                            
11 And speech; anecdotally, an unidentified football commentator recently alluded to “the narrative 
behind” Player X‟s missed goal. 
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schemata and their earlier versions in cognitive science;  and Swales (1990) 
reviews these schemata and various cultural, cognitive, literary and other labels 
such as scripts, scenarios, frames, and routines, to demonstrate how academic and 
research genres are themselves narrated.  Of particular interest also to my study is 
Pollak (2005), who uses narratives of dyslexic-identified students in tracing a shift 
from dyslexia models to dyslexia discourses in theoretical, diagnostic and 
intervention literatures.   
 
Some authors have been critical of the entire narratological project, variously for 
its fancifulness and its determinism (notably Mink 1978 and White 1984 in 
Verhesschen 2003).  Conversely, a number of researchers have offered 
particularly delicate and useful insights into how individuals self-narrate.  These 
authors are revisited here - notably Verhesschen, Polkinghorne, Fisher and 
Battersby.  Mindful of my purpose of gauging the „fit‟ between accounts of 
dyslexia, these authors were also selected because their contributions on narrative 
themes interconnect, in critical terms, with other concepts which emerged in the 
study - notably phronesis and „tacit, „implicit‟ and other forms of professional 
knowledge. 
 
2.3 Issues in narrativity I:   the interest in links between narrative and life 
 
I felt that a necessary prelude to discussing narratives and their role would be to 
review early interest in this field, notably to inform a later dualism – between the 
„episodic‟ and the „diachronic‟ as relating to automaticity. 
 
Paul Ricœur described how we can speak of human life as “a story in the nascent 
state, and so of life, as an activity and a passion in search of a narrative” (Ricœur 
1991, p. 29). Later, an important question in relating the worth of narrative in 
spheres such as education and research was raised by Verhesschen (2003), who 
suggested that: “The question is whether we live out narratives in our lives or 
whether we first live our lives and can impose a narrative structure on it 
afterwards” (Verhesschen, p. 451).  Verhesschen‟s answer is that “narrative 
structure is immanent in action and experience” (ibid.).  Indeed in resolving his 
own question Verhesschen appeals, within Ricœur‟s cyclic triple mimesis, to the 
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(again, triple) mediation of Ricœur‟s Mimesis II:  Ricœur‟s notion of emplotment 
accounts for the sequencing of disparate and separate events into a configuration; 
the synthesis of heterogeneous elements; and synchronisation of episodic, linear 
events within a semantic totality.   
 
But importantly for what follows, Ricœur‟s Mimesis III is also cited:  the notion 
that the process of composition or configuration of a narrative is not completed in 
the text but in the reader (Ricœur 1991, p. 26; emphasis added).  This account, 
and its small rider, also help to resolve into more iterative directions 
Polkinghorne‟s 1995 early dualism - based on Bruner‟s 1985 
paradigmatic/narrative distinction - between “studies whose data consists of 
narratives or stories but whose analysis produced paradigmatic typologies or 
categories” and “studies whose data consists of actions, events and happenings, 
but whose analysis produces stories” (Polkinghorne 1995, pp. 5-6).  The 
narrator/narratee (Prince 1982) invites our help in completing her story. 
 
2.4 The narrative paradigm and „narrative rationality‟:  the contribution 
of Walter Fisher 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre, for whom narratives prefigure but do not determine lived 
experience, has proposed the notion of the “story-telling animal” (MacIntyre 1981 
p.201), and offered a supporting ontological characterisation of human action in 
which "enacted dramatic narrative is the basic and essential genre for the 
characterisation of human actions" (MacIntyre 1981, p. 194).   
 
This inspired Fisher (1987) to propose the case for homo narrans, who both 
embodies and enacts a narrative paradigm.  This narrative paradigm is itself 
informed by Fisher‟s concept of narrative rationality.  In this ontological but non-
dualistic (Descartes) or differentialist (Derrida) rationality, human communication 
is “rational when stories satisfy the demands of narrative probability and narrative 
fidelity" (Fisher 1987, p. 58).  
 
Paraphrasing Fisher, his essential postulates for narrative rationality are that while 
humans are, in their very essence, storytellers, human decision-making and 
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communication are predicated upon “good reasons”.  Fisher glosses these good 
reasons as “values or value-laden warrants for believing or acting in certain ways” 
(Fisher 1987, p. xi). These change according to situation and the communication 
medium chosen, as well as according to genre.   
 
However, there‟s a story within this story:  “good reasons” are deemed to be such 
through historical, biographical, cultural and psychological criteria.  Intrinsically, 
determiners of “good reasons” live in awareness of narrative probability: they 
have knowledge of what is a coherent story. We have referred to coherence above.  
Determiners of “good reasons” constantly test narrative fidelity, to see whether 
experience chimes with their lived experience.  Finally, the knowable world is 
constituted of stories among which it is necessary to choose in order to constantly 
re-create that world (Fisher 1987, p.5)  
 
Fisher counterposed his narrative rationality to “classical” or “world rationality”, 
characterised as follows (paraphrasing Fisher 1987, pp. 59-60).  First and 
foremost, humans are essentially „rational‟ beings whose paradigm for decision-
making and communications is the argument; that is, a discourse with clear-cut 
inferential or implicative structures.  There, situation determines the conduct of 
argument – be it legal, scientific, legislative or public.  “World” rationality calls 
upon argumentative ability operating upon subject-matter knowledge, and 
advocacy skills in the given fields; and in its argumentative structure, this 
„rationality‟ serves to solve the set of logical puzzles which is the world.  In 
Fisher‟s view of “world rationality”,  
argument as product and process is the means of being human, the agency 
of all that humans can know and realize in achieving their telos... The 
philosophical ground of the rational-world paradigm is epistemology 
(Fisher 1987, pp. 59-60). 
 
However Fisher is careful to explain that, whilst world rationality lacks his 
proposed homo narrans dimension, the reverse is not true.  Thus, narrative 
rationality embraces world rationality – and notably, its „scientific‟ stories and 
arguments.   This one-directionality is reflected in the way Fisher construes the 
narrative paradigm in non-constructivist terms, rather than anti-constructivist 
ones.  The narrative paradigm subsumes all others, notably in its search for the 
48 
value of values which are neither „field invariant‟ (Fisher 1987, p. 114), as in the 
analytical sciences, nor the hierarchical values of arguers and measurers, but 
internalised criteria for humane, meaningful action in the world.  
 
White (1980) is used to further undergird this precedence:  
 
Narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which 
transcultural messages about the shared reality can be transmitted ... the 
absence of narrative capacity or a refusal of narrative indicates an absence 
or refusal of meaning itself (White 1980, quoted by Fisher 1987, p. 65).  
 
Fisher expands:  
 
The narrative paradigm stresses ontology rather than epistemology, which 
is not to say that knowledge does not exist but that it does not have an 
absolute foundation in ordinary discourse.  The subject of such discourse 
is symbolic action that creates social reality (Fisher 1987, p. 93). 
 
Fisher asserts that for proponents of narrative rationality, the world is constituted 
not of arguers, as Perelman (1979) and later Habermas (1984) contend, but of 
storytellers: 
 
[Habermas] conceives rationality as grounded in the presuppositions of 
speech, specifically argumentative interactions [...] he reserves rationality 
for argumentation, "that type of speech in which participants thematize 
contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through 
argument. An argument contains reasons or grounds that are connected in 
a systematic way with the validity claim of a problematic expression" 
(Fisher 1987, p. 91, quoting Habermas 1984, p. 18; original emphasis).  
 
Fisher eschews the positivist version of validation in story-telling.  Indeed, he has 
already disparaged the positivism inherent in structuralist „narratology‟, which he 
finds both ontologically and teleologically void: 
 
 Narratology, [...] the "scientific" study of narrative discourse [...] 
advanced by writers such as Greimas, Todorov, Genette, Barthes... what 
takes place in the narrative forms is literally nothing - what happens is 
language alone (Fisher 1987, p. 90). 
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Fisher reinforces his ontological take on narrative by citing Booth (1974) on 
interanimacy questions and social reality:  "Not only do human beings 
successfully infer other beings' states of mind from symbolic clues; we know that 
they characteristically, in all societies, build each others' minds” (Booth 1974, p. 
114).  In the present study, these conceptions may have explanatory power when 
we consider dyslexics in the Institution and indeed, their potential exclusion from 
it through a failure to have their story heard, and/or to participate in the 
institutional narrative, or indeed wider ones. This is a narratological axis to which 
we will return in discussing Battersby‟s dialectical extension of Strawson, but also 
in a later discussion of inclusion within and exclusion from group-generated 
learning. 
 
Returning to Fisher, it is values, and the encoding and accessing of these, which 
explain how the narrative paradigm determines narrative rationality – and praxis 
itself.  “The role of values in constituting truth, knowledge or even reality has 
been generally denied”, he claims, and stresses that “values function in 
constituting all that we consider knowledge” (Fisher 1987, p. xi).  The ontological 
focus of the paradigm he advocates is once again stressed: "The narrative 
paradigm advances the idea that good communication is good by virtue of its 
satisfying the requirements of narrative rationality, namely, that it offers a 
reliable, trustworthy, and desirable guide to belief and action" (Fisher, p. 95).  We 
may read this „validation‟ as non-, rather than anti-, positivist.  We also note that 
Fisher proposes a triangulated and again, coherentist view of the „validity‟ of his 
narrative rationality thesis, explicitly linking narrative rationality, “good reasons”, 
and phronesis:   
Aristotle‟s view of phronesis [...] recognised contingency in the social 
world, the particularities of practical existence, and the possibility of 
wisdom [...] It is a constituent of the narrative paradigm.  Good reasons 
express practical wisdom [...] making it possible that principles of decision 
or action can be generalized” (Fisher, p. 94). 
 
I will take forward Fisher‟s statements on narrative, values and “good reasons” 
into my analysis of the „fit‟ between the stories around dyslexia told in our study 
by considering phronesis under a separate heading.  However, Fisher extends and 
adapts Aristotle‟s conception of it:   
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The narrative paradigm - with its associated concept of narrative 
rationality ... seeks to account for how persons come to believe and behave 
... a theory of human communication that encompasses ... the practical 
wisdom of all persons. (Fisher, p. 98; original emphasis).   
 
Fisher‟s “all persons” above squares well with Gadamer, whom he cites: 
 
The process of communication is not mere action, a purposeful activity, a 
setting-up of signs, through which I transmit my will to others ... it is a 
living process in which a community of life is lived out. (Gadamer 1982, 
cited in Fisher 1987, p. 95). 
 
Later, in further discussion of phronesis, I consider writing from Flyvbjerg on the 
links between knowledge, professional knowledge, and phronesis.  But in 
describing the ontological nature of narrative rationality, Fisher triangulates 
phronesis with both praxis and practices.  Fisher‟s “all persons”, above, echoed in 
Gadamer‟s “community of life”, reappears in Bernstein (1983), whom Fisher cites 
because he wants "to try again and again to foster and nurture those forms of 
communal life in which dialogue, conversation, phronesis, practical discourse, 
and judgement are concretely embodied in our everyday practices" (Bernstein 
1983, cited in Fisher 1987, p. 94).   
 
2.5 Issues in narrativity II:   identity, agency, and the narrator narrated:  
Battersby‟s discussion of Strawson 
 
I wish to pursue the concept of „narrator/narratee‟ along another axis. Battersby 
(2006) revisits Strawson (2004), who attacked proponents of the Narrative 
Identity Thesis, notably Sacks (1985), Taylor (1989), Bruner (1994), Schechtman 
(1997), and Phelan (2005).  Notably, Strawson attacked the “prevailing 
Diachronic approach to self-experience, in which the self, considered as a self, is 
understood to persist in time from the past into the future” (Battersby 2006, p. 27).  
Strawson proposed a return to non-narrative approaches and notably, „episodic‟ 
ones, which I characterise further below.  Phelan (2005, in Battersby) had 
proposed a synthesis and the term „multiple‟ rather than „diachronic‟ or „episodic‟, 
51 
however Battersby notes that Strawson had twin targets in the diachronicist camp, 
to wit:   
 
those who endorse both the descriptive “psychological narrativity thesis” 
(each of us “constructs and lives a narrative” that is our identity) and the 
normative “ethical narrativity thesis” (constructing and living life as a 
narrative is good, something we ought to do) (Battersby 2006,  p. 28).  
 
Battersby is dismissive (on the grounds of „obviousness‟, in the technical sense of 
obviating discussion) of the distinction made by Strawson between „holistic‟ self-
views and „inner self‟ views, thus between: 
 
oneself when one considers “oneself principally as a human being taken as 
a whole”, and the “experience of oneself when one considers oneself 
principally as an inner mental activity or „self‟ of some sort” (Strawson in 
Battersby 2006, p. 28).   
 
However, Battersby usefully isolates, refines and extends Strawson‟s view of the 
diachronic/episodic polarity thus:   
 
Implicit in the Diachronic personality‟s attachment to continuity of self 
[...] there would seem to be a tendency to adopt a narrative mode of self-
representation, just as implicit in the Episodic personality‟s commitment to 
a kind of punctuated-equilibrium conception of the self [...] not there 
yesterday, but here today and gone tomorrow, there would seem to be a 
tendency to [...] adopt a non-narrative mode of self-representation (if any). 
(Battersby, p. 29) 
 
He adds: 
 
It turns out that just a there can be Diachronic and Episodic individuals, so 
there can be Diachronic and Episodic cultures (ibid.). 
 
Battersby concludes by stating that there are  
 
many truths we can tell [...] about selves, and many ways of telling them 
but [...] the whole truth is, unfortunately, a chaotic mess of stuff belonging 
to a massive number of incompatible categories that simply cannot be 
brought under the control of a single discursive taskmaster. (Battersby, p. 
43). 
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My purpose here is not to isolate any such „single discursive taskmaster‟, or revel 
in Battersby‟s gloom; however I will return to the apparent narratological schism 
between „diachronic‟ and „episodic‟ self-narrators. A „diachronic‟ individual lost 
in an „episodic‟ culture may be an informing metaphor when we assess the „fit‟ 
between the narratives of dyslexic learners and the narratives of various 
institutional agents in the research presented here.  Phelan (2005)‟s concept of 
“narrative imperialism” may also prove to have explanatory power in deciding 
whether and to what extent the institutional dyslexic students studied are 
„narrators‟ or „narrated‟;  and the effects of these positions on their agency and 
learning.  I return to these issues in my closing Chapter 5. 
 
2.6 Aspects of professional knowledge 
 
Here, I continue to assess commonalities and differences in certain concepts 
which are material to my study, notably phronesis, forms of tacit knowledge, and 
other issues in professional knowledge, and use those raised by Flyvbjerg and by 
Eraut in different professional contexts as heuristics.  
 
2.6.1 Phronesis and phronetic research 
 
 I referred to the Aristotelian notion of phronesis in an earlier discussion of Fisher 
(1987) and Bernstein (1983).  Aristotle‟s Nicomachean Ethics describes phronesis 
as an intellectual virtue “that is reasoned, and capable of action with regard to 
things that are good or bad for man” (NE 1140a24-b12, 1144b33-1145a11).  The 
pre-eminence accorded to phronesis among the virtues (“the possession of the 
single virtue of [phronesis] will carry with it the possession of them all”) long 
prefigured Fisher‟s pre-eminence of narrative over world rationality.  But here, I 
first analyse the needs for, and dangers of, phronesis, together with some 
proposals for and examples of a phronetic approach to professional knowledge.   
 
2.6.2 The need for phronetic working 
 
In exploring avenues for assessing the „fit‟ between types of knowledge, and 
notably here forms of professional knowledge, it is not always the case that a 
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researcher is assembling quantities of facts so that their underlying laws can 
become known.  This would presuppose that there should be underlying laws, that 
they do exist, that they are amenable to discovery, and that this is somehow the 
business of educational research into human subjects.  Nor may „scientistic‟ 
approaches which rely on hard positivist and reductionist procedures, always be 
advisable.  Indeed, deification of means over ends, supposed „objectivity‟, and 
requirements for replicability, generalisability and a predictive focus may occlude 
more than they illuminate, certainly in human affairs.   
 
The „dichotomy‟ between quantitative and qualitative working has long been 
dissolved (Schofield 1990). Even when dealing with the everyday and the 
commonsensical, ascribing explanatory and predictive powers to purely inductive 
procedures such as Peirce‟s „abduction‟ (Peirce 1960) and Harman‟s „inference to 
the best explanation‟ (Harman 1965) may prove antihumanistic, even if they seem 
intuitive:  human beings are not always entities that can be aggregated, nor are 
they endowed with dependent and independent variables that are so clear-cut that 
they can be mechanistically reduced.  Inducing central human essences from a set 
of human phenomena would require me to assert that complex systems can be 
understood by reduction to their components. My data here witness not only to the 
complexity of individuals, but to the sheer variability between them, notoriously 
even among the „institutional dyslexics‟12. 
 
2.6.3 Phronesis in professional contexts:  the contributions of Flyvbjerg and 
Eraut 
 
Having made this case, I now consider authors who have explored means of 
isolating and describing knowledge in the professional context.  I will return, in 
discussing Eraut and later, in my conclusions, to the appeal Flyvbjerg makes to 
Dreyfus (1982) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) in this area.  But writing within 
the domain of professional planning, Bent Flyvbjerg both elucidates and extends 
the term „phronesis‟ towards a contemporary translation of  “practical wisdom, 
                                            
12 Though useful and telling, the term „students identified as dyslexic‟ which Pollak (2005) uses in 
his book title is not adopted here, but only because my own term is imported from the earlier 
work. 
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practical judgement, common sense, or prudence” (Flyvbjerg 2004, p. 284).  He 
extends it by removing it from Habermas‟ „argumentative‟ (see earlier) and post-
metaphysical (Cooke, 1994) contexts of communicative rationality with their 
implicit, intuitively-mastered rules.  Instead, Flyvbjerg focuses on the power 
sources and power lines involved in deciding what phronesis is, aligning this take 
on phronesis with the writings on power of Machiavelli, Nietzsche and Foucault.  
In the latter case, Flyvbjerg (2004, p. 296) cites Foucault‟s axiom that “discourse 
isn‟t life; regular daily practice is life” (Foucault 1981 p. 5; 1991 p.72).  He does 
this to justify attention to „little things‟ (Flyvbjerg 2004, p. 295), micropractices, 
in a process akin to Geertz‟ “thick description” (Geertz 1973, p. 6). 
 
Flyvbjerg (2004) alluded to a basic tenet of phronetic planning research when he 
stated that “practical examples are typically more effective vehicles of 
communication than are discussions of theory and methodology” (Flyvbjerg 2004, 
p. 283).  He continued by explaining the apparent paradox whereby a researcher 
can end up “arguing theoretically for a methodology which emphasises practice” 
(ibid.).  He stated that one of the basic questions of phronetic research must be “to 
provide concrete examples and detailed narratives of the ways in which power and 
values work […] and with what consequences to whom, and to suggest how 
relations of power and values could be changed to work with other consequences” 
[Flyvbjerg 2004, p.320].  Despite Flyvbjerg‟s caution that in the Planning context, 
such research “is also not about, nor does it try to develop, theory or universal 
method” [ibid], the present study will not eschew theory, nor lose interest in the 
normative or the utopian, but will entail an analysis of the relative position and 
power of the diverse players – the teachers, the students, the teacher/managers, the 
students‟ helpers – and it will also be necessary to attend to the expressed needs of 
each of the parties concerned.  This analysis, clarification, critiquing and 
generating new perspectives has an epistemological as well as an ontological 
outcome:  to produce further knowledge, and to suggest action. 
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2.6.4 The phronetic locus 
 
A phronetic approach regarding the pragmatics of teaching foreign languages to 
dyslexic students is therefore one which studies how matters are done, practically, 
on the ground.  But in the planning area, Flyvbjerg offers three cautions:   
 
The result of phronetic planning research is a pragmatically governed 
interpretation of the studied planning practices.  The interpretation does 
not require the researcher to agree with the actors‟ everyday 
understanding; nor does it require the discovery of some deep, inner 
leaning of the practices.  Phronetic planning practice research is in this 
way interpretive, but it is neither everyday nor deep hermeneutics.  
Phronetic Planning Research is also not about, nor does it develop, theory 
or universal method (Flyvbjerg 2004, p. 302).  
 
Thus, phronetic planning research is indeed an analytical project, but not a 
theoretical or methodological one.  We will take this as meaning that in intent, 
phronetic research is indeed interpretive; but not teleological.  Secondly, 
Flyvbjerg stresses that  
 
“Phronetic planning research may be practiced in ways other than those 
described here, as long as they effectively deal with deliberation, 
judgement, and praxis in relation to power and values, and as long as they 
answer the four value-rational questions at the core of phronesis; (1) 
Where are we going with planning; (2) who gains and who loses, and by 
which mechanisms of power?  (3) Is this development desirable?  (4) 
What, if anything, should we do about it?” (Ibid). 
 
Importantly, Flyvbjerg states in his worked example (Flyvbjerg 2002, p. 353), that 
the phronetic take is not simply one related to “the inevitable question of power”, 
for it seeks to elucidate the values involved in decision-making.  Phronesis, for 
Flyvbjerg, goes beyond the analytical and scientific knowledge of episteme and 
the know-how knowledge of techne to include what Vickers has described as the 
art of judgement where, signally, “the mental activity and the social process are 
indissoluble” (Vickers 1995, p. 15). For knowledge to be rational and not simply 
incidental, the first principles of the conditioned beliefs of episteme and techne are 
as known as the conclusions drawn from them.  Thus, phronesis is all the more 
important because it is that activity by which instrumental rationality is balanced 
by value-rationality (Weber 1978; but see also Oakes 2003), a rationality which 
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sits well alongside the narrative rationality of Fisher (1987) that we commented 
earlier.   Flyvbjerg‟s injunction then is to “problematise taken-for-granted truths” 
in developing “the craft of situated, contextualised research about planning 
practices and the power relations which define such practices” (Flyvbjerg 2004, p. 
302). 
 
My interest here is in in Flyvbjerg‟s „power relations‟, and whether and to what 
extent such power relations may affect the interplaying streams of knowledge to 
which dyslexic modern language learners are exposed.  Of equal interest is 
Halverson‟s “phronetic eye” for action (Halverson 2004, p. 92), and like him I 
wish to steer its focus away from simply “what works” to “how best” to use 
phronetic knowledge amongst other „knowledges‟ to which dyslexic language 
learners are exposed in the institution.  These notions inform many of my 
concluding suggestions in the final chapter. 
 
2.6.5 Tacit knowledge 
 
I have discussed the notion of phronesis; but can this be compared to professional 
„tacit‟ knowledge?  And to what extent do the „automaticities‟ involved in 
professional „tacit‟ knowledge impinge on expected, or failed, automaticity in 
language learning?   
 
I will also turn, in a later section, to the allied notion of „implicit learning‟.  
Implicit learning holds an interest for this study in terms of its effect on future 
behaviour.  Theorists including Reber (1993) propose that such „future effects‟ 
can only be explained as resulting from the accumulated experience of several 
episodes, rather than that of a single event, implying that some selection of lived 
experience has previously entered long-term memory, albeit not as part of a 
conscious, deliberate process. 
 
My data here was be screened to find whether, and to what extent, there is 
evidence that tacit knowledge of practitioners (managers, advisors) conflicts with 
implicit learning by students, notably dyslexic ones.  At narratological level, 
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students‟ accounts were examined for commonalities in such implicit learning, 
and what were the consequences in terms of the agency of the various actors. 
 
Eraut (2000) discusses the idea of „tacit‟ knowledge and retraces its roots, 
realigning possible co-synonyms reviewed in Spender (1998).  Eraut‟s focus is the 
interplay between public, propositional knowledge, and personal versions of this.  
The personal, available for use, version of the public/propositional will have been 
conditioned by this personal use, which may have been across one or several 
contexts and have necessitated integrating other knowledge which was itself both 
public and personal.  Hence, tacit knowledge has been generated, which has been 
publicly as well as personally sourced.  The dialectic of the reciprocal interactions 
between personal and public or group or collective mind (Durkheim 1964, 1970, 
Halbwachs 1992, Weick and Roberts 1993) is not discussed here. 
 
The interplay between implicit learning, tacit knowledge and reactive learning 
was, however, of interest to my study. The concept of „tacit‟ knowledge is 
difficult for researchers because its making explicit is often interpreted as 
requiring reduction to propositional „findings‟.  This may not only constrain the 
researcher into positivist avenues but once decontextualised, propositional 
findings can turn into uncritical orthodoxies. Vigilant use of the term „tacit‟ is 
needed, for it presents numerous dichotomies and presuppositions, some of which 
are discussed below.  Finally, over and above mere conflicts in status, role and 
function between, say, teachers, teacher-managers, work colleagues, and learners, 
the exporting tacit knowledge or learning across professional contexts and 
boundaries involving „tacit‟ understandings of people and situations and „tacit‟ 
rules underpinning intuitive decision-making may well generate conflicts in tacit 
knowledge. Not all actors in a learning environment may be powerful enough to 
face such conflicts or their consequences. 
 
So, conversely, the „tacit‟ notion is of direct interest to my „coherentist‟ narrative 
analysis. As Eraut - recalling dichotomies explored by Oakeshott (1962) and 
Argyris and Schön (1974) – reminds us, “The central problem for most managers 
and professionals is that they are intellectually and emotionally committed to 
espoused theories which describe the world as they would like it to be, but which 
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do not accurately describe their own actions” (Eraut 2000, p. 123).  Hence, the 
interplay between such a form of dissonance and questions of automaticity or its 
non-development or its loss in dyslexic language learners is relevant to my study. 
 
 
2.6.6 Dichotomies and problems in „tacit‟ knowledge 
 
In earlier writing, Eraut (1994, p. 66) cites Buchler (1961) on Bentham‟s concept 
of a „tacit faculty‟ to draw out a certain dualism.   „Tacit‟ can mean two things.  
One is knowing what to do in certain circumstances:  it is „anticipatory‟ in 
adapting from as repertoire of possible actions. The other is dealing with the 
„unanticipated‟ or unexpected.   
 
Buchler‟s dichotomy was followed by Polanyi‟s 1962 distinction between 
“objective and tacit knowledge”.  Polanyi‟s subsequent and oft-cited reference to 
“that which we know but cannot tell” (Polanyi 1967, p. 4), explores a distinction 
not based on activity but on communicability of knowledge.  Anderson (1983) 
and Singley and Anderson (1989), in contrast, would later identify the interplay 
between „declarative‟ and „procedural‟ knowledge.  Spender (1998) problematises 
Polanyi‟s communicability criterion in identifying „tacit‟ knowledge in that “we 
can neither know about nor really be much interested in that which cannot be 
communicated” (Spender 1998, p.23), though tacit knowledge is referred to in 
terms of difficulty, not impossibility. 
 
Eraut (2000) explores tacit knowledge further, problematising it both in its 
detection and its representation.  Proposing three types of tacit knowledge (tacit 
understanding of people and situations; routinised actions; and the tacit rules that 
underpin intuitive decision-making), he isolates four types of process - reading the 
situation, making decisions, overt activity and metacognition.  In his analysis, 
three modes of cognition – intuitive, analytic and deliberative – underlie these 
processes.  Tacit knowledge is derived, Eraut proposes, from “ non-formal 
learning […] which incorporates implicit learning that gives rise to tacit 
knowledge, as well as reactive learning which is near-spontaneous and unplanned, 
and deliberative learning for which time is set aside” (Eraut 2000, p. 115).   
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Citing Spender‟s view that tacit knowledge should be defined as „that which has 
not yet been abstracted from practice‟, Eraut adopts Spender‟s distinction between 
tacit understanding and tacit knowledge in action.  (Spender 1996
13
, in Eraut 
2000, p. 119). I discuss abstraction and Dreyfus (1982) in Chapter 5, but after 
abstraction and practice, another dichotomy arises between “what one knows 
consciously and what one might know in some other way that can only 
demonstrate through practice” (Eraut 2000, p. 23).   
 
Eraut also proposes that the „unconscious effects of previous experiences‟ (Eraut 
2000, p. 116) may be a bar to implicit learning, and the „empirical‟14 data here 
will confirm that to the respondents, previous experience is influent.  Conversely, 
Eraut‟s notion of „reactive learning‟ may be of interest in questions of 
automaticity and, as we shall see later with Spender, de-automation of learning.  
Eraut describes „reactive learning‟ thus:   
 
This reactive learning is near-spontaneous and unplanned, the learner is 
aware of it but the level of intentionality will vary and often be debatable. 
Its articulation in explicit form could also be difficult without setting aside 
time for more reflection and thus becoming deliberative (Eraut 2000, 
p.115; original emphasis). 
 
I will consider later whether successful dyslexics are, strategically, using 
something akin to Eraut‟s reactive learning, even where explicit or indeed, 
implicit learning is unavailable. 
 
2.6.7 Tacitness, implicitness and automaticity 
 
Further, in my discussion of automaticity, I would contrast Reber‟s (1993) 
expression “the acquisition of knowledge independently of conscious attempts to 
learn” (Reber 1993 in Eraut 2000, p. 115) with Eraut‟s „near-spontaneous and 
unplanned‟ description of his „reactive learning‟ (Eraut, ibid).  Though with Eraut 
we are with workplace (and therefore situated) learning, and the dialectical 
                                            
13 Eraut gives this as Spender (1995). 
14 In a post-positivist sense of „empirical‟, where interview „data‟ were used to allow the interplay 
between narratives to emerge. 
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relationship which holds between individual and social learning, his subsequent 
discussion of cognitive matters is informative.  He uses the Dreyfus and Dreyfus 
(1986) model of skill acquisition and notably, their table of levels.  At its peak, 
“deep tacit understanding” is given as the basis for “intuitive grasp of situations” 
which in turn marks  
 
later abandonment of explicit rules and guidelines as behaviour becomes 
more automatic […] Progression beyond competence is then associated 
with the gradual replacement of deliberation by more intuitive forms of 
cognition (Eraut 2000, p. 126;  emphasis added).   
 
This leads to explicit procedural knowledge becoming 
 
automised [sic] and increasingly tacit through repetition” (op. cit, p.127), 
[with] “increasingly intuitive decision-making […] based on the tacit 
application of tacit rules” [where] “their distinctive feature is that of being 
tacit at the moment of use (ibid;  original emphasis). 
 
The situatedness of learning is a very relevant concept because, if any piece of 
knowledge is situated in a particular context, it is comprised not only of a location 
but also a set of  (social) activities.  If it contributes to and/or is embedded in a set 
of social relations which engender those activities,  the cognizing and learning are 
then a social process which is, in part, outside the head of any particular 
individual.  Such distributive cognition can be witnessed in the language 
classroom as well as in the workplace.  But there is a double marginalisation here. 
Cognition is depersonalised, but the dyslexic is also marginalised, owing to the 
language difficulty and further so, when she undertakes to study another language. 
 
2.6.8  Other difficulties with the „tacit‟ concept 
 
Thus far, I have identified two reservations with the term „tacit‟, one ontological 
and one methodological; however I can distil several more: 
 Epistemologically, „tacit knowledge‟ may equally refer to knowledge 
which is not communicated, and knowledge which cannot be 
communicated and further, be variously an attribute of knower (and some 
cannot communicate their knowledge; indeed, Eraut et al. (1998) found 
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that the capability to tell was linked to people‟s prior experiences of 
talking about what they knew) or an attribute of the thing known. 
 There is a range of partial descriptions available:  glimpses, insights, 
perspectives, and “what many might regard as a reasonable, though not 
complete, representation of the whole” (Eraut 2000, p. 118). 
 The relative agency of researcher and knower:  “[making tacit knowledge 
explicit] can mean either that the knower learns to tell or that the 
researcher tells and then seeks respondent verification” (ibid.). 
 There are discourse-level concerns with explicit (that is, „apparently‟ non-
tacit) forms of discourse which nonetheless tacitly include latent messages 
of authority, orthodoxy, or competence, or are in defence of practices or of 
the status quo. 
 The owner of tacit knowledge may have no conscious awareness or 
memories of episodes which may have combined to form the tacit 
knowledge base; and accessing such memories may trigger the secondary 
effects already discussed elsewhere.  
 Eraut is cautious of invading “the taken-for-granted world of the knower, 
their social reality” (Eraut 2000, p. 122), warning that knowledge privacy 
of the implicit theorist provides protection from criticism and escape from 
the influence of more explicit, public theories. The implicit is, for some, a 
refuge. 
 
2.6.9 Implicit learning 
 
So much for tacit knowledge.  I still needed to distinguish more concisely between 
tacit knowledge and implicit learning.  Horvath et al. describe implicit learning as 
“the direct influence of event knowledge in episodic memory on behaviour – 
influence that is not mediated by the generalised knowledge representations in 
semantic memory” (Horvath et al. 1996, p. 8).  On the other hand, tacit knowledge 
is inferred from the nature of the observed behaviour.  Like tacit knowledge, 
implicit learning cannot necessarily make itself explicit, except through induction 
or abstraction by others.  It takes time to observe and entails known observational 
phenomena, not least the observer‟s paradox.  Once again, items of non-explicit 
62 
learning are unlikely to be consciously recalled unless there was an unusually 
dramatic outcome, and returning to it may prove psychologically traumatic. 
 
 
2.7 Automaticity revisited 
 
To my discussion of „automaticity‟ derived from theories of language acquisition 
and from my discussion of the sense of „proficiency‟, I shall now  add further 
views of what „automaticity‟ entails, derived from writings on „professional 
knowledge‟.  It could be argued that these views stem from disparate knowledge-
areas and that the list is shorter than the review of automaticity and second 
language acquisition given in Segalowitz (2003).  But it is precisely these 
definitional interstices which are of interest here, rather than Segalowitz‟ own 
admission that “research on automaticity in grammar acquisition does not provide 
a tidy picture” (Segalowitz 2003, p. 400).  
 
In workplace terms, Eraut reminds us that “Routinisation turns explicit procedural 
knowledge into tacit knowledge through repetition” (Eraut 2000, p. 123, my 
emphasis).  Here, automation equates to non-deliberation:   tacit knowledge is 
implicit knowledge embedded in action. But if the organisation or teaching 
institution‟s memory is encoded by routines and learned by doing, some routines 
may, by their powerfulness, cut across learners‟ attempts towards their own 
„automaticity‟ qua exponential learning. 
 
Eraut adopts Spender‟s (1998) typology of individual and social modes of 
cognition and, under „individual‟ and „social‟ columns, lists learning modes in 
explicit learning and in implicit learning.  Under individual / implicit are the 
entries automatic (as opposed to collective) and intuitive (as opposed to cultural).  
Looking further into Spender, we find that „automatic‟ here is in fact glossed as 
the antonym of „conscious‟.  (The term „unconscious‟ is properly avoided because 
of its physiological and psychoanalytical associations). 
 
Automaticity can also be glossed as „mindlessness‟. Reber defines implicit 
learning as the “acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely independently 
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of conscious attempts to learn and in the absence of explicit knowledge about 
what was learned” (Reber 1993, p.5; emphasis added) and in doing so, he appeals 
to Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi‟s 1988 concept of „flow‟. This 
proposed that implicit learners make correct choices, but using knowledge they 
weren‟t aware they possessed – and thus again, „automatically‟.  Indeed, Spender 
cites Reber‟s recasting of „judgement‟, already a synonym for the phronesis which 
I considered earlier:  
 
“Rather than use the term judgement, which is used in so many other 
senses, we might employ the term „automatic‟ to identify the individual‟s 
ability to recognise, to choose, and to perform when „mindless‟ or in a 
state of „flow‟”(Spender 1998, p. 26). 
 
Again, my data will show that dyslexic modern language students may have 
intrinsic linguistic-cognitive difficulties, for example with rule-formation; or 
whether entering a state of “flow” is impossible for them, a-priori; or whether 
entering this state causes their language facility to „crash‟, in IT parlance; or 
combinations of the above. 
 
Automaticity also suffers from the fact that in certain areas of knowledge, 
learning is a metaphor for adaptation.  Adaptation is often viewed, particularly in 
phylogenetic contexts, as “improvement” on a lower or more basic state – where 
responses are „automatic‟ and induced by stimuli outside the organism.  
Decorticated frogs, indeed, can still „automatically‟ perform certain functions.  
Reber proposes that this automaticity cedes its place to “a self-referencing 
consciousness which is able to view and model itself and so „think‟ in the 
contemporary sense” (Reber 1993, in Spender 1998, p. 28). The supplanted 
„automaticity‟ was, instead, other-focused and non-thinking. 
 
Lastly, automation and de-automation reside, for Tharp and Gallimore (1988), 
within recursive cycles between the two last of their „Four Stages of Learning‟.  
De-automation is a temporary de-skilling of the child between Stage 3 – 
internalisation and control of Stages 1 and 2 to the point of automaticity, but 
embedded in a meaningful social activity – and Stage 4.  When this activity 
changes in Stage 4, following crises or the introduction of new contexts, de-
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automation back down from self-regulation towards self-control of others‟ goals 
may ensue.  Though Tharp and Gallimore‟s work on Vygotsky‟s dialectical ZPD, 
or zone of proximal development,  is intuitively transferable to adult learning and 
indeed, language-learning (notably in terms of temporary „backsliding‟), this de-
automation may not simply be catastrophic in itself, to a student who has already 
endured it in L1 acquisition. For a dyslexic second language learner, further de-
automation may be cauterising.  “Balkanized” (Hargreaves 1994, p. 213) 
university language teaching situations
15
 and discontinuities or slippage between 
child and adult disability „statementing‟ may provide ideal loci for such de-
automation.  The data will provide cases in point. 
 
In conclusion, this short review of writing on these aspects of professional 
knowledge has served to highlight assumptions and practices which may intersect 
negatively with the objectives of some consumers of that knowledge – including 
dyslexic second language learners.  For each emerging „autonomous but 
socialized‟ member of an institution – a teacher, a manager, an advisor – who has 
a stake in and contributions to make to its discourse fields and community of 
practice with „unassisted self-control and regulation‟, there will be a number of 
learners  for whom assumptions concerning the acquisition of „automaticity‟ (and 
hence proficiency) will be negative. 
 
Conversely, as not all dyslexic language learners are fated to failure, some „tacit‟ 
or „implicit‟ concepts such as „reactive learning‟ may prove to be both germane 
and expressed by the respondents. 
 
What evidence to this effect exists in the narratives collected in this study will be 
returned to in Chapter 4, where I analyse my interview data.  But first, I turn from 
these questions of narration and professional knowledge to further theoretical and 
contextual issues regarding dyslexia, proficiency, automaticity and second 
language teaching, as heralded in Chapter 1. 
 
                                            
15 Hargreaves (1994) refers of course to balkanisation between subject areas; however the posting 
of foreign-language teaching to language centres with an EFL-dominated and commercial ethos 
may also justify the epithet. 
65 
Chapter 3 – „Communicative language teaching‟ (CLT) and its theorisation 
 
I noted in Chapter 1 – the Reprise on the CAS Study – that I would return to 
concepts of automaticity and exponentiality as they relate to dyslexic subjects, 
specifically regarding the acquisition of modern languages.  This chapter therefore 
concentrates on key issues and dates in a process which brought about the present 
vogue for „communicative language teaching‟ as practised in the institution under 
consideration.   
 
Central to this discussion must be the underlying assumptions that 
„communicative language teaching‟ exists, and that it leads to learning.  Another 
further relevant issue, and one with which we shall begin, is how and to what 
extent „acquiring‟ a language relates to „learning‟ that language. Far from the 
simplistic but highly pervasive gloss of „communicate successfully and learn 
automatically‟, and to illustrate the conceptual range in the field of 
„communicative‟ language teaching we may compare, here, Munby‟s highly 
operationalised 1978 model of Participant, Purposive Domain, Setting, 
Interaction, Instrumentality, Dialect, Target Level, Communicative Event, 
Communicative Key and Attitude-Tone Index, from which a „communicative‟ 
syllabus can be derived, with Norman, Levinh and  Hendequist (1986) and their 
concern that their „communicative‟ language teaching methodology “stresses, 
more than other books of a similar kind, student participation, creativity, students 
producing their own materials, fun and games, and subconscious language 
acquisition (Norman et al. 1986, p. 3; emphasis added).  Both poles rest upon the 
assumption of „subconscious‟ acquisition – one synonym for the „automaticity‟ I 
discuss here. But Norman et al. (1986) have clear implications for agency in 
learning, and its relationship with automaticity. 
 
Indeed, I referred in Chapter 1 to some dyslexia-related accounts of automaticity, 
including the Nicholson and Fawcett (1990) hypotheses of DAD and CC – 
“dyslexia automization deficit” and “conscious compensation”.  For what is to 
follow, we can expand general discussion of automaticity with Segalowitz (2003), 
who cites Newell (1990) in characterising automaticity thus:   
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it is fast; it is unstoppable (ballistic); it is independent of the amount of 
information being processed; it involves exhaustive or complete search of 
all the elements [...]; it involves no awareness of processing [...] In 
contrast, non-automatic processing, also called controlled processing, is 
characterised as [...] slow, it is capable of being inhibited; it depends on 
information load; [...] it involves awareness (Segalowitz 2003, p. 384, 
citing Newell 1990, p. 236). 
 
To clarify some assumptions and theoretical conflations underlying 
communicative language teaching, I review some key sources here.   
 
3.1 Learning and acquisition – a brief review 
 
Much of the relevant literature is couched in terms of the relative precedence of 
cognition and language, and their independence or indeed, interdependence.  Is 
cognitive development a precursor for the development of language and if so, a 
necessary and sufficient one?  Or conversely, does possession of an innate 
capacity for language characterise human development and spur cognition? 
Garton (1992) proposed a dualism.  There is a choice to be made between sources 
of knowledge in the child:  it may be innate, including language knowledge; or it 
may be social in origin – acquired from parents, siblings and peers.  A third view 
will be that there is a mixture of influences at work, and I return below to the less 
nativist, more interactionist ideas proposed for example by Jerome Bruner, Jean 
Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, and Michael Halliday.  Self-evidently, an „unexceptional‟ 
adult is already socialised to some extent, and in at least one language. 
 
3.1.2– Automaticity - an early glimpse:  Noam Chomsky 
 
For all that Noam Chomsky has gradually stepped away from it in favour of 
parameter-setting models (Chomsky 1981), his 1965 notion of a LAD or language 
acquisition device has become something of a cause célèbre, and maintained a 
half-life beyond its years by becoming transposed into aspects of AL2 or adult 
second language learning theory.  Originally concerned with the development of 
an innate and universal grammar for language, the innateness question has come 
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to be stressed at the expense of universality.  Whereas universality of the process 
and the existence of key language-development stages were the features which led 
Chomsky to conceive of the language acquisition device – a set of rules used by 
children to process linguistic inputs and hypothesise and trial the rules of their 
mother tongue - other factors came to predominate, especially in the later 
mapping of this process onto adult language learning by other theorists and 
practitioners. 
 
I will consider how Chomsky‟s own ideas would become more elaborate and 
delicate in response to the ideas and findings of other researchers, notably in the 
field of second language acquisition.   But first, some early terminological 
discrepancies between Chomsky and other writers need to be noted.  It is these 
discrepancies which account in part for the later corruption of some concepts in 
the more wild accounts of adult second language acquisition, which I discuss 
below.   
 
Whereas Chomsky (1959) had left B.F. Skinner‟s 1957 stimulus-response, 
operant-conditioning, behaviourist accounts of language acquisition (where the 
child learns through imitation and reinforcement) towards a more mentalist 
direction, Chomsky later made a further distinction between „competence‟ and 
„performance‟ in the language being acquired.  „Competence‟ is here a critical 
term:  for Chomsky (1965), this „competence‟ has an idealised and a quantitative 
(as opposed to qualitative) character.  So here, the term „competence‟ encodes an 
idealisation of language in the mind:  it is abstract knowledge, which accounts for 
the possibility to create infinite but grammatically-perfect sentences.  As I 
suggested earlier, the counterweight of Chomsky‟s 1965 notion of „competence‟ 
was that of „performance‟.  Chomsky clearly makes the point that actual use of the 
language in concrete situations may not be an accurate representation of what that 
language-user really knows.  Hence, „performance‟-related grammatical 
imperfections do not belie the underlying (quantitative, idealised) „competence‟ 
(Chomsky 1965, p. 4).  The speaker/writer is not, in that sense, „incompetent‟; but 
neither does acquiring „the competence of‟ Language X predict competence „at‟ or 
„in‟ that particular tongue. 
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This is an important caveat, or get-out, because Chomsky‟s argument was, 
initially, deemed circular. Before extending our discussion towards other, more 
ethnographic and sociological accounts of „competence‟ from e.g. Hymes (1967) 
and Halliday (1973), it is worth recalling the arguments Chomsky offered in 
support of his theory.  These are well summarised in Steinberg (1993). 
Crucially for our later discussion of „automaticity‟, Chomsky‟s four arguments 
invoked the ease and speed of child language acquisition; inadequate language 
data; poverty of stimulus; and the irrelevance of intelligence.   
The first argument was based on comparison with an abstracted, idealised, adult 
„native speaker‟, and noted the speed at which unexceptional children attain 
„content‟ competence.  They both learn fast and learn things they haven‟t 
explicitly been taught. 
Secondly, despite being exposed to „degenerate‟ data in the form of pauses, 
hesitations, errors, grammatical incorrectness or discontinuity and the like, 
children acquire a complex linguistic system which nonetheless fails 
systematically to reproduce those input (PLD, or primary linguistic data) flaws in 
their output.  The child corrects and updates as it learns, even from non-ideal data. 
Thirdly, children acquire new structures and can produce and understand novel 
utterances, i.e. ones which are not in the direct input.  Indeed, this „poverty of 
stimulus‟ argument covers well-formedness and hints at metalinguistic sensitivity.  
Children fail to make certain logical but syntactically inaccurate transformations 
even in complex and embedded structures.  Conversely, they do spontaneously 
introduce „adult‟ deletions (and don‟t say *Is [the man] [who [here] [is]] tall).   
The last of his arguments is bipartite:  animals have intelligence but no language 
(hence, intelligence is not a necessary precursor to language) but in human terms, 
more importantly, there is no direct connection between the degree of intelligence 
of a subject and the magnitude of the (quantitative, Chomskyan) competence they 
acquire.  As we said earlier „performance‟ may well differ between individuals, 
though for more sociolinguistic reasons.  Discussions around intelligence and its 
measurement are highly problematic, as language content and use are very much 
implicated societally in determining intelligence levels.  This new circularity is 
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not explored further here, nor are the various, systematic refutations of 
Chomsky‟s four arguments.  But we can note that Chomsky (1965) held that the 
co-existence of both a defective „performance‟ and a „perfect‟ abstract, idealised 
native speaker was a possibility, and we shall return to this argument in due 
course because it finds its echo in proficiency discussions I raised in Chapter 1 
and indeed, raised in dyslexia literatures themselves.   
Despite these reservations, we note that Chomsky (1965) required that his LAD 
should host a certain number of components.  First, the acquiring child must 
possess one or more techniques with which to represent incoming PLD.  
Secondly, and separately, means are needed in order to represent the structural 
links between these incoming data.  In addition, there has to exist some early 
means of organising the categories of possible hypotheses the child may make.  
This done, there needs to be a back-link (we might today invoke a „hyperlink‟) 
between each hypothesis made and the trigger utterance.  In other words, what 
does each triggered hypothesis imply, relative to all the other hypotheses?  
Finally, the child needs a mechanism with which to select the hypothesis most 
adapted to the PLD.  Given this interactivity, and the number of variables 
involved, this process goes far beyond mere „local‟ interpretation of single units 
of PLD – induced generalisations „learned‟ about the data.  This feature, for 
Chomsky, explains the systematized acquisition of knowledge of language as well 
as knowing that language itself.  In this account, then, automaticity encapsulates 
both systematicity and metalinguistic knowledge, additionally to the L1 itself.  I 
shall return below to a discussion of the interplay between metacognitive and 
metalinguistic awareness in reference to dyslexia literatures on second language 
learning. 
 
3.1.3   Jerome Bruner – automaticity through interactivity 
 
The interchange in roles (or „handover‟) between agent and experiencer 
exemplifies and underscores much of the work of Jerome Bruner, who qualified 
Chomsky‟s second argument in particular by positing a LASS, or  language 
acquisition support system, in response to Chomsky‟s LAD.  Bruner‟s LASS is 
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derived from observational work on developing children (Bruner 1983), and notes 
changes in dyadic activity between language-giver and receiver.  Here, the child 
progressively learns to decode caregiver speech in context through growing 
knowledge of the social situation.  The pertinence of context of learning will be 
discussed later, in the context of empirical „dyslexics‟ data. 
 
In Bruner, the concept of an inner, irresistible compulsion to acquire language, as 
in Chomsky‟s LAD, was not ruled out.  But in LASS, there is a supporting 
dynamic, originating from context and furthered by caregiver comment in 
response to non-adult, early-form expressions.  There is an interactive exchange 
of symbols.  For Bruner, writing after the appearance of Vygotsky in accessible 
translation, the developing child will exchanges roles, going from passive receiver 
or experiencer of situated language, to that of agent actively soliciting 
confirmation and extension of their utterances.  Bruner alludes to a „handover 
principle‟, entailing a „process of setting up the situation to make the child‟s entry 
easy and successful, and then gradually pulling back and handing the role to the 
child as he becomes skilful enough to manage it‟ (Bruner 1983, p. 60). Later, 
describing the role of the tutor as „consciousness for two‟, he comes to associate 
scaffolding with Vygotsky‟s positing of the ZPD  or zone of proximal 
development (Bruner 1986, p. 75)
16
. Here again, situated, contextual 
understanding is both a prerequisite and a precursor of language development.  
Cognition takes the lead, in other terms, even if some seed of language is innate.  
Of course, not all children in all cultures are privileged enough to acquire 
language in supportive dyads:  nonetheless, the progressive development of 
agency is probably more easy to accept, even where peer and/or passive informal 
learning are the norm, outside supportive dyads or formal teaching.  We retain this 
notion of agency for further discussion:  its non-development is invoked in certain 
dyslexia literatures. 
 
 
 
                                            
16 Vygotsky, whom I discuss below,  describe this as “the distance between the actual 
developmental level as determined by independent problem–solving and the level of potential 
development as determined through problem-solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with 
more capable peers” (Vygotsky 1978, p. 86). 
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3.1.4  Jean Piaget 
 
Jean Piaget‟s views on child language development are, as in Bruner‟s case, 
derived from observational work on children (Piaget‟s own) but differ from both 
Bruner and Chomsky.  They differ from Bruner‟s view in that Piaget is not neutral 
on the existence (or not) of innate language.  They differ from Chomsky‟s view in 
that Piaget subsumes language into cognition, and gives cognition primacy over it.  
Through the twin mechanisms of organisation and adaptation (organisation of 
sets of  behaviour, followed by adaptation through the Piagetian processes of 
assimilation and accommodation), the child both creates structures and assimilates 
incoming, new information into these – a child-led dynamic.  Piaget‟s genetic 
epistemology (Piaget 1972) seeks to demonstrate that all thinking is supported by 
a great number of categories of knowledge.  But a dialectic is, nonetheless, at 
work.  Though cognition leads, the equilibration process between assimilation and 
accommodation requires empirical reflection on actions undertaken by the child, 
rather than on the objects involved.  These actions are internalised as operations 
and this process of internalisation – „learning by doing‟; acting upon the world – 
will be the engine for reflective abstraction.  This, in turn, necessitates 
development of language for efficiency of mental representation, and for further 
cognitive development.  In asserting that the construction of knowledge by the 
child is an active and not a passive process, Piaget the constructivist shares 
territory with Piaget the structuralist, who hypothesised various structures which 
might demonstrate commonalities in the development of these areas of 
knowledge. 
 
I have stated, however, there are cognitive pre-requisites involved, and a 
discussion of the innateness of cognitive structures must follow.  For Piaget, 
children may be born with undifferentiated schemata:  mind-concepts from which 
intelligence will develop experientially.  Language, being a product of 
intelligence, will ensue, but only when the child has mastered intellectual skills 
derived from the sensory-motor stage he posits.  When the need has arisen for 
mental representation of more abstract concepts, the child moves from 
“egocentric” speech, unidirectionally narrating its thoughts and actions, towards 
communication with others.  Thus, if any form of automaticity is involved for the 
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acquiring child, it resides in the cognitive sphere, which is separate from (but 
leads to) the linguistic – and the linguistic is not, for Piaget, innate. 
 
3.1.5  Lev Vygotsky 
 
A further ontogenetic account of first language acquisition was evolved by 
Vygotsky (1965, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988).  Vygotsky (1965) linked language and 
thought as “a phenomenon of the interpsychic to intrapsychic functioning”, 
(Vygotsky 1965, p. 133).  He later restates and explains himself in this way: “First 
[language] appears between people as an interpsychological category and then 
within the child as an intrapsychological category” (Vygotsky 1981, p.163).  
Hence from childhood but then into adulthood also, language develops in order to 
aid cognitive development.  Recalling Malinowski (1935)‟s distinction, the 
representation of the mind‟s activity through language is situated:  both in an 
immediate context, for meaning, but also in a historical, cultural one:  there is a 
social context and thus, a social need for communication.  In the child‟s case, it  
 
feels the need for words and, though his questions, actively tries to learn 
the signs attached to objects.  He seems to have discovered the symbolic 
function of words (Vygotsky 1988, p. 82).   
 
Through this mechanism, integration of thought and language is possible:  
“thought becomes verbal and speech rational” (Vygotsky 1988, p.83).   
 
In this sense, and though his work only emerged in translation well after Piaget‟s 
cognitive constructivism, Vygotsky proposed a transactionalist, constructivist and 
social-constructivist explanation of how language evolves in the individual.  It 
evolves both as a semiotic tool and as a cultural one.  It is a tool in the sense that it 
allows mental activity to be mediated and communicated; ultimately, it allows 
individuals to transform the relationship between themselves, individually and 
collectively, and their environment.  But here, I noted in particular that it is social-
interactive processes which, through ontogenesis, facilitate the emergence of 
individual cognitive competence.  Language follows, but feeds back into this 
cognitive development (Vygotsky 1978).  Internally and externally to the 
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language user, however, are contextual factors of a cultural and historical as well 
as a situational and immediate nature, which both require and facilitate dynamic 
interaction with a particular discourse community which itself has an interactive 
dynamic with its constituents.   In „unexceptional‟ cases, that is. 
 
I shall return shortly to the concept of „discourse communities‟, and Dell Hymes.  
But there is transcendence – semiotic mediation, in Vygotsky‟s term, in the child‟s 
assisted passage from „social‟ language to inner thought.  Any „automaticity‟ 
involved in the Vygotskyan project will thus intervene in older children and 
upwards, and reside at the „exponentiality‟ level - the level of discovering the 
symbolic functionality of language though the recursive interplay of ontogenetic 
language processes and evolving cognitive development – often at the ZPD or 
zone of proximal development, to which I alluded earlier.  As we have read, 
intrapsychological processes have their origin in Bruner‟s „handover‟ stage 
(which implies movement from interpsychological to intra-), and evolving 
intrapsychological autonomy is a necessary precursor to any automaticity. On this 
basis, expectations of automaticity in older second-language learners (who have 
already completed most cognitive development stages) may seem counter-
intuitive.  However, the impulse to automaticity in L2 settings remains social and 
is still based in, or converging towards, the social activity upon which Bruner‟s 
and Vygotsky‟s work is predicated.  In addition, subsequent cognitively-based 
syllabuses may be expected to appeal to unexceptional adult second language 
learners, whose relatively developed cognition frees them to concentrate on L2 
linguistic matters.  I sought to discover in the data whether, and to what extent, 
cognitive language learning strategies are deployed by adult dyslexic L2 
acquirers; however, Michael Halliday‟s contribution to acquisition processes is of 
relevance here also, and I now turn to it. 
 
3.1.6   Michael Halliday 
 
Michael Halliday is included here, not directly for his views on child language 
acquisition, nor as another counter-case in discussions of „automaticity‟ of 
acquisition, but as a bridge to viewing the linguistic transition from childhood into 
adulthood.  Also, concepts proposed by Halliday have migrated from „child‟ to 
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„adult‟ language acquisition theory models.  Further, they have also been 
generalised from CL1 (or child first language) to AL2 (or adult second language) 
literatures, then from learning/acquisition literatures and into syllabus design and 
testing orthodoxies.  Testing and its involuntary effects are well discussed in, for 
example, in Messick (1989) and Shepard (1993) and their work on consequential 
validity.   I will return to the question of the adsorption of Hallidayan assumptions 
into „good practice‟ for dyslexic AL2 students. 
 
Through the empirical, inductive study of his own child, Halliday delineated 
purposive, functional labels for the language acquisition mechanisms through 
which the growing child operates on the world.  She does this owing to the 
semiotic necessity of making meaning along a chain which, according to Halliday, 
links the ideational to the interpersonal to the textual.  Here, over and above 
linguistic knowledge and categories, language use is ontogenetic in nature and 
reciprocation between the growing language user and society is mediated through 
the three contextual components of „field‟, „tenor‟ and „mode‟ (Halliday 1978).  
This represents an extension of Halliday‟s functional and notional aspects of 
meaning-exchange towards an attention to context and discourse, and a concern in 
his work with his wife (Halliday and Hasan 1976) with cohesion and coherence 
and the dynamic effect of these factors the reader/hearer of the texts conceived, 
construed, constructed and communicated competently within a discourse 
community.  I shall return to the notion of „competence‟ once again in the 
following section, but simply note here that Halliday proposes a spontaneous and 
exponential (or automatic) emergence of language use, and I consider later the 
interplay between metacognitive and metalinguistic ontogeneses in dyslexics as 
they emerge in the data. 
 
3.1.7  Dell Hymes: „competence‟ revisited 
 
Continuing my review of concepts and terms which have „migrated‟ into Second 
Language Teaching and Syllabus Design, and may affect dyslexic second-
language learners, I return once again to the concept of competence here, because 
of the influence of Dell Hymes. Hymes firstly proposed the concept of 
„communicative competence‟ (Hymes 1967) but then with John Gumperz, 
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elaborated this towards the notion of a „speech community‟ (Gumperz and Hymes 
1986) – one in which the idealised „native speaker-hearer‟, to whom I have 
already alluded, might dwell.  Both concepts re-emerged and were expanded in 
Halliday and to this day, they may populate native language assessments, despite 
Davies 2003‟s deconstruction of the „native speaker‟ norm. 
 
The „communicative competence‟ of Hymes (1967) differs from Chomsky‟s 
„competence‟ along qualitative rather than quantitative lines.  Where Chomsky‟s 
„competence‟, as I suggested earlier, is an idealised abstraction of all that can be, 
could be and is Language X (quantitatively), Hymes (1967) stressed that 
(qualitatively), making appropriate choices in Language X is more important than 
making grammatically accurate ones.  This ethnographic focus on „successful‟ 
social communication (and the societal language attitudes which Hymes induces 
therefrom) may be unsurprising, given Hymes‟ academic background.  However, 
the qualitative concept of „appropriacy‟ would in due course become detached 
from this social/societal explanation.  „Appropriacy‟ became part of the 
assessment canon, next to items such as „accuracy‟ and „elaborateness‟ and 
„fluency‟, as a descriptor of good „language learning outcomes‟.  Implicitly, there 
is something of a notion of automaticity here, in that the target norm for a second 
language learner, in Hymesian accounts, will be an automatic, unreflecting 
appropriacy and accuracy in the target language. 
 
Later, Hymes would link the notion of „communicative competence‟ to the notion 
of „speech community‟.  In discussing it and its trajectory into second language 
teaching, mention must also be made of  conceptual redefinition and expansion of 
these terms in  Canale and Swain (1980) and Canale (1983, 1984), as these lead us 
back to „communicative language teaching‟,  a primary focus of this chapter, and 
whether its pragmatic adoption can thwart dyslexic AL2 students. 
 
 
3.1.8  Canale and Swain, and „automatic‟ mastery of strategic competence 
 
Canale and Swain (1980, p. 28) analysed the „communicative competence‟ in 
Hymes (1967) into three domains which, they proposed, might serve to underpin 
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second language pedagogy.  Again, we note the assumptions about passages 
between child and adult, first language and second but essentially, grammatical, 
sociolinguistic and strategic competences were identified, though Canale (1983) 
would later vary the proposed content of their „sociolinguistic‟ sub-domain.  In 
this account, and in order to be deemed to possess adult, appropriate, native-
speaker and, all-in-all, „proficient‟ levels, the learner needs “knowledge of lexical 
items and rules of morphology, syntax, sentence-grammar semantics and 
phonology … [together with] … knowledge of how to determine and express 
accurately the literal meaning of utterances” (Canale and Swain 1980, pp.29-30).  
Their „sociolinguistic competence‟ contains “two sets of rules:  sociocultural rules 
of use and rules of discourse” (ibid).  Two things are involved:  both knowing 
how to interpret the social meaning of utterances and also, knowing how to select 
language which is appropriate to social context.  Canale (1983) would later hive 
off „discourse competence‟ as an individual component of „communicative 
competence‟.   
 
But it is the third, personalised and indeed, most idiosyncratic, of the Canale and 
Swain (1980) sub-competences, „strategic‟, which will take us on furthest in our 
reflection on „communicative language teaching‟. 
 
„Strategic competence‟ contains the „verbal and non-verbal strategies‟ (Canale and 
Swain 1980, p. 30) which are adopted by a developing second-language learner in 
order to compensate for as-yet insufficient levels in the first two sub-
competencies – the grammatical, and the sociolinguistic.  „Strategic competence‟ 
therefore refers to behaviour.   
 
Many observational studies exist of child language development, notably of 
acquisition order and a separate emergence order of both pre-linguistic and 
linguistic items
17
.  If, however, we leave these broadly descriptive studies aside, 
we note that „strategic competence‟ contains the seeds of two developments in 
                                            
17
 See for instance Brown (1973), Snow and Ferguson (1977), Trevarthen (1974, 1979); De 
Villiers and De Villiers (1978), and Clark (1974), but also covering ages and stages, Foster (1990) 
for a modular review of child communicative competence, and cross-linguistic and cross-cultural 
studies often within a universalising framework , for example in Bruner (1981), Bowerman (1985), 
Slobin (1985). 
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second language acquisition studies, namely the behaviour (as opposed to 
behavioural) aspect; and the critical notion of successful communication.  
According to the precepts of „strategic competence‟, then, the unexceptional 
second language learner is engaged in a process of trial and error and if s/he is 
rewarded, the result is learning until ultimately, success builds on success and 
some form of spontaneous mastery – but not „exponential automaticity‟ – ensues.  
I shall add an analysis later of this „qualified output automaticity‟ for certain 
dyslexic students proposed in Schneider and Crombie (2003). 
 
 
3.1.9  Selinker (1972) and the failure of automaticity in L2 acquisition 
 
Whether what Canale and Swain described under „strategic competence‟ was 
already the case in Vygotsky‟s ZPD, discussed in 3.1.3 and 3.1.5 above, remains 
an issue.  While noting the „vicarious‟ consciousness and scaffolding of the tutor 
proposed in Bruner (1986), p.77,  many have queried the apparent contradiction of 
conscious mastery being acquired unconsciously and others, the non-falsifiability 
of claims regarding consciousness in second language learning (see e.g. 
McLaughlin 1990).  Notwithstanding such apparent circularities, „strategic 
competence‟ came to the attention of language researchers through its status as 
behaviour and thus, as observable and identifiable mental processes.  Selinker 
(1972) in particular proposed means of observing and identifying such processes 
when he posited the concept of Interlanguage.  
 
It was precisely the lack of automaticity in adult second language acquisition – 
partly evidenced by error-making - which first motivated Selinker to coin the term 
„Interlanguage‟ in 1969 and then with others, notably Corder‟s studies in CA – or 
contrastive analysis (Corder 1973, Corder 1981) to engage in the actual analysis 
and classification of learners‟ errors.   
 
A key insight emerging from Selinker and from Corder‟s work was that there is 
preferential attention to meaning at the expense of form in second language 
acquisition (see especially Selinker 1972).  In certain but not all dyslexic cases, as 
we shall read in the data, the thwarting of this preferential attention to meaning 
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may translate into various coping strategies such as problem-avoidance, and 
unanalysed holophrastic learning. But this is not all.  The errors made, according 
to later Selinker writing, both systematic and positive: hence the errors are 
conversely not random, and they are positive in the sense that certain errors which 
one might posit are not made (Selinker 1992, p. 151).  Corder, and later Selinker, 
would doubly identify Interlanguage as a system and a process, something they 
ascribe to neither phylogenetic or ontogenetic origins, but which individuals need 
to access and „run‟ in order to reach what is termed „transitional competence‟ 
(Corder 1981, p. 11).   
 
Thus, in the happiest cases, Interlanguage becomes a channel to automaticity, 
where this signifies spontaneous adult L2 acquisition:  for „transitional 
competence‟ in this account supplants itself, and approaches ever closer to the 
perfection of an idealised educated native speaker-hearer-writer. 
 
 
3.1.10  Failed automaticity:  Selinker, interlanguage and fossilisation 
 
Of particular interest to the present study is Selinker‟s delineation of the five 
processes thought to underscore the formation of the posited „interlanguage‟:  
 
  
 Language transfer phenomena – from language 1 to language 2, (though 
further sub-transfers from child to adult language are not commented);  
 Secondly and thirdly, individuals‟ learning strategies and communication 
strategies; 
 Fourthly, elements of instability in the form of „backsliding‟ (in which at 
first holistically-acquired units are then analysed and re-learned 
atomistically, with some regression);  and  
 Finally, fossilisation. 
 
A characteristic of fossilisation is that certain errors become ingrained. Syntactic 
adaptation and elaboration does not occur; generalisations and exceptions or 
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reservations around rules are not registered.  Phonemically important forms are 
either not noted for their semantic or discoursal import are not registered.  The 
learner‟s native accent prevails, pervasively, or a universal „foreign accent‟ is 
applied to all second language learning, irrespective of the TL, or target language.  
Learning is effortful and conscious rather than unconscious and automatic; in 
extreme cases there may be effects upon the first language
18
.   
 
As Prabhu (1987) and Widdowson (1979) made clear, early „interlanguage‟ 
concepts in Corder and Selinker were subsequently applied to other aspects of 
learnership over and above simply morphosyntax - in relation, for example to the 
development of „discourse competence‟ and „cultural negotiation‟, concepts not 
discussed here.  Despite reservations in Long (2003), p. 521, who proposes a more 
empirically-testable phenomenon of stabilization, we can note that there are 
strong symptomological ties between aspects of dyslexia and proposed features of 
fossilisation.  Notions of absence, deficit or failure of automaticity are implicit in 
both.  To what extent each is causal or consequential (“explanandum or 
explanans”, Long 2003, p. 486) remains to be discussed in the light of the 
empirical data. 
 
All the foregoing approaches are marked by differences.  They are also marked by 
similarities.  Bliss (1996) compares the ideas of Vygotsky and Piaget in, 
specifically, theorising the teaching of science; while Wells (1994) demonstrates 
complementarities between the work of Vygotsky and Halliday.   
 
But how do these approaches translate into adult teaching and learning in the 
second language?   
 
3.2   Acquiring and learning in the second language 
 
A succinct historical account of the evolution of language teaching methodology 
is given in Adamson (2003), including a review of methods as social artefacts. 
                                            
18 This must, for present purposes, remain an anecdotal comment as it is derived from observation 
of a small cohort of (self-described) „fossilised‟ adult second-language learners who may 
coincidentally have been dyslexic in their L1. 
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Given the variability across accounts of first language acquisition, some of which 
we have discussed above, I now discuss some inclusions in communicative 
language teaching which appear to be transfers across the fields of child and of 
adult learning and which, in addition, intersect with concepts in dyslexia.   
 
3.2.1 Incidental and intentional learning 
 
A useful, initial distinction to be made is the one posited between two types of 
learning:  incidental, and intentional.  I do this in part to set up a distinction 
between acquisition and learning per se, when I consider the contributions of 
Stephen Krashen, below.  But at a broader, more anecdotal level, certain learners, 
including foreign language ones, can fail to acquire certain taught items.  At the 
same time, they can acquire others which seem to feature nowhere on the 
„intentional learning‟ syllabus.   Parallels with the experience of certain aphasics 
and hyperlexics are not drawn here, but only for reasons of space. 
 
3.2.2 Krashen, learning and acquisition 
 
Krashen (1977, 1981, 1982, 1987) proposed a dilemma not unrelated to the 
incidental / accidental dichotomy I mentioned above, namely that if a distinction 
can be made between learning and acquisition, and if a feature of acquisition is 
that it is naturalistic, i.e. it occurs in natural settings and is informal and untutored, 
how should this „naturalism‟ inform formal, tutored learning contexts?  
McLaughlin (1987) and Ellis (1995) have already pointed out several important 
difficulties with Krashen‟s dualistic hypothesis.  These include the vagueness and 
lack of empirical evidence for Krashen‟s views;  the impossibility of observing or 
understanding „implicit‟ rather than „explicit‟ learning which takes place in the 
developing child;  and general lack of concern for what we may characterise as 
Vygotskyan, or socio-cultural, concerns.  Notwithstanding these, Krashen‟s early 
proposal gave credence to various (outré, for some, but usefully inexpensive) 
pedagogic „methods‟19.  More positively, numerous empirical studies were 
engendered to refute Krashen. 
                                            
19
 Among these Asher (1969) and „Total Physical Response‟, Gattegno (1972) and the „Silent 
Way‟; and  Lozanov (1979) and „Suggestopaedia‟. 
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3.2.3 Terrell:  „less-is-more‟ teaching 
 
The „naturalistic approach‟ which Terrell introduced in 1977 and Krashen and 
Terrell elaborated in 1983 took a line of minimalism in the classroom.  Here,  
teacher control is not altogether replaced by the psycholinguistic interplay 
between (conscious) learning and (unconscious) acquisition, but remains limited 
to provision of her own and others‟ „comprehensible input‟ at a level slightly 
above the learner‟s current one.  This invoked the intuitive but ultimately circular 
and inoperable (i+I) formula of Krashen (1982). Why should one input that which 
is already comprehensible (circularity); and it is inoperable because of the 
disparate „prior experience‟ and previous teaching and learning experiences and 
world knowledge of any set of learners.   Other implicit but central notions in 
Krashen are that acquisition is irresistible, that „acquisition‟ precedes „learning‟, 
and that subconscious (and thus, seemingly „automatic‟) acquisition survive from 
childhood into adulthood.  Implicitly, once again, what is valid for Language 1 
will be valid for Language 2, in this account.  
 
Importantly also, Krashen‟s theories – both explicit and implicit – appear to rely 
on a Chomskyan, LAD-type mechanism which feeds a tri-partite process, 
internally.  First, from Dulay and Burt (1977), an „affective filter‟, whose 
lowering facilitates learning; then an SLO or second language organiser after 
Dulay, Burt and Krashen (1982), and finally a „monitor‟, surviving from Krashen 
(1977), which handles learner- or tutor-generated feedback.  A further hypothesis 
needs to be mentioned:  the „natural order‟ hypothesis (which alludes to an 
„internal syllabus‟ in each learner, and therefore may not necessarily be 
generalised into a group teaching programme).  This L2 „LAD‟, in combination 
with the externally applied „comprehensible input‟, ensures that acquisition-like 
„automaticity‟ will ensue, certainly when it is framed in a „natural communicative 
syllabus‟. 
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3.3  From „natural communicative syllabus‟ to „communicative language 
teaching‟ 
 
For all that it presents an evolution of Krashen‟s work, the „communicative 
syllabus‟ remains problematic, not only intrinsically but in my research so far, for 
dyslexic students exposed to it. 
 
3.3.1 Problematising CLT 
 
I have already mentioned, in my broad preview on CLT in Section 1.4,  the 
apparent operational distance between Munby (1978) and Norman et al. (1986), 
despite some coherence on the „automaticity‟ issue.  But this is not all. 
 
Firstly, like any teaching method, communicative language teaching or CLT is 
prone to being misconstrued, in this case as stating that „communicating‟ in the 
classroom can, by itself, re-trigger acquisition towards automatic, exponential and 
permanent uptake sans grammar teaching.   
 
Secondly, the „communicative syllabus‟ can become operationalised merely as 
algorithmic permutation between the „four skills:  Reading, Listening, as inputs; 
and Speaking and Writing as outputs.  Any „natural order‟ internal learner 
syllabus is left to fend for itself.  If this is indeed possible, when one or more 
domain is impaired, for example in dyslexic students. 
 
Thirdly, reducing the classroom syllabus to mere „oral communication‟ work with 
little overt or systematic structural work (or „grammar teaching‟) despite the use 
of written supports may engender only short-term, atomistic learning of holistic 
and unanalysed items, or „chunking‟. While there is evidence that this is a 
dyslexics‟ coping strategy, it can be onerous upon short-term memory function, 
which is sometimes depleted in dyslexics. 
 
Fourthly, for dyslexic students in particular, the assumption of „affect lowering‟ 
through „language fun‟, „spontaneous activity‟, or „distraction teaching‟ may not 
be of help, especially when loss of autonomy and control is involved.  In non-
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dyslexics, Bailey (1983) warned eloquently of the affective threats to learning.  
We shall read later of the effects of quick-fire „fun teaching‟ on particular 
dyslexic subjects in the data analysis. 
 
Lastly, the „communicative syllabus‟ is problematic in that it attempts to 
generalise across learners.  Even if Krashen‟s (i+I) equation for „comprehensible 
input‟ were workable, circumstances and context need to be available for each 
participant to consciously engage with their own (i+I).  This presupposes an 
extremely well-furnished syllabus, and well-imagined teaching space. The 
proposed re-engagement of LAD-type or L2-LAD type mechanisms or modules 
may in any case be otiose, if these are non-existent or impaired in dyslexic 
students.  Sources such as Aaron and Phillips, (1986) state that, with the exception 
of a small number of acquired dyslexia cases (e.g. brain insult though injury) who 
have other cognitive and/or motor needs, only  a relative minority reaches 
university-level teaching if they have both receptive and productive difficulties in 
their own L1.  An added problem for dyslexic students may intervene at the 
„individual differences‟ and „institutional dyslexic students‟ levels.  No two 
unexceptional, or „normal‟, students are alike in terms of previous learning, affect, 
motivation and a myriad other variables (see for example Carroll 1961, 1981, 
1985, 1988 on language aptitude);  nor a fortiori are dyslexic ones. 
 
3.4  Bridging between „communicative‟ and dyslexia literatures:  some 
further aspects of „automaticity‟ in dyslexia literatures 
 
With the notable exception of Margaret Crombie, discussed below, few 
mainstream „dyslexia writers‟ have explicitly addressed foreign language 
acquisition/learning issues – except fleetingly20.  Those who have commented 
often proposed mixed and partial accounts of what „automaticity‟ signifies in 
language acquisition, teaching and learning, either as first or subsequent language. 
 
 
                                            
20 Ott (1997), for example, consecrates nearly 4 (of 408) pages to modern languages in a chapter 
on „adolescence‟;   but has nothing directly on this topic in her chapter on further and higher 
education.  She does refer onward to Peer and Reid (2000) on Multilingualism. 
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3.4.1 Uptake and output automaticity; steady-state versus performance 
 
Most simple is the conflation of „automatic acquisition‟, and the „acquisition of 
automaticity‟.  Both forms of „automaticity‟ can be either holistic, or partial and 
attenuated.  Both forms can assume the existence of the other, and assume 
explanatory power for the other.  In other words, assumptions about automaticity 
of uptake can be mapped onto assumptions about automaticity of output. 
 
Particularly in Adult L2 acquisition, a further confusion can arise, at output level, 
between fluency in performance and what we have referred to as „exponential 
automaticity‟, i.e. a spontaneous, dynamic and iterative form of learning. 
 
I will explore these conflations further, below.  But they are encased within a 
larger, qualitative difficulty with foreign-language learning writings related to 
dyslexic subjects.  A short discussion of these qualitative reservations is included 
here, illustratively. 
 
3.5 Bridging the literatures:  ontological and other difficulties 
 
Hill and Roed (2006), writing on dyslexia and modern languages, attempt the 
following classification of the literature they review: 
 
 The literature on dyslexia is large but falls mostly within three categories.  
One is attempts to investigate the nature and explain the causes of 
dyslexia. A second category of studies focuses on the actual 
manifestations of dyslexia or symptoms, and a third category deals with 
support issues – how students can help themselves and how teachers or 
lecturers can help their students (Hill and Roed 2006, p.2).  
 
There are indeed inherent difficulties in categorising dyslexia literature.   
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3.5.1 Circularity, unanalytical aggregation and folk-validation 
 
The first difficulty is ontological, where a category is proposed but then used 
circularly to „prove‟ its own existence.  Hence, I might argue that there are 
dyslexics because there is dyslexia or, conversely, there is dyslexia because there 
are dyslexics.   
 
The second difficulty flows from the first, and has two aspects: aggregational (but 
unanalytical) treatments and reviews can conflate ontological discussions of the 
topic with symptomological ones.  Here, assumptions are justified inductively 
from symptoms which could easily derive from other sources.  A consequential 
(Messick 1989; Shepard 1993) aspect of such reviews is that categories can be 
„pop validated‟ (Stevenson 1985) by brute force of citation.  
 
As a result of the above, much grey literature can emerge which fails to address 
any ontological issues, or indeed symptomological ones at all, and instead 
proposes confused and a-critical „solutions‟ to dyslexia, such as merely acting on 
dyslexics‟ self-esteem, or cheering them up a bit, or adopting dyslexia-type 
approaches for all students.  Despite citable titles and ease of electronic access, 
„grey‟ items can be neither rigorous surveys of institutions nor of the literature, 
but cherry-picked selections from both.  Hill and Roed (2006) and Davis (1997)
21
 
may be considered samples, for all that the latter is adulated in certain quarters; 
and Internet hosts a profuse babble.
22
 
 
Lastly, dyslexia literature falls foul of numerous other sources which are directly 
or indirectly sceptical of its epistemological and ontological underpinnings:  
Seligman (1992) on „acquired helplessness‟, Elliott (2005) with press knocking 
articles on dyslexia “myths”, Eriksson (2005) on the invention of psychiatric 
                                            
21 Davis R.D. (1997) (“The Gift of Dyslexia”) is not to be confused with Davies, A. (1977, 1968, 
2003) to whom extensive and positive reference is here. 
22 A Boolean internet search on 28.07.2010 of the coordinates “Dyslexia” + “self-help” yielded 
“about 77,800 results” [sic]. One source - (http://felixdexel.de/English/persoenlich.html) cites 
S.Paul on the “blessing” of dyslexia: “...all things (even learning disabilities, dyslexia, depression, 
feeling blocked, etc.) work together for the good of those who love God“ (Rom. 8:28)”, others 
propose the “casting out” of dyslexia though faith-healing, along with cancer 
(www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/news/christchurch/2746441/Faith-healers-attack-cancer-with-prayer). 
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conditions, and Goldacre (2006) on the critical gullibility of using screening tests 
for developmental dyslexia tests, then claiming “cures” for dyslexia. 
 
3.5.2   Attempts at clarity:  theorising dyslexic students‟ language difficulty 
in MFL 
 
Conversely, Schneider and Crombie (2003), publishing with the imprimatur of the 
British Dyslexia Association, attempt to fill gaps between language acquisition, 
MFL
23
 and dyslexia literatures.   
 
As a point of entry, they stress (with Ganschow et al. 1998) that frustration and 
low motivation among dyslexic MFL students are not causes, but effects, of 
linguistic difficulty.  Hence, they propose that linguistic difficulty is not reducible 
to „mere‟ deficits in output skills over input ones, but that linguistic difficulty is 
the product of individual differences, mediated by an array of individuated 
strategies, and also the sheer variation in comparability between languages. 
 
Ganschow and Sparks (Ganschow et al. 1998; Ganschow, Sparks and Schneider 
1995) had earlier summarised these into their LCDH or linguistic coding 
differences hypothesis.  In essence, LCDH proposes that success breeds success 
both in encoding and decoding, across languages – but the contrary case (failure) 
is also true.  Not only so, but any success or weakness in phonology/orthography, 
syntax or semantics needs to include cross-linguistic analysis.  An L2 may well be 
easy because it is similar to L1.  But conversely, the L2 may be „harder‟, because 
of extra syntactic processing requirements.  Across the Ganschow et al. studies, 
order of difficulty rose from semantic to syntactic to phonological-orthographic.   
Schneider and Crombie (2003), after Gerber (1993), also factor in the compound 
effects of poor short-term and working memory stemming from LCDH-type 
complexity: there is more to remember in both languages when you are a dyslexic 
learner. 
 
                                            
23 Modern Foreign Languages 
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Implicitly, therefore, Schneider and Crombie are at first less than sanguine about 
dyslexic learners reaching (output) automaticity – because it is not a given in the 
L1:   
 
 These [the Ganschow et al. 1998] findings make it clear that reading, 
writing, listening and speaking skills in the FL are all significantly 
affected by weaknesses in linguistic coding skills even when the native 
language has been well mastered through years of developing strategies 
and overlearning to the point where automaticity has been achieved. 
(Schneider and Crombie 2003, p.5;  emphasis added). 
 
Indeed, they add:  “The underlying language processing difficulties and 
differences are likely to affect the student when exposed to foreign language 
learning”, requiring “[…] direct and explicit teaching of linguistic encoding and 
decoding skills in the foreign language” (ibid.;  emphasis added). 
 
Later, they state explicitly:  “Lack of automaticity in native language grammar 
structures […] will exacerbate the problem […]” (Schneider and Crombie 2003, 
p.6). 
 
 
3.5.3 Implications for dyslexic MFL learners (Schneider and Crombie) 
 
Two things result from this.  Firstly, Schneider and Crombie (2003) admit of a 
qualified version of (output) „automaticity‟, for successful L1 dyslexics, which 
can be created by intense work and inputs.  Nevertheless, input automaticity 
(“lack of automaticity in native language grammar structures”, above), however 
obtained, seems to be a prerequisite for dyslexics‟ foreign language acquisition 
success.   
 
Secondly, they stress the role of metacognitive and metalinguistic skills, and 
remark above that these need direct and explicit teaching. Because “without 
explicit modelling and over-practice of metalinguistic strategies, dyslexic learners 
will not be successful students” […] “Often”, they explain (citing Dreshler et al. 
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(1984a), (1984b) on learning-disabled adolescents), “dyslexic students are 
referred to as „inactive learners‟”.  Even if this „qualified‟ form of automaticity 
can be acquired, it is not „automatically‟ acquired in the sense of child language 
acquisition
24.  With „qualified‟ automaticity, we are reminded here of our 
discussion of the notion of proficiency in its “thresholdist” and “holistic” variants 
explained in Chapter 1.  
 
These explanations nonetheless remain problematic, because the difference they 
make between „student‟ and „learner‟ is unclear, as is the degree to which 
metacognition and metalinguistic prowess depend on each other, or lead/follow 
one another.  Finally, if metalinguistic awareness is lacking, can either 
metalinguistic or metacognitive skills be used to solve „problems‟ the learner is 
not aware of?   
 
The discussion appears circular, and indeed Schneider and Crombie also refer to 
the “time to explicitly show the student […] what the logical, metalinguistic 
connection is between the new and the previously learned information” 
(Schneider and Crombie 2003, p. 47; emphasis added).  Does this amount to 
supporting the “highly dynamic nature of the inner self-correction dialogue, more 
or less spoke out loud at least at the semi-vocal level that the FL learner needs to 
master” (Schneider and Crombie 2003, p. 26), or can this translate as simple 
conditioning?   
 
Their discussion can peter out into the use of „multisensory ways‟ (p. 26) which 
allow dyslexics to compensate for auditory and/or visual weaknesses, though it is 
up to the educator to „analyse the underlying linguistic thinking steps that lead to a 
correct response‟ (ibid.). Hence, they require the dyslexic language learner to be 
consciously able to map fairly advanced metacognitive skills across onto depleted 
metalinguistic ones in order to develop „qualified‟, deliberately-acquired, 
automaticity.  They consciously equate (p.17) productive automaticity with 
„overlearning‟, which is not further defined or referenced, all in the context of 
producing greater „learner autonomy‟ (ibid, viii). 
                                            
24 In the limited, simple sense that universally, unexceptional child language acquisition is 
irresistible, spontaneous and, initially, child-led. 
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3.5.4 Schneider and Crombie: a predictive focus 
 
In summary, then, Schneider and Crombie (2003) are neutral on automaticity of 
input or uptake in unexceptional first-language acquisition.  Thus, they do not 
posit any level of automaticity of output even in unexceptional L1 acquisition.  
But they  do, however, directly relate depleted first-language acquisition to 
impaired second-language learning in the case of dyslexics, and further anticipate 
depleted, or at least, non-automatic and very effortful „overlearning‟ output in the 
L2 among dyslexic foreign language learning subjects.  I explore the data for 
confirmatory instances later. 
 
In the next chapter, I consider how these varying approaches to and assumptions 
about „automaticity‟ cohere with the evidence of the students, educators and 
support workers I interviewed.  In due course, I will map these assumptions back 
to the notion of proficiency, and the specifics of modern foreign language 
teaching/learning in a particular H.E. institution, Wealdston University, in order to 
assess the degree of „fit‟ between these – as discussed in Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4 – Exploring the data 
 
 
Firstly, in this Chapter, I offer a reminder of the techniques which I used for data-
handling.  Then, in narrative form, I recount my exploration, analysis and 
interpretation of the data.  This analysis falls into several sections, which broadly 
correspond with the revised Research Questions I proposed in Chapter 1, and in 
which I seek to gauge the coherence between these sets of views themselves.  
 
In the final section I attempt to identify, in particular, what narrated evidence in 
the dyslexic respondents‟ reports emerges to support association between 
exponential automaticity and Proficiency and now, emerging from the data, 
agency.  In particular, I was interested in how anterior is agency in relation to 
other factors said to militate against adult second-language acquisition in the 
dyslexic students studied.  My final chapter will then trace the links between these 
concepts and the earlier parts of the thesis. 
 
4.1 Reduction and analysis of the data 
 
I analysed the data using NVivo 8.  The advantages and drawbacks of Grounded 
Theory were discussed in Chapter 3; however the NVivo 8 package allowed me 
both bottom-up and top-down analysis, and cross-comparison of concepts through 
hyper-linkages and some „quantitative‟-style variable („attribute‟) analysis of 
demographic and other data.  I have already mentioned the drawbacks of the 
analysis in terms of propositional reduction, decontextualisation, fragmentation; 
and loss of discourse features have already been mentioned too.  It was these 
drawbacks which accounted for my creating an (equally searchable) „researcher‟s 
narrative‟ in which, despite some loss of formatting, further conceptual case notes 
and methodological „memos‟ could be kept.  Conversely, I found positive 
advantages with an analytical tool of this nature in that it relieved some mental 
and memory overload, provided audit trail possibilities, and therefore encouraged 
efficient and robust working. I was also able to give conceptual mass to categories 
emerging in the data by referring to clear examples. 
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In this way, my qualitative data analysis tool NVivo 8 was used to find primary 
instances which referred to actual data citations, and secondaries which referred to 
my transcription notes retold as the “researcher narratives” and formed from 
instances at one remove from the „primaries‟.  My „tertiaries‟ are at a double 
remove from the data, and belong to the narratives which I constructed using 
propositions derived from the interview transcripts, but informed by contemporary 
notes.   These „dyslexic students‟ stories‟ are included in the Appendices, for the 
interest of the reader; and on occasions I cite these to foreground and concentrate 
(from sometimes diffuse responses) what I interpreted the respondent‟s message 
to be. 
 
 
4.2 Issues relating to automaticity, proficiency and dyslexia 
 
4.2.1. The „institutional dyslexics‟25:  the interplay of theory and personal 
theorising on issues around proficiency and automaticity. 
 
A first NVivo 8 scan of the direct, transcribed data, yielded no instances of the 
word „automaticity‟ originating, in terms, from the mouth of the respondents.  
This was unsurprising; indeed, the purpose of the research is to uncover implicit 
understandings and versions of this concept. 
 
Using the operators automatic OR automaticity immediately yielded 3 
„secondary‟ hits, cued from my analytical notes, as follows: 
 
1. Jess explained that French didn‟t „click‟ for him and hadn‟t sunk in over 
time, at school: 
 Yeah we did French, and … I think we started speaking … 
we started learning French, you were given a list of words 
which of course all looked the same and didn‟t know the 
meaning of, and it just ... I didn‟t click at all, it never sunk 
[sic] in at all[…] I got a Certificate, but that was quite easy 
to get. […] I‟d get the basic and then they‟d suddenly jump, 
and I just can‟t bridge that gap when it jumps to a … to 
                                            
25 I have changed the names, sometimes the gender, and other personal details of the respondents  - 
students, advisors, academic director - when this is not material, in accordance with the ethical 
attitude I have articulated in Appendix 1A. 
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another level, I can‟t get the words […] I can do the first 
stage, I can do a bit of the second stage, and the third stage 
– well, no chance. 
[Jess, NV 245-265] 
 
2. Jake, secondly, notes automaticity in others but reveals that automaticity 
struck him in an unexpectedly negative way: 
 It just happened to me today and I just get so stressed by it, 
and I mean it really is a horrible thing to have to… I mean 
it might not even be my dyslexia, but I immediately think, 
“I‟m not good enough to do this”, it‟s stopping me doing it 
so I‟m never going to cope with this, and this is my first 
assumption, that I can‟t do it.  And it‟s horrible.  […] And 
also people – some people just Really Don‟t Understand it, 
one of my family he does the same course as me, he just… 
he‟s the most undyslexic person you could ever imagine, 
you know, completely logical, can write an essay with just 
once to read it and still get a first … 
[Jake, NV331-335; original emphasis] 
 
3. Freesia too outlines difficulties at this level.  In the first instance,  
 
 I can read, but it‟s ... I linger over words a lot and... re-read 
things a lot because I‟ll get half-way through a paragraph 
and will have sort of forgotten what the point of it was, even 
though I‟ve said each word in my head, I don‟t ... I 
sometimes don‟t string them together to make sense.  […] 
With the alphabet, I can‟t pick... I can pick it up half way 
through but only at certain stages, so if I‟m trying to 
remember if f comes before h, I have to go you know d-e-f-
g-h.  
[Freesia, NV89, 351; emphasis added] 
 
Freesia explains: 
 
 It‟s not that I‟m not concentrating „cos I have quite a long 
attention span, but I‟m ... the processing ... somewhere 
between that and the actual taking the words off the page 
and putting them into the thought, it kind of mismatches 
and doesn‟t quite work so I‟ll be half way through the 
paragraph and not even ... I‟ll know the last 5 words I‟ve 
read but I don’t know what context it’s in so I haven‟t built 
up, like, a sort of internal story going on, when I‟m doing 
well.  
[Freesia, NV111] 
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So in the initial stage, it seemed to me that the institutional dyslexic students had 
encountered the concept of automaticity under four different guises: 
 An unrealised expectation (Jess) 
 negative automaticity (automatic self-doubt) (Jake) 
 loss of automaticity (or „tuning out‟ out) (Freesia) 
 unavailability of serial-and-parallel working (Freesia) 
 
 
I represented these early respondent insights using NVivo 8 models, and evolving 
them later: 
 
 
 
 Model 1 
 
 
 
4.2.2.1  Blocked automaticity 
 
Later, in Aggie‟s Transcription comments, I noted that Aggie (an EFL teacher 
also trying to learn foreign languages) was seeking automaticity in her own 
language studies, but could not reach it because something came to block it: 
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No the teaching is  ... and I do try ... I don‟t know, 
because I‟m a teacher trainer and I obviously teach in my 
way but I am quite […]  But basic teaching has to be... 
there has to be some sort of methodology, some sort of 
thought into it. 
[Aggie, NV71] 
 
It was just a very poor teacher and ... I don‟t know 
whether it was ... you know he was a teacher working in 
... a local college so ... and his attitude, he wasn‟t an 
unpleasant person, he was actually a very nice person, he 
just hadn‟t been properly trained.  
[Aggie, NV75] 
 
I realised that here that as a learner, Aggie has intellectual doubts about her 
teacher.  It appeared to me from Aggie‟s responses that if there is to be any 
“magic” to adult language acquisition, then a feet-of-clay realisation (T, though 
“very nice” above, is perceived as incompetent,  or otherwise lacking) may douse 
any spontaneous naturalistic acquisition or, in our terms, re-stimulated 
automaticity. 
 
Aggie made a second point when she stated that “there has to be some sort of 
methodology, some sort of thought into it.” [Aggie, NV71, above].  She seemed to 
be distancing herself from some assertions of the „communicativist‟, „exposure 
and interaction‟ school of language teaching espoused, for example, by the 
academic director and discussed in a later section of this Chapter.  In terms of 
automaticity of uptake, I could not extrapolate here what Aggie believes about 
what happens to „artificial‟ constructs and devised, non-naturalistic language 
(which Krashen, for example, would admit as „comprehensible input‟).  But I did 
note that Aggie reports teacher thought, method and content selection are an 
expectation and that their absence was a „negative‟ for her in terms of acquisition 
and uptake.  Indeed, in our interview, Aggie failed to respond to an invitation to 
discuss functional-situational syllabuses yet at the same time, is clear that she 
does not have the automatic uptake of her (non-dyslexic) sister: 
   
[So they definitely know they‟re coming onto a functional-
situational kind of syllabus course?]. 
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AGGIE:  Yes.  Yes.  But all of this class, nearly all the 
people said we go to Italy every year or “We‟re thinking of 
buying a holiday house there or a time-share in Italy”. [….]   
YVES:  Right.  So what we‟re kind of saying is that there is 
no way that Aggie believes that you can go into a culture, 
sit there, absorb the language, and it will happen all by 
itself, in the same way that a child learns a language ? 
AGGIE:  No I‟m not saying that at all, it doesn’t happen for 
me.  It happens for my sister.  
[Aggie, NV243-245; emphasis added] 
 
Aggie is therefore aware both of „automatic‟ uptake of a foreign language (her 
sister‟s capacity), and of her own incapacity in this respect. 
 
In these further views of automaticity (schematised into the „desiderata‟ and 
„reality‟ in Model 2, below) further delineations seemed to me to be emerging in 
the data: 
 
- automaticity as spontaneous naturalistic acquisition (from naturalistic 
sources) 
- automaticity of uptake – involuntary and seemingly untutored acquisition; 
and 
- automaticity of output – acquisition towards automatic assemblage and 
performance. 
 
Further models expand these delineations.  But I noted at this stage that a first 
schism (Schism 1, in Model 2) had arisen:  between what the respondents seem to 
desire, in early parts of their Interviews, and what they go on to report later, and in 
probes.  I will return to this schism, and identify another. 
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Model 2 
 
 
Further informing entries emerged. Lin seemed to suggest a “Not-yet 
automaticity”.  He appears to call upon an auto-feedback mechanism - a native-
speaker self-judgement of grammaticality based on heard evidence. So he is using 
the oral/aural route as a backup to visual analysis.  This is, however, not automatic 
as a volitional, or „conative‟, engagement is required. I had already included 
“Unrealised expectation” in Model 1; the present entry covers some similar 
ground to the extent that Lin has the expectation of automaticity, that is to say, the 
belief or assumption that it exists, in others.  But in his own case, Lin requires an 
act of will – deliberate checking - in the form of phonological back-up.  We can 
look at the original transcript here: 
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Figure 3 – Lin‟s transcript 
 
[Lin NV62; here, 181-189 in Original Transcript] 
 
 
Lin can achieve in language, using written criticality judgements based on many 
considerations including many phonological, grapheme/phoneme routes (“they 
sound nice”) and non-phonological ones, discoursal felicity conditions, and 
possible propriocentric feedback if he is subvocalising
26
 (see discussion in 
Bruinsma 1980); but this checking will cost him processing speed and hence, 
automaticity of output.   
 
4.2.2.2  Automaticity as exponential 
 
I discussed this concept previously in chapters 1 and 3.  Exponentiality refers to a 
notion in which both uptake and output of language can be described as 
spontaneous, irresistible, dynamic, iterative, open-ended and, in unexceptional 
subjects, permanent:  that is, not overwriting itself but conversely, capable of 
„exponential‟ growth, using what it has learnt in order to learn more. When 
exponential automaticity occurs, the learner can understand and create a nearly 
                                            
26 The literature discussed in Bruinsma (1980) also refers to covert speech, inner speech and 
implicit speech.  Dyslexia literatures, also, refer to absence or depletion of this feature; see e.g. 
Frith (1985) on Phonological Deficits and Wolf (1997) on Phonological Decoding Deficits. 
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endless supply of novel utterances, not all of which have been explicitly taught or 
modelled. 
 
Issues in exponentiality raised by Lin covered several areas.  Firstly, Lin himself 
stated (NV110 et seq., original transcript 320-321), that he couldn‟t at first 
transfer his classroom knowledge of French into interactive, exponential and 
creative longer-term work.  Secondly, despite being able to use short term, 
discrete packages, he did not always attain long-term acquisition or growth in his 
language from what he had learnt: 
   
 “I could go home and study one thing, one section of a text 
book and learn that, but then when you combined with all 
the other exceptions and all the other things which is hard - 
after four years of French, to have four years of 
experience”) . 
   [Lin, NV116; emphasis added] 
 
 Nor does Lin feel capable of extrapolation or parallel running.  He can only do 
things in series, whereas the concept of exponential automaticity implies that both 
should be operative. In Lin‟s own words,  
 
  “If I‟m given one task at a time, one simple task at a time, I 
can do it very well but this is … as soon as I have too many 
things at once, that‟s when I can‟t choose one of them, I 
can‟t decide […] it‟s almost like an obsessive-compulsive 
thing, but it‟s only in relation to doing work.  It‟s not in 
relation to my life in general”. 
     [Lin, NV136] 
 Though he has not used the word himself, he cannot achieve automaticity and 
indeed, thirdly, what acquisition of rules and exceptions in e.g. French grammar 
Lin can manage atomistically and synchronically will not see organic and 
diachronic growth, or serial-and-parallel working.  Lastly, I found a clue (Lin 
(NV245-251) that mere attempts at exponentiality in fact lead Lin in the opposite 
direction: towards the exact reverse of automaticity, and moving to de-automation 
and shut-down.  I shall refer to this again later when I consider questions relating 
to agency, as Lin proposes an informative causal explanation relating secondarily 
to his dyslexia.  
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These further polarities on automaticity, illustrated in Models 3 and 4 below, 
highlighted  the following, for me. 
 
On the positive side, there are the possibilities of: 
 Interactive, creative exponentiality 
 Transcendence of „chunking‟, or holophrastic and piecemeal learning 
 
On the negative side, I noted the inclusion of 
 de-automation, the converse of, and loss of, automaticity;  and  
 strategic escape into micro-planning, as modelled below (Model 3).   
 
Aggie had already invoked this when she reported losing what I might call here 
the „seduction‟ into acquiring - because she gets nervous for the teacher.  Lin is 
also informative here on the interference, ironically, of his own „coping‟ 
strategies.  Once again we can see a trace of de-automation in his original 
transcript entries: 
 
 
     
[Lin NV191 et seq.;  520-526, Original Transcript] 
 
Figure 4 – Lin on interference and de-automation 
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As Lin had said himself, “I just shut down” when attempting holistic working. 
 
  
 
Model 3 
 
In Model 3, above, we can see how Lin is failing to reach his ideal of automatic, 
effortless and endlessly creative output.  This is because, in his view, he becomes 
de-automated through non-holistic chunking, i.e. he only holds and surrenders, (or 
only takes up and puts out), isolated fragments.  These can be slowly gathered, 
assembled and outputted; but they do not feed back into an expanding reservoir 
for future use.  
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Model 4 
 
 
It seemed to me that Carmen had another form of de-automation: 
 
 [Reading] takes a long, long time.  I tend to read things out 
loud to get the gist of them … I tend to sit there and read 
the same thing over and over on the same page and it won‟t 
sink in at all. […] I tend to be OK with presentations, 
actually, I tend to make sure that I‟m prepared enough to 
write but I will lose … I will lose words but it tends to 
happen in everyday life as well, I‟ll know what I‟m trying 
to say and … emmm … I just can‟t find the right … the 
way to express it.  And it ends up with me skirting round, 
trying to find my way round through into what I’m thinking. 
 [Carmen, NV25, 51; emphasis added] 
 
She adds, of the opera singing which will be her career when she completes her 
Music degree, 
 
  I get a huge well obviously not a panic it‟s just nerves, it‟s 
like “Shit I can‟t remember the words” and I can‟t 
remember the next word so I do a great line in made-up 
German and made-up French […] I did the Schiller and the 
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Frau Liebe of Weber last week and I‟d been doing the 
rehearsing for my performance thing since the last term, 
and we‟ve been practising for hours every day and I still … 
it just still doesn’t click in, it just doesn‟t, I don‟t know 
why. 
 
 
[Carmen, NV516-522; 2nd emphasis added] 
 
I will term this secondary de-automation, where Carmen is apparently rendered 
dyslexic because of what she herself regards as a working memory problem. 
 
Sandy, conversely, uses memory in order to circumvent the automaticity he 
perceives himself as lacking: 
 
 
SANDY: Sometimes it‟s just a case of bludgeoning 
the word in there, like “This is how it has to be spelt [sic], 
there is no other way about it”. 
YVES: So you definitely lay down a particular 
spelling, you remember it, you can see it written down in 
your mind, or…? 
SANDY: Emm – it‟s more of the hand-action to write 
the word. 
[Sandy, NV229-231]. 
    
 
Sandy appears to be using this kinetic or dynamic memory strategically, to 
emulate automaticity and to over-ride the visual recognition problem he has.  He 
will also rely on cueing by others, as in this example captured “in vivo” during 
Sandy‟s interview: 
 
SANDY:  I... I‟m not something to be fixed, it‟s my 
own little problem and I‟ll make all the little... what‟s the 
word I‟m looking for... ummm …?  
YVES: Adjustments, or…? 
SANDY : [loudly] YES! 
       [Sandy, NV191] 
 
I wondered at the time whether causally, Sandy‟s de-automation could be 
considered clinical and the result of tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon or a mild 
developmental aphasia, though such causality is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Millie also presents partial and sometimes implicit accounts of automaticity.  
Indeed, she herself proposes tip-of-the-tongue as an explanation for her impaired 
output: 
 
 OK.  Well I often can‟t find the words to say what I want to 
say.  I often find it difficult to structure what I mean – so it 
tends to be when I write things down, I write down 
everything and then I can edit it to what I actually mean - 
eventually.  Sometimes I have difficulty in concentrating on 
what people are saying, and I just have mind blanks or… 
and in terms of reading?  Yeah.  I often read the same over 
and over again but like completely wrong and just not 
realise it, or yeah I‟ll read things and put different meanings 
on them because I‟ve read it wrongly.  Emmm – and yeah 
it‟s generally just this tip-of-the-tongue thing where I know 
what I want to say but I can find the words to say it.  
 [Millie, NV9] 
 
More interesting for me was that Millie may imagine she has a specific deficit 
with semantic automaticity:  to recall a word‟s meaning she can “shout them out 
in my head” [Millie, NV354], a sort of long-circuiting of her problem. Further, 
Millie seemed to have something of an expectation of automaticity in that she 
expected words to „speak to her‟, that is, for their sense individually and 
collectively to become available to her at semantic level, without any long 
graphological-to-phonological – a „hearing them in one‟s head‟ type access.  
Millie neither confirms nor denies she has this intervening, phonological stage.  
But implicitly, if she is not getting the semantics when she looks at certain items, 
this is her reported approach.  Finally, Millie appears to believe in automaticity 
„by proxy‟:  whereas she cannot, herself, deal with certain items or gain access, 
she “would just presume that they would understand what I meant” [Millie, 
NV390]. 
 
Jess, conversely, does have visual automaticity, of sorts, but a phonological 
blockage:  he has difficulties with making relevant responses.  This may signal 
autistic spectrum disorder difficulties again beyond the scope of this study
27
.  
However the de-automation he experiences also stems from launching into 
production before he has completed assemblage, thus we should widen our 
                                            
27 Though the advisors will refer to autism too, tangentially; vide infra, section 4.2.2. 
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discussion of automaticity and indeed, fluency to include automaticity of pre-
output.  Jess, in his professional life, has input automaticity in dealing with circuit 
diagrams, they speak to him directly, he can “spot quite easily” [Jess, NV280] 
what they are telling him, as there is no phonological route.  
 
 Like Millie, above, Jess can „borrow‟ automaticity from an interlocutor:    
 
 You get the feedback from the person, that makes it much easier to 
produce the next part because it sort of meshes within and you‟ve 
got that interaction‟s flowing  
[Jess, NV529]. 
 
 Whereas Millie appeals to „proxy‟ automaticity, Jess employs „discourse-
sustained‟ automaticity. In these cases, however, I noted again two things: 
 
 a) The assumption in the respondent that there is automaticity, at least in 
others, and that they themselves lack it, like Sandy above and Sam, below; 
and 
b)  These further automaticity items (proxy, and discourse-sustained) are 
untaught strategies for dealing with their „different‟ language qualities. 
 
As regard what follows, I observed that one or more items of successful non-
language automaticity (for example, well-rehearsed „work-around‟ strategies) can 
be used to shore up missing or depleted language automaticity.  Such „substitute‟ 
automaticity will also find echoes and equivalents in a later discussion of 
phronesis within the general, coherentist framework of the study. 
 
Sam too has a difficulty: 
 
 Errr... [pause] not really, I‟ve just always known I‟ve found 
it a little bit more difficult to read and write and all this ... 
sort of things, an ... I don‟t really know exactly why that is, 
and why I find it more difficult. Emmm... er... as I said 
maybe it‟s because I rush things sometimes, but well I often 
just... stop... the way things come easy to people... 
[Sam, NV14]. 
         
Sam doesn‟t have a „personal‟ expectation of automaticity – but he too, like Sandy 
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and others in the cohort, believes in automaticity in others (“the way things come 
easy to others”, [Ibid.]; and “I didn‟t want people to know I hadn‟t read the book, 
„cos everyone seemed to be able to read these books so easily and I couldn‟t, I 
could just never get into them” [Sam, NV266).  Indeed, his effortful attempts can 
prove counter-productive, and I will now distinguish between induced and 
elective de-automation.  The former is involuntary but the second, an act of will, 
or lack of will.  Sam distinguishes between his resting „mind‟ and „really thinking 
about‟ things:  
 
 The spelling and the grammar behind it, I‟ve never really had the mind for 
it, it‟s just never really come easy to me.  I‟ve always had to really think 
about it. 
 
[Sam, NV16]. 
 
It appeared to me that one part of Sam‟s mind is unsuited to language acquisition, 
whereas another is suited to problem-solving and rule-learning.  Further, Sam can 
work towards recall of lexical items (though probably not full, „exponential‟ 
automaticity).  He stated there are two stages in his learning of words:  hard graft 
for recall of spelling but then, frequency of input can step in and give some 
automaticity of recall. “It‟s true, if I learn a word, then I can spell it right, if I see 
words often enough then I‟ll remember how to spell them.” [Sam, NV46]. 
 
From Sam‟s discussion [Sam, NV37 et seq.], de-automation by overwrite seems 
to be a factor. In this scenario, respondents may not have a diagnosable, primary 
linguistic deficit as such - but they may, conversely, rewrite the rule or lexical 
labels and wipe the previous trace each time – what I shall term (after the film of  
that name) a „Groundhog Day‟ de-automation.  Sam can overcome this because he 
has a phonological escape-route.  But any success he obtains is in suppressing this 
trait, and not through an improvement of the basic linguistic functions.  However, 
respondents like Sam are stuck in the present, can‟t „get lost‟ in their reading, or 
sustain a flight of writing or get into the „flow‟ I described earlier. 
 
Pat, a science student, presented me with a double dilemma around automaticity:  
another version of „elective‟ de-automation, which I will compare to the 
involuntary version which affects others on the cohort.  Pat‟s „elective‟ de-
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automation is qualitatively different to Sam‟s.  Sam may well give up; however 
Pat phrases his dilemma thus: 
 
I tend to read quite a lot... for someone of my age group, let 
alone a dyslexic! […]  If I read a sentence, for instance, and 
I‟m not paying very much attention to it, then I‟ll read 
something different. 
 [Pat, NV31]. 
 
 Pat is another student who cannot „get lost‟ in a text and read on „autopilot‟ 
because if he does, lexical items will trip him up.  This is one dilemma:  
automaticity versus accuracy. Pat needs to read with a certain precision, as a 
science student. But as a science student, Pat is beset by another dilemma.  He 
will plough through „difficult‟ text, but be interrupted by „easier‟ texts:  he is more 
likely to worry over not understanding or misunderstanding „easy‟ things.  This 
may well be another reason why „science‟ dyslexics may fail to be identified as 
such earlier in their studies:  they crash-read adequately for gist, up to a certain 
level.  Pat explains, 
 
If I‟m reading something very technical then I‟d probably 
assume I‟m not understanding and just carry on reading, 
but if I‟m reading Harry Potter for example and it‟s not 
making sense then I‟ll think it‟s my mistake, probably, 
because it‟s not desperately tough.  
 
[Pat, NV39]. 
 
Petey, finally, presented me with an interesting view on automaticity and de-
automation:  in his case the de-automation occurred not only at local semantic 
level – word-meanings, in strings he has read – but also at a higher level:  the 
narratological and discoursal.  His problem is best explained in his own words: 
 
PETEY: […] I mean it‟s not just a case of my mind 
wandering, it‟s more I read all the words and they‟re just 
words, rather than coherent sentences. 
YVES:  Right. 
PETEY: They just jumble. 
YVES:  You‟re not getting a message. 
PETEY: I don‟t get a message from... I don‟t get the 
narrative, I just get a load of words.  
YVES:  You get a load of words.  When you‟re getting this 
load of words, are you… understanding generally what‟s 
107 
happening, or the reasons behind why the author‟s writing, 
do you think? 
PETEY: You mean like the gist of the story? 
YVES:  Mmmm-hmmm.   
PETEY: Yeah I mean pretty… it depends how complicated 
the piece of writing is but… I find… yeah I ... I… I‟ll either 
completely miss it and have to read it again, or ... there‟s 
different levels I suppose, it depends, it really depends on 
how I read it.  I have to read every word. 
  YVES:  Right, OK. 
PETEY: And I have to read them as a whole piece rather 
than as… because I tend to read them as separate words, 
like if I look at a whole line, of words, I can‟t necessarily 
take in the whole line and then in a linear order or see some 
in the middle and some at the beginning and… Just 
jumbled, really. 
YVES:  It‟s just a jumble for you.  OK. 
PETEY: Yeah. 
[Petey, NV31-43] 
 
As with Pat before him, Petey gets interrupted.  However, it is not primarily the 
accuracy of his intellectual understanding of a science topic, nor the recall of what 
specific words represent which is at issue, but following a story – critically.  As he 
says above, “... I don‟t get the narrative, I just get a load of words” [Ibid.].   
narratological input automaticity is in play, here:  identifying, holding and 
comprehending a narrative.  Jess, earlier, managed this - but only with interlocutor 
support. 
 
 
Modelling these further descriptors, the contributions of Carmen, Millie, Jess, 
Sam and Pat, Petey can be visualised thus, in Model 5:  
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Model 5 
 
4.2.2   I turn now to the Advisors [Jillie and Dave, below], and the interplay of 
theory and personal theorising on issues around proficiency and automaticity in 
their responses.  The advisors have a generalist role in offering personal, 
emotional and academic advice to students in a particular School or unit of the 
university, and offering informed referrals to other parts of the student support 
structure.  They also possess together with knowledge of the examination and 
disciplinary structures.  They typically have formal qualifications in counselling 
and/or social work. Jillie is qualified in Modern Languages; Dave has confided 
that he has a dyslexic son. 
 
Several items make their views on proficiency and automaticity apparent.  But I 
found that these views were, in certain ways, at odds with those stated by the 
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Dyslexic Students Cohort majority:  indeed, the advisors only accept the notion of 
„automaticity‟ implicitly, and with reservations.  I will consider the advisors‟ 
phronetic position in due course – they advance certain a-theoretical, pragmatic 
arguments for dealing with dyslexic students – but I also noted that theirs were not 
wholly concordant views, even between two advisors, notwithstanding the 
narratological interest in their performed responses exemplified by the next 
Footnote. 
 
Jillie in particular seemed to me to hanker after something like the grammar-
translation model of second language teaching - or at least, a model in which overt 
grammar structure teaching is a necessary engine for exponential language 
growth: 
 
 I‟ve always thought that … oh, I don‟t know, I‟m not surp ... I 
think that the way English is taught in Junior Schools is very bad 
[Advisors, NV272] 
 
 
Jillie never states that automaticity is or should be „untaught‟ and emerge 
naturalistically.  But she did seem to believe in a worsening of formal grammar 
teaching in schools.  In addition, Jillie makes an explicit link between L1 strength 
and L2 success, and wants overtly developed metalinguistic awareness as a 
precondition for L2 leaning/acquisition: 
 
It‟s no wonder students find learning foreign languages difficult 
when … well basically we‟re not really taught our own grammar 
very well, and I think that does have an effect on difficulty.  
[Advisors, NV272]. 
 
Indeed, Jillie seemed to be proposing a causal chain, linking between overt, 
descriptive grammar teaching and the evolving of metalinguistic knowledge, then 
between metalinguistic knowledge and the evolving of exponential automaticity. I 
was left feeling that for Jillie dyslexia was, by extension, a depleted association 
between all three:  metalinguistic knowledge, overt descriptive grammar 
knowledge, and exponential automaticity. 
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Advisor Dave drew an interesting parallel between dyslexia and autism, 
proposing that in some cases the „dyslexia‟ is a failure at social language, a failure 
at „sub-text‟ identification, a failure at the „unsaid‟, at detecting ironies (which can 
involve comic negations or opposites).  Aspergers‟ autism may be marked by this, 
Dave explains below, but so may early stages of both unexceptional L1 and L2 
learning/acquisition: 
 
DAVE: I found when I was teaching some dyslexics that 
some of them were very good at learning rules and 
working with rules, and that often when I was 
working them I would … you know, see a sentence 
as a sentence like kind of naturally but they‟d be 
applying a rule / 
JILLIE: / yeah /
28
 
DAVE: / and God we‟re thinking in two different ways, 
they were very good on rules about all sorts of 
things, actually, a little bit kind of like Asperger‟s 
type of way of looking at things,  
JILLIE: / oh yeah / 
DAVE: / a kind of very formal way, everything is 
compartmentalised, they have systems for 
everything, some of them, the colour-coded thing as 
well, and some of them lived very well because 
they‟d internalised a whole set of rules, and that got 
them through everything. Yermmm.  
[Advisors, NV281 et seq.]. 
 
The advisors here seem to be proposing an example of failed automaticity 
stemming from the narratological-discoursal underdevelopment which 
characterised Petey‟s responses in the preceding section.  In this case, we would 
not be looking at a failure systematically to generalise individual rules. The failure 
is either in obtaining interactivity and pragmatic, native-speaker grammaticality 
compromises between these rules – or in overgeneralising these rules.  But we can 
at least speak of Dave‟s proposed sub-automatic „rule-internalisation‟. 
 
                                            
28 I used conversational analysis conventions in transcribing as I was struck by the amount of 
overlap and turn-taking and -giving between the two advisors, who have social work backgrounds 
and seemed to be finishing each others‟ sentences and thus, sharing a narrative.  I continued this 
practice later, when I noted I was doing the same thing with a respondent. 
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I address phronetic issues specifically in a later sub-section, but the advisors‟ 
evidence struck me at this stage, because it appeared inconsistent.  On the one 
hand, Jillie advises, 
 
 Structure and grammatical structure [sic
29] aren‟t the same across 
the different languages anyway, are they, so?  In fact in some ways 
maybe sometimes it‟s easier, I was just beginning to think in some 
languages, other languages.  
[Advisors, NV262] 
 
The advisors‟ answer is to doubt severity, arguing by implication that for someone 
to have progressed so far, the condition cannot have been too bad and only their 
academic study skills may be in deficit:  
 
We do see even at MA level how difficult some students seem to 
find – and these aren‟t dyslexic students necessarily, I don‟t know 
they are or not, but students who wouldn‟t consider themselves 
dyslexic how difficult they find sometimes writing coherent 
sentences. 
 [Advisors, NV274]  
 
But automaticity, for advisor Dave, is rooted in successful parsing using the 
oral/aural route: 
 
If you just think in terms of a sentence, most of us, we know when 
something‟s a sentence (or not) just naturally, because it doesn‟t 
sound right if not, but other people might analyse it to see whether 
it‟s a sentence or not, because they can‟t hear whether it‟s a 
sentence.  
[Advisors, NV289; emphasis added] 
 
So for advisor Dave, „input‟ automaticity requires effortless phonological parsing 
of novel utterances, and an underlying metalinguistic framework upon which to 
found grammaticality judgements „just naturally‟.  Strictly speaking, Dave‟s 
contribution was too slight for me to attribute an „innateness‟ argument to what he 
suggested (where does the underlying metalinguistic framework come from?); but 
I noted earlier that Lin appeals to such a mechanism too in judging accuracy, 
well-formedness and felicity.   
 
Model 6 below maps the automaticity „terrain‟ of the advisors‟ responses: 
                                            
29 „Syntax‟ may have been intended here. 
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Model  6 
 
We can note visually that the Advisors connect with „DYSLEXIA‟ but do not 
connect directly with „EXPONENTIAL AUTOMATICITY‟, though they have a 
position both as accepting and being arbiters for „partial‟ forms of automaticity.  
Their interaction with language students up to and into DSS (disabled student 
status is influenced by their other responsibilities and interests (see for example 
their useful but idiosyncratic association of autism and dyslexia, discussed above).  
This being said, Jillie and Dave‟s criteria are often norm-referenced to idealised 
descriptors, notably their „relative‟ automaticity (where one language can be 
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deemed intrinsically harder than another, or where they doubt the „dyslexia‟ 
descriptor on the basis of the student‟s performance up to that point). 
 
I note, however, that de-automation has not been a concept in their responses, so 
it is not included in Model 6. 
 
4.2.3 The academic director:  the interplay of theory and personal theorising 
on issues around proficiency and automaticity 
 
The academic director (Derek) presents a number of stances.  The variedness of 
his responses is consistent with his varied roles:  overall director of an non-
academic
30
 teaching unit; head of section of an English Language Teaching unit; 
an internally-competing fund-holder and seeker of external funds; co-ordinator 
and ultimate maker or breaker of British Council and other academic and 
commercial accreditations; and modern languages and later, ELT graduate in his 
own right, to mention but a few.  So much for variedness; I will return to any 
internal variability or inconsistency within his positions later in this chapter, but 
also in the final discussion chapter when I contrast emerging theoretical with 
narratological and phronetic issues. 
 
4.2.3.1  Automaticity „versus‟ exposure and interaction 
 
At first sight, Derek, the academic director, appears to hold the simple view that 
Automaticity is not „singly‟ useful as a concept:  the keys to acquisition are 
exposure to, and interaction with, the second language.   We have discussed the 
origins of this view earlier:  it is „communicativist‟ and interactionist, and not hard 
„nativist‟ in the sense of irresistible and untaught.  We note also that this is a 
learning theory derived ultimately from L1 acquisition.  His comment arises in a 
short discussion of „context of learning‟, and refers to Japanese students learning 
English at Wealdston: 
 
                                            
30 A non-academic unit in this usage is one which is not funded through research but through a 
mixture of central and/or internal „top-slice‟ funding and external commercial work. 
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 YVES:  So it‟s a question of volume, the amount of stuff 
you get in the foreign language – you can‟t switch it off 
because you are in Wealdston rather in Tokyo and it‟s just 
there, in massive quantities, exponential quantities of target 
language. 
DEREK:  Yes.  It‟s not ... it‟s not exposure alone, I mean - 
it‟s got ... there‟s  got to be some kind of interaction – I 
think there was a study
31
 done in Holland where they sat 
children down in front of televisions and played them hours 
and hours and hours of English television and that didn‟t do 
very much for them / 
YVES:  Right / 
DEREK: / but it‟s the combination of the exposure and the 
interaction. 
[The academic director, NV78-81] 
 
However, we need to contrast this apparent view with the response to a question 
about the value of sending modern languages students abroad for an Erasmus 
Year, particularly if they are dyslexic.  So the following exchange no longer 
concerns Japanese-to-UK exchanges, but UK-to-EU ones.  Derek states: 
 
We‟ve come to a decision that students need to be of a certain 
standard in terms of proficiency with the language before they go 
on the year abroad and we‟ve done that for their good, and I don‟t 
think that we should change that. 
[The academic director, NV123] 
 
The word „proficiency‟ is mentioned here and I needed to analyse what the 
academic director understood by it.  
 
Year Abroad students are specifically excluded from attending courses in their 
native language and/or laid on particularly for them.  So it might be assumed that 
one purpose at least of their year abroad is to improve in their target language, 
over and above any „content‟ acquisition which may take place – say, a 
geographer acquiring deeper subject-knowledge through European research-based 
teaching in German or French.   
 
Conversely, attaining proficiency entails reaching automaticity in the face of 
unpredictability.  And if the assumption is that dyslexics cannot reach such 
                                            
31 Kuppens (2010) reviews such studies, but adds that recent evidence from subtitled viewing 
presents the opposite view, that is, enhanced uptake of English. 
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automaticity in the face of unpredictability (they have no exponential growth in 
their language ability), then there are circularities at work.  Why? 
 
Firstly, this dents the idea that modern languages degrees with their year abroad 
offer added value because of the inimitable, unpredictable and not always 
controlled interactions with native speaker/users.  These interactions are not only 
deemed to give perfecting and uplift of the student‟s language-skills up towards 
native-speaker norms.  They are also used to legitimate „proficiency‟ testing of a 
nature described here in Chapter 1 as „holistic‟:  that is, deliberately testing of off-
syllabus items not specifically included in direct teaching, but which a „proficient‟ 
learner might be expected to be able to deal with. 
 
Were this to be the case, then the consequence might be that dyslexics should 
NOT be sent onto a year abroad.  When we discussed this, the academic director 
was insistent:  proficiency is gradable and not „yes/no‟; and not only this, but 
gradable before exposure on a year abroad. In his words, 
 
  “We‟ve thought about it carefully, and we‟ve come to a 
decision that students need to be of a certain standard in 
terms of proficiency with the language before they go on 
the year abroad and we‟ve done that for their good, and I 
don‟t think that we should change that.”  
 
 [The academic director, NV123] 
 
 Further, in this case, discrimination is required.  In terms of modern languages 
students, currently an Honours degree is not possible without a year abroad – only 
„Spanish Studies‟ or „French Studies‟ etc. will be obtained and subsequent 
avenues, curtailed (teaching, translation studies, competition for higher degree 
places or funding).  It occurred to me that a modern languages dyslexic might now 
need to persuade the Institution that s/he was never dyslexic at all, or had 
„recovered‟ sufficiently from the condition in order to get onto a year abroad.  
 
4.2.3.2  Re-launching acquisition 
 
In a further exchange, The academic director offers an important, qualifying 
concession: 
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[YVES: So something of an Integrative Motivation but 
Group Integrative Motivation with their peers is a 
strong engine, you‟ve said, for that. 
DEREK:  Mmmm.  Mmmmmmmm. 
YVES: Good.]  And they‟re going beyond mere learning 
and going to language classes in Paris, in the French 
setting, to acquiring mechanisms slightly more, you 
think. 
DEREK: Yes.  If you want make the distinction – if you 
want to make Krashen‟s distinction between 
learning and acquisition, I would say yes, they have 
the opportunity to acquire … 
 YVES: Well I don‟t want to make Krashen‟s 
distinction!  But in that direction, so.  Absolutely, 
good.  So you – yes, Question 15 “re-engagement of 
acquisition is expected in the year abroad country 
for adults”32, so it‟s not expected, it is something 
which possibly can be expected, but it‟s not an 
expectation as such. 
 DEREK: Yep.  I think so. 
[The academic director, NV98 et seq.] 
 
There is, in his view, if not a gamble then certainly an open-endedness involved in 
year abroad arrangements and evolving language skills.  This ambivalence may 
further justify his view of the possible pointlessness of foreign study for dyslexics. 
 
The academic director takes us further still away from models of automatic, 
exponential or indeed, effortless acquisition in the following discussion: 
 
YVES: French, German, Spanish, Italian, those sorts of 
courses would be aiming to get … to measure our 
students against some sort of idealised Native 
Speaker of that language, would you say. 
DEREK: I … 
  YVES: Or is it a case of shifting from point A to point B? 
DEREK: I wouldn‟t say that; I don‟t think so.  And I don‟t 
think that we really aim for that on our General 
English courses.  […]  In terms of Modern 
Languages, I would think you‟d need to go higher 
than that, but I don‟t think you‟re necessarily trying 
to turn out people who are like Native Speakers, 
completely like Native Speakers. 
                                            
32
 Question 15:   It will be remembered that the advisors and the academic director were 
interviewed to a protocol broadly similar to that used with the original dyslexic respondents; these 
are included in Appendix 3. 
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YVES:  So we‟re going more for criteria rather than/ 
DEREK:  / yes  
YVES:  / than absolutes 
DEREK: / yes 
YVES:  / and Native Speaker Levels.  
 DEREK: Yes. 
[The academic director, NV62 et seq.]. 
 
Thus, the academic director, Derek, confirms his belief:  “- So we’re going more 
for criteria rather than absolutes and Native Speaker Levels. - Yes” [ibid.].  In his 
view, the teaching unit should be sticking to GP (general purpose) and / or forms 
of MLAP (modern languages for academic purposes, cf. EAP) teaching with no 
assumptions of exponential growth in the direction of native speaker levels.   
 
Proficiency is therefore, for the academic director, “adequate communication of 
meaning” according to criteria and not to norms.  But importantly for what 
follows, this definition of proficiency centres upon agency, performance and 
intercommunicative success.   
 
A discontinuity, however, arises.  To a probe about the levels addressed by the 
new modern languages syllabus, his response changes: 
 
DEREK:  [We will] use the ALTE
33
 levels, and so 
actually in theory that‟s what we should be doing, because 
each of the language courses should be pegged, and I think 
the curriculum documents say that, they should be pegged 
to certain ALTE levels and certainly we use ALTE levels 
for our English Language courses. 
YVES:   What is your understanding of the influence 
of Native Speaker proficiency - as opposed to being 
referenced to various criteria of things you can do with the 
language - in the way that we teach certainly Modern 
Foreign Languages, at The University of Wealdston? 
DEREK: […] Well it‟s an educated native speaker, 
which I suppose you can understand in a way, for a 
qualification which is aiming to tell Universities – give 
Universities information about this person‟s language 
                                            
33 ALTE Levels refer to, and correspond to, the Council of Europe‟s Common European 
Framework such that the Council of Europe‟s Levels A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, C2 cross-refer 
respectively to ALTE Levels 0 to 5.  ALTE also produces a series of „Can Do‟ Statements – about 
400 – for 3 principal subject areas of Social & Tourism, Work, and Study and each of these is 
subdivided, by Level (0 to 5) into Listening and Speaking, Writing, and Reading statements of 
what language users at that Level can do in a particular language. 
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abilities.  But certainly, there is an example of a scale, or a 
reference as it were, which does refer to Native Speakers 
and … and says that the top level even is beyond some 
Native Speakers. 
 
[The academic director, NV55 et seq.; emphasis added]. 
 
Derek refers above to pegging, suggesting that the courses, on paper, should 
appear to be anchored in acceptable national levels framed as outcomes – and also 
pegged to a notion of native speaker proficiency.  There is a risk that this be taken 
as licence to engage in „naturalistic acquisition‟ type teaching, a downgraded 
version of the „communicative‟ teaching I described earlier.  This sort of 
„naturalistic‟ teaching assumes that L2 acquisition mimics native speaker L1 
acquisition. It seemed to me that the academic director, Derek, had simply 
contradicted himself.  He does want to vaunt „native-speaker-pegged outcomes‟– 
but in this way, these are ultimately norms. To which, according to many 
definitions of dyslexia, these students cannot aspire.  Conversely, Derek identified 
that the top level is not systematically accessible to all native speakers either. 
 
 
A further issue arose for me in considering the academic director‟s view of 
teaching towards „proficiency‟.  Derek responds tellingly to a question about the 
effects of outside bodies - examination authorities, for example – on the taught 
syllabus and how this interacts with a student‟s internal language-learning 
syllabus.  Elsewhere in the interview, Derek had espoused „informed eclecticism‟ 
as the house teaching style, and he went on to make this qualification: 
 
YVES:  Can we be “Informed Eclectic” all the way down 
the line with the Examining Bodies, the Outside Bodies, or 
do they control us in any way? 
DEREK: Well I think that Informed Eclecticism is … part of 
it is that it‟s horses for courses.  I means in terms of the 
Cambridge … let‟s take the Cambridge Exams since you‟ve 
raised those, there is, on the one hand there is a ... the 
examination is made up of several different papers.  I mean 
one of the papers is the Use of English Paper, and so really, 
in order to prepare students for that examination, you have 
to look at the kinds of tasks, questions that come up and 
deal with those, and that would be a fairly kind of … I 
suppose traditional look at grammar structures, but also … 
also certain lexical things, not only grammar.  But on the 
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other hand, the …the Oral for the Cambridge exams - 
which is worth a fair bit, I think it‟s worth more than the 
usual kind of cursory 5 or 10% - is … is in the form of a 
conversation in pairs, with students given certain 
communication tasks to do, and so it‟s very … very 
definitely targeted at how well students can communicate 
and interact / 
YVES:  Right. 
DEREK: / thoroughly, so … so it is … it would be more 
academic, more focused I suppose on grammar, reading and 
writing than a General English course. 
 
[The academic director, NV38 et seq.]. 
 
Several things emerge from this.  His view is in response to a question about the 
grammar-translation model of language teaching (still well-evidenced in European 
language-teaching programmes), and justifying its (mainly) non-use in UK 
modern languages institutions.   
 
But what Derek has stated is that for English proficiency exams, such as those set 
and tested by Cambridge and required for entry to UK universities, then there is 
indeed a grammar syllabus.  However what is unanswered is the place or 
involvement of the students‟ own acquisition syllabus or order – and the student‟s 
conative „agency‟ as discussed below, in addition to her existing psycholinguistic 
skills.  What seems to be really tested in this „proficiency‟ model under „Use of 
English‟ – a holistic proficiency, as discussed earlier here - is each teacher or 
syllabus writer‟s predictive skills in forecasting what to teach, rather than the 
student‟s ability to a) react appropriately and in a “high” native speaker way, and 
b) evolve automaticity and exponentially greater language use from a limited 
input.  Lastly, the academic director‟s prescriptions for English language 
proficiency and modern languages proficiency of course differ; though he is the 
ultimate manager for both programmes. 
 
Before I turn to phronetic and then, narratological issues in the data, I will model 
the academic director‟s positions on automaticity and allied issues, and compare 
these finally with those of the dyslexic students and those of the advisors. 
 
As a reminder, the academic director‟s data has highlighted the following issues. 
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Firstly, he offers a mixed theorisation of sources for automaticity.  On the one 
hand it offers „possible‟ re-launched acquisition.  But he also holds that it is 
pedagogy-dependent („exposure and interaction‟ sub-model). 
 
Derek also is working with mixed descriptors of proficiency in describing his 
teaching unit‟s EFL and MFL issues.  In the EFL case, there are native-speaker-
pegged norms expressed as industry-known outcomes.  However in the MFL case, 
his aspiration is only towards to „general purpose‟ and „modern languages for 
academic purposes‟ types of teaching, with the year abroad doing the rest.  
 
In consequence, Derek gives mixed weighting to proficiency issues.  It is a 
precursor condition to a year abroad in MFL, but conversely a (highly 
marketable) outcome of a year abroad in the case of EFL taught in England. 
 
As a result, I felt that there were mixed messages from the positions Derek 
expressed.  On the one hand, he offered narratives of internal institutional 
orthodoxy and external recognition and validation as regards the EFL side.  But 
these were counterbalanced by fairly low expectations for modern linguists in 
general and, by extension, even lower ones for dyslexic MFL students.  More on 
this particular issue emerged in a later discussion. 
 
I also felt that mixed causality underlay Derek‟s espousal of „informal 
eclecticism‟.  It is simply a fact that trained, selected, and periodically-inspected 
and reaccredited EFL teachers are in over-supply.  Conversely, MFL teachers of 
equal standing are not, and great latitude in what may legitimately comprise 
„eclecticism‟ ensues, probably to the detriment of dyslexic MFL students and 
notably in relation to cultures where dyslexia is not recognised
34
 - and their 
teachers in the U.K. 
                                            
34 One (non-advisor) staff reaction at Wealdston was “Oh let them [the student concerned] sort it 
out, we don‟t want them getting all clingy, do we?” [cited in Advisors, NV412].  In another, the 
International Officer wrote, “Our partner institutions are not always that accommodating - they are 
usually receptive to our request for extra help, but some do not have quite an understanding of 
what help the students should expect to get, since nothing precise has been set up for their own 
students and the help that students need with dyslexia is not yet recognised to the extent it is in the 
UK” [cited in Advisors, NV413]. 
121 
 
Model 7 offers a representation of the above. 
 
 
 
 
Model 7 
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Salient in my model is the relative lack of connectedness of the “Dyslexics” label, 
which I discuss in the next section, and also the question of „anteriority‟ in 
proficiency.  In one and the same „home‟ for Modern Languages and English as a 
Foreign Language, proficiency is required to exist before the year abroad in the 
case of modern languages, but the reverse is true for EFL students.  In their case, 
their very presence at Wealdston is based on the assumption that residence among 
native-speaker language-givers and judge-peers will lead to proficiency.  It might 
be argued that this simply implies different types or levels of proficiency – neither 
holistic nor threshold as I discuss in Chapter 1 but gradable; but this would 
simply confirm my case regarding dyslexics.  A visiting dyslexic EFL student 
may not appear to be so at all (as these learners all appear „dyslexic‟ until they 
improve).  However, „home‟ dyslexic MFL students will be far more salient. 
Thus, not only do dyslexics have little prominence in Model 7 of the academic 
director‟s narrative, but the model reveals that a lower degree of importance is 
attributed to automaticity in acquisition on the MFL side – it‟s a „possible‟ rather 
than an aim. Hence, one might anticipate that dyslexic MFL students are lower 
still in the success stakes and therefore, still less worthy of focused effort and 
resources.  I examined the academic director‟s views further, to confirm his 
position.  
 
 
4.3 Exponential automaticity, proficiency and dyslexia:  a contrastive 
model of responses (Model 8) 
 
In my next model, we see few positive connections between the dyslexic students, 
the advisors and the academic director.   
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There are some close similarities between some student and some advisor items,  
For example the dyslexic students‟ Groundhog Day label (which I sub-described 
in NVivo 8 model-generator as “Automaticity does not evolve because linguistic 
information is over-written by new items effortfully acquired”) bears a 
resemblance to the advisors‟ Overgeneralisation label (“Little has been 
internalised in the way of metalinguistic knowledge AND it has been 
overgeneralised”).  I think it is readily apparent that students and advisors are 
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proposing different causal links:  overwriting (dyslexic students) and poor original 
metalinguistic base (advisors).   
 
Likewise, there seemed to me to be a consensus between advisors and academic 
director regarding testing norms.  For the academic director, these are (in the case 
of MFL) to be „pegged‟ to native-speaker derived criteria, as discussed earlier.  
The intuitive feeling of the advisors is, likewise, that MFL students are not only 
reaching for this level.  However, the advisors express the view that teaching in 
their own native language has often let the dyslexic students down:  they have 
underdeveloped metalinguistic awareness, stemming from poor school teaching 
and resulting in what they term an „autism-like‟ language condition [Advisors, 
NV281 et seq.]. 
 
A more significant link can be seen between Advisors and Academic Director.  I 
have referred to the apparent split in the academic director‟s mind regarding 
Before Proficiency and After Proficiency, labelled as such in Model 8.  The 
advisors identify and believe in a case
35
 in which, again citing my NVivo 8 sub-
descriptor, “Memory and cognition allow quantities of language (including 
foreign) to be internalised, though probably for monologic outputs in restricted 
fields and functions”. The academic director, in turn, proposes that the MFL 
case
36
, students should in any case only be aiming for GP (general purpose) or 
MLAP (modern languages for academic purposes) outcomes.  This is a lower 
ambition, perhaps more accessible to dyslexic MFL students;  however, this 
stance is diametrically opposed to the aims of EFL teaching in the same unit, 
where foreign students are studying in England, and not at home in Japan, for a 
reason. 
 
 
4.4 The EFL/MFL schism 
 
Above, I pointed out similitude between some advisor and some academic 
director positions. However I felt there were few links between items expressed 
                                            
35
 labelled “partial automaticity [sub-automatic rule-internalisation]” in Model 8. 
36 labelled in  Model 8 as „Only „aspirational‟ of GP/MLAP;  relaunch only „possible‟. 
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by the students and the corresponding stances by the academic director.  Not only 
this, but the academic director gives a bifurcated response, depending on whether 
EFL or MFL are concerned.  Whereas for Derek, the „Exposure and Interaction‟ 
model can lead to acquisition in the EFL case, and  the “aspiration and „possible‟ 
re-launch” might be operational for MFL, the students propose two mechanisms 
which fall below consideration and do not link in Model 8 to either the academic 
director or the advisors.  These were my Narratological-discoursal 
automaticity
37
 and Interlocutor sustained automaticity
38
 labels in Model 8. 
 
I felt that this was important.  While the dyslexic students expressed the view that 
they might derive progressive benefit from support at a narratological and 
discoursal level, the academic director‟s view seemed to me to imply that this is 
perhaps only feasible at EFL level (tutors are more plentiful, as cheaper, and the 
courses bring in more income).  In such a view, MFL aspirations should simply be 
lower.  This would represent a double bind for the MFL dyslexic students. 
 
More than one view can be taken at this stage of the disparities I have highlighted, 
on the one hand, and the limited similitude between student, advisor and academic 
director positions.  The lack of overlap could be an accident of the data-gathering 
and analysis.  Indeed, the research instruments for the dyslexic students and for 
the advisors and academic director only cover similar ground, though of course 
advisor and academic director interview schedules were very closely matched. 
 
However before I consider certain phronetic and later, narratological issues, I can 
note at this stage that: 
 The dyslexic student cohort demonstrates in general a good understanding 
of dyslexia and each student has an understanding of their particular 
condition, often informed by family, educational, cognitive and linguistic 
perspectives. 
                                            
37 Glossed in my NVivo 8 sub-descriptor as “One form of automaticity is that exponentially, the 
more narrative-types and discourse-types you encounter, the more you know of them and the less 
these impinge on your uptake or output of language.” 
38 Glossed in my NVivo 8 sub-descriptor as “De-automation doesn't kick in so long as automaticity 
is sustained by an interlocutor (i.e. it might when lecturing, presenting, monologuing 
unidirectionally)”. 
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 The dyslexic student cohort has in general an attitude towards language 
acquisition which differs markedly from both the advisors‟ and the 
academic director‟s. 
 The academic director‟s attitude towards acquisition and questions of 
proficiency varies according to whether EFL or MFL is being discussed. 
 The advisors‟ views on language acquisition are underscored by societal 
and educational issues around mother-tongue teaching failures, with 
family experience being cited in this area by one advisor who is also a 
„dyslexic parent‟. 
 The advisors‟ views tally more closely, institutionally, with those of the 
academic director than those of the students, though their causal 
explanations for dyslexia and subjacent theorisation (negative L1 
acquisition will negatively affect L2) are at some variance with the 
academic director‟s. 
 
4.5 Issues in professional knowledge 
Phronetic issues:  interplay of forms of professional knowledge 
 
4.5.1 The academic director and the dyslexic students 
 
As I suggested earlier, trying to characterise the academic director‟s views on 
dyslexia and issues around automaticity, exponentiality and effortlessness of 
acquisition towards proficiency was further complicated by phronetic and indeed, 
narratological issues.  It could be argued that the academic director‟s views should 
not equate with the institution‟s.  Conversely, however, this would have ignored 
processes, influences and power issues which do in reality affect the Institution.  
 
Firstly, I found that the academic director‟s response to disability in general, and 
by extension to dyslexia, was conflicted in its dealing with students, appealing to 
equality between disabled and non-disabled students on the one hand, but also 
requiring fairness among students on the other.  As we shall see below, fairness 
here can be glossed rather crudely as „not getting saddled with a disabled student‟.  
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 But there is a further conflict.  An institution will encourage recourse to 
professional knowledge, and will encourage initiative and pragmatism in dealing 
with issues such as staff recruitment, retention and promotion, teaching styles, 
teaching assumptions, course contents and outcomes.  It will honour forms of 
professional knowledge in its managerial staff which may, however, be 
intrinsically conflicted.  These conflicting forms can include subject knowledge, 
financial accounting knowledge, managerial knowledge, and institutional 
knowledge, to mention but a few. 
 
A vignette from the data illustrates what I shall term here the „phronetic density‟ 
of the academic director‟s position.  Abstracted from the original transcript, this 
short section of his „Story‟ illustrates this clash of interests well: 
 
We had an application from a student who wanted to come on one 
of our Summer Courses, not only was he wheelchair-bound, which 
wouldn‟t have been a problem, but he was blind.  And that created 
a problem because the Student Support Unit wanted us to provide 
the sort of support which might have been sufficient if that student 
had been attending lectures – and seminars – so just you know, 
blow up the lecture notes and photocopy these.  But of course that 
wasn‟t the case, he was going to be in a class, with other paying 
students, with teachers who were teaching full-time as you know – 
the 21 hours a week – and using a course book for 21 hours a 
week, and so we tried to explain that really the only way that we 
could cope with such student [sic] was if he had a companion 
there, in the class, who could actually read out what was there.  It 
was clear to us that that was the only way that we could cope in 
order to be fair to the student, to be fair to the other students in the 
class, and not to overburden the teachers. And there was this great 
thing going round the houses as to whom [sic] should pay for this, 
he wanted to be on a Pre-Sessional course, that‟s right, so the 
question was should the Unilang Centre pay for it, should the 
receiving Department pay for it, should Student Support pay for it, 
they said “No, you know, we only get money for British students”, 
and so in the end he actually didn‟t come.  
 
  [The Academic Director‟s Story, NV 51 et seq.; emphases added]. 
 
Tacit professional knowledge, as I have already stated in my discussion of Eraut 
(2000) and Spender (1996) in Chapter 2, is possessed of its own automatisms. 
Tacit professional knowledge in skirting difficult issues, particularly those with 
attached funding implications, may well be prized at Senior Management level in 
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many teaching institutions, not least in periods of acute financial austerity.  But 
adducing a discourse of equity and preservation of academic standards makes this 
palatable and acceptable at higher education level, in some views.   
 
Dyslexic students, however, may think that this in fact tarnishes the institution.  If 
there is already an intrinsic bias towards EFL assumptions regarding proficiency 
teaching and against the validity and viability of MFL, knowledge of the parallel 
financial and other Institutional rationales attaching to their disability may place 
them in a double bind.  We have seen, notably, that certain received ideas about 
dyslexics in the advisors‟ and academic director‟s accounts of themselves may not 
be reflected in the dyslexics‟ own views.  I return to the narratives offered in order 
to isolate instances of this divergence, or non-coherence. 
 
 
4.6 Narratological issues (narrating and narrated subjects) 
 
4.6.1 Of will and agency 
 
The notion of agency has arisen earlier in this study, in varied contexts including  
my Chapter 2 discussions of Fisher (1985), Eraut (2000), Bruner (1986) and 
Phelan (2005), notably around questions of „narrator versus narrated‟.  Analysing 
the dyslexic students‟ responses also revealed much of explanatory interest which 
mainstream discussions of dyslexia have perhaps only touched on slightly – and in 
one case, disparagingly. 
 
An emergent issue – represented in Model 8 – is that of what I have termed 
„conative de-automation‟.  A note on the diagram alerts against conflating this 
notion with de-motivation – a topic in language acquisition literatures (both child 
L1 and adult L2) which needs little introduction, indeed my Chapter 3 here cross-
referred to discussions of backwash effects on motivation (Crombie 2000, p. 114).  
However, whilst motivation and other psychological traits allied to affect are well 
discussed, the interplay between affective and agentive aspects of the dyslexic 
respondents‟ evidence was, for me, an unexpected feature.   It became apparent to 
me that there were items in the students‟ reports in which they themselves seem to 
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suggest that agency intervenes causally and at an earlier stage than de-motivation.  
All the dyslexic respondents, in various ways, intimated that in some anterior 
stage, their agency has been compromised.  Affective issues might well ensue - 
but as consequences, and not as causes, hence my terming these as „prior‟. 
 
I also flagged this notion in the present chapter when discussing the academic 
director‟s view of proficiency as centring on agency, performance and 
intercommunicative success, then in an associated discussion of the students‟ 
agency in contributions they may need to make over and above the items formally 
included in a teaching programme, notably if that programme is to be tested 
against proficiency norms involving the unpredictable and the untaught (Allen and 
Davies 1977; Davies 1968). 
 
As a researcher, I needed to be logically wary of asserting that past issues – 
positive or negative – necessarily influence future behaviours.  However, a further 
search of the dyslexic respondents‟ data showed that, on a variety of counts, each 
had suffered from knocks, discontinuities and other phenomena which had, in 
their own view, affected their evolution as students in general and language 
students in particular.  But here, we shall focus on their preservation (in almost all 
cases) of their personal sense of agency. 
 
4.6.2 Agency versus helplessness 
 
In some recent writing on dyslexia, it has become fashionable to associate 
dyslexia with conditions referred to as „acquired‟ or „learned‟ helplessness.  
Attribution Theory is espoused by Seligman (1975) and theories of self-
perception, intelligence, success and failure are proposed by Licht and Dweck 
(1984) and reviewed by Eppler and Harju (1997) in higher education contexts; but 
the term has also become a catch-all pejorative in some „dyslexia-negationist‟ 
circles
39
.  Here, however, the dyslexic respondents narratives were searched, 
                                            
39
 We may contrast for example the usage by Elliott (2005) with Kerr (2001).  In Elliott‟s case the 
tone of his title says much  („Dyslexia myths and the feelbad factor‟; emphasis added), whereas 
Kerr goes full circle and attributes „learned helplessness‟ to dyslexia practitioners too fazed by the 
possibility of  making a „maladaptive diagnosis‟ to be of use (Kerr 2001, p. 82). 
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notably their „good‟ and „bad‟ stories, for accounts not of depleted motivation or 
helplessness but compromised agency prior to either of the foregoing. 
 
4.6.3 „Compromised‟ agency:  its expressions, loci and resolution 
 
Searching the sub-topics of „help‟ and „self-help‟ offered me major entries into 
questions of agency.  Indeed, all of the dyslexic respondents offered avenues for 
exploration of this concept. 
 
As potential dangers to his own agency, Sandy proposes direct parental help 
(substitution), indirect parental help (feedback), and „interference/intervention‟ 
help –– but conversely, he values shared agency with fellow-dyslexics. 
 
 Before I had been diagnosed my parents were actually a 
great help, they‟d sort of like proof-read documents for me 
quite a lot and just kind of go “This isn‟t right” so they got 
me through my GCSEs quite happily, and... but they were 
less able to help me with A Levels because it‟s more exam-
based than GCSEs were. 
 
[Sandy, NV131] 
In addition to this direct help, Sandy receives corrective feedback – but he has 
evolved a causal explanation for his reading trouble – then and now: 
 
 YVES:  And you said you were always an avid 
reader, as a child.  Did you get read to, when you were 
smaller, can you remember? 
 SANDY: Yes, I got read to quite a lot when I was 
younger. 
 YVES:  Did you get help reading as well? 
 SANDY: Whenever … whenever I was reading from 
the page occasionally they‟d pick up on little mistakes that 
I‟d said, because it would go in slightly jumbled and then 
come out slightly wrong.  I still do that from time to time 
now. 
     [Sandy, NV132-135; emphasis added] 
 
I recalled Sandy‟s words from discussing his use of kinetic memory to bolster 
automaticity: 
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SANDY: The only assistance I managed to get out of 
it was some handwriting lessons because no-one 
else at the time thought it was anything more than 
me having bad handwriting, which didn‟t really help 
that much because I thought, there‟s something 
more to it, than just me not being able to write 
clearly. […] I... I‟m not something to be fixed, it‟s 
my own little problem and I‟ll make all the little... 
what‟s the word I‟m looking for... ummm …?  
YVES:  Adjustments, or…? 
SANDY: [loudly] YES! 
      [Sandy, NV189-193] 
Ironically, Sandy does want, and accepts, help – but this is in a context of careful 
preservation of his own agency.  This may explain how he has learnt to find help 
from an unexpected source: 
 
 SANDY: It‟s … well, with my friends it‟s more of a 
comparison of what we do wrong and we just check up - we 
hope that our different dyslexias cover each other, that one 
of us will notice someone else‟s mistake. 
 YVES:  O.K.  So… right.  So it‟s a kind of a self-
help thing, and it‟s alerting you to the fact that a) this 
person is also dyslexic therefore there might be something 
that you can find in their work and vice-versa and they 
might find something in yours. Good. 
 SANDY: Although there are some quite funny 
moments where it‟s just all of us and one of us turns round 
and says “How do you spell this?” and the other two turn 
round and go “You‟re asking a pair of dyslexics how to 
spell!” [laughs] 
[Sandy, NV256-258] 
 
Jess too sheds light on agency – through its loss.  He is doubly-punished at school 
for his handicap: 
 
 I think it really became a problem in Junior School when 
they gave writing lines as a punishment. […] And they 
gave writing lines because I didn‟t produce enough written 
work, which didn‟t help. 
[Jess, NV85-87] 
But then at university, Jess‟s agency is compromised through the kindness of 
others – and their „mixed messages‟: 
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 In terms of the essay it‟s … I‟m great at summarising and 
getting short sentences and summaries, but it‟s the 
expanding bit ... well, I thought it was the expanding bit, I 
thought that‟s what essays were, people have been… have 
now been saying different things, saying it‟s like a story, 
and that seems to be helping, maybe a way round it. 
[Jess, NV93; emphasis added] 
 
Also, he also points out that the „assistive‟ technology on offer is of little help, 
“Probably because the touch-typing is as slow as is my writing”. [Jess, NV103] 
 
Jess however becomes aware of his own lack of agency and is stung into 
reclaiming it.  Receiving negative feedback “wasn‟t that devastating, it was more 
unhelpful than devastating, for example the Open University tutor who just said 
well this is not accep... this wouldn‟t get you a… anywhere at University” [Jess, 
NV343 et seq]. He continues, “It gives you determination, I‟ll show you, you 
know, it‟s there inside, it‟s just not coming out right” [Jess, NV351]. 
 
Jake, initially, cares little and cares too much for his agency, as a schoolboy: 
 
 “My Mum paid for me just a local French lady that helped 
me, I got B in the end and that but again I was pretty 
naughty in my French class”  
 
 [Jake, NV167]  
 
 However for his English exams, and in a subject for which he cares, 
 
 About 6 weeks before my exams I didn‟t actually do much 
before that, I worked hard on all my coursework, I sat down 
and my Mum, bless her, sat down every day and night with 
me and I didn‟t go to school, she just went through it all 
with me, and I learned it all. [Jake, NV177] 
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Jake takes himself in hand.  However, Jake receives a direct blow to his agency at 
school, which still rankles at university and is reproduced here because of its 
typicality.  Similar stories abound in the data.40 
 
 Once, in my A Levels, my tutor – the guy – he was like a 
student teacher I think at the time and he was teaching us 
and he said something - I can‟t even remember what it was 
but he said a comment about dyslexia and then said 
something about me, and in fact I… it was the most 
unprofessional thing anybody could have done and I just 
left the class, and he really did upset me actually, and this 
lay man - this shows how bad my memory is, that I can‟t 
ever remember what it was but he did – he said something 
like “Oh it‟s probably because you‟re dyslexic” or 
something because I‟d made a comment and umm he 
obviously – and I was really – and I was really upset 
actually and it did upset me but then he – it was quite – he 
sent me a letter in the post which was extremely odd I 
thought, saying “Jake I just wanted to tell you I‟m really 
sorry if I upset you and trying to say it was completely 
inappropriate for me to say that to you”, and you know I 
just want to reassure you that you are one of the brightest 
students you know in the class that I teach and like I hope 
that you‟re not angry”.  But I was angry. 
[Jake, NV 339; emphasis added] 
 
It would be tempting to interpret that anger positively, as the spur to becoming his 
own agent once again in his studies.  But upon arrival at university, 
 
 I came here and we got this pack through the post saying 
“You are dyslexic, we‟ve got a whole student support unit 
that‟s funded… blah blah blah blah blah”… and then I got 
here and it never really came to anything, I got my 
computer and a scanner which like… I could have… it 
didn‟t really… I have tuition once a week but last year the 
guy I had was useless, he was subcontracted in from outside 
and so he was… I dunno, he wasn‟t… I didn‟t find it very 
helpful the support last year, until this year. I felt like… I 
nearly left at the end of last year because I just thought… I 
can‟t do this, I have no… I didn‟t feel like… that is how I 
felt. 
[Jake, NV195 et seq.] 
                                            
40
 Illustratively, from the Stories in Appendix 2: Pat‟s Mrs Spriggs [Pat, NV372], Freesia‟s „ousted‟ teacher 
[Freesia, NV395], Sam‟s Geography Teacher [NV320], Chris‟s English Teacher [Chris, NV99], Carmen‟s 
Music Tutor [Carmen, NV394], Aggie‟s Russian Teacher [Aggie, NV17 et seq.]). 
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Jake‟s transitional difficulties from home, his early passivity in his studies and 
knocks from what he perceives as teacher stupidity are not helped by the „help‟ on 
offer at University.  But like Jess, Jake recovers his agency through a second 
transition: 
 
 A lady […] told me of the options that were available to 
me, and said “You have to be proactive in using these to 
help you” […] And I thought, “All right then I will”, and I 
did, and it has worked really well and it is actually a lot of 
the support system and I got a new tutor who‟s brilliant and 
I feel a million times more happy this year. 
 
[Jake, NV195; original emphasis] 
 
Jake will indeed become „proactive‟ and recoup his agency, to the tune of a top 
2:1 degree.  
 
Pat is another student who is dyslexic, transits with difficulty from primary to 
secondary to university, and wants help - but it is help to restore his own agency. 
 
 [At primary school, I had] two years of these individual 
lessons once a week and then when we got into secondary 
school, they stopped everything. There was no additional 
help.  […] I had to leave because I was just falling behind 
quite drastically. […] The college I went to specialised in 
small classes and it was just a tutorial college, and they 
because of the small classes and they were all ... every 
teacher had a training in dyslexic students so they knew 
how to go about teaching if they felt that I was slipping 
behind.  And that worked a lot better, one-to-one tuition 
and things like that.  And just ... I think maybe just 
psychologically it works a bit better as well, because they ... 
er ... seem to be caring a bit more than the Lycée 
International, which just left me to get on with it, whatever. 
[Pat, NV95; emphasis added] 
 
It seemed to me that Pat was caught in a bind:  he wants to be his own agent, but 
is abandoned to his own devices in an International School where „dyslexia‟ does 
not exist – seemingly, because if it did, it would foul up success rates.  His 
education has been totally outsourced in that neither parent wishes to help, nor 
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male siblings or friends.  Alone of the respondents, Pat claims he is „upper‟ 
middle-class. 
 
Freesia has shared agency, rather than help. 
 
 One thing which has really helped me is I‟ve got a 
computer programme now that will sort of read along with 
me, sounds a bit sad but... I do use that, I use that a lot. 
[Freesia, NV83] 
 
Whereas she may feel she is being helped, passively, she has perhaps qualified 
agency and mechanical support none too different to a dictionary in the case of 
non-dyslexics [Freesia, NV228]. 
 
Freesia recoups agency after an incident when she realises that her English is the 
problem with her Spanish.  In her anecdote, she has mis-read „orchid‟ for 
„orchard‟.  
 
 I kind of felt like I needed help, and it wasn‟t there for me. 
[…]... I didn‟t say anything at the time but it‟s something I 
highlighted with [my teacher] and various other people at a 
later point, it wasn‟t that I‟d done it wrong it was just the 
fact that my English was... I mean I can read the word 
orchard but I didn‟t, I don‟t know why.  My English failed 
me. 
 
[Freesia, NV458;  emphasis added.] 
 
Freesia didn‟t fail Spanish; her English did.  Not a huge epiphany, but Freesia 
now acts. 
 
 The only thing which I did which no-one else in the 
Spanish group did was I went to the Library and I got 
myself a Teach Yourself Spanish tape to listen to while 
driving in the car, thinking a couple of hours a day will... 
was going to help me […] 
[Freesia, NV474] 
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In point of fact, Freesia does retrieve her agency, but to drop Spanish (“I kind of 
felt like I needed help, and it wasn‟t there for me”) [Freesia, NV 468].  But I felt 
that she had had a realisation:  she doesn‟t have a language problem; she has a 
learning one.  Re-establishing agency was, ironically, to lead to her quitting her 
language studies. 
 
With Millie, likewise, I was tempted to view her testimony as indicating purely 
motivational and/or self-esteem issues.  However, she writes of a physics teacher: 
 
 […] in part of my education I had a really good physics 
teacher – I was quite bad at it [laughs] but he was always 
so encouraging, you know saying “You can do this” 
constantly, I think it‟s just having an encouraging teacher 
who kind of believes in you.  I don‟t think I got that 
because whenever I got a test back that I‟d failed it was 
always presumed that that was all I could do, because I 
didn’t think I was trying my best because I didn’t believe I 
could do any better.  So yeah, having that encouragement 
would have helped. 
 
[Millie, NV498; emphasis added.] 
 
Millie had suffered previous curtailments of agency.  These included, in her 
narrative, a lack of funding for both diagnosis of, and assistance with, her 
dyslexia; a fractured transition into secondary education, and a further fractured 
progression into higher education - including a stay in a teaching establishment 
with low academic expectations.  All of these were both prior, and contributory, to 
her loss of agency – until a good teacher challenged her. 
 
Sam too is illuminating.  He did not receive „help‟ in the sense of others doing 
things for him, but he received help in reasserting his agency and re-establishing 
mastery of his situation.   Sam suffered a loss of agency, and associated 
deskilling, in a familiar transitional situation, and needs inputs rather than 
„support‟ help:  
 
 I got an extra tutor before I left primary school to get into... 
to try and get into secondary school, she was just there to 
help me out on these things that, you know, some prim... 
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state primary schools don’t teach you what you need to 
know for public school...
41
 
[Sam, NV154; emphasis added] 
 
Later „support‟ help makes things head towards greater automaticity as well as 
agency: 
 
 I was tested at Sixth Form just to get extra time because I 
knew I needed extra time, which I really did, it was such a 
help.  Just to get a little more time to sort out the ideas in 
your head, you feel less pressure then everything comes out 
clearer. 
[Sam, NV136; emphasis added] 
 
Lin has early agency and transitional difficulties (“I was actually being home-
schooled because I was living in the suburbs outside New York and the schools 
were really going quite badly, they were very dangerous at that time”) [Lin, 
NV38], but he offers the very exemplar of agentive contribution to his own 
learning
42
: 
 
I got quite high grades, but I think I probably had to work 
harder than … than a lot of the people that were in that 
same category as me.  […] it cost me in terms of stress as 
well, just having to work until …. I went to ... At high 
school I went for a little while to like a private school in the 
states where I went to school seven … six days a week and 
had four hours of required sports every day, so it was 
almost like a military kind of school, so I was … I didn’t 
have a day of the week that I wasn’t working, that was a 
holiday. 
[Lin, NV102-104; emphasis added] 
 
Lin has suffered from restricted agency, in the sense that he wants to and can 
successfully study many things – but in serial and not parallel or serial-parallel 
mode.  This is general in his studies, and strikes at his language work also: 
 
                                            
41 In fact Sam names a very prestigious and highly competitive [at entry] private school, or „Public 
School‟ in UK terms. 
42 Lin NV 301 also explains that he was dosed with Ritalin, in the U.S. 
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 if I‟m given one task at a time, one simple task at a time, I 
can do it very well but this is … as soon as I have too many 
things at once, that‟s when I can‟t choose one of them, I 
can‟t decide whereas all my other peers are like “oh just do 
one, this one‟s the one to do first, just concentrate on that” - 
I can’t do that,  it’s almost like an obsessive-compulsive 
thing, but it’s only in relation to doing work.  It‟s not in 
relation to my life in general.  […]   
 
[Lin, NV136 et seq.; emphasis added] 
 
Interestingly, Lin introduces a diachronic aspect to his language condition: 
 
  I don‟t think that that‟s dyslexia, I think that‟s just a … 
effect of me having dyslexia when I was younger, that‟s 
from right going to a school that was quite strict and having 
to deal with these deadlines when I was quite young.  And 
because I was dyslexic and because I needed more time for 
all of them, it meant that I have … I just feel more 
intimidated by having a lot of things at once, because I need 
so much more time. 
     [Lin, NV138] 
 
Lin relies on brute efforts of will:  the agentive here is the conative.  On language 
specifically, he has already stated that 
 
I did 4 years of French but it was ... it was definitely very 
hard and I can‟t remember it […] if I study something over 
and over and took a test then I could do it, but I couldn‟t 
just keep it, remember all of the rules, all the different ah 
…. conjugations of every verb at once in order to just at the 
end of the knowledge I had in discrete little bits but I 
couldn‟t do it all at once.  
[Lin, NV108-110] 
 
My probe at this stage of the interview established that his agency does indeed 
exist and that despite his institutional „dyslexic‟ label, his „Languages‟ problem is 
secondary to his cognitive difficulty. 
 
Chris offered two insights into the question of agency; the first is more political: 
 
 Well that‟s something we didn‟t talk about actually was just 
feminism, the idea of like the écriture of a woman which is 
like all into her being the madwoman in the attic and… like 
you could say that‟s like, maybe like the way I write, 
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refusing to, you know, to conform to phallocentric ideas of 
how things should be spelled! 
[Chris, NV377] 
 
The second is the challenge to agency provided by her school and, once again, it 
is anterior to her attempts at languages at University: 
 
 [I went to] a very traditional private you know girls‟ school 
and just my English teacher was very kind of Old School, 
very kind of Oxbridge and like she certainly didn‟t think 
that spelling wasn‟t important and she didn‟t think that 
linking together random ideas was very interesting so that I 
used to drop a lot of marks for my spelling and stuff. 
[Chris, NV99] 
 
It occurred to me here, re-reading Chris‟ narrative, that once again, as with earlier 
accounts, a challenge to agency neither entails nor predicts its loss.  Conversely, 
though on occasions it means a spur to its retention, this outcome is not 
generalisable either.  I have simply noted that in the cohort studied, agency is 
anterior to factors such as loss of motivation, and that there was evidence of an 
association between agency and automaticity and thereby, „exponential‟ 
proficiency.  In this way, Chris‟s agency is curtailed by her circumstances – but 
this falls outside her conative disposition, or will, which remains unaffected
43
.  It 
is unclear whether Chris just has a sunny disposition or has deliberately adopted a 
positive approach to conserve her agency, but she states: 
 
 Obviously there‟s an approach to it, if they‟re saying... you 
know, taking on board the fact it‟s spelled wrong and being 
happy to go and correct your mistakes and stuff, as opposed 
to being like… but like I’m just waiting for someone to find 
the spelling mistakes in my work, so I don‟t feel bad about 
it when they do. 
 
[Chris, NV295-299; emphasis added.] 
 
Carmen too helped with this notion, as she depicts what she considers to be an 
excellent „dyslexia teacher‟ (in her words: “the best and the most important to me 
                                            
43 As the transcript noted, Chris in fact took a 1st in her degree, four months following this 
interview. 
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is Moira, my dyslexia helper that I have here” [Carmen, NV299].  A late-
diagnosis student (not diagnosed dyslexic until university), she obviously does not 
lack agency, having „survived‟ an aborted first year but progressed into a third 
academic year (her second at Wealdston University) – though growing complexity 
and technicality of academic texts is a threat.  Carmen is being helped to preserve 
her agency – through strategies. She is in this sense a „recovering dyslexic‟, but 
her agency has always remained quite intact.  Indeed, the following information 
from her enforced „gap-year‟ is telling: 
 
 I was learning German in Germany, as I was living with a 
German family in Germany, and I was always talking in 
German so I had to, if you have to do it then you will do it.  
So. […]It‟s ... I really do think it‟s the only way to learn 
foreign languages is just to do it, you know? 
 
[Carmen, NV470-474; emphasis added.] 
 
Carmen is another dyslexic student whose worst experience is not with a foreign 
language per se – but with her English, as the scarifying comments on her Music 
essay reveal.  To quote her „bad story‟ narrative, “it just came back as totally 
slated […] …it must have looked like I‟d just whipped it off in 10 minutes like 
about an hour before you had to hand it in”. [Carmen, NV394]. 
 
Aggie‟s narrative casts another light on agency:  she suffers from what we might 
term loss of agency by proxy:  a trained teacher and teacher-trainer in her own 
right, it seemed to me that she had felt disempowered in turn by an (unnamed) 
Italian evening-school teacher and then by Mashinka, a „Suggestopedia44‟ Russian 
Teacher to whom she was exposed on an enforced Russian course during her 
M.A. studies. What seemed to me to have thrown Aggie was her tutor‟s own lack 
of agency, in both cases.  With the Italian tutor,  
 
                                            
44 Suggestopaedia is a teaching technique propounded by the Institute of Suggestology Sofia, 
Bulgaria;  as it name denotes, the founder Dr Lozanov‟s methods include yoga-like relaxation 
techniques, and „accelerated learning‟ without recourse to overt grammatical teaching but, 
conversely, the need to „become‟ someone else during one‟s tuition.  The Institute‟s materials refer 
to enhanced memorisation as „hypermnesia‟ and, perhaps tellingly, to its teaching sessions as 
„séances‟. 
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 I knew the game and I knew what he was doing and so…  
Because I‟m insider, it is true […] He certainly wasn‟t a 
qualified, you know PGCE-style teacher, I don‟t think he 
could have worked in a secondary school […] maybe he 
was trained but just... hadn‟t picked up on what the aims 
were […] He was... he was a very nice person, he was a 
nice man.  Well-meaning. 
       [Aggie, NV103 et seq.] 
 
Even at the price of automaticity in her acquisition, Aggie cannot meld her 
teaching-learning experience with an Italian tutor who is following a method 
which, in her view, he does not understand.  Likewise with the Russian Tutor 
Mashinka, who both professionally and interpersonally repels Aggie. 
 
 It‟s a big institute, and it‟s very famous and it‟s all very... 
supposedly prestigious and they had this emmm... woman 
called Mashinka […] who came across to teach us.  And 
nobody… everybody hated it, it was quite peculiar and I 
found it very stressful but it was based on very strict 
Suggestopedia classes.  […] I can‟t remember all the details 
now but there were meant to be twelve students per class, 
you‟re meant to have 3-hour classes every morning, etc. 
etc. etc., and as is normal in the – in Suggestopedia classes 
you’re given a personality, you’re given a persona that 
isn’t developed by yourself it’s developed by the Tutor.  
And I was ... I still can‟t remember ... I was a Russian 
woman who worked as a computer programmer.  And 
that‟s what I learned to say in the first lesson.   And I still 
can‟t remember it to this day. 
 
[Aggie, NV25 et seq.; emphasis added] 
 
It was immediately apparent to me from Aggie‟s interview that loss of agency is 
not something she will allow to happen to her.  Interestingly, in a 
contemporaneous note to the Interview, conserved at the end of her transcript, I 
suggested: 
 
Aggie posits a sort of nous which a teacher needs to have – 
in practical terms (carrying the bottles
45
) but also, a type of 
knowledge which is that of knowledge being formed, i.e. 
empathetic bonding with the learner (or whole class!) 
                                            
45 Aggie had referred in her narrative to a rather gormless tutor who was ill-prepared for class – 
ferrying bottles to and fro when he could have used a tray. 
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which monitors and is “in there” with the learner.  Krashen 
mentions a Monitor Theory, about the learner him/herself; 
this is an extension or parallel of this, to monitor uptake as 
one is giving input.  The reason for mentioning it at all here 
is that it‟s so obvious that when it‟s absent, it has an effect 
on the student (and teacher) Aggie herself. 
 
[Researcher, at Aggie, NV488] 
 
I expressed reservations about Krashen‟s views earlier, in Chapter 3.  However, 
Aggie clearly associates (re)acquisition with automaticity and with the need for 
non-compromised agency – both for herself and, equally, for her own students. 
 
Before ending this review of the dyslexic respondents‟ contributions, it is worth 
mentioning another student, Petey, a mature student, who offered me another 
pertinent institutional reminder. 
 
In Petey‟s words, 
 I feel like I know the subject but I don‟t feel like I‟m 
really engaged in a conversation, because I‟m not actually 
articulating in that subject.  It seems to come out – it‟s 
either I can‟t recall what I want to say or... or it comes out 
quite jumbled. 
[Petey, NV59] 
 
He continues,  
It‟s only when I sit down and try and... I think that‟s 
why… I think essay-writing has sort of helped me to really 
express my ideas, yeah.  Yeah.[…] Because you can really 
sit and think about it in your own time, and… [dries] 
[Petey, NV63] 
 
The irony here is that Petey is an institutional dyslexic who, to recoup and 
preserve agency, likes writing essays.  That Petey is an „institutional dyslexic‟ 
cannot be challenged, seemingly, within ght institution - though careful analysis 
of his responses, and my witnessing their occurrence (e.g. in my transcript, Petey 
“dries”, above) led me to suspect a mild form of developmental aphasia.  This left 
me with a slight ontological reservation – not regarding „dyslexic students‟ but 
regarding „institutional dyslexics‟ who occupy this category by default of another, 
and might resent inclusion in more cognitive and certainly, medical categories. 
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In the final section of the thesis, Chapter 5, I offer a summary and discussion of 
the findings of the research in the light of the Research Questions, and discuss 
issues around the ontological status of the study and to what extent it is a 
generalisable case. 
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 Chapter 5 - Final discussion, reservations and qualification 
 
5.1 Preamble 
 
In this closing Chapter, I review and re-address the Research Questions.  I then 
discuss some possible reservations.  Finally, I ask whether, and in what sense, this 
study is a „case‟ and whether, in consequence, it is generalisable beyond the 
precincts of the institution studied, Wealdston University. 
 
My opening Preface proposed that „automaticity is anterior to proficiency‟; but 
that „agency is anterior to automaticity‟ among the institutional dyslexics studied.  
Reorienting this statement, my finding is that discovering or rediscovering their 
sense of agency has allowed almost all of the dyslexic participants to attain a 
qualified measure of automaticity in their language studies and hence, of 
proficiency.  This Chapter describes how and why I came to this conclusion. 
 
5.2 The research questions, reviewed and answered 
 
I address my overarching Question 1 under Question 3.6, which is informed by 
the answers which precede it. 
 
Question 2 asked, “What theoretical coherence is there between literatures on 
second-language proficiency, on dyslexia and on professional knowledge?” 
 
I found that several areas of theory share terms, but that many underlying 
concepts were divergent.  As regards „proficiency‟, I drew attention in Chapter 1 
to the distinction between „gradable‟ or „thresholdist‟ proficiency, and „holistic‟ 
proficiency.  The first two terms admit of partial proficiency – you can be 45% 
proficient (gradable) or  proficient over such-and-such a pass-mark or set of 
criteria (thresholdist), whereas the „holistic‟ proficiency term signals that 
automaticity has been reached in the sense of exponential growth towards native 
speaker levels without much further intervention by others, such as through 
formal teaching.  The question of automaticity arises in particular when learners 
are asked to demonstrate it, and be tested and qualified as „proficient‟.  Work by 
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Davies (1968, 1977, 2003) discusses the notion of including unpredictable and 
untaught items in Proficiency testing which is, by implication, geared to native-
speaker norms, automatic uptake through a personalised language learning 
syllabus, and by extension, non-dyslexia. 
 
In language acquisition literatures, automaticity underscores arguments for 
irresistible, untaught and imperfectly modelled understandings of acquisition.  
These are heavily contested in L1 acquisition literatures by sociolinguistic, 
constructivist, symbolic-interactionist and many other schools of acquisition 
research, some of which I reviewed.  Nevertheless, such views may still permeate 
thinking on second language acquisition and so, the teaching of foreign languages.  
In many cases, the notion of „re-engagement of child language acquisition‟ still 
prevails and remains an educational „magic bullet‟ for some – a case in point was 
Aggie‟s encounter with Lozanov‟s „Suggestopedia‟ in Chapter 4; and “listen-and-
repeat” audiolingual learning packages, apparently predicated upon nativist 
acquisition assumptions, still abound
46
. 
 
I also encountered automaticity in the sphere of professional knowledge. Reber 
and Eraut invoke a form of automaticity when they refer to “the acquisition of 
knowledge independently of conscious attempts to learn” (Reber 1993 in Eraut 
2000, p. 115) and a “near-spontaneous and unplanned” type of “reactive learning” 
(ibid).  Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi‟s (1988) concept of „flow‟ speaks 
to a form of automaticity, and it is echoed by Spender‟s allusion to “the 
individual‟s ability to recognise, to choose, and to perform when „mindless‟ or in 
a state of „flow‟” (Spender 1998, p. 26). 
 
In the narratological field, which I explored for its useful metaphors of the 
„narrated‟ and „narrating‟ subjects, I found that using Strawson (2004) and 
Battersby (2006)‟s descriptions of „diachronic‟ and „episodic‟ individuals and 
cultures was informative.  I suggested earlier in Chapter 2, that a „diachronic‟ 
individual lost in an „episodic‟ culture was an informing metaphor when we assess 
the „fit‟ between the narratives of dyslexic learners and the narratives of various 
                                            
46 “Unbelievable?” asks Lingualearn‟s advertising for its new EarWormsTM, 
http://www.earwormslearning.com/lingualearn/index.php, last accessed 27.3.2011. 
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institutional agents in the research presented here.  Phelan (2005)‟s concept of 
“narrative imperialism” may also prove to have explanatory power in deciding 
whether and to what extent the Institutional Dyslexics studied are „narrators‟ or 
„narrated‟;  and the effects of these positions on their agency and learning. 
 
In the dyslexia literature specifically, several notable sources allude to the notion 
of automaticity.  Frith (1985), extending work by Marsh et al. (1977, 1980, 1981, 
1983), described dyslexia in deficiency terms, i.e. the non-development of 
automaticity.  Nicholson and Fawcett (1990) hypothesised, in terms, a DAD (or 
“dyslexic automatization deficit”) and an associated CC (or “conscious 
compensation”) hypothesis. 
 
Question 3.1 asked what empirical evidence emerged from institutional dyslexic 
students‟ narratives on issues related to second-language proficiency such as 
automaticity.  Models created from the responses suggested that students were 
aware of and indeed, preoccupied with automaticity-related questions.  There was 
also a clear schism, depicted in Model 2, between how they felt this should be, 
and how they felt things actually were, in relation to proficiency and automaticity 
for dyslexic students of a foreign language. Students showed unrealised 
expectations of automaticity, automatic self-doubt about their capacities, talked of 
loss of automaticity through „blanking out‟ or „tuning out‟, and losing serial-and-
parallel „automatic‟ working.  
 
Further modelling revealed that below the surface, the students compared 
themselves not only with friends and family but with non-dyslexic fellow-
students.  They appeared to infer that these other, non-dyslexic students possessed 
spontaneous, naturalistic acquisition, and automaticity of both uptake and output - 
being, in the latter case, more „fluent‟ than themselves in speaking and in writing.  
They expressed a wish to overcome „chunking‟ behaviours - piecemeal learning - 
towards interactive and creative language work.  Instead, their reality was often a 
descent into qualified automaticity – strategic micro-planning when (or in case) 
automation is interrupted.   
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Finally, the dyslexic students proposed areas of automaticity and de-automation 
which I found compelling, and explained in Chapter 4
47
.  In proxy automaticity 
the dyslexic subject assumed others will understand;  seamless automaticity of 
memory equates to effortless recall;  pre-assemblage automaticity refers to 
automatic (and  therefore, not effortful) assemblage of items before their output;  
semantic automaticity corresponded with unprompted access to the meaning of 
intrasentential elements, but was also described as a non-antonym of anomia; in 
interlocutor-sustained automaticity, de-automation is not triggered so long as 
automaticity is sustained by an interlocutor (though it might when lecturing, 
presenting, or monologuing unidirectionally);  elective de-automation ensues from 
self-screening for accuracy in favour of automaticity;  over-writing describes 
where automaticity does not evolve because linguistic information is over-written 
by new items effortfully acquired; narratological-discoursal automaticity requires 
interactivity and pragmatic, native-speaker grammaticality compromises between 
these rules, and not over-generalising them;  and conative de-automation  invoked 
loss of will through compromised agency and as opposed to motivation. 
 
These items suggest further avenues both for research into the teaching of modern 
foreign languages to dyslexics, and into their own learning and coping strategies. 
 
Question 3.2 asked what views on these issues were expressed by the advisors 
Jillie and Dave assigned to such dyslexic students.  They did indeed have 
positions.  Though they are not specialists in Modern Languages, and though they 
admit of „partial‟ automaticity, it appeared that they attributed lack of automaticity 
to failure, and to overgeneralization.  They proposed that failure is in pragmatic 
grammatically judgements; and the overgeneralization is of the limited 
metalinguistic resources available to any dyslexic student.  This L1 dyslexia 
failure, in their view, maps across to failure in L2 acquisition.  I noted also that 
„bad school teaching‟ - an absence of overt grammar awareness in their native 
language - seemed to underpin some of the advisors‟ account; and that the 
advisors norm-referenced dyslexics to native speakers in respect of both the 
dyslexic students‟ English and their foreign language. I found it interesting that 
                                            
47 These terms are glossed in Appendix 4, using the sub-descriptors derived from the NVivo 8 
modelling package. 
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they melded dyslexia and autism in proposing L1 „language autism‟ as a causal 
agent for dyslexia carry-through into the L2.  This is reminiscent of Hinshelwood 
(1900) and his notion of „mind blindness‟. 
 
Question 3.3 concerned the views expressed on these issues by the academic 
director, Derek, who revealed both pragmatic and theoretical stances.  Derek 
does not believe in an „absolute‟ form of automaticity per se, but believes that 
„exposure and interaction‟ are the keys to its evolving.  This is an orthodox 
„communicativist‟ stance. However Derek‟s response, as academic director, was 
two-headed, highlighting a schism between EFL and MFL students as regards the 
utility of a study year abroad.  The difference is in the place and status of 
proficiency.  Derek justified foreign students coming to Wealdston on the grounds 
of the uplift this would offer to their proficiency.  But he has lower expectations 
for MFL students.  It may follow that these expectations will be lower still for 
dyslexic students.  Not only so, but MFL students in particular need to display a 
measure of proficiency (thus, gradable/thresholdist) before they complete a study 
year abroad, in order to access it. 
 
Question 3.4 concerned the coherence between the views expressed by the 
dyslexic students, the advisors and the academic director.  As Model 8 shows, a 
greater convergence exists between the advisors and the academic director, with a 
limited convergence between students and advisors, and virtually none between 
students and academic director.  The coherence between advisors and academic 
director relates to the norm-referencing of descriptions of proficiency, which 
ultimately centres on an idealised, native speaker/writer (although in intermediate 
stages, the gradations can be couched in terms of „can do‟ statements, „criteria‟, 
and the like).  Some linkage can be seen between the advisors and the students.  
However, it only tangentially links to the academic director, and relates to the 
question of „partial‟ automaticity.  This is described as „qualified‟ automaticity by 
the academic director in the EFL case but much less, a mere „possibility‟, for 
MFL.  Conversely, the items „partial automaticity by sub-automatic rule 
internalisation‟ (advisors) and „de-automation by overwriting‟ (students) tally 
more closely, though dialectically.  There is some consensus between academic 
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director and advisors on the substantive issues of dyslexia and by extension, 
disability, to which I shall return below.  
 
Question 3.5 extended the focus to ask what other information or indications 
emerged from the data and its analysis and interpretation. Earlier, during the 
process of analysis, I had noted the emergence of the notion of agency.  I 
suggested that this is an overlooked factor, though common to most of the 
dyslexic respondents and „prior‟ to other factors such as motivation, aptitude and 
other well-commented variables.  I shall return to agency below.  But regarding 
disability, I noted a shared diffidence at institutional level regarding engagement 
with disability in general, and dyslexics in particular.  The advisors cohere, in this 
sense, with the academic director.  The latter wishes away such an impost on his 
cost centre.  The advisors, on the other hand, query the ontological status of the 
students they advise, implying that they cannot be all that dyslexic if they have 
made it here to Wealdston. 
 
It also emerged, at this general level, that there is conflict.  At institutional level, 
Wealdston University vaunts a meta-narrative couched in the rhetoric of widening 
participation, inclusion, diversity, languages-for-all, internationalism.  At more 
local levels, the levers and tools for dealing with „exceptional‟ students tend to be 
„internally outsourced‟.  Monies are cascaded down to deal with advisors and their 
charges, but not from central teaching and research funds. This meta-narrative can 
also be subverted by a hands-off approach to disability which is not proactive but 
instead, demand-led and legalistic.  This legalism is underscored and justified by 
reference to the transition of dyslexics from a mandatory educational context to a 
more „elective‟ and „aspirational‟ one – but in fact, to a different funding 
environment. 
 
Other issues came into focus for me throughout the analysis. I found Salomon‟s 
(1993) concept of „distributed cognition‟ both informative and pertinent.  The 
academic director and the advisors are not „in the same loop‟, institutionally.  
Conversely, the dyslexic students lack any loops - beyond the local (department- 
or faculty-level) advisors - unless they join a process of formally „becoming an 
institutional dyslexic‟, which I outlined in Chapter 1.  In that sense, the institution 
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is not mindful of its dyslexic students; it seems, in this sense, mindless, though in 
a sense very different to the earlier discussion of what Csikszentmihalyi and 
Csikszentmihalyi (1988) or Reber (1993) understood – automatic, and „in the 
flow‟. 
 
Likewise, institutional „knowledge‟ in the field of dyslexia, modern languages and 
issues such as automaticity and proficiency can become conflated with 
„professional knowledge‟- most directly, the academic director‟s - which is in turn 
conflated with „best practice‟.  „Best practice‟ can often be reduced to tutors‟ 
personal „intuitive knowledge‟ or „tacit knowledge‟, but be subverted when these 
tutors are part-timers working door-to-door between institutions, or treated as 
„non-academic‟ staff or, anecdotally, labelled „barefoots‟.   
 
Despite my heuristic references to Davies (1968, 1977, 2003) in discussing what 
„proficiency‟ means, testing per se did not form a major focus of my study.  
However, a relevant and thought-provoking issue to emerge with several dyslexic 
respondents was the joy at not taking up special allowances in examinations, and 
therefore having passed under the same conditions as their peers; and their agency 
was enhanced in the process. 
 
Power issues came to light.  The „internal outsourcing‟ of dyslexia advisors, and 
their requirement to operate within a  legal framework co-determined by the 
Human Resources, Student Assessment and Progress (Exams), Disability and 
other internal units, determines both professional practice and praxis in the 
professionals.  This can set up further power issues in that the implicit, collective 
knowledge of the institution can prevail over the explicit, conscious but depleted 
knowledge of the individual – be they advisor or advisee.  I found their situations 
were not equilibrated.  The advisors may be more „narrated‟ than their dyslexic 
charges. 
 
I noted that a further power issue arises when professional „experts‟ in one area 
are not expert in another.  This may arise because they possess one type of 
knowledge but lack other types which their role or function demands. Both the 
academic director and advisors intimated that they had not set out to be the 
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manager of an MFL unit as well as an EFL one, or to become syllabus experts and 
cogs in a disciplinary machine as well as student counsellors. Changing 
institutional status and roles may create disempowerment through progressive 
disqualification, often in the name of „efficiency savings‟ and even when a 
promotion is awarded.  Even the comfortableness of knowledge qua adherence to 
trending orthodoxies is ruptured; the knock-on effects can be severe „downstream‟ 
in the institution, and it may be the case that neither the academic director not the 
advisors possess, in truth, much more agency than the dyslexic students. 
 
Question 3.6 asked, in sum, what coherence, theoretical or empirical, in the 
Institution concerned informs the „incommensurability‟ question raised in my first 
Research Question:  “To what extent is studying a foreign language at University 
to Proficiency level incommensurable with being dyslexic?” 
 
An unfortunate and negative conclusion would be to advance that the institution is 
non-coherent and un-mindful, to avoid the terms incoherent and mindless.  More 
properly, the incommensurability question reveals positive opportunities, not least 
of which is the opportunity for the institution to learn.  A teaching institution 
which cannot learn would be a poor thing.  But in my analysis, I felt clearly that 
coherence is lacking at both theoretical and empirical levels.  Whether this study 
is a generalisable „case‟ will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, but on 
a positive note, the „incommensurability‟ question also provides a strong answer:  
automaticity and proficiency in dyslexic second-language learners in the 
institution studied is indeed possible; these learners say so. 
 
Question 4, finally, asked what avenues were suggested in the research that the 
actors concerned in the study (including the Institution and, by extension, others) 
might explore to refute the „incommensurability‟ notion. 
 
Mindful of the answer to Question 3.6 above, it seemed to me that several actions 
are needed.  Not all of these first arise at the level of the institution concerned, a 
fact which I return to in my short discussion of „cases‟ below.  Some actions are 
also applicable to non modern languages students.  But conversely, and for all that 
they refer specifically to testing, I found that the pervasive nostrum whereby 
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„what is good for dyslexics [sic], is good for everyone‟, cannot apply a priori, 
given the non-coherence, discontinuities and overlaps I have highlighted.  Thus, 
specialist and particularist interventions are needed. 
  
1. Transitions:  A major difficulty reported in this study by the dyslexic 
students seemed to relate to transitioning.  Not unusually, these 
problematic transitions have been between primary, secondary and tertiary 
education but also, between state and other institutions.  Some of the 
institutions encountered by respondents were remedial but with low 
expectations for the student, and some were intended to be remedial for 
the student, but the institutions had higher expectations for their own 
repute.  Thus, the public/private schooling binary needs more delicate 
assessment in this light, when considering a dyslexic student‟s „journey‟ 
before entering higher education. The price they pay for „help‟ can be 
more than financial, as several students reported.   
 
2. Confidentiality:  An emergent issue has also been confidentiality.  
Students wishing to maintain privacy regarding their dyslexia, or indeed 
any disability, also forego certain aids and assistances.  This no-man‟s 
land needs to be converted into common ground, if students‟ compromised 
agency is to be overcome. 
 
3. Mindfulness:  The Institution in particular needs to be mindful of its 
students.  It is in its own interests to be so.  The „mindfulness‟ needs to be 
genuine, systemic, systematic, and not superficially compliant („box-
ticking‟) or involve generalising dyslexic students under „diversity‟ or 
other (possibly better-funded) labels. 
 
4. Auditing:  The Institution needs to hear its dyslexic students and, in the 
case of modern linguists, audit them „locally‟, especially as regards 
compromised agency.  The auditing process needs to be systemic and a 
mind with a memory needs to exist, which is both powerful and 
accountable at, and to, Pro-Vice-Chancellor level.  This auditing is a sine 
qua non of shared proactivity (see 6. below) and must compensate in 
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particularist ways for a student‟s inclusion in the generalised „institutional 
dyslexic‟ category. 
 
5. Teaching delivery: Not unexpectedly, teaching delivery is a major issue.  
Under the guise of „cultural preparation‟, teaching delivery in modern 
languages can override a student‟s needs, even when these are clearly laid 
out in education psychologists‟ reports, because “That‟s how it‟s done in 
(Germany, France, Italy…) on your year abroad”.  Multi-skill, cross-
competency, multi-media foreign-language teaching is theoretically 
valuable to dyslexic students; it is, however, rare.  Examples arose 
anecdotally of lecturers who „don‟t do teaching‟ because they are, in their 
minds, researchers; and will at most provide a photocopy or two in 
advance. Conversely, dyslexic students may often be repelled by what 
Eraut terms „hot‟ learning (Eraut 2000, p. 130).  Balance and informed 
negotiation on teaching delivery are required. 
 
6.  Agency:  For me, the major finding in this study was that students are in 
fact able and willing and motivated to study a modern foreign language – 
when they have agency.  They have broken out of a self-denying category 
and are attending university and studying a language at an advanced level.  
The facile answers that a) they were not dyslexic or b) they were 
insufficiently dyslexic are not generally borne out in the data.  Conversely, 
what clearly emerged was that help by substitution („I‟ll do it for you‟) is 
often no help at all; but help in becoming proactive is.  Therefore an 
important action must be to discover and implement means for shared 
proactivity in establishing or re-establishing and then maintaining that 
agency. 
 
I have limited these proposals to what is necessary, achievable, and suggested by 
the data.  But transforming compromised agency into shared proactivity would be 
an end in itself, and also a good beginning – for all the actors involved in this 
study. 
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5.3 Some reservations about the study 
 
Before speaking about generalisation and cases, I need to address some possible 
reservations about the study.  Firstly, there were a small number of subjects, 
arbitrarily 12 in number and opportunistically gathered rather than selected or 
sampled for; and the institutional context in which they find themselves is 
specific.  
 
Conversely, we would be speaking of relatively low numbers of dyslexic modern 
language students in any university-level institution.  
 
Secondly, the in-depth, semi-structured interviewing method and the subsequent 
analysis which sought to increase the „thickness‟ of the depth of investigation, 
presents known dangers.  Not least among these are voluntary or involuntary 
convergence with the interviewer, involuntary „cueing‟ of the respondents, 
respondent „clienting‟, and many others explored by Hycner (1985), Powney and 
Watts (1987), May (1997), and Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000).  
 
Thirdly, the subsequent analysis which sought to increase the „thickness‟ of the 
depth of investigation from an idiographic, naturalist and subjectivist point of 
view presents known challenges too.  I have referred elsewhere to the 
methodology and method used in data analysis and the need to go beyond the 
boundaries of the immediate setting (Hammersley and Atkinson 1993).  
 
To address these issues, I have worked (noting Giddens‟ 1979 „double 
hermeneutic‟), within a phenomenological ontological framework in which the 
reality on which I focus involves a group of actors, including myself, who 
constitute that reality by performing certain actions with a particular 
understanding, or particular understandings, of what they are doing.  In this 
subjectivist and particularist ontology there are limits to positivistic working. I felt 
that Dreyfus‟ (1982) heuristic requirements of modern scientific theory that it be 
explicit, universal, abstract(ed), discrete, systematic, complete and predictive
48
, 
                                            
48 See also Schatski (2006). 
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could not hold in my study, if they can even be held to do in the natural or the 
social sciences. Explicitness entails more than clarity and implies an exhaustive 
and propositionalised specification of the concepts under study.  Universality 
requires a generalisation to all times and places; abstraction, in this sense, 
requires extraction of the object of study from purposive human action by sharers 
of meanings; discreteness presupposes that human context can be, and has been, 
elided from the „reality‟ under consideration; systematicity requires both non-
accidentality and systematic and rule-governed interrelationships between 
concepts.  The requirement for completeness, which is the springboard of 
prediction, is a requirement for specification of all pertinent elements and possible 
effects in relation to the object of study – an impossibility, in my view. 
 
Notably in this, my discussion cannot have a predictive focus (except in one, 
coincidental manner which I discuss in a short Postface chapter, below) because 
the reliability of predictions would depend in large part on their authentication 
(avoiding positivist connotations of „validation‟) by human beings who are being 
considered in relation to the quotidian which constitutes the „world-which-
constitutes-them‟. Predicting to known „predictees‟ may invoke circularity. 
Secondly, though perhaps of greater importance, is that beyond any mismatch 
between concepts, prediction of human activity is impossible because human 
activity is, in my view here, indeterminate.   
 
In Chapter 2, I cited Ricœur‟s notion of narrative completion in the reader 
(Ricœur 1991, p. 26).  My broader constituency of „validators‟ will be the readers 
of this thesis, who will be mindful in turn of cautions against the false 
consciousness of the respondents (Rex 1974) or of their lay actor status (Giddens 
1976) and the potentially dissimilar realities of respondents and interviewer. My 
appeal is to Kemmis (1980) on the need for research to meet the demands of 
justification of people concerned with the truth of the findings and people worried 
about researcher accountability, and to Schutz‟ postulate of adequacy by 
verisimilitude or compatibility with the „constructs of everyday life‟ (Schutz 
1979, p. 35), and lastly to Maxwell‟s 1992 interpretation of verstehen which 
admits of descriptive, interpretive, theoretical and evaluative validity - but also, 
lastly, considers generalizability.  
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Thus an important question which remains to be addressed is whether this study 
presents a case, and whether that case is generalisable; and to this I now turn. 
 
5.4  Making a case II - On validity and generalisation 
 
As I suggested in section 1.11.2, defining a case can be problematic.  Leaving 
aside the major question of whether cases are „found‟ or „made‟, to which I 
alluded earlier, definitions of case are numerous and circularly, can reflect the 
epistemological concerns of the definers, some of whom I cited in the earlier 
section mentioned.   
 
Returning to cases and their generalisability, I ended my discussion in section 
1.11.2 with Donmoyer‟s cautions about „proof-giving‟ types of casing.  Further 
discussion is offered here - a brief discussion of validity in qualitative and in 
quantitative working, and refocused epistemological understandings in 
presentation of a case. 
 
Schofield (1990) cited Campbell and Stanley (1963), for whom “external validity 
asks the question of generalizability” (Campbell and Stanley 1963, p.175; original 
emphasis). For them, this generalizability will likewise require the application of 
hypotheses derived from quantitative findings across two axes: the socio-
geographic, and the diachronic.  Both Schofield and Donmoyer expanded away 
from these traditionalist views, and from the accretional epistemology advocated, 
for example, by Thorndike (1910), towards alternative conceptions. Hence, they 
looked toward a new language and new epistemology centred on vicarious 
experience.  
Donmoyer presented two challenges to the “traditionalist” view as he defined it: 
the “Complexity” challenge, and the “Paradigm” challenge. The first is an 
essentially cultural and diachronic problem.  Of particular interest to me was his 
reminder that generalisations “lose potency” over time owing to the changeability 
of cultures and the many-faceted interactions between subjects and methods 
which may intervene in place and in time, to the detriment of supposedly „hard‟ 
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findings. Onto this time-place instability, Donmoyer grafts a discussion 
[embryonic, but expanded in Schofield (1990)] of the difficulties which may arise 
if the objects of the practitioner‟s interest are relatively autonomous individuals, 
and not an inanimate aggregate. 
 
Donmoyer‟s “Paradigm” challenge addressed the problem of perception and the 
temporal convergence of (often idiosyncratic and latent) assumptions into shared, 
a priori theories - or paradigms - to which the researcher may subscribe.  These 
may “influence the researchers‟ findings at least as much as the empirical reality 
being described” (Donmoyer 1990, p.179).  Indeed, he specifically rejects cause-
and-effect generalisations in research findings.  Donmoyer is informed by the 
symbolic-interactionist views of Blumer (1969): his arguments are socio-semantic 
to the extent that “human beings act towards things on the basis of the meanings 
things have for them and that meanings are a product of social interaction rather 
than external causes ... […] meanings are not static but must constantly be 
constructed and reconstructed by actors during social interaction” (Donmoyer 
1990, p.180). 
 
For me, one positive and one negative outcome may flow from the “Paradigm” 
challenge. Firstly, a knowledge of the process itself of social interaction and 
meaning exchange (for example, in teaching-learning situations), which is in 
Blumer‟s own terms “of far greater value for prediction, if that is one‟s interest, 
than would any amount of knowledge of tendencies or attitudes” (Blumer 1969, p. 
98). My interest, as I have said, is not in prediction.  But secondly, there is a 
recognition that explanatory frameworks can themselves send messages which are 
inaccurate, regardless of their substantive content, because of the essentially 
Kantian dilemma of our being unable to disentangle what we know from how we 
(have come to) know it. 
 
This left me with another paradox: if I, as a researcher, am to remain concerned 
with non-ideal, (in several potential senses) individuals rather than with abstract 
aggregates, then research can only ever remain a “heuristic [which] can suggest 
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possibilities but never dictate action” (Donmoyer 1990, p.182).  However, the 
research itself remains “inevitably ideological” (Lather, 1988), as the researcher 
must inevitably rely on a priori conceptualisations not determined by the data but 
determining of them. Hence we have “heuristic” data which nonetheless 
“inevitably conceals as it reveals” (Lather, 1988). 
 
How to escape from these dilemmas?  Donmoyer offered proposals to adapt and 
extend the concepts of transferability - derived from Lincoln and Guba (1985) and 
of naturalistic generalizations (Stake 1978, 1980) towards his concept of the 
„vicarious‟ experience channelled through qualitative case studies.   
 
Schofield too recognises that a redefinition of positivist „replicability‟ can in fact 
serve not only to justify but to enhance qualitative work.  Although much 
qualitative work is too arduous to specifically permit replicatory studies, 
particularly if, as in my thesis, the focus has been „thickly described‟ in the sense 
of Geertz (1973), it can nonetheless “stimulate further research of a qualitative or 
quantitative (my emphasis) nature that provides information on the replicability of 
that one aspect of a study” (Schofield 1990, p. 204; emphasis added). Schofield 
cites earlier work of Guba and Lincoln (1981, 1982) and Stake (1978) together 
with Goetz and LeCompte (1984) to describe an emerging consensus in 
qualitative work itself, though terminologies and precise foci of attention differ: 
“fittingness” - the degree to which situations studies match one another - in Guba 
and Lincoln, “naturalistic generalization” or idiographic bodies of knowledge 
encapsulated in “working hypotheses” in Stake, and “translation and 
comparability” based on clear description of theoretical stances and research 
techniques advocated by Goetz and LeCompte (ibid.).   
 
I have noted the “fittingness”, as it is cousin to my coherentist approach. 
 
Several other factors informed the present research and served me, the researcher, 
in my quest for understanding. Donmoyer refers to the accessibility offered by 
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research “to places where most of us would not have an opportunity to go” 
(Donmoyer 1990, p.194), through this vicarious experience. He proposes that “the 
role of research is not primarily to find the correct interpretation … […] the 
purpose of research is simply to expand the range of interpretations available to 
the research consumer” (ibid.). 
 
I noted also that in their discussion of positivist forms of triangulation and their 
counter-proposal of transferability, Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that “an 
investigator can make no statements about transferability for his or her findings 
based solely on data from the studied context alone. […] the final judgement on 
that matter is […] vested in the person seeking to make the transfer” (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985, p. 217). 
 
Synthesising points I have raised so far, despite the exigencies of trying to 
emulate quantification by breadth and density of investigation, I believe that it is 
still possible to respect the notion that we can generalise by, in Shakespeare‟s 
terms, “holding the mirror up to nature”. As a researcher working within a 
qualitative and coherentist approach, I have become aware that questions of 
validity, applicability and indeed, generalizability reside firmly with the study‟s 
readers, provided always that my study has been scrupulous and professional not 
only in presenting and describing and analysing, but in relating also the contents 
of my “peripheral vision” of the phenomena I have studied, and of myself.  
 
5.5 Implications for further research 
 
My research has several implications, and suggests avenues, for further research. 
 
5.5.1 There is a need to consider gaps in stages in schooling as a general case.  
Specifically in terms of the themes of this thesis, there is a need to enquire further 
into socioeconomic issues and schooling, notably the disruptive effect on first-
language and foreign-language skills of being moved, by fluctuations in family 
finances, between state and private schools, notably where the latter are both 
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success-focused and unequipped for remedial or supportive work – and brazenly 
flout legislation on this „invisible‟ disability. Such research would also contribute 
further to understandings of the links, if links there are, between first language 
and further language dyslexia: is an English mother-tongue dyslexic fated to fail 
in another language?  „Second bite at the apple‟ literatures exemplified by Miller-
Guron and Lundberg (2000) may be even less persuasive (Le Juen 2006 p. 52) if 
other explanations for counter-cases of  L2 success in L1 dyslexics can be found. 
 
5.5.2 Accessibility issues:   The notion of agency has emerged in my study, and 
the realisation that people from certain backgrounds can make it work;  however, 
the small sample of students and their limited variability in terms of social 
stratification and ethnic origin calls for amplification:  only one claimed „working 
class‟ status and none showed visible signs of ethnic difference.  Discussions of 
power and thus, powerlessness need to accompany a further, more delicate 
discussion of agency as it relates to accessibility to higher study. 
 
5.5.3 The „institutional dyslexic‟:  this concept, which I have used 
heuristically, needs further unpacking along two axes:  you cannot, seemingly, get 
help unless you accept the label of „dyslexic‟ (thus, a measure of self-diagnosis 
and self-confirmation is required) and secondarily upon this, the issue of the 
centrality of dyslexia is lost.  In other terms, the pragmatic lumping together of 
„dyslexia‟, „dyslexia-like‟ and „dyslexia-producing‟ labels may hide other 
conditions and needs – as simple as reading-glasses, or as devastating as parietal 
lobe brain tumours. 
 
5.5.4 Gender issues  
 
5.5.4.1 Meta-awareness:  There seems from my limited sample to be greater 
meta-awareness among the female students, in broad terms and here, in the 
narrow term of their self-understanding in relation to their dyslexia. Exploring this 
apparent difference with males would find avenues for back-reflection toward 
both exceptional and unexceptional female students, notably those engaged in 
formal foreign language study. 
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5.5.4.2 Gender and choice in academic disciplines:  Very specifically, future 
research would be useful on the fate of women students with dyslexia who 
undertake formerly „male‟ subjects – such as engineering and the applied sciences 
– and may make themselves doubly visible – by their dyslexia and their gender.  
This research might well point up difference in institutional views, in that 
allusions to „creative genius‟ often accompany references to male students in 
media or informatics courses who are dyslexic.  What is the experience of women 
dyslexics in these fields?   
 
5.5.4.3 Gender, dyslexia and prior „bilingualism‟:  Additionally, when female 
dyslexic students come to further or higher education from multiethnic and/or 
multilingual backgrounds, what are correlative and what, causal links between 
their language difficulty and previous home and school language use?  Some girls 
and women are forcedly „bilingual‟ in the home, and may be assumed at 
secondary school level to be linguists;  although formal exposure to further 
languages can in fact be catastrophic.  Primary research in this area seems to lack, 
but will be essential to “widening participation” and similar initiatives. 
 
5.6 From CAS to Thesis:  a final reprise 
 
I suggested at the close of Chapter 1 (the reprise of my CAS study)  that a part of 
the Conclusion here should be to comment on what the thesis has added to the 
CAS.  This is simply stated.  The heuristic „institutional dyslexic‟ of my CAS was 
useful at both the substantive and the methodological level to highlight disparities 
between theory and practice regarding notions of „proficiency‟, „automaticity‟ and 
the condition of being a „dyslexic‟ student of modern languages in a higher 
education institution.  The thesis has added more dimensions.  Firstly, the voices 
of non-heuristic („real‟) institutional dyslexic students.  Secondly,  a re-
consideration and reconfiguration of the interrelationships between automaticity, 
proficiency and dyslexia in the light of second-language teaching and learning 
theory, and in the light of the stories which are told in the Institution:  the 
institution‟s own, as vehicled by its dyslexic students, and those of their student 
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advisors and an academic manager.  Finally, an account of conflicts in knowledge 
(and consequently, power) which ensue from the „automaticities‟ of overt and 
tacit knowledge and professional expertise – and sometimes, their loss or 
supersession – was included. 
 
What has emerged for me is that from a picture of possible negativity and 
impossibility, managerialist pragmatism and short-termism, and certain signs of 
discontinuity, balkanisation and insularity of the Institution, hope shines through.  
Subjectively, I found it particularly salutary that in their narrations, the dyslexic 
students themselves were able to help me realise that their own remediations and 
strategies, and notably their struggle for agency or its restoration and certainly, its 
sharing, have value, possibility and opportunity.  They are far from being 
„narrated‟. The dyslexic respondents have led me, a  researcher and teacher, to 
learn something I didn‟t expect to.  This will inform my professional practice – in 
both spheres. 
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Chapter 6  
 
A Postface 
 
I completed reading for, and writing, this study in April 2011.  Earlier in the 
thesis, I discussed the question of prediction, in the context of Dreyfus (1982).  
My research has, since its inception and quite „unpredictably‟, become very 
topical in that the Wealdston University, inspired by new managers and an 
apparent turn-about in government policy
49
, has decided not to curtail its language 
programmes but instead, preserve its modern language degrees and indeed, 
expand the programme to include a „language proficiency‟ qualification as a 
„minor‟ element in a very great number of its science, social science and 
humanities degrees.  Numbers of „institutional dyslexics‟ attempting a language 
will, in all probability, increase.   
 
This research is dedicated to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 April 2011 
44553 words net  
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Appendix 1A – Research Ethics Statement 
 
The present Statement is modelled on the Standards and Guidelines on Research 
Ethics and its Checklist Annex published by the University of Sussex variously at 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/rrdd/documents/code.pdf (1990) and 
https://studydirect.sussex.ac.uk/file.php/1153/Handbook_Assessment/Professional
_Doctorate_in_Education.pdf (2006/7), both accessed most recently on 17th July 
2007.  It is to be noted that these documents are now off-line because they have 
largely been subsumed, after the reorganisation of the Sussex Institute which 
hosted the Education Department, into more recent protocols;  thus slightly more 
extended and explanatory answers are given here, in the spirit of convergence 
with these, and not in the interests of prolixity. 
 
Standards 1 & 3: Safeguard the interests and rights of those involved or 
affected by the research.  Establish informed consent. 
 
1.1 I have considered the well-being of those involved or affected.  Measures 
have been taken to protect their interests (e.g. by clarifying the use to be 
made of outcomes, and particularly the assurance of anonymity and 
confidentiality). 
 
1.2 Written and signed consent was not obtained for one of the cohorts 
because of the nature of the participants in the research - who are dyslexics 
and can react to form-filling, e.g. by avoiding it.  In compensation for this, 
a full verbal explanation was given at the time of interview, and an 
abbreviated version of the main points of this explanation was recorded as 
part of the transcript.  The participants were informed of their right to 
refuse or to withdraw at any time.  Respondents who were not members of 
the Dyslexic cohorts being interviewed were offered a written consent 
form but the main cohort of dyslexic subjects were first read the paper then 
supplied with it. 
 
1.3 The purposes and processes of the research were explained and the 
implications for participants in terms of time were explained also.  The 
“standard” refers to the expression “fully explained” but for reasons 
intrinsic to the research it was not fully explained to members of the 
Dyslexic cohort that the same instrument would be used for “Fossilised 
Adult Second Language Learners”, nor vice-versa, to avoid leading the 
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respondents.  In the event the responses of the  “Fossilised Adult Second 
Language Learners” were not used in the present study.  For reasons 
adduced under 1.2 above only verbal communication was used except for 
logistical e-mails.  Any reference to the possible influence of the outcomes 
of the Research was, again for reasons cited above, usually only made if 
elicited by the Respondent, again to discourage respondents‟ convergence 
with the Researcher in their answers, and because the outcomes will only 
be known upon analysis of the data. 
 
1.4 I did not use covert forms of research, indeed the research questions and 
general outline of the Semi-Structured interviews were explained overtly 
to the participants (dyslexic respondents, dyslexia advisors, academic 
director) using the protocols also included here as Appendix 3A, 3B, 3C.  
Agrement to proceed was included as part of each interview, the 
possibility of not answering was explained, and confidentiality offered.  
My Appendix 1B, below, presents the Informed Consent form read-over to 
participants (initially, as they were dyslexic) then given to them. 
 
1.5 Section 1.5 contains presuppositions on what “data” and “findings” are 
and here, “data” are taken to mean raw, incoming information and 
“findings”, to mean selected, analysed and categorised items from which it 
is proposed to claim knowledge. The research did include procedures to 
verify data with respondents but not to offer feedback on the findings.  
Data-verification procedures were limited to response verification a) 
during interviews, through interview probes or requests for clarification, 
and occasional oral running summaries and b) in an end-of-interview, a 
closure section when the respondent was asked what s/he felt had been 
omitted or now wished to add spontaneously.  For reasons germane to 
interviewing methodology and the uniqueness of the event (see Tulving 
(1972) and Episodic versus Semantic memory and the dangers of over-
writing oral data), continuation interviews were not proposed though some 
respondents supplied additional factual information after the event, usually 
by e-mail (exact A Level grades, parental information they had lost, 
similar).  
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1.6 The participants were involved indirectly, but legitimately, in data 
collection (see reservations in 1.5 about this term) to the extent that some 
of the respondents belonged to a type of Dyslexia Club run on campus by 
the Student Advisory service, and could refer their friends and 
acquaintances to me.  No student was paid for recruiting other students.  
Individual students and some part-time colleagues were paid a flat-rate, 
small honorarium, as is common practice with e.g. science and social 
science research project interviews. 
 
1.7 Anonymity and confidentiality were offered and these were conditional, as 
discussed below. Reciprocal confidentiality was requested, to avoid 
predisposing other respondents and because not all respondents have 
elected to make their language condition known to a) fellow-students, b) 
the University.  Anonymity has been preserved in a further sense, which is 
that the Semi-Structured interviews have been reduced into a single 
narrative by means discussed elsewhere (Proposal Document).  
Conditional anonymity has been hard to offer and already a fellow 
employee at Sussex (who no longer works here) contacted my cohort via a 
Student Advisory e-list, with a view to discovering their opinions on 
various matters.  I will not be using the students who were contacted in 
this way, or their interviews, as it transpired that my offers of anonymity 
and confidentiality were baseless.  Further respondents will have this 
concept of “conditional” anonymity and confidentiality better explained, 
particularly in view of legal requirements and effects of the Disability 
Discrimination and associated Acts (e.g. disclosure of a disability is a 
requirement if the University/employer etc. are to act on this disability). 
 
1.8 There is no person directly parallel to these categories however individual 
Student Advisors, on the one hand, and my own Line-Manager, on the 
other, are aware of the research and in positions to intervene upon myself 
or my respondents in case of need under 1.8. 
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Standard 2: Ensure legislative requirements on human rights and data 
protection have been met.  
 
2.1  The implications of at least the four pieces of legislation listed at  
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/si/1-7-6-2.html (last accessed on 17.07.07) have 
been considered:  The Data Protection Act, to the extent that the 
Respondents will be made aware how and why any of their personal data 
is being held, including non-electronic ones though these will be a rarity 
given the nature of the research and its methods.  As regards onward use of 
their data for secondary analysis beyond the purpose for which they were 
first collected, these responses will have been analysed, anonymised and 
transformed into a collective narrative and thus no longer be strictly 
identifiable as “their” data. 
 
The Disability Discrimination Act (1995-2005 and annexes) is a central 
plank of the Thesis and of its precursor CAS
50
.  Dyslexic participants in 
the research will be invited to apply for details of its outcome.  The Human 
Rights Act (1998) and Convention the Rights of the Child (1989) are not 
thought to have direct relevance to the research nor its prosecution in ways 
not covered in other responses to the Code of Ethics but it has been noted 
that the online Sussex Institute Standards and Guidelines on Research 
Ethics referred to above propose that “the spirit of this Act should apply to 
research contexts involving young people and vulnerable adults involved 
in research”.  The Respondents are all adults, though some lability, 
convergence and projection has been noted in  early work and will be dealt 
with professionally or referred.  As has already been stated, by extension 
of UNCRC (1991) art. 12, the Dyslexic respondents have been facilitated 
in making Informed Consent by repetition. 
 
 
                                            
50 Le Juen, Y. (2006),  Proficiency, Automaticity and the Dyslexic Modern Language Learner:  A 
Critical Analytical Study in Conflicts of Knowledge - CAS (Critical Analytical Study) in part-
submission for Professional Doctorate in Education (EdD). 
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2.2   No particular implications have arisen from legislation, nor do 
uncertainties currently exist, but contact will be made with the named 
university person in such cases.  Ethical issues will be separated from 
employment ones, as the coherentist approach to the research requires 
triangulation of the enquiry from dyslexic respondents not only with a) 
dyslexia tutor-advisors, but also b) my own line-manager.  
 
Standard 4: Develop the highest possible standards of research practices 
including in research design, data collection, storage, analysis, interpretation 
and reporting 
 
3.1 Existing literature and ongoing research have been identified and 
considered both in the CAS (reference as above) and in the emerging 
Thesis. 
 
3.2 Methods have been selected to be fit for purpose. 
 
3.3 Where appropriate to the Research Design, all data collection proposed has 
been used to address the question. 
 
3.4 Methods for verifying data have been built into the research design, 
including the triangulation referred to in 2.2 above. 
 
3.5 The research is not externally funded. 
 
3.6 Plans of this nature (UK Data Archive) have not currently been 
considered, given the nature of the degree-bearing research concerned. 
 
Standard 5: Consider the consequences of your work or its misuse for those 
you study and other interested parties 
 
4.1 The short and long term consequences of the research have been 
considered from the perspectives of the participants and the researcher.  
The fact of its being carried out has been reflected upon separately from 
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any facts it may be uncovering.  Funders and “policy makers” may be, 
locally, an issue if the research findings highlight “grey” institutional 
practices in the admission/teaching/qualification of dyslexic students, 
given that the Institution will also fund and award my Thesis. 
 
4.2 Cost (financial) to participants has been dealt with on the basis of a flat-
rate hourly payment well in excess of Minimum Wage requirements and 
comparable to similar payments made to undergraduate respondents in 
similar research projects. 
 
4.3 Information about support services such as mentoring and counselling has 
been considered in cases where there might be unsettling effects of the 
research, and the notion of respondents „clienting‟ is covered in the 
methodological discussion.  However the majority of respondents have 
been referred by such services in the first place.  It is observed here though 
that respondents were redirected to Advisors rather than Student Mentors, 
unless for the barest practicalities, but consideration was given to students‟ 
funding status also as Counselling costs require either LEA, Private or 
Hardship Fund financing, and are not free. 
 
4.4 Planning flexibility will allow for time to discuss issues arising from the 
effects of the research on the individuals;  however the effects on 
institutions/services will take further time and fall outwith the research 
project itself where this refers to external institutions and services rather 
than the Institution which is forming the focus of the study. 
 
Standard 6: Ensure appropriate external professional ethical committee 
approval is granted where relevant 
 
5.1 A supervisor was asked to comment on the research proposal in the first 
instance, then a second internal supervisor, in ethical terms and following 
a reading of a draft of this document. 
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5.2 Sensitive ethical issues:  none had at the time of writing been raised by the 
School Committee nor comments sought. However it was anticipated that 
Supervisor comments might well do so on reading parts of the Thesis.  
Indeed, revisions lead to further masking of the participants‟ details as 
some respondents were, in addition, colleagues and, in one case, in a line-
managerial relationship with the researcher though that respondent has 
now retired. 
 
5.3 External professional ethical committees:  none has been identified as yet, 
thus none has been contacted. 
 
5.4 This question asked whether guidelines from that professional committee been 
used to check the proposed research.  At that time the Sussex Institute dealt 
internally with these issues and I generated a draft statement which was reviewed 
and amended by my Supervisor, notably as my research does not bear on health 
or social care issues. 
 
5.5 This question asked whether plans include seeking clearance from any 
committee and leaving sufficient time for clearance when organizing my 
proposal.  Such planning was not included, for the reasons adumbrated 
above.  However, mindfulness of the issues raised in the Ethics clearance 
process at that time led to my creating an Informed Consent document to 
be read in the first instance to participants (as many were dyslexics) then 
supplied to them in written form.  This is attached below as Appendix 1B. 
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Appendix 1B – Research Ethics Statement - Informed Consent 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking part in my Research.  This Research is subject to the 
guidance of a Research Ethics Committee.  I am required to point out 
some things to you for your information and your protection - and mine. 
 
1. We are required to respect the most recent versions of four pieces 
of legislation in particular - the Data Protection Act 1998, the 
Disability Discrimination Act 1995-2005, the Human Rights Act 
1998 and Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989.  In 
accordance with common practice I extend the UNCRC to cover 
both children and vulnerable adults. I am accustomed to reading 
out this document for DDA reasons, but I’ll give you a copy too. 
 
2. Your contribution to the research will be doubly confidential:  it will 
not identify you personally in the first place (anonymity), and 
methodologically, your contribution will be blended with others into 
a narrative. 
 
3. I would ask that confidentiality be two-way, i.e. that you don’t tell 
other people the details of what you learn about this research.  This 
is only because others might contribute after you, and may try to 
“help” the research. 
 
4. You have every right not to answer particular questions which you 
find personally intrusive.  It would help if you would say “No 
Answer” rather than disguising your feelings. 
 
5. In some cases I will have asked you to speak from a Role position 
rather than a Personal one.  Both contributions are welcome.  I will 
ask you on some occasions to remind me from which position(s) 
you are speaking - Tutor, Advisor, Parent, etc. 
 
6. I try not to “lead” you with the questions I ask.  But sometimes I’ll 
ask for clarification, or instances, or a qualification (such as slightly, 
deeply, 50%, and so forth). 
 
7. I would welcome, but do not expect, further information you 
remember after the interview;  if things arise at interview that you 
need to talk through with me on a non-interview basis, please 
contact me without hesitation and I will help or seek help for you. 
 
8. I will now ask you, as part of the recording, to indicate to me that 
you are happy to proceed on this basis, and you will have a copy of 
this Statement for your records. 
 
 
The Researcher - Yves Le Juen, A57 Arts A, 7409
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Appendix 2 – The respondents‟ stories 
 
2A - Aggie‟s Story 
2B - Carmen‟s Story 
2C - Chris‟ Story 
2D - Freesia‟s Story 
2E - Jake‟s Story 
2F - Jess‟ Story 
2G - Lin‟s Story 
2H - Millie‟s Story 
2I - Pat‟s Story 
2J - Petey‟s Story 
2K - Sam‟s Story 
2L - Sandy‟s Story 
2M - The Advisors Jillie and Dave‟s Story 
2N - The Academic Director Derek‟s Story 
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Appendix 2A – Aggie‟s Story 
 
Me, in a nutshell! 
I am middle-class, I am not tone-deaf, I don‟t have a clinical or Ed-Psych report of 
amusia or acalculia or alexia, dyslexia or SLI [specific language impairment], I‟m not 
clumsier than average, and I am mostly right-dominant.  I have same-coloured eyes 
(blue/green/gray) natural, normal hearing natural, normal eye-sight - just oridinary [sic] 
short sight - (5.5).   I can‟t do deliberate mimicry, impersonations but I have involuntry 
[sic] mimicry (or convergence). Have I just made 2 typos in my e-mail or am I dyslexic?  
Yes, I am dyslexic - but not certified as such. My School French GCE = Grade B, and my 
School English GCE = also Grade B.  I know other languages through their difference to 
English but don‟t “fully” know those languages.  I‟m going to talk about learning 
Russian, Italian, and French. 
 
I have fun with Russian – a crap teacher 
I had a Language 2 imposed on me as part of other studies – Russian.  I found learning it 
a very stressful experience - I just didn‟t get on with what was going on; I vaguely 
remember accented homonyms, the rest is a blank now! I read and prepared and learned 
ahead of the class - but I found the course peculiar and I was not alone in hating this 
course.  The tutor was from overseas, and I think there was a secret agenda to the 
teaching.   I know about Suggestopaedia:  I know what‟s normal for a Suggestopaedia 
class, so I know that this was “strict” Suggestopaedia. I noted a class mate was motivated 
to learn non-Suggestopaedically.   Like I said, I was very, very tense about it; I needed a 
drink before each class!  I learned nothing from the bad Russian tutor. I had no 
expectation that I should pass or fail with the Russian - but I don‟t regret not acquiring 
Russian, because it wasn‟t my choice to study it.  I was depersonalised and infantilised by 
the tutor/teaching of Russian.  Why?  I was offended by the teacher‟s attitude and by the 
teacher‟s presumptiveness about being the source of learning.  I was horrified by being 
saddled with a Personality Teacher and a teacher who took no account of individual taste 
or preferences.  Here was I giving to the tutor (time, money) but this wasn‟t 
acknowledged.  I received Bad (Customer) Service from this tutor! 
 
I had a gut reaction against a tutor who treated people like that and was revolted by the 
teacher‟s cruelty.  The Bad teacher made me aware that it would be very easy for a 
teacher to destroy my confidence and motivation. 
 
I can spot a crap (for me) teacher in nanoseconds. I was stressed by anticipation, ill-
disposed to the Russian Tutor.  I had a flashback / panic reaction to the Bad Russian 
teacher:  “I just know that this woman cannot teach me”, I thought, and that‟s the only 
time of my life that it‟s ever happened, apart from with Mashinka. I feel that with 
Mashinka, it wasn‟t just the methodology, it was the lack of acknowledgement of her 
pupils as people.  I felt Mashinka was telling me “It‟s your fault if you‟re not learning”.  I 
was actually probably the person who reacted most strongly to this woman, though I was 
conscious of the other learners‟ feelings and thoughts. I was aware that many people were 
so angry and so offended by this Russian woman.  I learned nothing from the Russian 
tutor, none of us did. 
 
What went wrong? 
I am not ill-disposed to “difficult” languages, a priori, but I am sensitive to learning 
atmospheres.  I need an atmosphere which is conducive to learning, but I was seething. I 
despise formulaic teaching (Russian or Italian) by tutors who know what they‟re doing 
but not why. And I don‟t take language ability for teaching ability. I don‟t have a problem 
with Suggestopaedia per se, only with under-rehearsing learners and reciting their “basic 
phrases” - because otherwise they get memory overload. I am a teacher myself and I can 
spot “appalling”.  I can spot a crap teacher because I can spot the vindictive and the 
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pathological! I know a PGCE-trained teacher when I see one.  I found the teacher 
arbitrary and unfair, so I switched off I was being forced to remember something 
unanalysed and not understood. I had a double annoyance:  that we didn‟t do read/write 
language learning AND that we were actively “not allowed” to do it.  This experience has 
affected my desire to know Russian culture and travel there.  This (my experience with 
this Russian tutor)  hasn‟t put me off learning a language at all, but I would do absolutely 
anything at all to get out of learning Russian, now.  Indeed, I built up an actual resistance 
to absorbing Russian, from this experience. I needed to be coaxed by the others to come 
into the lesson.  My reaction personally was probably stronger than the others, indeed the 
symptoms of my distress were different to the others in the class. 
 
My Credo – How should it have been? 
I‟m about to argue below for elasticity and not rigidity in teaching-learning situations but 
the elastic timetabling, on the Russian course, had offended me. I have a theory around 
elasticity in teaching-learning, not rigidity. I think tutors should bend.  In my teaching-
learning theory, tutors should react to learners and not vice-versa (you can plan it, AND 
you can dump it if necessary).  I believe interest in languages and prior language learning 
are facilitators of further language learning. I want writing when I learn a language, i.e. I 
want to produce/transform inputs rather than to repeat un-understood ones. There is a 
mathematical relationship between length of time of teaching and uptake of that teaching!  
Insider knowledge [my being a teacher who is being taught] is a double-edged sword:  it 
speeds me up in task completion, but it saps motivation when I see it being done wrong. I 
think a “teacher‟s book” attached to a course book neither trains nor educates teachers; 
but if they‟re trained or educated already, then teacher‟s books have some sense and/or 
are redundant. 
  
I think becoming accurate and building up the foreign language are parallel but separate 
activities.  I believe a wants analysis is needed (rather than needs) and that students 
should be acknowledged culturally and motivationally by their teachers.  I believe in 
negotiation between teacher and student(s) over the syllabus, and that the teacher needs to 
help develop the learner‟s motivation and confidence.  Because learning styles are 
individual, I believe teachers should abstract themselves - rather than teach against their 
principles.  It‟s the teacher‟s role to acknowledge their students.   
 
I believe teachers have an identity separate from their personal identity but I think 
empathy and a bit of attention predispose learners favourably. 
 
Thinking about my own language learning needs and strategies 
I have “inclinations” in my language learning – strategies and desires and probably my 
own learning syllabus.  Indeed, I have a theory about language learning and 
cultural/linguistic immersion.  My colleagues in the Italian class were instrumental 
learners - not seeking automation, just accretion - but I need an integrative + instrumental 
motivation:  instrumental alone wouldn‟t carry me through an evening class programme.  
 
I focus and complete better in group language learning than alone, but the teacher has an 
influence on how long I stay on the course.  I can work out people‟s prior language 
learning history.  I need teachers who, like me, have been trained – properly. I have high 
expectations of teachers because I‟m a teacher trainer myself! I probably do need to learn 
to switch off a little bit more when I go into a language class; I have classroom anxiety by 
proxy.  
 
Now I like grammar:  learning it is related to my Learning Style. I welcome 
metalinguistic knowledge and its encouragement in others by teaching. I know my French 
grammar‟s poor and that does bug me a little bit.  I have a birth-bilingual sibling, but I too 
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had a childhood experience of communicative success in a L2, not failure.  I have overall 
prosodic awareness, even if my micro phonology e.g. vowel discrimination is defective. 
 
I (think I) project enthusiasm and a desire to learn. I know what I‟m doing and I can‟t 
acknowledge that I don‟t know what I‟m doing.  As an adult, I feel sometimes I have to 
get someone else to do it if I don‟t. 
 
My theory on uptake is that, if you have a reasonable level and you have confidence, then 
uptake is (diagrammatic, quadratic, schematic…?). I liked focused and purposeful one-to-
one teaching, for specific short-term purposes.  Indeed, I might take separate classes for 
separate language activities in the FL 
I probably do need to learn to switch off a little bit more when I go into a language class; 
I have classroom anxiety by proxy.  I can get by:  but my instrumentalism is cutting off 
accuracy, I have no motive in being accurate if I can achieve anyway, so I need an 
external stimulus in order to start improving my accuracy. 
 
Ideally, I would lead my own learning by choosing classes, teacher, and 1:1 status.  I 
wouldn‟t “automate exponentially” if I wanted better French, I‟d need “quite boring 
repetitive work”, “a long haul”, “quite hard”. I both need and despise dull, boring and 
ploddy teaching in basics.  I‟d want bespoke teaching materials, though I can revise and 
recall phrase-book language and functional-notional items from teaching scenarios.  
 
I think people can have an “ear” for languages:  my sister‟s knowledge of high technical 
French grammar is permanent and communicable. I don‟t acquire spontaneously as an 
adult, myself - though my sister does:  but she studied grammar books, so it wasn‟t all 
“spontaneous adult acquisition”.  
 
I like learning things and I„ve never had a problem saying “I don‟t know and I‟m going to 
learn”. My own learning strategy:  “if I want a language I‟ll go and find a situation in 
which I have to use it”, because I feel language learning in the abstract is pointless - I feel 
language is about responding to people.  In language, you have to make some effort to 
establish that rapport. 
 
I‟m always angry at my lack of self-discipline to do things - I‟m very poor on the self-
discipline front, and I need somebody to impose a bit of discipline.  I actually appreciate a 
teacher picking up on my weaknesses in order to help alleviate them, so I need 
negotiation and shared control, i.e. discipline without loss of autonomy. 
 
As an adult I sometimes feel I have to bluff if I don‟t know, or even lie!  I have had issues 
with my age, gender, status, and levels of formality too. My strategy is to speak quite 
quickly so nobody hears what I‟m saying! I could compensate practically for my lack of 
grammar knowledge in tests in this way. 
 
French and me! 
I have had passive child acquisition of spoken French.  Paradoxically my childhood 
success is now adult failure as I‟ve not followed through grammatically, and people will 
wonder… My sister has high technical understanding of French grammar – she acquired 
“magically” because she was 5 and bilingual.  At school, language facility in French 
brought me kudos.  And boys.  A practical outcome and success in it added purpose and 
confidence to my school studies. I was average but individualistic at school – this 
individualism was a coping mechanism.  My Oral and Written French were out of balance 
at O Level – an indicator. I got the same for French and English GCEs – grade B.  Having 
gone back to French, because I went to live and work in France, My opportunistically 
acquired, orally-sourced French has all but disappeared, as I have little metalinguisic 
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sense or categories now;  I acquired français de l’oreiller but I can‟t write a letter in 
French;  I can describe and circumlocute my way around things in the foreign language 
(here, French), but I have a problem with accuracy as opposed to fluency in my French.  I 
am aware enough of how bad it is, yeah – my written French.  I wanted to be an insider in 
France but not to be French.  “Correct” English can have a Scots etc. accent;  however 
“correct” French shouldn‟t have a Brit one. I can‟t make some French vowel sounds 
because I can‟t perceive them as input.  I would rather speak the French I speak with a 
reasonably good accent than speak grammatically perfect French with an awful accent - I 
didn‟t ever offend people [with my French] but I was always a foreigner, so that was OK!  
I had a convergence problem - or gift of mimicry, depending on how you consider it, to 
the point of some native language loss;  I was embarrassed by others out of using these 
Gallic overlays 
 
I have a conservative view of my (Chomskyian) competence in French.  Having 
motivation and having discipline for language learning aren‟t the same thing, for me.  I 
am a reverse case of the rest of the class:  I am fluent but inaccurate, they are accurate but 
not fluent. I haven‟t got the discipline. I should have added to what the Teacher did, done 
it myself.  
 
Other teachers – and me! 
I believe there has to be some sort of methodology, some sort of thought into [language 
teaching. Teacher attitude can be a factor in my own acquisition/learning/uptake of 
language.  I dislike pompous, dogmatic and didactic teachers.  In my experience, a 
teacher can be irrelevant or at least, a poor agent for learning.  I think it‟s punctured 
confidence (punctured by half-cock teaching) which makes language learners go back to 
2-language use in the foreign language classroom.  As for me, I‟m a “communicative-
based teacher”, even if I‟m not altogether on board with Communicative Language 
Teaching.  I found the (Italian) teacher was a communicativist, i.e. in this sense, he was a 
giver/sharer and not a withholder or FOFO artiste like the Russian woman.  This over and 
above the Communicative Movement typology.  I can work out people‟s prior language 
learning history.  I think that there is a particular sort of knowledge available to a “good” 
teacher which isn‟t simply years of practice; I think learners also get confidence from 
witnessing this knowledge and conversely, lose confidence sometimes dramatically when 
it‟s not there. I can define a good teacher as someone who wants to teach well, is 
interested in the students, tries to innovate, has a nice manner, who plans and arranges.  A 
teacher needs nous and pre-emptive thinking / mind-melding with the learners – because 
they‟ll switch off it it‟s not there. A well-meaning teacher isn‟t good teacher if they 
haven‟t evolved their own way of making aims and methods address each other.  Some 
teachers can encourage accidental learning in the right context, in my view.  I think 
there‟s a difference between being uncritical about something and not minding about 
something.  You can „not mind‟ something because you are lacking critical awareness, 
and mind desperately just because you are critical about something, of course. I learn a 
lot by observing other teachers, even though this can be a turn-off in my own learning 
situations (Russian, Italian examples).  I think one fluff in teaching is excusable; two 
begins to look like carelessness – with apologies to Lady Bracknell 
 
Cultural attitudes, accents, Britishness 
The thought of what I could end up sounding like blocks me, a bit.  I believe you can be 
British in French, if you don‟t look out, and imposing Britishness linguistically makes me 
cringe. I am slightly repelled by Britishness including British language learning prowess 
(or the lack of it!).  I think that languages have a soul, and the soul of a language is its 
sound and rhythm.  The soul of the language is the communicative act, it has a 
performative aspect. A Ted Heath accent really hides racism or at least cultural autism. I 
have perceived a split between native speaker attitudes and learner attitudes on the 
relative importance of communicative ability over linguistic accuracy. I infer that people 
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infer that I‟m mocking the soul of the French Language if my accent‟s too Brit. I believe 
a language expresses a culture uniquely.  Some British people imagine a foreign accent 
isn‟t “nice”, and probably treacherous! 
 I have a belief that monoculturals/monolinguals are more coloured or resistive towards 
other language/cultures:  such people suffer from a lack intercultural awareness and this 
blocks their acquisition or uptake of a foreign 
 
My linguistic instability 
I was not conscious of oddities in my English when I was abroad; however being in a 
foreign country my own First language became definitely wobbly.  I have good 
metalinguistic awareness - but aurally and for other people.  So I can notice “not quite” 
English in others, but living in another language does affect my own ability to use 
English, as does living with somebody with a strong accent.  I have been told here that I 
pick up expressions from colleagues and I don‟t even think about it . 
 
Oh, did I say?  I think I‟m dyslexic. 
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Appendix 2B – Carmen‟s Story 
 
General Stuff about me! 
I was aged 21 at the time of this interview.   I‟m middle class I am recognised by the State 
as disabled. I had a false start at Uni.  I‟m right-handed and right-footed. I‟m not much 
more clumsy than the next person but I‟m messy, very messy.  My eyes are the same 
colour;  I had a lazy eye in childhood, corrected by glasses. I‟m a bit long-sighted in my 
lazy eye I still occasionally wear glasses.   I was told to see an Optician but didn‟t bother 
because I decided intellectually that this was pointless.  My hearing is fine; I can do 
accents, badly.  I converge phonologically with people (the accommodation 
phenomenon).  I had naturalistic acquisition of music.  I know about “famous” dyslexics. 
I‟ll “have a go” at anything, despite my dyslexia. I get drunk. 
 
So:  what‟s my problem? 
I have a „late‟ diagnosis of dyslexia.  This diagnosis took place at University; the 
psychologist‟s diagnosis was of “mild dyslexia” and “fluency problems”. Indeed, my 
dyslexia is a knock-on effect of another cause, the working memory difficulty – this 
emerged in general diagnostic work. I do not have automaticity and have to learn by rote 
BUT I can‟t learn by rote too well, with my Working Memory problem.  I have a 
Working Memory problem with the interrupted numbers test. My numbers problem has 
never been salient in daily life, unlike my language difficulty. I don‟t have acalculia, just 
working memory problems. 
   
I have never had a problem with actual reading:  I have always been a keen reader. I feel 
a bit iffy about this, but I come from a family of avid generalist readers.  My problem is 
more productive than receptive. I have problems with fluency in writing: I have difficulty 
in expressing, in writing, what I‟m thinking. I have great difficulty in assembling and 
structuring for another reader the orderly ideas that are there in my head.  Academic text 
is new to me I need time to read academic text. 
 
I have tip-of-the-tongue word-retrieval difficulties:  I lose words, and “hang” like a 
computer. The „me‟ who is thinking and the „me‟ who is assembling and saying what I‟m 
thinking don‟t communicate, at times. I am socially inhibited by my “block” and potential 
malapropisms - It‟s just happened, I‟m looking for the words malapropism and synonym 
and they‟re not there.  I don‟t have an accessible slot for some of these words; they‟ve 
slipped my mind even now.  I have a certain amount of fatalism about word-loss. Some 
spellings are NOT obvious to me; learning to spell “stupid” words was a “little victory” 
[battle image].   
 
Dyslexia is not that bad because I can master it to work for me.  I‟m still determined, 
even after my realisation; I know something if I can write it down, this is my strategy for 
learning.  Oral presentations are fine if I‟m prepared.  But listening and writing at the 
same time makes me tune out, because I lose both the input - from the Lecturer - and the 
output, the notes to myself.  Communicative interactions of any sort are affected by my 
dyslexia. I can sing tunes (music) note-perfect but not the words - I can‟t learn German 
lieder by heart, as a singer, it doesn‟t click in; I don‟t acquire automaticity over singing 
material in German or English.  
 
My family 
For my father, I respond about my parents during the interview.  My family are all 
academic high achievers. I am a psychiatrist‟s daughter.  My Dad‟s an Oxford graduate, 
psychiatrist and author, “so” not dyslexic. My father the psychiatrist doesn‟t take my 
dyslexia seriously as a problem (but I‟ll note later in the Interview that my Dad the 
psychiatrist DID help me at school with spellings - my Little Spelling Book). My Mum 
has terrible handwriting I am aware of my mother‟s coping strategies for probable 
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dyslexia. I told my Mum she might be dyslexic, indeed I have discussed her dyslexia 
extensively with Mum. I believe there is a genetic route for dyslexia. 
 
Reading 
I do really have a receptive problem with reading despite what I said earlier (so I‟m 
inconsistent, like Matt).  I tune out during reading. I don‟t absorb information from 
reading when I‟m tuned out.  Also I can‟t get the gist of a technical text because of new 
technical words which interrupt my holistic reading; I can‟t get the gist of a technical text 
because of complex sentences which interrupt my holistic reading. 
 
Writing 
My spelling is terrible, and people noticed my bad spelling.  I don‟t have 
strephosymbolia, however I do write „phonetically‟, as I would hear or say it.  I do have 
unstable orthography, as I said earlier, so my spelling is „variable‟ as well as just „bad‟. I 
have difficulty hearing the Lecture and writing Notes at the same time I go off on a 
tangent when writing essays - I am worried about my habit of including irrelevances and 
tangential items.  I need help with overall structure, which is not the same as idea-to-idea 
relationships in a mind-map. My marks don‟t change, or the feedback (I feel no progress). 
I recognise the paradox of the deskilling effect of progression.  
 
Grammar 
I have poor metalinguistic awareness, indeed I have little to no metalinguistic knowledge 
– I haven‟t a clue about grammar! I depend on spell- and grammar-checkers for 100% 
accuracy.    I can‟t make my implicit knowledge explicit, nor can I export my implicit 
language knowledge into another language  
 
School to Uni 
I was at a very small school and I had small class size of 10. Theatre school is for 
thickies! I had individual attention - my momentum in school was sustained by others.  I 
got Grade A at GCSE English; in fact all my GCSEs are B upwards.   I got lots of 
practice at GCSE French – there was a small class size of 10, and I got B at GCSE 
French. 
 
I extrapolated my high class position at GCSE onto A Levels whereas in fact I had to 
work beyond the class teaching to maintain my success through to A Level.  I was 
crammed (or at least, tutored) outside school.  I had a threefold increase in class size, at A 
Level; I could hide, at A Level, and could choose not to attend.  I was successful with, 
and liked, English Literature.  I had a problem assembling and structuring essays, at A 
Level. 
 
Strategies 
Sitting by myself before a blank piece of paper doesn‟t help me with assemblage and 
output.  However, speaking out loud allows me to perform assemblage and output of 
ideas. I have a strategy of transcription rather than written composition, I write as I speak.  
On the reading side, my strategy is to force the phonological route by hearing myself read 
aloud instead of hearing text meaning when I quiet-read.   
 
My former coping strategy was fatalistic-ditsy-bubbliness. My dyslexia helper Moira is 
very good and sweet – in addition to helping me attach some retrieval tool to „losables‟ 
and „confusables‟, she teaches me strategies - general learning strategies and academic 
reading skills. For example, I have been taught a strategy which is pause-and-
analyse/summarise. The structure of essays “isn‟t there for me” until Moira has helped.  
Moira helps me arrive at a point, a conclusion; she helps me make physical maps of my 
ideas and gives me reading to do – she takes dictation from me! I benefit from her 
oral/aural feedback; I don‟t go to the group meetings, I prefer 1:1 help. 
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I‟m responsible for any stickering. I‟m not required to put on stickers. I have Mind 
Reader to record lectures, though I am irregular in using Mind Reader. I don‟t use scan-
and-read software, it sounds like a parrot and I find it hard to read computer-generated 
mind-maps e.g. from Inspiration.  Dictionaries are not much use to me as a dyslexic, so 
I„ve been introduced to a syllabary phonetic dictionary 
 
Self-organisation is a key to good marks, for me; I have a Buzan-inspired study-skills 
routine, pre-, during, -post lecture; I‟ve started doing essays in a slow, structured way. I 
“just get on with it”.   I learn the word by “doing” the word, in writing/checking (this isn‟t 
performativity except in a physicalist sense). I go about lexia differently; I am differently 
lexic - I use brute mental energy to remember spellings of words.   
 
One of my tutors uses Ron Davis‟ The Gift of Dyslexia. I have to make sure people 
understand my determination, after my realisation that I was dyslexic. 
 
And I can always get a housemate to do help with my work.   
 
Affect and Psychological 
I may have been under covert expectation to come to University - I wasn‟t directly 
pressured to come to University – but I‟m not an academic, I‟m a singer. I‟m only 
average, intellectually - but I am intelligent, because I‟m at University.  My dyslexia 
makes me feel frustrated.  My dyslexia gets me down.  I feel stupid, being dyslexic.  I 
know I‟m not stupid but I feel stupid nonetheless.  I have had problems with morale - I 
don‟t like being dyslexic, I feel a lack from my dyslexia because I don‟t like feeling not 
level with everyone else [sic]. I‟m aware of dyslexia types and can compare by exclusion:  
there‟s no-one here whose dyslexia matches mine exactly.  I don‟t want to stand out from 
the crowd - I don‟t like getting special treatment. I don‟t like to put stickers on my essay I 
don‟t want people to treat me differently to anybody else. My dyslexia is gnawing me - I 
want a 2:1 and I compare grades with my friends.  I‟m hard on myself (because I want a 
2:1) but I‟m fatalistic about by low scores. I am fatalistic because I can‟t change things. I 
am fatalistic and resigned about some confusables, for example, indeed I have always 
been fatalistic about my language problem. I‟m happier if I did it, rather than a machine, 
e.g. getting notes down but I have been a last-minute, self-stresser before.  
 
My “bad story” was around structured written work – Essays.  I am my work, and 
criticism of my work is criticism of me - “Slating” feedback is shitty. Dyslexia - It‟s just 
really horrible! I have had a blow to my self-esteem.  I am constantly conscious of my 
dyslexia :  whatever is underlying my dyslexia is ever-present, even in non-lexic 
situations - I find it hard to know what‟s my dyslexia and what‟s me, at a particular time.  
My dyslexia isn‟t part of my central identity: “things aren‟t just me” - I‟m part of a “we”, 
and you‟re part of a collective “you”.  
 
I have up until now thought dyslexia is the opposite of wonderful.  I have had a revelation 
through the dyslexia diagnosis. I have or had a belief that dyslexia is code for stupidity, 
and doesn‟t really exist. I thought I was a bit “slow” - I had a poor view of dyslexia until 
my own diagnosis and I‟ve been considered ditsy rather than dyslexic by my family up 
until now. I had found my dyslexia funny but now it‟s a problem.   
 
Positive was my suddenly realising and coming to terms with my difference; I‟m not slow 
or stupid - I came to a point where I accepted “It‟s shitty but I can do other things” – to 
get round the dyslexia. An epiphany was Moira helping me realise my dyslexia can vary 
in intensity, some days I am glad of the diagnosis. There‟s little to say that‟s good about 
my dyslexia – but it‟s important for me to know that it is something serious, and it‟s also 
important for me to know that …it is something that does change. I‟ve had self-
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organisational problems, I don‟t really lose stuff, it reappears – it‟s probably dyspraxia of 
some sort.  Dyslexia is a way of thinking; too I‟m learning and thinking about my 
dyslexia (reference to Time).  I feel challenged by my dyslexia. I have been taught to 
“accentuate the positive” (♫ always look on the bright side of life ♫). 
 
At University 
Academia is a separate reality, and not “everyday life”. My dyslexia is not something I 
really publicise - I don‟t know other campus dyslexics, though I know dyslexics at my 
last academic location before Uni (Esher College) and one of my best friends is terribly 
dyslexic - but I am recognised by the University as a Dyslexic student, indeed I‟m in a 
group which has a Dyslexia Helper.  In fact 3-4 fellow students on the actual campus 
know I am dyslexic and my housemates know I‟m dyslexic (and one helps me, see later). 
I don‟t tell people I‟m dyslexic for my Foreign Language, German. 
 
Modern Languages 
I‟m studying German at University as a Minor Subject.  L2 learning is a level playing 
field; I‟m with others who make mistakes.  I have good Oral German but I have problems 
with German Grammar.  Written German is orthographically transparent for me, i.e. 
written as it sounds. My German vocabulary is bad – I don‟t remember it. I got GCSE A 
for English and B for French but I‟m an autodidact on the German – no GCSE so the 
onus is on me to make the running about my dyslexia, in German. I acquired German by 
immersion in the target language culture.  I avoided the functional-notional when I 
learned German.  Language learning would be harder now as I‟m older Learning German 
in Germany was good, because I was living with a German family in Germany, and I was 
always talking in German so I had to, if you have to do it then you will do it.  I definitely 
find easier with some German words to express myself; I failed my German exam 
because of my English. 
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Appendix 2C – Chris‟ Story 
 
General Stuff about me 
I was twenty-three last birthday; I suppose I‟m middle class. I‟m right-handed – and 
right-footed as well.  I have glasses for long sight; my eyes are both the same colour. I 
feel a bit clumsy, I‟m not that bad but I do drop things. I worked for 3 years between 
school and Uni:  I did an A Level in Art History in the evenings, during one of my three 
years between school and Uni – with quite a lot of reading. I have normal hearing I‟m not 
tone-deaf I‟m not particularly gifted as a mimic. I got an A at GCSE for German. 
 
My family 
There was no affective family stuff around my dyslexia: my dyslexia was a non-issue in 
my family, and my brothers helped me matter-of-factly with spellings.  I think my Mum 
is dyslexic:   I went to this really small school, and so I had to bring the same book home 
all the time, and my Mum used to be like, by about six months of reading it she was really 
bored with me (841). 
 
My Mum – who has an Acquired Dyslexia from being forced to change writing hands at 
school in the 50s - thought it wouldn‟t be very good to have a dyslexia diagnosis, I think 
she had this idea of a big red dyslexic stamp over my exam papers. 
 
My problem with language 
Predominantly my problem is with spelling, which isn‟t very good.  My poor spelling has 
more than one cause - all input problems causing output problems: missing letters off 
words when I take notes, also I‟ll put letters in the wrong order, and I misread things quite 
a lot.  I‟ll see something very quickly and I‟ll think I‟ve got it, but it‟ll turn out I‟ve just 
completely misread some of the words 
 
I was a really, really late reader I hated reading I don‟t really have that much of a problem 
with numbers. It was my teacher in Secondary School started to notice that my spelling 
was appalling.  My Secondary School teacher suggested I might be dyslexic; but my 
mother thought that being dyslexic was a bad idea and didn‟t want me to get tested for 
[dyslexia] in case I was looked at badly because of it. 
 
Since coming to University I decided to go and see an Educational Psychologist, who 
agreed that I was probably dyslexic  
 
My “dyslexic teacher” [sic] is right when she suggests that it‟s because I‟m having a lot 
of ideas and I‟m in a real hurry to get those ideas down. My Dyslexic Teacher talked 
about it in terms of not having a very good short-term memory 
 
I read something I forget it straight away because I‟ve gone on to thinking of something 
else.  Also when I‟m listening to someone talk or I‟m listening to someone reading 
something and I think I‟ve grasped it, and my mind‟s kind of moved on to something 
else. I suppose what I‟m doing is when I‟m listening to the lecture I‟m having a lot of 
ideas about what‟s being said, and that‟s making me think about new ideas. So in that 
sense it [my dyslexia] is a memory problem. 
 
Writing 
I don‟t have strephosymbolia. I do leave out small, tricky words like “the”, and” and “of” 
- I get the wrong a lot! When I‟m writing something, engaged in unreflective, routine 
writing... you know, really boring, then it‟s fine, I make fewer errors. When I‟m full of 
ideas, my dyslexia is worse. I don‟t know I‟ve made a mistake – so I don‟t check and 
learn from mistakes. I sometimes find difficult words, but not incidences of anomia as 
such I get lost if I have to BOTH listen to and grasp what lecturer is saying AND keep 
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notes, linguistically . Usually if I come back to [my contemporaneous lecture] notes they 
won‟t usually make any sense.   
 
Now, I work as a writer but the editor just thinks it‟s appalling „cos it‟s all spelled really 
badly. I chose not to tell an employer I‟m dyslexic when I was editing a magazine. 
 
Even though I‟d spell-checked stuff sometimes when I sent it to [the Editor] there were 
some obvious mistakes that I didn‟t really notice. 
 
Reading 
I can read really quickly, but sometimes if you ask me what I‟ve just read I won‟t be able 
to tell you. I read something I forget it straight away because I‟ve gone on to thinking of 
something else. It wouldn‟t make a difference to my recall if I‟d actually read it aloud, 
rather than reading it silently. 
 
Affect and psychological 
My problem is worse when I‟m under pressure.  Exams are really, really bad for putting 
me under pressure and causing the language problem to manifest.  My stress and anxiety 
and linguistic skills seem causally interconnected. When I‟m stressed and when I‟ve got a 
lot of things in my mind that‟ll be the first thing to go, the spelling.  I have a holistic-level 
and synchronous, high-level facility with ideas, even seemingly unconnected ones, which 
others in the lecture may not be getting.  On the other hand, if I‟m trying to handle kind 
complex ideas in my head, maybe abstract ideas, I can find it quite hard to also be 
thinking about how to spell those words I suppose I‟m not very good  because I consider 
it to be kind of irrelevant whether you should spell them right not - I don‟t give a 
monkey‟s anyway. Maybe the way I write [is] refusing to conform to phallocentric ideas 
of how things should be spelled! 
 
I have problems with multi-tasking against the clock.  I feel embarrassed by my Dyslexia 
sometimes;  I felt a sense of injustice about being docked marks and had a certain amount 
of anger with the teacher for not realising I was dyslexic in the first place, and then  for 
not taking up the fact that I was dyslexic.  
 
I was in two minds about the dyslexia labels. I am calculating about “telling the truth” 
about my dyslexia.  If someone looked over your work and found spelling mistakes you 
might feel quite criticised, but I‟m just waiting for someone to find the spelling mistakes 
in my work, so I don‟t feel bad about it when they do. 
 
School to Uni 
I attended a very traditional private girls‟ school. My English teacher was very kind of 
Old School, very kind of Oxbridge and she certainly didn‟t think that spelling wasn‟t 
important.  Nor did she think that linking together random ideas was very interesting.  I 
think it depends what institution you attend for what the attitude to dyslexic work is. My 
school took a pragmatic view of dyslexia testing, for the extra exam points. I‟ve 
confronted teachers about it [marking penalties against dyslexics] at my school.  The only 
time I‟ve felt negative about being dyslexic was I suppose about when I was 14 when I 
noticed that I was really good at English and this teacher as I said kept giving me bad 
marks in my essays and I felt like I was always....the marks were always being taken off 
because of spelling.  I confronted my teacher for penalising me for ever on the same thing 
and my marks went up a little. 
 
The University wasn‟t expecting a dyslexic when I enrolled.  It was only after I started 
the first year I kind of remembered what had happened at school and thought, and I asked 
to see an Educational Psychologist. I get Student Support and Disability Allowance; I‟m 
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now officially a Dyslexic. The academic world is supposed to be about ideas and not 
perfect spelling. 
 
Modern Languages 
I did French and German and Latin at school I got quite good at spoken German, but 
spelling wasn‟t particularly… I wasn‟t particularly good at written German. The French I 
was generally rubbish at it. The Latin you never have to write it, you only ever translate 
it?  I could translate quite happily out of Latin at school, but probably not any more. I got 
an A at GCSE for Latin and I got an A at German, I didn‟t do the French - I got A or A* 
at English Language GCSE.  I‟ve heard of the “second bite of the cherry effect”. 
 
Dyslexia at University 
My Dyslexia “Statement” has helped me in very practical terms, because I‟m self-funding 
my way through University. The dyslexia grant means I can take texts home and I can if 
I‟m going to work a lot with the book. I find I need to read several times and underline it. 
I‟ve been given a lap-top and I get £200.00 a year to spend on books, and photocopying.  
My laptop‟s also good for structuring actually, being able to cut and paste and stuff on my 
laptop. I find it quite hard to structure my work but instead of having to rewrite it, you 
can just jig it around.  I get Inspiration for mind-mapping on my computer, which I don‟t 
actually use at all.  I‟m just not very computerate, I suppose, I do actually do the 
equivalent by hand. But I just can‟t be bothered a lot of the time.  I know it sounds really 
bad but I‟m really grateful for the laptop and I can spell-check. I am also grateful for the 
back-up of the minidisk to listen to again after a lecture. I also get things like these 
stickers I put on my work that say I‟m dyslexic and they‟re not supposed to take marks 
off for spelling and the same in the exam and I suppose really that works for me because 
that‟s like the way I think, which is “Let‟s just not talk about that”. I was in two minds 
about the Dyslexia Labels. I don‟t like the fact that the dyslexia stickers are big and 
yellow. I suppose I go to some lengths not to let other people see the stickers.  I did think 
about whether or not I wanted to be flagged as dyslexic in my exams, because I felt that if 
an examiner was coming to my paper, they would they immediately like think something 
about me. I‟ve spent a lot of time talking to this Dyslexia Teacher about which would be 
better and I suppose I decided in the long run that I would probably lose enough marks by 
not being flagged as dyslexic that it would be worth my while to kind of do that. 
 
Part of me which is quite traditional thinks that part of getting a degree in English 
Literature should be about being good at spelling and grammar. What if I want to be an 
English Teacher, for example? I think there are still very old school people in the world, 
and they look at the label dyslexic and maybe that person‟s marking your exam and 
they‟re thinking I don‟t know if I would want someone to come out of  my University 
with an “A” in English Literature who couldn‟t even spell. 
 
I think I have been really lucky actually at Wealdston because I think that being dyslexic 
and being able to put together like the approach I‟ve taken to some of my work I think 
has meant I‟ve got better marks and actually I see that as a result of being dyslexic. I use 
lateral thinking, which makes me realise what I‟m studying might be relevant to all the 
other stuff I‟m doing, whereas some people are a lot more compartmentalised in their 
thinking.  My Dyslexia Teacher reckons that the transfer of ideas between topics is 
because I‟m dyslexic and I‟m linking together very different ideas. So. I think I‟ve been 
quite lucky. 
 
Applying for these MAs, should I tick the dyslexic box or not?  One of my Lecturers said 
that she thought to go on and do an MA even though you were dyslexic, they would see 
as a positive thing, because it‟s like you‟d overcome something.  With the MA, I did 
think that I might want to apply for support money and stuff...  that‟s how I ended up 
ticking the dyslexic box, because I thought like subsequently if I need to apply for a 
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laptop or something like it, it might be a difficult situation to then go back and say I was 
dyslexic. 
 
My “Good Story” is that I used to get a lot of criticism for my essays, which used have 
loads of ideas in and there used to be quite a negative feel, at School, whereas here I find 
that having a lot of ideas is considered to be quite a good thing. So. I mean it‟s not a 
specific story but generally I‟ve been quite happy during my degree. 
 
Strategies and Assistances 
I have maybe up to half a dozen little tricks for actual spelling. I don‟t really have study 
help routines and ditties, mine or others‟;  I kind of write things obsessively in a diary, 
actually, and people say “God you‟re organised!” and I say “It‟s because I‟m not very 
organised that I have to …” I don‟t go to the group workshops, I don‟t know why.  I can‟t 
say if other people‟s dyslexia is like mine as I‟ve non-one to compare with.  I have one-
to-one teaching from the Dyslexia Teacher - we do things like make the letters of the 
alphabet out of Plasticene.  It‟s quite fun.  I‟m not sure how useful it is! 
  
 
My dyslexia in the “real world” 
I think even doing an MA will be harder in the real world. Presentation is quite important, 
in the “real world”. I used to make quite a lot of mistakes, when I used to work as a 
waitress, as well.  Really, recently after months, I mentioned to someone at work that 
actually I was dyslexic and that my spelling was really bad.  I don‟t think if I ever apply 
for a job I‟d ever tell them that I‟m dyslexic. I‟m pretty resolute about that [not telling at 
work that I‟m dyslexic], but then partly I just think I would find other not just coping but 
being good enough in other areas of my work for it not to be a problem, I don‟t think 
dyslexia has to be the be-all and end-all. 
 
Articles which I write might be badly spelled, some times, but I‟d like to think they‟re 
always of good quality and I always give them in on time I am calculating about “telling 
the truth” about my dyslexia. I‟ve been quite lucky that I‟ve always worked with people 
who haven‟t been particularly cross with me about my dyslexia.  I‟ve never been fired or 
anything because of that, but when I was waitressing for example my boss would come 
out with special rules about spelling. 
 
My bosses are never very happy when I‟m sending a letter to someone and it‟s a 
professional letter and there are spelling mistakes and stuff in it. I don‟t know if I‟d be 
breaking the law by not telling an employer I‟m dyslexic - it‟s not legal, sacking a 
dyslexic, is it?  
 
Coda 
I wasn‟t at all like the people in “The Gift of Dyslexia”.  But the more my Dyslexia Tutor 
talks about dyslexia, the more I can se the whole way my mind thinks is influenced by 
being dyslexic.   I‟ve come to think about it, my dyslexia, as a really positive, fantastic 
thing. 
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Appendix 2D – Freesia‟s Story 
 
 
Some general stuff 
I am aged 21, at the time of this Interview.  I‟m middle-middle-class. I had a Gap Year, 
before University.  I am right-handed, have good vision, may have slight deafness, but 
have no aids except lip-reading at times. I‟m not tone-deaf, and I can read music. I can‟t 
mimic people, nor imitate regional or foreign accents. I am not particularly clumsy, but I 
can seem a bit forgetful. I got the same grades for English and French at school. 
 
 
Family 
For me, science is the study of reasons behind things; but I‟ve taken no interest in the 
subject of my dyslexia, despite being a science undergraduate.  Still, I believe there‟s a 
strongly genetic rather than environmental explanation for my dyslexia.  I am the 
daughter of an undiagnosed dyslexic, and the sister of a diagnosed dyslexic.  My dyslexic 
sister Jen is older than me.  She has a voluminous handbag too!  She is over-inclusive:  
“she has a big handbag with everything she could possibly need all day within it”.  Jen 
had “learning difficulties” too (we have said these are difficulties with learning rather 
than cognitive depletions); she was, like me, late-diagnosed in her language/learning 
problems.  Jen had extra-school paid-for help, but I didn‟t. My sister‟s dyslexia 
identification was secondary and coincidental to help with integrating into a new school.  
Unlike my sister Jen who came to university “because she wanted to leave home and it 
was the only mechanisms she could use”, I came to university because I thought I could 
do it. 
 
My problem, as I see it 
I have a form of dyslexia, but I don‟t know very much about it (I can‟t remember my 
dyslexia sub-diagnosis!)  It wasn‟t until I was about 18 and a half, nineteen, that I really 
got seen about it when I got to University; in fact I managed, with the odd hiccup along 
the way, until University.   
 
I have specific problems with spelling and word recognition, and learning new words.  
It‟s kind of somewhere in between hearing and reading, quite often... sometimes I can‟t 
read a text at all, other times I just can‟t process it?   I think I have more of a processing 
than a hearing problem - although as a child I was had [sic] quite severe problems for the 
first two and a half years with my hearing. I can “hear” some familiar words off the page, 
but I use lip-reading to segment inputs and disambiguate them. 
 
I‟m not too sure if I have a memory problem as such.  I get letters and numbers in the 
wrong order.  Not only do I sometimes get the numbers in the wrong order, I also get the 
letters in the wrong order.  I always had problems with spelling tests at school, and I don‟t 
remember words I‟ve looked up several times in the dictionary. I can spot a typing error 
but then retype the same error! 
 
I have a strong visual memory, even across time, so my memory‟s really good for 
placement of things and I have long-term memory for words I have tagged visually as 
well as phonologically. I‟ll seek a “phonetical channel” for new words I come across - 
and I won‟t remember what I can‟t pronounce.  Conversely, I lose words I don‟t 
“organise”, i.e. tag in non-phonological ways.  If I don‟t organise it, then it goes straight 
out again. If I don‟t need a noun I‟ll not go back and learn it.  
 
I have a problem with names and remembering them (I‟m anomic) I can remember Frodo 
by his face, not “Frodo” the name.  I need a (written-language free) visual support when 
receiving aural inputs. 
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I „tune out‟ though distractibility, like everyone else.  But also, a word or phrase in 
writing activity (output) can blank me out. I have a conflict between lexical memory and 
discourse/narrative memory, they cause each other to cut out.   
 
I can only access grammar sequences by reinitiating the whole sequence; I can‟t break 
into the alphabet sequence but must repeat it from the start.  So I don‟t have hologramatic 
access, i.e. access to part doesn‟t gives access to whole, access to the whole doesn‟t give 
me access to the part, I need to go back to the beginning.  And I don‟t have numeric 
automaticity any more than alphabetic. 
 
Schooling 
I was educated outside the state sector.  I didn‟t feel stigmatised at home or before 
University in general.  I had learning difficulties in my first primary school - to the extent 
that my mum actually moved me schools and I was put into small groups. I had been 
retained in Reception Class because of class sizes, before - I was a victim of 
disorganisation by my previous school – but in the small-group school scenario with 
teaching assistants I did incredibly well and I got a lot confidence as well. 
 
At the first Primary School, my „bad‟ teacher was “not very nice” and “a bit of a bully” – 
and she has been “ousted by Ofsted”, since.  My good teacher was encouraging, really 
enthusiastic and methodical, and she was approachable. I got a lot of praise so she was a 
good teacher.  I was given a pen instead of a pencil!  The encouragement I received 
created a learning spurt.  My catch-up with the “good” teacher gave me confidence and 
self-esteem as a springboard into Secondary School; it motivated me, “wanting to do well 
at school as well”. I think I‟ve always done well and I care, as well.  A “good story” was 
realising it wasn‟t me, it was them all the time.  
 
I did really well in secondary school, so... I feel like I got lost along the way a little bit.  
My school French tutor, who was also my Form Tutor, spoke French and was very 
approachable.  She was nice, and nice, for me, is “really, really supportive.  My Uni 
Spanish Teacher at Uni, in contrast, didn‟t always speak Spanish. I‟ve always been quite 
well-supported - I had some after-school activities tailor-made just for me.  In science, I 
was in top sets for everything; there were 65/70% girls in science but the group was hard-
working, supportive.  But also, there were expectations of me from having been “good” at 
some subjects.   
 
I left secondary school at 16.  
 
 
Strategies I use 
I am aware, or at least, subliminally aware that people have mechanisms or skills to 
compensate for their language / learning problems.   I have a friend who is “crap at 
spelling and other things”, though his record collection is huge and alphabetical and he‟s 
“really good at sciences” and “must have some incredible strategy for organisation”. I 
can‟t (or won‟t) organise myself 
 
I cheated in spelling tests at school - I cheated by looking up verb tables in the dictionary, 
but my dyslexia makes me poor at cheating; I can copy down the wrong word. Now, I 
live my life by sticky notes.  I have Post-It notes all over everywhere I sample words then 
dump some half-way through.   
 
I need multiple recall techniques.  My strategy with names (nouns in fact) is to know their 
relevance, then remember the item concerned, and not the other way round.  I need the 
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highlighter for saliency / relevance purposes when I have to retrieve. I‟ll repeat an action 
or scenario several times rather than risk forgetting it.   
 
I‟ve mostly evolved my own strategies for coping because I know myself best and what 
works for me.  I wasn‟t taught strategies directly by the Ed Psychs, but I was given 
positive reinforcement of my strategies by the Ed Psychs. But they used some negative 
modelling/instances, too.   I use lists, as a technique. My lists are literally aide-mémoires, 
as well as satisfaction-garnerers: I have a highly planned daily diary of deadlines and 
tasks; this allows me to give myself satisfaction for my progress.  I‟m very organised, e.g. 
my handbag with all its compartments. My wallet‟s the same, i.e. planned inside and I 
have a multi-compartmental bag also.  
 
I learn by doing, and I have a kind of a reward system for completing work.  I delegate 
my mental planning and organisation to physical objects. I tick pages and fold pages back 
to signal progress and completion – to myself.   
 
I use keys to access rules or memories, but I can access rules or memories by substitute 
techniques when these are blocked by my dyslexia.  For example, I have a strong 
associative memory, j for jalapenos; visual letter/vegetable shape and phonology are 
associated. 
 
I do miss some lectures, but not many.  I sit quite close to the front.  I quite like the 
beginning, middle and end, kind of thing;   I like them to tell me where we‟re going in the 
lecture, and I find that a lot more useful if there‟s some sort of structure I can follow.  
 
I do plucky I‟ve always persevered and made it through to the end at least; this failure at 
Spanish is my first avoidance. 
 
Grammar 
I can remember grammar rules and models in general. My spelling can be incorrect:  I 
have letter reversals esp. d and g, I have d-slot and g-slot inversion (god/dog), and my d 
and g problem creates word segmentation problems. 
 
Reading 
I don‟t read for pleasure very much:  I tune out after half a page, even when reading for 
pleasure.   I am a slow reader, because I have to re-read a lot. When dyslexia hits I need 
to stop and start over again, so I need to use a highlighter when reading. Even though I‟ve 
said each word in my head, I sometimes don‟t string them together to make sense. I also 
re-read things a lot because I‟ll get half-way through a paragraph and will have sort of 
forgotten what the point of it was.  I‟ll know the last 5 words I‟ve read but I don‟t know 
what context it‟s in so I haven‟t built up, like, a sort of internal story going on… I‟ve lost 
the story, pretty much, I quite literally lose the plot. I find it so frustrating:  I can go back 
and read about four or five times.  I have a computer-based reader, which help; sounds a 
bit sad but... I do use that [the computer reading programme] a lot. I need to highlight for 
gist and for salience / relevance as I read science papers.  
 
I don‟t remember what I can‟t pronounce.  I seek a “phonetical channel” for new words I 
come across. My processing interruption occurs somewhere between the actual taking the 
words off the page and putting them into the thought… it kind of mismatches, and 
doesn‟t quite work.  
 
Writing 
When I can‟t convert thoughts into words I fall into circumlocution and periphrasis, 
lengthening my phrases unnecessarily 
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Affect and Psychological 
I was really stressed as a 7-year-old and I plucked out all my eyebrows and eyelashes 
Sometimes I feel just a bit of an airhead, I can seem a bit forgetful I always thought 
myself as a bit of a blonde bimbo. I think up until now I just thought I was a bit scatty.  I 
am aware of the impression I make on other people I have obsessive-compulsive traits 
sometimes, I‟m not paranoid or over-anxious but I‟ll continuously check things because I 
don‟t remember doing them. 
 
In the Spanish class – which I failed - I felt anxiety.  Definitely.   I felt embarrassment. I 
wasn‟t happy at all about involvement with others. I need to be in control. I prefer private 
to public, and I compare my performance and motivation with other people‟s;  I can feel 
humiliation about what other people think.  I‟ve been quite emotionally involved in my 
academic work.  I‟m not good at expressing feelings - I just tend to cry.  The one and only 
response. 
 
I‟m very stubborn, and I have quite a long attention span, though I imagine my condition 
sounds pathetic to others.  But I gauge success and progress by my popularity, as an 
indicator, because low self-esteem and lack of confidence would have led to lack of 
esteem, i.e. unpopularity.  
 
For me, self-esteem leads to learning success leads to language success. Self-esteem isn‟t 
so much language-related as learning-related, for me. 
 
Modern Languages and me 
As I said earlier, my school French tutor spoke French (my University Spanish Teacher 
didn‟t always speak Spanish, in contrast) and the French teacher at school was not only 
my Form Tutor but was very approachable too. And there was practical application of 
some of the French teaching, at School. My GCSE was just above average, 6/10 at 
school, but I am monolingual:  I‟m sad and sorry to say that just don‟t know any French 
really at all, now.  I crammed for GCSE French but it never stuck, and I don‟t even have 
passive, comprehension knowledge. 
 
I tried Spanish at University - although I didn‟t get on so well. I was pretty 
underconfident in it (I had a utilitarian, not integrative motivation for learning it) but my 
learning didn‟t generalise or exponentiate, my strategy of thoroughness and over-learning 
was pointless, for foreign language work;   In addition to having dyslexia, I‟m beyond the 
“critical period” (Lenneberg 1967). My Spanish wasn‟t “growing organically” for me, 
and it was never there for me, spontaneously. 
 
 The “bad story” in my interview was to do with the Spanish teacher. I was treated 
unfairly, and I was angry because she hadn‟t bothered to look into my special needs. I 
was hard-done-by:  there were non-beginners in the Beginners‟ Spanish course, and it 
would have been fairer to support the people who were having problems rather than the 
people who were finding it a lot easier „cos they speak Greek or other languages. I have a 
belief that people who know more than one language have an advantage in learning a 
third or fourth etc.:  I was shown up in front of speakers of other European languages on 
this course. 
 
I think a lot of my problem with the Spanish was that the teaching approach at the 
University was different from school, which I think made it very difficult. Spanish […] 
was a lot more fast-moving and a lot more text-book orientated, at University. My time 
and memory problems were not catered for in this group learning situation. I was more in 
control of things, in the School language classroom. Having people look over my work I 
didn‟t like that very much, especially my spelling and such things I prefer it [marking] to 
be done by the teacher in confidence.  I don‟t like opening [exams] all together, or 
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speaking about them afterwards.  I tend to just open them and not say much. I was sitting 
there humiliated. 
  
“I had to go first out of all the class” in the Oral Exam - I wasn‟t able to use stuff in my 
rôle-play learned from other class members.  I couldn‟t use my in-class peer modelling / 
learning strategy.  
 
I never reached exponential automaticity in French or Spanish. I have only been 
concerned about my language use since coming to university.  Spanish was my first 
failure… I couldn‟t emotionally do that, this time; it was just total avoidance, which is the 
first time it‟s ever really happened.  Another part of the “bad story” was also not knowing 
anyone else in the class, and that I didn‟t feel as though I was doing all right:  I felt I 
needed help:  but there was no-one there, and stupidly when I got the report back, I did do 
all right. My oral test was not worth quite as much as I emotionally thought. The 
University Spanish course incident was a bigger knock than Primary School, with the hair 
plucking etc. 
 
A Coda 
I have been vindicated - it wasn‟t just my problem, others had it too, and that teacher has 
been “changed”. 
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Appendix 2E – Jake‟s Narrative 
 
Me – some basic stuff! 
I‟m twenty years old at the time of recording.  I‟m reading psychology here at university. 
I‟m upper middle-class (though the term is much devalued).  My eyes are the same 
colour.  I had a gap year between Secondary and Higher Ed.  I‟m clumsy and break things 
at home.  In fact I‟m the worst, at home, at clumsy/breaking.  I also lose things a lot. I‟m 
completely tone-deaf. I can‟t impersonate people‟s voices or replicate accents which 
aren‟t mine. I am ambidextrous except for writing (mixed laterality), but left-footed.   I 
miss appointments, even important ones.  I haven‟t dealt with my scattiness as rigidly as 
my sister - I can‟t really be arsed, to tell you the truth.  I “go out” quite a lot but I have a 
hearing problem with people‟s voices (I‟ve probably been deaf since 13 years of age) so 
people find me loud, I shout at them. I‟m unaware of my loudness, so get embarrassed 
when it‟s pointed out! 
  
My family 
I have bilateral family dyslexics of strong to severe handicap, both ♀ and ♂.  I find the 
same things difficult as the rest of my dyslexic relatives.  Abby is [dyslexic], that‟s my 
sister.  My sister‟s dyslexia “dominated our family”.  My aunts and uncles were 
„dyslexics before dyslexia‟ and “just dropped out of school I think”.  . I have one 
“dyslexia disbeliever” family member.  
 
My problem 
Personally, I‟m dyslexic or should I say, I‟m “dyslexic broadly”.  Dyslexia affects my 
memory quite a lot.  I‟ve a very bad short-term memory.  Also, I get things muddled up.  
In fact, dyslexia affects basically the speed of my reading and organisation… organising 
my work and everything in my life really. I forget my word-processing.  My room is 
really a mess.  My bag is always a mess. I‟m not organised at all, and that is so frustratin‟ 
sometimes. 
  
Reading 
I believe you have to read in order to get better at it, but I‟m so scared of reading. I get 
scared and very anxious because there‟s too many words on the paper, too many long 
words.   I can‟t read long words.  I find reading very difficult.  I took minutes at a 
meeting, once, but wasn‟t able to read them back. I can‟t always read OHP slides I don‟t 
scan-read, I grab what I can, opportunistically because I lose “the plot” or argument if I 
trip over a hard word. I can read short sentences, and I‟m fine with single-syllable words 
but no more;   I find sentences with nested clauses difficult to read.  Complex descriptors 
can throw me when I read, too. My problem isn‟t that words get mixed up or back-to-
front.  I actually just can‟t read the words; I don‟t know what they say. When I am 
reading, all the letters start jumping around, and the words stop making sense. I don‟t 
allow myself to read, but I do think if I actually allowed myself to actually read more it 
would become easier. Reading makes me anxious because you just see so many words on 
the piece of paper. I have to invest heavily when reading because I need to process 
everything – before I can analyse and decide what‟s relevant.  I‟ve got to go through 
every single sentence, every single word.  And if I go through my alphabet to find 
something I always have to go A, B, C all the way back to the beginning.  I would prefer 
having to over-process potentially redundant information, rather than getting totally lost 
in any case. 
 
I never read silently except on holiday.   On holiday I can read silently in my head if 
there‟s not a single sound to distract me.  I have to speak out loud so that I overcome 
whatever noise there‟s there.  Talk-radio is a big obstacle to head-radio when I‟m reading.  
I don‟t like reading out aloud in Seminars if I haven‟t had time to prepare for it, I‟d hate 
that, but yeah if I‟m well-prepared I‟m OK. 
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Writing 
I experience different problems to reading when I write. 
 
Grammar 
I find it hard to remember where punctuation and plural markers go. I remember being 
taught punctuation - but not what was taught. 
 
Modern Languages 
I did French foreign language. I really didn‟t like it very much - I was pretty naughty in 
my French class, but I had extra tuition with it. My Mum paid for me - just a local French 
lady that helped me.  I got B [in French], in the end. 
 
Strategies and techniques 
I don‟t recall any spelling ditties, strategies.   Indeed, I don‟t recall having been taught 
e.g. spelling ditties, strategies. Technology-wise, I scan and enlarge my work on a 
computer screen too. 
 
I avoid self-directed anger by avoiding tasks and situations likely to create this anger. I 
deliberately won‟t read stuff.  I procrastinate and “just leave” stuff.  I will borrow OP 
(Other People‟s) essays but not reciprocate:  I have good essay feedback (but still don‟t 
want to share what I‟ve written with other students). My flatmates also study psychology 
- my flatmates offer interpretation and clarification of inputs I‟ve received. But I find 
friendships with other dyslexics “naff”. I find organised socialising with other dyslexics a 
bit lame or naff too. 
 
I can chat way in seminar. My friends tell me I‟m a waffler because I do just talk a lot. 
Seminars are good because I can listen to lots of stuff.  I learn through talking and there‟s 
no interaction but there IS essay-writing so I have a double bind in motivational terms.   
 
My theory 
My theory on my own dyslexia is that I wasn‟t taught grapheme-to-phoneme 
equivalences - we didn‟t have phonics at school. But I don‟t really have private theories 
on dyslexia. I think dyslexia affects people‟s reading and spelling in that maybe words or 
letters within sentences or letters within words get muddled up, or wrote [sic] the wrong 
way wrong. I think some people also experience difficulty with digits and maths, in 
dyslexia. I have a series of beliefs, though: I would say there‟s some genetic 
predisposition to it, and that  if dyslexia is caught at a young age, if you get them at a 
young age and you teach them properly they can… they have to work hard but they can 
be just as successful. There is a belief in my family (Mum) that “proper teaching” and 
hard work can lead to success. For me, personally, success equals academic success 
equals reading and writing. I associate dyslexia with illogicality.  I believe dyslexic 
people have impaired logic. 
 
School and transfer to Uni 
I was a bit of a joker at Primary and Junior School, before diagnosis.  Because I was a 
“naughty child” at school, dyslexia wasn‟t apparent until my A Levels. My A Level 
teacher said “You‟re dyslexic”.  I went and got tested and I was. My parents paid for me 
to have it [Dyslexia Support] externally from the actual School.    No-one before my A 
Levels clocked I might be dyslexic.  I was not taught phonically at school.  I think had I 
gone to a better school they would have picked it [my dyslexia] up. 
 
I went to a school which didn‟t cope with students who had learning or even behavioural 
difficulties very well at all, they‟d just kind of exclude you, I think had I gone to a better 
school they would have picked it up.  It‟s a class thing, definitely.  
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A Bad Story was when a student teacher referred publicly to my dyslexia. 
Another teacher publicly associated my classroom naughtiness with my being dyslexic. I 
believe a dyslexia diagnosis is an invitation to open, public disparagement by others. 
 
Surprisingly I got an A for English Language, and I got a B for English Literature.  I 
thought it would be the other way round, I have to say. I did about 6 weeks before my 
exams - I didn‟t actually do much before that. My Mum, bless her, sat down every day 
and night with me and I didn‟t go to school, she just went through it all with me, and I 
learned it all.  My mother tried to make me take responsibility for inducing syllabus 
content from exam papers. My mother trained me in exam-craft. In Secondary, I got an A 
in Psychology and a B in English at A Level; I‟m not saying for Drama. My teachers 
were passionate about their subjects, and they made me want to learn and want to do it.  I 
came from a good school background, all clever girls. My “Good Story”?  A Level 
teachers - because it was good size classrooms, you know, they were able, they had 
enough time to be able… you know, you could meet up with them and speak to them 
about it 
 
Uni and Dyslexia 
I thought my dyslexia arrangements would be in place when I arrived at Wealdston. The 
dyslexia support we got in the post was just words, it “never really came to anything”. 
 
I got a computer and a scanner, which I could have provided myself, though the technical 
assistance here from Assistive Technology Unit was really good. I was told, “You have to 
be proactive in using these to help you”.  I found it hard to go and say to people “Help 
me”.  I have to work harder, with my dyslexia, so I have to be a lot stricter with myself, 
thus my dyslexia is socially limiting, e.g. staying in alone to study. 
 
I made a conscious decision to engage with the Support system. I have tuition once a 
week . Last year the guy I had was useless, he was subcontracted in from outside and so 
he was…I didn‟t find it very helpful the support last year.  I nearly left at the end of last 
year because I just thought… I can‟t do this. I got a new tutor who‟s brilliant and I feel a 
million times more happy this year. 
 
My studies have taken up loads of Mum‟s time – she‟s a family therapist, chatty and into 
psychology. My mother has edited all my essays up to now. If I got an essay back with a 
bad grade, and I‟d done it all myself, “Yeah I’d be disheartened, I would have to say”. I 
wrote my first essays by myself last week and my Mum didn‟t check it. For the first time 
last week I felt confident and I think a lot of it for me is confidence of being able to write 
it. 
 
Affect and psychological states 
My dyslexia saps my confidence and replaces it with automatic self-doubt, which is 
horrible.  I am mentally really, really anxious. I don‟t feel as anxious when I‟m talking (as 
when I‟m reading) - I tend not to “lose it” when I‟m talking, as I feel I‟m much more in 
control (I have propriocentric feedback on my oral outputs). I lack confidence in my 
writing abilities, enough to hide my work from others - I don‟t want anybody to ever read 
my work.  
 
My psychologist‟s report for my dyslexia said that my sequencing and my short term 
memory was really bad.  I get panic attacks, headache, hyperventilation, shakes. I hate 
having all this work hanging over me, it makes me anxious.  Dyslexia makes me feel 
angry with myself for not being able to do simple things Dyslexia makes me feel 
frustrated.  I believe I‟m intelligent, behind it all.  I don‟t doubt my intelligence, but I find 
it really difficult to know what the level is expected of me. I do feel embarrassed by [my 
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dyslexia] sometimes.  In fact my dyslexia is terribly embarrassing - it is actually 
embarrassing to have to say to people “Oh actually you know I‟m dyslexic” in work-
place settings. 
 
Being identified as dyslexic in front of my peers made me angry, and I feel people may 
think I‟ve faked my dyslexia to get a computer. I find in-your-face disbelief / denial of 
my dyslexia upsetting.  A dilemma is that although I wouldn‟t reject a fellow dyslexic 
just because they were dyslexic, I don‟t really identify with the label “disabled”.  The fact 
that I find reading so difficult has made me more outgoing.  
 
On the upside, I wasn‟t disgraced in front of my peer group by my A Level results. I 
didn‟t think I‟d get my A Levels although I‟d worked really hard to get them.  So that‟s a 
Good Story for me - just getting my exam results, because I never thought I‟d get „em.  
 
My unfulfilled needs 
This Dyslexia Support is only indirect, impersonal, generalised help, and so not about me, 
not directly helpful of me.  It‟s not personalised, one-to-one teaching / feedback.  It‟s 
very generalised, so it‟s quite hard sometimes, it‟s not coming at it from my direction. I 
believe older students like me need individual tuition because I have grown, individuated, 
and attained different levels to others - so need individual tuition. My success / survival 
mechanisms are also now potential blockers to teaching-learning. University‟s just an 
“absolute joke” because there are so many lecturers or tutors - but you can‟t access any of 
them:  school wasn‟t that small and they were busy, but available. 
 
Weighing it all up 
My dyslexia has actually contributed a lot to other things that I‟ve enjoyed doing - like 
sports.  I don‟t think Dyslexia is a “gift” - I‟m annoyed by the “gift of dyslexia” concept.  
I sometimes imagine famous or successful people became so because they were never any 
good at reading or spelling so they did it more. 
 
Success, for me:  a Coda 
“I got an A and two Bs” at GCSE, and that was a good result, I mean it was a normal 
result. 
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Appendix 2F - Jess‟s Story 
 
General stuff about me 
I‟m 37 years old, I‟m long-sighted, I have dominant R hand/foot, no mixed dominance. 
I‟m middle-class because my parents were middle class – teachers.  I‟m not tone-deaf.  
I‟m poor at mimicry. I‟m uniquely dyslexic in my family, I‟m different from the rest of 
them. 
 
My School Education 
I scored “Ungraded” at English, and wasn‟t even put in for French – I was fobbed off 
with a piece of paper. I believe my schooling was responsible in part for my problem:  
school set me back, caused problems.  But I had this BEFORE school; school exacerbated 
and focused the problem.  I am aware people at school took “knocks” over their language 
difficulty [perhaps even I did]. 
 
I‟ve pulled off some academic successes in school but couldn‟t repeat them, i.e. build up 
success. In my little “success” at school [my ace character sketch from either Charlotte 
Brontë - or Jane Austen], I‟m still unsure how the actual academic exercise won praise. 
 
I combined a distraction technique with attention-seeking in class, and knew that 
punishment/attention would surely follow; but I was inwardly sad no-one was picking up 
on my problem. My problem correlates with being punished for something which isn‟t 
my fault – being slow in writing.    
 
I had an 8-10 year gap between school and Uni work. 
My post-school education has been a bit stop-start. 
 
My Language problem 
I received lots of oral/aural inputs as a child, but I need time, to complete things involving 
writing. I sometimes lose the thread and answer one thing heard and take it as the salient 
item – so the “language thing” (288) isn‟t replied to, the “family” (286) one is. I‟ve been 
involved in empirical psychology work of others.  I think my language and motor 
problems are related even though I have no problem actually articulating. Even for a 
success, a positive thing, I am averse to being shown up in front of others.  
 
When I go monosyllabic, people assume I‟m a moron. I may have a problem reading 
myself in others‟ eyes.  I can “come off” with odd statements, like saying I was involved 
with Cherry:  it‟s Cherry who is involved with both Dyslexic Students and with Mature 
Students.  We‟re not “involved” in that sense! 
 
My language problem is in fact the interaction of two problems, which sort of interfered 
with each other. I also have an assemblage problem which seems to combine anomia with 
tip-of-the-tongue, minor aphasia.  
 
I‟ve had these problems ever since school. The main problem I have with language is in 
the written form. I‟ve never had a problem with reading, and was even a couple of years 
ahead, at times.  But actually forming words is physically effortful for me. An outward 
sign of my language problem is that I write in capital letters, which slows things down.  
My problem isn‟t mechanical in origin, but there‟s still a mechanical outcome because I 
need to write in CAPITALS.  With the exception of e, I don‟t have real problems with 
cursive script.  My writing got smaller and smaller in tandem with my lack of confidence, 
though I‟m not sure of this pop-psychology interpretation.  
 
The knock-on effect is loss of memory in the planning department of my written outputs. 
I find it hard to read my own work with someone else‟s eyes, i.e. abstract myself from my 
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own writing. I feel I‟m “meant to” and “supposed to” write in certain ways, and this is 
another thing I lose sight of:  the academic readers‟ expectations of me, as well as losing 
concentration on what I intended to write.  I can‟t sometimes marshal and assemble ideas 
to tell or write to others.  
 
Flow, or automaticity, was something I couldn‟t achieve owing to the twin claims of 
written output and assembling concepts. I don‟t have automaticity in writing, I have to 
concentrate and make my hand write, so my meaning-intentions have to “hang” 
temporarily. And so when I‟ve performed the writing, I need to go back and see what it 
was about, and rejoin the semantics.  If my ideas are clear, I don‟t have a problem 
retaining them even if embedded in complex syntax. However rather than at syntactic 
level, at discourse level I have difficulties in joining on the next idea. I‟ve forgotten the 
“story” of what I‟m writing; this is a discourse-level phenomenon, really.  
 
I sometimes need to blank out the world in order to concentrate. The information is there 
in my brain but locked in by occasional word-blindness. I crash, or hang, like a computer 
programme. I find it hard to do assemblage and information transfer, e.g. in something as 
negotiated and two-way as explaining something – I‟m assembling and producing for 
two:  for myself and for my hearer. Sometimes I don‟t know whether I‟ve been relevant 
in my answers, particularly to involved questions.  There‟s a feedback problem at times:  
have I said the correct thing, versus have I said the socio-culturally relevant thing, i.e. 
what was expected of me. 
 
I‟ve not had problems with general reading but as a student of technical texts I have mild 
anomia:  I can retrieve whole-words visually though not phonetically:  I see words I 
recognise as wholes but I don‟t “hear” them speak to me.  My visual sense isn‟t as 
developed as well as my sibling‟s mental 3D or my parents‟ artistic work. Segmenting 
visual forms may be slowing me up, as I have to go for the whole form.   
 
I can achieve certain grammar structures successfully when talking, spontaneously; but 
not when writing. I haven‟t internalised some metalinguistic categories at all. What 
metalinguistic terminology I do possess comes from formal study of English at school, 
not a foreign language.  Sure, writing “lines” at school was more physical as a problem, 
but with essays, it‟s marshalling the ideas and marshalling an appropriate essay format at 
the same time which is the problem, for me. Because of my writing and language 
difficulty I find it difficult learning and recalling and assembling and writing all at once.  
I need to get the whole first then analyse down, not analyse particulars and create a whole 
from particular to general 
 
Orally, I need to do differentiated listening, for relevance and emphasis as well as 
content.  Blanking on individual words, like I‟m doing now, halts the flow and stops me 
from synthesizing my ideas. I have to go round some problems and carry on the other 
side. I actually know that I know things, and I also know it‟s not coming out right, it‟s an 
expressive rather than a content thing.  So for the oral side, I‟m dammed-up on the 
thoughts-into-words side (until I‟m given or find the sesame word), whereas for the 
written side, it‟s more properly an assemblage problem for thoughts into writing. People 
fire sesame-words at me and I remember. I can‟t trigger recall in myself, but others can 
trigger me. 
 
Interestingly, on the numbers side, I can‟t do numbers orally but can do them written 
down.  I‟m actually faster with numbers than words in experimental situations. This 
seems to opposite to my language problem where the reverse is true. I didn‟t have number 
automaticity until years of practice and certainly not at school, where we learnt numbers 
by chanting words!  I can do with numbers what I can‟t do with words, i.e. see the symbol 
and hear it in my head and use it as a token, almost simultaneously.  Writing takes longer, 
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I need time to recover the semantics, this affects my writing and communicating and 
discourse-level communicative performance. 
 
Separately to just writing, I have problems with attention and focusing. I‟d rather not 
seem clumsy – but I am, because I can have motor problems in restricted spaces. I‟m 
forgetful - but at least I know I‟m forgetful. I might have slight developmental language 
problem owing to infant hearing difficulties 
 
I have scientific curiosity about my problem. More important than my scientific curiosity 
is the possibility of overcoming or curing my problem, because I think sometimes that I 
can‟t do some things at all. 
 
Affective and psychological 
I am keen to help with the Interview. 
 
I judge success and failure in oral communication by others‟ reactions. I have memories 
of success which are still salient.  I had an early-life experience of failure.  I didn‟t have 
the comfort of a diagnosis, at school, and blamed myself.  I still wonder why I‟m not 
doing things right.  In fact, praise was rare at secondary school. I like working to my 
strengths (Parents positively reinforced what I could do, my strengths (like the Dyslexia 
people here are trying to do?) 
 
After the positive focus of my family, the state (school!) used negative reinforcement on 
me, setting me lines to do. There was ambivalence towards me at school – Sinner 
(slowcoach) and Saint (Monitor) I regret that the penny didn‟t drop and that acquisition 
didn‟t take place.  I was inwardly sad no-one was picking up on my problem. Later, I 
would also lose my feelings of success and progress.  Success, for me, the sort that leads 
to more success, has to be conscious, striven-for success.  I‟m suspicious of some 
“automaticity”, therefore, because it‟s a loss of control over success strategies I‟m 
familiar with.   
 
At school I used my empathetic skills to draw out the character of someone written by 
Jane Eyre.  Since leaving school and going into Higher Education, I suffered for the 
woman giving the Student Support Dyslexia talk - I feel their position and am empathetic 
about it, in the abstract, so not autistic in analysing what they‟ve said or written 
 
I was shy and relied on bravado in my earlier H.E. studies. I may have seemed more 
mature than I feel.  I am mature enough to be (or at least feel) proof against “knocks”.  
Actually it did knock me, I‟m reinterpreting positively that I learned from this but it took 
quite some time – 2 years – to accept I needed the Ed Psych.  I feel stupid at times.  But I 
feel more puzzled than stupid. I‟m taciturn, I‟m not systematically up-front about it 
[Dyslexia] with people. I am averse to being shown up in front of others. So I feel stupid 
from me and stupid from others. 
 
I wasn‟t happy to carry on the way I was, but also, I have made a profit-and-loss 
calculation of my own about receiving help. I felt annoyed by the O.U. Lecturer; I felt he 
was over-frank, negative and unhelpful – he wasn‟t constructive (so he was destructive).  
I have resolve and pluck, and possible vengefulness [an “I‟ll show you” Motivation]  
 
I‟ve become aware of, and slightly taken on, the University‟s point of view; I‟m 
convergent as well as empathetic. 
 
Difference and “Passing” 
I pass as OK, from my oral performance:  listening to me you‟d rarely think there‟s 
anything wrong.  But I have a sense of otherness: for a start, I‟m uniquely dyslexic in my 
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family; I‟m different to the rest of my family.  What‟s more, I am aware of difference I 
am aware of not conforming to expected behaviour and actions. I have to intuit what is 
“normal” and good in non-dyslexics. I‟ve been aware of being “bad at writing” but at the 
same time, intellectually “quick”, since childhood.   The teachers “caught on” that there 
was something amiss, a contradiction in my performances.  I had assumed everyone else 
functions in certain ways, in teaching and learning.  Why did no-one spot I was different? 
I‟m in a no-win situation.  I‟m not “the classic visual dyslexic guy who sees the letters 
moving around.”  I‟ve met others who have an output, not an input problem.  I find 
strategies easier to deploy in private, e.g. going the long way round. I don‟t have 
problems of face, in private.  But in public…  I‟m “out” to other dyslexics and have a 
“tribe” to fall back on to a certain extent  
I‟m not a “youngster”, being thirty seven years of age. In earlier studies in a technical 
subject where my dyslexic tendencies may not have been spotted, I expected my 
difference, i.e. my individuality, to be addressed by the tutor who dealt with me.   I need 
to work to my strengths, which are my differences, but not be different, and “pass” 
among others. 
 
Uni and diagnosis 
My oral language doesn‟t impinge on others, you wouldn‟t know from hearing me. .  My 
dyslexia wasn‟t picked up at school (I scored extremely highly in school assessment tests) 
but still no-one picked up on my dyslexia.  In fact, I was never “statemented” at school; I 
had to wait until Level 3 education.  
 
I know about dyslexics and dyslexia and the idea of a continuum of problems. 
I believe there was a cause outside myself for the problem.  I can hear in my head what 
I‟m reading, but I‟m not hearing on output, just on input. I don‟t think I have amusia.  .  
I‟ve had to learn inductively what I‟m not good at from what I‟m told I‟m good at.  The 
Dyslexia people here work to my strengths.  Having a delicate metalinguistic 
classification doesn‟t work for me as well as pragmatic language use, but I need visual 
feedback to confirm the success of my communications (But I don‟t get this, in written 
work, as I go).   
 
My dyslexia has been connected with my grasp of the world.  I‟m less good at 
phonological routes for retrieving words from their sounds.  I‟m good at holistic pictures 
of words – holoforms.  My explanation of “my” dyslexia is that the holistic visual route 
blocks the phonological, analytical one.  I can achieve spontaneous visual understanding 
of non-linguistic items such as wiring diagrams:  so I can cope with the “language” of 
maps and diagrams, I receive communication from them.  I am aware of paralinguistic 
features even if I miss out on metalinguistic ones.  
 
I‟m “out” to other dyslexics and have a “tribe” to fall back on to a certain extent – but I‟m 
not systematically up-front about it with people.  The help from Student Support at the 
O.U. was oral and I‟m good at oral. There‟s collective help I‟ve garnered for myself and 
collective help organised by Student Support.  But:  I think I realise some of these people 
aren‟t clinically qualified to deal with some cases.   
 
Modern Languages 
I was exposed to situational and functional-notional syllabuses; French didn‟t click, it 
didn‟t become automatic for me.  French didn‟t sink in over time, either. The intercultural 
communication route didn‟t work.  I‟ve tried elective audiolingual courses, of the 
generative perfect-master variety. The automaticity thing didn‟t kick in for me. 
 
 
My Strategies  
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I seem to be OK in talking, possibly I‟m picking up cues that people respond to but in 
written work. I need to “get my head round” certain things, learn them my way and not 
the teacher‟s way.  So being assertive, at times.  In fact it is a strategy of mine to avoid 
things which set me difficulties with my studies:  [plain avoidance of the problem!] I‟m a 
mature student and know what difficult academic situations to avoid, by now. 
 
A phonological solution to taking exams would help - but as a Dyslexic all I get is extra 
time.  
 
Outside academia, I found some redemption in practical work appealing to my strengths.  
I found professional work using my strengths – cognitive, problem-solving. 
 
Attitudinally, I nearly was negative, leaving things to the last minute, but I‟ve spun this 
positively:  I cope and complete even if it‟s at the last minute. 
 
I need to be sustained by interlocutors, so mutual feedback. 
 
I have general learning strategy of learning comparatively and by analogy. 
I tend to work from general to particular, from holistic position to a more micro, 
analytical one; I‟m a deductive and synthetic learner. I explain things out loud and I 
sometimes think that people think that I‟m patronising them when in fact I‟m just using a 
strategy for me, not for them. 
 
I‟ve received help of a narratological nature in presenting and discussing facts as a kind 
of dialogue; I can do oral, but can now do it on paper too. 
 
There‟s collective help I‟ve garnered for myself and collective help organised by Student 
Support.  I‟d probably like 1:1 help.  But I‟ve gone for collective, suggestive and 
generalistic types of aids from Student Support. Pragmatism!   
 
I have an “If it‟s not bust don‟t fix it” approach, don‟t rock your own boat if you‟re 
getting to the right port.  Pragmatism again! 
 
I‟m damning myself with faint praise, here – I don‟t really count this as “success” 
[getting it right but not knowing why – the Character Sketch].  I need control as well as 
success. 
 
The bad tutor wouldn‟t give me feedback time and wasn‟t afraid to show it.  So a need of 
mine is for time, as well as feedback. 
 
I‟m OK on confusables as regards spelling in my own language - I didn‟t get taught little 
routines to help with my English - but I did refer earlier to slightly more semantic rather 
than orthographic difficulties – and those lists of words in French and English. I‟ve got 
over the basics, so there were some things I could “fix”, my dyslexia is to some extent 
repairable. 
 
I know I can cope at holistic level and work downwards to the micro; the reverse would 
be micro, analytical, and working upwards – like piecemeal grammar classes.  In a way, I 
put a brake on myself and my learning:  if I haven‟t got holistic learning then I can‟t 
micro-analyse, but I won‟t allow myself holistic learning that I haven‟t found effortful or 
whose processes I can‟t remember going through, to extrapolate from next time.   
 
A coda 
There‟s a difference for me between academic and professional spheres. I have prior 
teaching/learning experience in another Level 3 institution.  I feel I‟m hard-done-by:  I 
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think the O.U. tutor was a bad teacher - he would analyse my work but not me.  He was a 
hooray [“badminton and stuff”]. I know that the tutor wasn‟t lying, but telling me the 
truth.  I expected help, not criticism, from a Tutor.  The bad tutor wouldn‟t give me 
feedback time and wasn‟t afraid to show it.  I‟m paying for this but am being palmed off 
with an uninterested part-timer. 
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Appendix 2G – Lin‟s Story 
 
Me, in a nutshell! 
Let‟s rule some stuff out.  I‟m not clumsy / dyspraxic, I‟ve got very good eyesight 
I‟m left hand, left foot dominant.  I‟ve had no time out of education.  I can spontaneously 
caricature / mimic accents - but not deliberately.  I may be a bit deafened [clubs], and I do 
have selective hearing - I need people to speak up (volume); my mood can relates to my 
hearing at times. I‟m not tone-deaf as such. 
 
About my family 
I‟m middle class, my mother is a dyslexia specialist teacher.  I have a younger brother 
with worse dyslexia.  I am a better reader than my brother but I‟m less practical, less 
hands-on than he is - less artistic and “handy” than him.  He‟s right-handed and right-
brained, I am left-handed and left-brained.  My girlfriend‟s actually dyslexic; or she‟s just 
found out she‟s dyslexic and she‟s also dyspraxic.  
 
School and Diagnosis 
My dyslexia wasn‟t showing as a child. I was privately tested for dyslexia, but actually 
not at school.  In fact I was actually being home-schooled when I was “diagnosed”.  My 
school education was discontinuous. Working round my dyslexia to obtain high grades 
cost me in time and in stress, more than my peers.  I was living in the suburbs outside 
New York and the schools were really going quite badly;  I was in the top 10% of my 
class in High  School but my schooling was dangerous and I ended up taking that test 
when my parents sort of got a little bit involved in my education.  
 
My mother “took up” dyslexia teaching when she found out we were both dyslexic. I was 
used in part by mother to discover about dyslexia!  I was not near the “worst case 
scenario” people my mother was studying.  I was home schooled before my mother knew 
much about it, but having a name for my language problem so early on was a help.  I 
knew what the problem was, so it was less of a problem as a consequence. I think that 
there was more of a taboo a while ago, of how you were put you were put into different 
classes at school in England and stuff and it was something better to not know about than 
know about in some ways. 
 
Uni – the help I‟ve had 
I was 17 when I started university.   I had a scholarship to Boston University, but 
preferred Wealdston.  I‟m coping, generally. I recognise myself and my dyslexia in some 
other dyslexic students as I know other dyslexics here at Wealdston.  I‟m not alone in 
being stressed.  I‟ve even channelled some students to Support Unit myself!   I had my 
dyslexia assessment forwarded to the Student Support Unit, and I got extra time in 
testing. That‟s all I arranged, extra time for exams, if needed. I‟ve not had tutoring, only 
extra time because time is a critical factor for me, less than external help.  There are also 
particular aspects, individual ones, to each dyslexic. I‟ve noted that dyslexia can 
particularise, paradoxically, as a result of school / early life intervention, i.e. it can be 
much more up-close-and-personal at university.  I did not get Assistances as, I wasn‟t 
resident 3 years in U.K., so I did not get group or individual support for dyslexia: I had 
my own laptop but I don‟t understand some dyslexia support software, I only use Word 
tools. 
 
My problem with unstable dyslexia 
I‟ve been aware that I‟m dyslexic since I was about 12. My language difficulty sort of 
varies from time to time, and I am now borderline dyslexic because of progress I‟ve 
made.  Being borderline dyslexic is very different to being fully dyslexic, I think, but 
being borderline dyslexic hasn‟t really hindered me.  In fact, I don‟t regret having 
borderline dyslexia: initially, it was more the speed in which I read which was the 
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problem. I was a little bit of a slow reader – well quite a slow reader really:  I did 
understand completely what I read and I was quite good and saying what I‟d learned from 
whatever I‟d read. I used to be prescribed Ritalin, not for ADD but for reading speeds and 
I found it stimulated my attention / concentration centres.  I can‟t really remember how I 
got prescribed to it [sic]!  I also had a problem with my spelling. 
 
I‟ve come to terms with it over the years. The way it‟s affected me has changed.  
Ironically, success in my inputting (reading, comprehending) has led to a problem with 
my outputting (essays etc.).  Now, the dyslexia affects me more in terms of structuring 
my thoughts and essays, and making the facts more concise.  What happens is that words 
lose their visual focus when I‟m tired or after long periods of reading. I‟ll often find my 
brain will be very tired very quickly.  
 
The main thing that sparks off my dyslexia is just stress in general, I find that stress 
makes me have the effects of dyslexia come right back out - I can have relapse dyslexia.  
I can “practice” my way out of some dyslexia phenomena whereas if I‟m not stressed it‟s 
almost as if I don‟t have it.  Stress will make me reverse words and make my spelling 
change, so my spelling can be unstable:  I switch letters round in my spellings, 
sometimes.  And again, it‟s stress that will make me have to go back and read a paragraph 
again. When I get stressed, I seem to lose the logic a little bit and sort of get a bit 
confused with those deadlines and stuff, on essays;  I can‟t get my head round what I‟ve 
said and what I haven‟t said. 
 
With a lot to do at once, I lose focus in my thinking.  I can‟t do one, single thing well 
because I‟m thinking about all four at once.  If I have four different things I have to do, 
because I know I have four things, I cannot just take one thing and do it, I‟ll think about 
all four at once.  I can‟t prioritize. It‟s not that I panic, it‟s just that I can‟t think, I just 
shut down - I have conative immobilisation, i.e. my will and decision-making facilities 
are sapped in front of too many tasks.  Is my parallel/serial problem causing me “stress 
dyslexia” or is my dyslexia stressing me into serial/parallel blocking?  My stress doesn‟t 
cause dyslexia:  my dyslexia causes stress, but purely in the academic sphere.  If I‟m 
given one simple task at a time, I can do it very well.  It‟s a dilemma:  I need to work in 
parallel and in real-time, and am nearly obsessive about this, but also I have to sequence 
(serialise) to avoid “hanging” This self-blocking in parallel is something I always seem to 
do.  
  
Under exam pressure I start to lose connection to language and don‟t know what to say in 
writing.  I‟m working, everything‟s fine, then all of a sudden the „dyslexia switch‟ will go 
and I‟ll just realise that ... It‟s gone.  I have this task in hand and I can‟t really understand 
what this question is.  That‟s the worst, when I completely lose sense of what I‟m doing 
or thinking about or writing and what the question means [whiteout]. Having had dyslexia 
and associated assistances like time I have become dependent on them and stress when I 
don‟t get them.  A vicious circle? 
 
When I‟m reading 
 
Why am I studying literature?  Because I love to read.  I‟m not hit by dyslexia when I‟m 
reading novels, I can get into the flow with novels. I can visualise and imagine fiction 
reading because I have more strategies available to access prose when it‟s non-technical 
and fiction (metaphor, etc.).   But my reading speed varies with stress:  the more I‟m 
stressed, the slower my reading becomes.  With complex philosophy texts I need to stop 
and take notes, and this breaks the flow.  I don‟t have a problem with actual words, 
vocab, lexis, and I don‟t have anomia, knowing the thing but not being able to say its 
name. 
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When I‟m writing 
 
My essays are described as prolix and rambling.  I have a tendency to write quite long, 
and complex, sentences which muddle what could be more simply stated.  I don‟t know if 
that‟s dyslexia or just the way that I write sentences!  It‟s a trend that I‟ve always had, 
overcomplicating my sentences.  My every sentence probably in some ways could be 
simplified to half its length. 
  
I‟m basically completely dependent on a computer, when I write, because I can type as 
fast as I think - but I can‟t write as fast as I think. I dunno if this is a trait of dyslexics, but 
my handwriting isn‟t... when I speed up, legibility decreases just ridiculously.  This 
handwriting thing struck at university, it was OK before.  I write my exams on computer, 
now.  My illegibility isn‟t to do with my dyslexia directly, but because of my left-
handedness and writing speed. 
 
Grammar 
 
People don‟t comment on my grammar, it‟s good.  I had school tests just on grammar in 
the States, and teaching of grammar rules was really rigorous.  In fact I had double the 
grammar teaching that students get in England; I know my grammar quite well.  This 
being said, I have grammar knowledge in discrete little bits but can‟t do it all at once.  
 
Me and others 
 
I‟ve never had any kind of hassle for being dyslexic from anyone, I‟ve never really been 
singled out to others as a dyslexic, and the only people who know I‟m dyslexic are the 
ones I tell.  I‟m more in control of my dyslexia than being controlled by others.  Yes, I am 
aware of my peers‟ views and attitudes etc., and I know quite a few dyslexics because 
there are quite a few around.  I‟m in a word-of-mouth network of dyslexics. But I only 
know happy and interested dyslexics, not “sufferers”  
  
How I got on with French 
 
I did 4 years of French at High School in the States; it was definitely very hard and I can‟t 
remember it.  I could remember French class-work, I could cram for tests, but couldn‟t 
keep it. I don‟t really have the head for languages because I had problems integrating 
discrete grammar points and exceptions and non-cognate items into my acquisition of 
French.  I‟ve heard that dyslexia affects the way people do foreign languages but I‟m not 
sure. I didn‟t feel more dyslexic in English as a result of studying French. 
 
My hypotheses 
 
I‟m not sure if this mismatch between intention and execution is dyslexia-related but this 
is my struggle.  I need to sequence (serialise) to avoid “hanging”:   I am micro-planning, 
however in so doing, I‟m holding lots of information but also, lack lots of information, 
propriocentric info on my work in progress. 
 
Winning through 
 
I‟ve heard of that book “The Gift of Dyslexia” but I haven‟t really read it - I certainly 
don‟t know what my “dyslexia gift” is!  I just think dyslexics think differently because 
they‟re using their brain differently - I‟ve heard an explanation that dyslexia is like a - 
two hemispheres of the brain sort of working at the same time.  What I know is that I am 
not my dyslexia, i.e. some things are “me” and some things are “my dyslexia”. Invisible 
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dyslexics can be invisible not because they‟re undetected but because they‟ve coped, so 
far. 
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Appendix 2H – Millie‟s Story 
 
General stuff about me! 
I was born on 27
th
 January 1983, so I‟m twenty two years old at the time of this interview. 
I didn‟t have a gap year.  I have a lazy left eye and something of a tracking problem.  
With my eye tracking the first half to the middle is OK but then the middle to the right, 
it‟s a little bit rough and then the whole jump from the right to the left it‟s just disaster! I 
have to get back to the next line I am quite clumsy, especially in the kitchen. I write and 
kick with the left foot, I‟m ambidextrous and ambipedal but can‟t wrote with both hands. 
I‟m not tone-deaf, though I think I just don‟t hear some kinds of sounds.  I think I have 
selective hearing. I don‟t choose what I select. When I‟m really tired, I‟m listening, 
listening, and I can‟t absorb certain things.  I had M.E. for some time during my 
schooling. 
 
 
My family 
My Dad was dyslexic and my brother too. I think my Mum is slightly – or at least, she 
has some of the same difficulties as me. My Dad‟s a really, really bad speller. Really, 
really bad.  My Dad wasn‟t very aware that he was spelling it wrongly. 
 
In terms of the visual-spatial thing with my Dad he was brilliant and so was my brother, 
but I don‟t know whether that‟s to do with another thing, because my brother was 
diagnosed as having Asperger‟s Syndrome. And then my Dad kind of has quite a lot of 
similar tendencies. 
 
My Mum‟s side tend to be more artistic and less academic, shall we say.  I think that 
because my brother was having so many problems at school, I was seen as not having any 
problems, or mine not being an issue in comparison to him. 
 
My Dad‟s side of the family are upper-lower going into middle class.  I do think one 
thing, actually, in terms of having an environment… the fact that my Dad is dyslexic kind 
of hinders you because he couldn‟t teach me to the extent he might have. 
 
I was read to when I was small, at Bedtime.  I didn‟t do the reading because I just 
remember hating it, I would just do anything not to. 
 
During bedtime reading I‟d just pretend, turn pages after about 2 minutes. I‟d make up 
my story as I went along! 
 
 
My problem with language 
I‟d say this is both an input and output thing. I often can‟t find the words to say what I 
want to say; it‟s generally just this tip-of-the-tongue thing, where I know what I want to 
say but I can find the words to say it.  I often find it difficult to structure what I mean.  
Generally, I get more frustrated with myself, because I know what I mean but I can‟t find 
ways to say it.  The tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon is just really annoying, because I 
know that there‟s a word for what I want to say and I don‟t have the vocabulary to 
express what I want to say most of the time. 
 
Sometimes I have difficulty in concentrating on what people are saying, and I just have 
mind-blanks (26).  Listening to other people can be difficult as well, especially if I‟m 
having to do two things at once - like in lectures if I have to listen and take notes. As soon 
as I start making notes, I miss what they‟ve said about the other thing.  Sometimes when 
I‟m speaking, what happens to me is that I have so many thoughts in my head, as I‟m 
trying say them all, that some of them just get lost.  I find myself hunting for the best 
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word to compensate for the tip-of-the-tongue word-loss, or just finding really long ways 
round to describing [sic] things.  
 
I “tune out” both productively in talking and receptively in speaking.  I think I‟m more 
aware of it [“tuning out”] when I‟m talking to someone because when I‟m listening, if I 
lose attention, I don‟t necessarily notice. That‟s why I prefer writing things down, 
because I can take my time, then in saying something that I want to say. 
 
I definitely have a bad memory.  I forget the names of simple things – like cats!  It‟s a 
memory thing, but also an attention thing.  I try and word my notes so I don‟t have to 
write everything down - and concentrating on that just takes away the concentration on 
the lecture. 
 
I had a difficult birth where I had to have an operation as soon as I was born and I had 
like patches over my eyes for a lot of the time, and I wonder if my visual-spatial thing is 
connected with that.  I came into the world blindfolded in a way.  When you‟re first born, 
you develop a huge amount in those days. 
 
In terms of my developmental side when I was younger, I didn‟t crawl;  with the whole 
crawling action, you‟re always scanning with your eyes to your left and to your right, and 
I think that‟s quite connected with having learning difficulties. 
 
 
Writing 
When I write things down, I write down everything and then I can edit it to what I 
actually mean – eventually. I have to sit there and think of that word, how to spell it, and 
whenever I write my notes I always write in pencil.  Always. I‟m constantly rubbing out 
going “no that‟s not how you spell it, you spell it like this”.  Because if I‟ve time to think 
about it I can often correct it.  It is a speed issue.  When I‟m taking down notes, I often 
get half way through a sentence, then I can‟t remember what I‟m meant to be writing! I 
get letters in the wrong order [but not back-to-front or upside down as in 
strephosymbolia].  
 
When I talk, people that I know think I‟m quite scatty, most times. But if someone saw 
my writing they‟d probably say “Oh, that doesn‟t sound like Lauren”.  Because I‟ve got 
time to say what I want to say, and give it structure.  When people read what I‟ve written 
they wouldn‟t necessarily think that was me because it‟s a lot more structured and 
sensible.  I take a lot of time over my writing, that‟s the thing, I‟m a complete 
perfectionist. 
 
 
Reading 
In terms of reading, I often read the same over and over again – but completely wrong 
and just not realise it. Or I‟ll read things and put different meanings on them because I‟ve 
read it wrongly.  I spend ages looking for a word, even if it‟s right there I don‟t see it - it‟s 
right there and I can‟t see it.  If I pay attention to something else, the word disappears; 
and sometimes if I refocus, the word comes back - but sometimes it doesn‟t.  I think I‟m 
seeing them, these words on the page, but I‟m just not processing them.  I don‟t think 
there‟s any kind of a visual thing in my not processing words on the page; I‟ve got a kind 
of theory on that: I see the word, but I just don‟t process it - that‟s what it feels like to me. 
We‟ve done it in psychology, often usually people will recognise the word quicker than 
the picture?  And I always recognise the picture quicker. Always. I‟m on that visual basis 
- the words tend to take on a form rather than individual things that make up the word. I 
see it as a whole and I don‟t break it down.  I can always do the long words, it‟s the… it‟s 
the short words that I got tripped on?  And I think it‟s like the where and the wear and 
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the… and the hear… I have incredible difficulty with sound-alikes.  Also, I get tripped by 
short function-words like “a” and “the”, because I try to read semantic value into them. It 
would take me a whole day to do the reading for an essay - and I wouldn‟t do anything 
else.  I can‟t tune out into the flow when reading - I‟m really aware that, as soon as I tune 
out I have to stop and I have to re-read it and re-read it. I can‟t tune out into the flow 
when I‟m reading because of the perfectionism thing and the attention-span thing as well.  
But I‟ll also get bored because I‟m not reading to the pace that my mind wants to. 
 
 
School to Uni 
I went to my Infant School and I never had time to finish anything, and I used to get 
really upset, specially in my art work.  My Mum said I just used to be in tears because 
they didn‟t give me time to finish my artwork.  And I think it was because it was 
something that I knew I could and I kind of excelled in. I felt really unhappy especially at 
Infant School, at one particular stage when we were doing our… I can‟t remember what 
tests they are, I just freaked out, I just came home crying.  I was like, I can‟t go to school, 
I think that the thought of being tested was just the worse thing. I did just feel incredibly 
isolated and different, incredibly.  I didn‟t get the support I needed back in Mixed Infants. 
I know that when I was at Infant School, children were just not being diagnosed as 
dyslexic because of the whole funding thing:  it wasn‟t in their interest to put it into light, 
basically.   Having our first tests just as you transition from Infants to P1, I just 
completely freaked out, and I‟ve constantly done it when I have exams, complete panic 
attack. 
 
Then, in reading at Primary School, I got pulled up for being a bit behind. In maths I just 
looked at it and everyone was going through their book and doing them and I just didn‟t 
understand it. In maths I‟d be at the beginning of the book when they‟d be on the last 
page of the second book. I didn‟t get support in maths; I was just left to do it when I 
literally couldn‟t.   
 
I liked writing stories and was good at it if I was given the time. But in terms of reading I 
think I pretended that I could.  I was very much hiding some of my difficulties there. In 
terms of the reading thing, I didn‟t feel very supported, in fact I remember one incident 
where a teacher shouted at me because she just couldn‟t believe that I getting this word 
wrong again: “I told you!  I told you this a million times before!” and I was just “I‟m not 
trying, you know, to upset you”.  I just used to dread the extra reading I class with the 
teaching assistant.  No I don‟t think I got practise.  I think they often presumed you would 
do it at home, you know, with your parents.  Apparently, my teachers never raised 
anything with my Mum, or my Dad for that matter, saying you know “She‟s having a 
difficulty”.  There was always just… I mean nothing was ever raised. I don‟t know if the 
teachers who taught me were [aware of my brother‟s condition.  No-one was really aware 
of my brother, they just thought he was a really odd child and they couldn‟t really 
understand him.  I mean his Asperger‟s syndrome didn‟t get diagnosed until recently, 
fairly recently.  So no, the teachers weren‟t comparing my brother and me.  
 
I think I was quite withdrawn anyway when I was younger, but I think that I was 
obviously noticed as being the one who was behind. I don‟t specifically remember being 
picked on for being “behind” but I was kind of aware that “Oh if I was better at this 
because then I could be friends with that person”.  
 
I remember being very, very unhappy at middle school.  But not really talking to anyone 
about it.  I got Extra English lessons at S. Mary‟s Convent from the age of about 11 till 15 
but with a group of people. I used to write things in very short sentences and not expand 
on them, and Extra English was stylistic expansion of my writing from very short 
sentences. The Extra English was just analysing poetry in a way, not writing it down.  I 
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was kind of good at analysing poetry, yeah. But Extra English was also chapters and 
things you used to be tested on, and I remember I starting to be tested on them and I got 
three lines of the story or something, and I just did so badly!  Over 50% of the time I 
wasn‟t there as well because I was ill.  So that would have been another hindrance in the 
Extra English comprehension tests. 
 
My structured academic education was hindered by my Steiner education in favour of 
non-structured thinking.  Then, I went to a State School – Alderman Jones – and kind of 
kind of just did my GCSEs in a period of a year.  They put me in classes probably higher 
than I should have been because I went to a private school, they just presumed that, and in 
terms of the structuring having to get things done and being tested kind of gave me the 
motivation to work. Doing an A-Level was more structured, you kind of like knew what 
you were doing.  But I found it very, very difficult to work in that structured pace thing 
where “I will achieve THIS by THIS”, because it‟s going to be done when it‟s done and 
when I‟m ready, that‟s what I always thought. I did freak out completely [in the state 
sector school].  It took its toll on my health even more there; in terms of achieving I was 
successful, because I got a B in English Literature and I got a C in English Language. 
 
When I did my A Levels I decided to do Human Biology because I thought I wanted 
prove it to myself that I could do a science. And I got extra lessons for that, just for 
myself, people helped me with the statistics side of psychology. I tried to do Art on two 
occasions but I was faced with the same problem that I didn‟t ever had enough time to 
finish it. 
 
 
Diagnosis - and Assistances received 
I was tested by a non-specialist at the Steiner School, who “wasn‟t sure”. 
 
At Wealdston, my EdPsych tests included Digit Memory, and the Similarity test and then 
Backwards Digits and Hand-Eye Coordination.  I got my Educational Psychologist 
Report back saying, you know, Lauren does have specific-learning-difficulties-brackets-
dyslexia. Actually I came out really high on my memory, as well, which was quite 
bizarre.  But (from my knowledge of it, anyway) a lot of dyslexics tend to have really 
high visual-spatial skills in… and certain other skills which I was really quite poor on. 
Stuff like the scanning, looking for the missing thing in the picture I was really bad at. 
Divergent thinking kind of the language stuff I was really good at apparently. I know that 
this whole structural way of thinking side of things coincides with Asperger‟s syndrome. 
But I‟ve not a structured way of thinking at all. I think that‟s the problem. 
 
The Ed Psych kind of tested my reading and my writing and he said “You know someone 
of your reading and writing ability really shouldn‟t … or doesn‟t usually get to 
university” and throughout the first year I thought, “Oh I shouldn‟t really be here; I‟m not 
good enough to be here”.   
 
But in terms of actually being diagnosed as a dyslexic, that was a really good thing for 
me, because it was just such a relief? The Educational Psychologist had explained to me, 
“This is what you‟re good at…and this is what you‟re not so good at, and these are the 
reasons for it”.  And I guess for me at least, because in my head I was feeling really 
stupid, I could kind of let go of part of that.  With my diagnosis and label, I felt a lot more 
confident about my difficulties, about showing them, because  I know that it wasn‟t down 
to something that I was doing particularly, it was just down to the dyslexia or whatever 
you want to call it. 
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Indeed, my Good Story is the day I was diagnosed.  Because I could make a whole lot of 
sense of why I had all those difficulties.  And the fact that I was given – started, anyway, 
to be given a whole lot of support and understanding of why I am like I am. 
 
Support at Wealdston is a bit of a sore subject, because I was supposed to get Statistics 
Support from the beginning of this academic year but it‟s only starting this week.  So I 
will be getting statistics support.  It‟s just breaking [maths] down because I do think I see 
things as a whole, and maybe that‟s why I was more artistic and stuff, you know the 
divergent thinker?  But you‟re breaking it down, you‟re seeing a table and knowing what 
you‟re looking at is something I definitely need help with. But I got stuff like software 
and a Minidisk player for lectures; I don‟t have to take notes, so I‟ve recorded all of my 
lectures because I know that in terms of the reading, I‟m just not going to get most of it 
done and I‟ve heard from some third years anyway that if you just do lectures and you 
know it well that‟s enough.  I think in terms of me having less information to concentrate 
on [lectures only, not the readings] means that I will learn more. 
 
I‟ve got a computer with the read-and-write thing, where you have a scanner or 
alternatively you can take Word Documents and it will basically read it aloud to you, 
which is brilliant.  Especially in terms of like essays, I can actually now correct my 
essays, because what I would do is I would read it with the punctuation in, even though it 
wasn‟t there, but if the computer does it, it just goes blah blah blah blah blah, I know 
when to put in the breaks because I can hear it? The Inspiration thing has been useful at 
times, but I don‟t know fully how to use it.  But generally, thanks to the kit offered and 
because I can concentrate, I‟m taking it in 
 
Strategies I use 
I can‟t make a presentation off the cuff, from notes.  I‟ve had to do a few presentations, 
and what I generally have to do is write everything. What I try and do is give out notes to 
my class and then do my own notes, but put them put them in very wordy ways so that 
they wouldn‟t necessarily think I was reading it.  
 
If I stand up and have to give a presentation I can‟t just do it like that, I can‟t research 
something, write little notes and give a talk like and talk about it. When preparing an Oral 
Presentation I would have to write the whole thing down just as a safeguard.  I haven‟t 
gone blank by giving an unscripted presentation, but I haven‟t ever given myself the 
opportunity to!  
 
In terms of reading strategies, I tend to cover up the rest of the page so I can only see 
down the lines that I‟m supposed to be looking at.  With some texts especially I shout 
them out in my head.  If during my reading I feel myself drifting off or various things like 
that, I try and make it in some way interesting by imagining a funny little accent or 
something when reading the words. 
 
When you come to doing a degree there‟s a lot less structure, a lot more independence, I 
didn‟t really know what was essential what wasn‟t essential, and in terms of the structure 
of my time the structure of my work… once I have a structure I can work from it.  I know 
that I created a lot of ways to hide my difficulties which in turn would be many reasons 
why they wouldn‟t pick it up, so I think it‟s just being aware of those signals. 
 
 
Affect and psychological 
My “Bad Story” was around generally insensitive or uneducated teachers being really 
personal or really inappropriate, how people have perceived me and not understood.  Not 
been aware.   I‟ve always been really, really aware of my difficulties and just kind of 
thought “Oh God I‟m really stupid”.  I was in a state just in terms of the knowing 
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everything but not being able to do it because it was just too difficult. I very much put 
myself down even at a young age, I mean there were a few people who I saw being pulled 
up as having difficulties reading, and I thought “I‟m one of them, basically”.  Even 
outside “tests”, I feel I am being tested just with a question:  I wonder if there‟s a right 
and a wrong answer. 
 
I think in terms of recognition, and in terms of the visual sphere, I have no sense of 
direction at all. I get lost, basically. I think that‟s connected to my lack of knowing where 
I am in the world, basically. 
 
Having these problems, and then being a complete perfectionist, kind of sets me up, I feel 
sometimes for just this kind of paralysed state where I can‟t do anything, because I can‟t 
achieve what I want to do.  I can spend a huge amount of time while I‟m being anxious.  
It‟s a great, then, an even greater barrier.  I did go through a phase last year when I didn‟t 
think I was going to carry on, and I just couldn‟t cope with it. 
 
I‟m learning to get over myself.  I do try and be careful because I don‟t want to think 
about this too much, “Oh I am A Dyslexic”, I have dyslexia, because I wasn‟t aware of it 
before, I wouldn‟t have made it as an excuse, it‟s really a word I don‟t want to... I just 
think of myself as the same, just try and do as high as I can. What I kind of have to do in 
those sorts of situations like presentations and in exams as well:  I can‟t talk to anyone 
beforehand, I need to keep myself in a calm state and not be influenced by… incoming 
things.  I focus on my breathing and I try and bring myself back.  The whole 
perfectionism thing, I thought… that whole area I think I‟m dealing with, so it‟s in that 
way it‟s easier for me to cope with my work. I have belief in myself and pass one thing at 
a time which builds up confidence in myself. 
 
 
Modern Languages 
In Wealdston Steiner School we did French and German, until aged 12 and then the way 
that we learned was very much based on music, and I was one of the top ones in the class!   
 
In Michael Hall in Steiner I did French again, but I dropped German, in fact doing extra 
English, and in Blatchington Mill I did start French but I was able to have my timetable 
reduced because I had M.E. and that was one of the ones that I dropped.  So I avoided 
French and German by doing Extra English. 
 
 
Coda 
I think that‟s been the main thing, in my Bad Story:  just people thinking I‟m actually 
slow or stupid. My Good Story is that I got a certain satisfaction at achieving my A 
Levels and finishing my degree and things like that. I have decided to carry on for my 
career and whatever.  In part of my education I had a really good physics teacher – he was 
always so encouraging, saying “You can do this” constantly, I think it‟s just having an 
encouraging teacher who kind of believes in you.   
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Appendix 2I – Pat‟s Story 
 
General stuff about me 
I am 18 years old.  I came to university straight from school with no Gap Year.  My 
Major subject here at Wealdston is International Relations. I write with my right hand.  I 
can understand people from different areas.  Pretty well. My hearing doesn‟t require 
hearing-aids, and I don‟t wear spectacles. Both my eyes are brown. I‟m not tone-deaf – 
but I have no musical skills at all: my singing is... singing in the shower kind of thing.  
I‟m not dyspraxic:  I don‟t drop things more than other people;  well, that‟s to say, I do 
have days when I tend to drop things, my sister too but it‟s just one of those days, so I am 
not more accident-prone than others. I acted in school plays and mimicked accents and 
voices; I mimic people a lot - friends from university and things like that, and at this stage 
now when I‟ve known them for a term I think I can roughly get their accents and things 
like that - I can mimic different regions and things like special words.  My mimicry can 
turn to mocking. I‟d probably say [I am] Upper Middle [class] 
 
My family 
I was aware my parents were alarmed at my progress. My mother used to try and help me 
with spellings and things like that, at home.  But I had rows with my mother because she 
didn‟t know what was on or off the syllabus. My sister who is 2 years older than me 
helped with learning and testing unlike my parents‟ style of teaching. My brother is quite 
a bit older than me and didn‟t get involved at all. 
 
Halfway through my summer vacation my parents told me that they were going to switch 
me to D‟Overbroeks because they didn‟t want me to waste an extra year of my life.  So it 
was their decision. I was thrilled about [my parents‟] decision to switch me to 
D‟Overbroeks].  There was only a certain amount I would tell my parents; I thought that 
if I did go home every day and said “I can‟t do maths” and “I can‟t do science”, and “I 
can‟t do this ...”, then their answer would be to put me in more classes.  I really dreaded 
these classes, you know, once a week, it was only an hour or so but it was horrible kind 
of lessons, I didn‟t like them at all. 
 
My problem as I see it 
Basically I‟ve always had problems with reading and writing.  [These problems with 
reading and writing have] then come into problems with actually speaking as well. I get 
words wrong, I miswrite words because of getting words wrong, I miss-say things, I 
believe my reading and writing problems and my miss-speaking problems are interlinked. 
My dyslexia is both ways, an input thing and an output thing:  I occasionally give myself 
negative feedback on the sense of some utterances. I‟m not aware of it at all; I think [the 
difference between how I work my English and how I work my I.R.] [Dyslexia] doesn‟t 
necessarily or it doesn‟t have to affect you at all moments of your life. I am coping, on 
the whole, I don‟t think dyslexia holds me back much. I did a number-remembering test, 
but can‟t remember what it was. 
 
I think to me it‟s always been spellings and reading problems which have just managed to 
make my schooling days a little more difficult than they should have been.  I wouldn‟t 
say dyslexia has wrecked my life, or anything like that, it‟s been a hurdle […] but it is 
manageable to jump over easily. My dyslexia is a very small part of me personally, it‟s 
about a quarter of me academically. 
 
Spelling and Grammar 
[You would first notice dyslexia in my writing by the] spelling mistakes throughout, my 
spelling is ummm… I‟ve always thought it [my spelling] was O.K., but numerous 
teachers have said that it‟s [my spelling‟s] atrocious. I am not strephosymbolic, but I have 
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a tendency to write things down as I hear them, i.e. phonetically. I have rule-formation 
problems (over-formation and under-formation).  
 
I think I was way into past GCSE before I actually realised what the difference between a 
verb and a noun and an adjective and things like that were. We didn‟t really learn 
grammar; we just learned how do things.  I remember spending two or three lessons 
throughout maybe the first three years of secondary school learning grammar.  We 
definitely didn‟t do any in primary school.  My A Level teacher was notorious for making 
us make sure that we learned our vocab, he thought that was like the most important 
thing. We had to spend at least fifteen minutes a day learning the vocab of the day which 
if you build up over a two year course does get you into a system of doing that. 
 
Reading  
I tend to read quite a lot... for someone of my age group let alone a dyslexic!  When I do 
read, I do tend to get the odd word mixed up.  If I read a sentence, for instance, and I‟m 
not paying very much attention to it, then I‟ll read something different, I‟ll get one word 
mixed up with another word and it‟ll just change the meaning.  I rely on semantico-
logical cues about any misreadings.  On phonological matters, lexical-semantic glitches 
slow my reading.  So I have phonological accompaniment when I‟m reading. I have a 
strategy of keeping on reading technical texts so context can help me  
I‟m not aware of having anomia in my L1:  if I see a name that I don‟t particularly know 
how to spell, if I can‟t say it in my head I‟ll try saying it out loud or something like that 
just to try and work out which name it is.  Homophones are by biggest problem I have a 
problem with homophonic-initial words. I might write something like “through” instead 
of “throw” or things like that. 
 
Writing 
When you get to long words, I‟m bound to make a mistake somewhere in all the jumble 
of letters. 
 
Diagnosis 
I was diagnosed with dyslexia when I was quite young.  I certainly didn‟t notice it and I 
don‟t think either of my parents did.  I think it was my 4th-year primary teacher who first 
said something, and then I was referred to an educational psychologist or something, who 
did then say I was dyslexic. I think they [some of the European School teachers] just 
thought I was very complacent and didn‟t care about the subject.  Some teachers almost 
didn‟t believe that it existed, the attitude that they had towards me wasn‟t exactly the 
nicest thing. 
 
I was a “sole dyslexic” in my family - but since all my tests and things like that were done 
my... my father suspects that he might have been dyslexic himself. I think I might get it 
from ... from his [my father‟s] side of the family if anywhere, but I‟m presuming it‟s just 
passed down family to family, from parents and grandparents.  As a child I was an 
asthmatic and I think I‟ve always felt that it‟s the same kind of thing, you know, I was 
born with dyslexia and had asthma and the two things were just there. 
 
Strategies and Remedies 
I talk fast sometimes. 
  
If someone did notice bad spelling I wouldn‟t say I was a bad speller, I‟d say, well, I‟m 
dyslexic you know. “This is normal for me”. 
 
I think peer teaching will be a good idea. 
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I had school-based remedial teaching in English - my remediation was interactive but led 
by the support teacher.  I don‟t remember what the remediation was in the extra English 
classes; I had story books with adventures and spelling and help sections, making it about 
as interactive as you can get with a book.  [To learn words,] I‟ll have a look at my piece 
of paper, reading the words and trying to get them into my head, trying to almost 
visualise the piece of paper. 
 
When we got into secondary school [The European School], they stopped everything. 
There was no additional help. I would go home and study and study and study and then 
come back in the next day for the test that the whole class was having, and whereas I 
would get a low mark my friends who hadn‟t studied at all, would get the highest mark in 
the class. We used to have to choose whether we were going to Higher or Lower Maths 
and English, and things like that.  I remember choosing lower all the time, just because I 
didn‟t want to get myself into a bad situation. I had to go to extra lessons for lots of 
things; my parents didn‟t want me to fall behind in any class. I had one-to-one classes. I 
remember there were a lot of shouting fits about [the extra lessons], and me refusing to 
want to go Things that I can remember being taught [are] maybe things like essay plans. 
 
The college I went to [later; d‟Overbroek‟s] specialised in small classes and it was just a 
tutorial college, and they because of the small classes and every teacher had a training in 
dyslexic students. That worked a lot better, one-to-one tuition and things like that. 
  
If they asked me, I‟d tell them how I work; but I wouldn‟t say that that is the way, I mean 
it‟s just the way that I‟ve started working now. I‟d really confuse myself [with little 
spelling ditties], because it‟s not my way of learning.  I can‟t evaluate my techniques 
comparatively, they seem so „normal‟ to me I can‟t even analyse them. I keep setting 
myself goals. I set my own goals and control myself rather than being controlled.  I‟m 
aware of other people‟s grades here in French, I‟m aware of other people‟s grades in I.R. 
I give myself rank feedback against my peers. I hope for the medium-range in my marks. 
 
My dyslexia wasn‟t followed through from the college to Wealdston University. I have 
been assessed and had all the tests done which I think have been passed on, so all the bits 
of paper are somewhere in the university. 
 
[The “disabled student committee”] gave me a sheet to photocopy and hand out to all my 
teachers, to warn them that spelling mistakes and grammar were going to possibly be a 
problem and I was officially dyslexic, as opposed to complacency. 
 
School to Uni 
 
I actually attended an International Lycée so it was very linguistic-based. 
 
This was all picked up around fourth year primary - I had two years when I was put into 
classes about once a week.  The [classes] with dyslexia specialists - those were even 
worse.  It was one thing to have extra lessons in French, which is my second language, 
but to have them in your first language...  It‟s not like studying English at A Level or 
something like that, it was like studying elementary English, which just annoyed me so 
much that I had to go and do that. 
 
I stayed at the European School for five years, at which point I had to leave because I was 
just falling behind quite drastically. 
 
Maths was one of my key worse subjects until I transferred to the English GCSE and got 
a B and the offer to take it at A Level. At the European School they were trying to put me 
in lowest classes for maths and kind of saying, well, we‟ll fade this out as quickly as we 
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can. I think the European School‟s Bac was just too much, I think it was just too difficult, 
it wasn‟t my style of working at all. When I moved over to D‟Overbroek‟s for the GCSEs 
it wasn‟t just maths that I started doing better in, it was general - all my subjects 
generally. [Maths] was the same sort of stuff, just taught in a different sort of way. I don‟t 
know why, I don‟t think there‟s a link between my dyslexia and maths, it just started to 
make sense. 
 
Dyslexia and Languages 
 
I started French when I was seven.  In those days learning French was singing songs and 
hand-claps and colouring in pictures of France and things like that. 
 
I was put into Spanish classes especially because Spanish is more audible in the writing 
as opposed to other languages and even with that I had a kind of tendency to get spelling 
mistakes again. Some grammar rules in Spanish I have acquired from the teacher, others I 
seem to have made up. I used to get very confused between French and Spanish.  It was 
just a lot of the time just saying the word and trying to look at the teacher‟s reaction, was 
it happiness or confusion on their face! But I don‟t think French had a negative effect on 
my English.  I‟d say it [French, after 3 or 4 years] might have actually helped my English 
a bit, especially with vocabulary and things like that, because learning French words 
which actually mean the same thing in English, they‟re the same word but I hadn‟t heard 
the word in English, I think that made me kind of improve my vocabulary a bit. 
 
For French vocab learning, I start off by writing on a piece of paper, French on one side, 
English on the other, then covering up the French side after spending five minutes 
learning.  I kind of spend five minutes making sure I‟ve written down each word like five, 
six times or something like that.  [I don‟t “see” the French in my mind‟s eye,] I hear it.  
Because in my head, I‟m saying over the word. I say the word in French and the word in 
English and that is an auditory link that I make.  Definitely it is an auditory link which I 
think may not be very good as far as my spelling goes because then I don‟t learn the 
spelling straight away and I usually have to go back to it and learn the spelling.  
 
My French teaching was directive, authoritarian, un-analytical at the European School. 
 
I suppose learning new words in French I try and see if I can think of an equivalent in 
English that I‟ve heard of and then just try and think of a different way to remember it, 
but it doesn‟t always work. If I‟m trying to learn an irregular verb or tense of a verb I‟ll 
just keep reading it over and you know, things like that, maybe leave it for 50 minutes, 
come back later and see if I can remember it still, and check it off. 
 
I reckon that if I got 60 in English I‟d probably get about 40 in French. 
 
On the speaking side of things that‟s the way I study or the way for French for me … I 
can speak it fine and go off to France and have conversations, but writing and things like 
that is almost out of the window. I‟m constantly forgetting how to spell those - ils... the 
plural of the third person plural - because when you say them they‟re the same.  My 
spelling impacts on my grammar because small spelling differences change things like 
tenses and moods. 
 
Affect and Psychological 
 
I have to get higher than a 2:2 at university just because that‟s what my brother got. 
 
There were definitely points at the European School where it was very kind of harsh... 
harsh things happened. It was pretty much survival of the fittest at the European School. I 
227 
remember that [low marks] being quite bad and making me feel quite stupid.  I also 
remember that [feeling stupid at low test grades] happened quite a lot.  
 
Psychologically it [D‟Overbroek‟s] works a bit better as well, because they seem to be 
caring a bit more than the European School, which just left me to get on with it, whatever. 
 
I would never get upset at school, I got upset at home rather than at school because that 
would I suppose show weakness and I wouldn‟t want my friends to think I was... 
unstable. I had a façade of not caring about the whole “dyslexia thing”, in front of my 
peers.  In fact, I was very frustrated with the learning. I didn‟t really want any help 
because no-one else needed any help with my friends, so I didn‟t want to single myself 
out. I felt that I couldn‟t do things like that [English, maths] because of dyslexia.   
 
[I think I would have done a lot better in my other subjects because] I think my self-
esteem would have been lot a lot higher which would have made me push myself a lot 
further.  I wasn‟t too worried about what the other children felt about me, I was a bit more 
concerned about what teachers thought about me. I just always felt that they [the teachers] 
were slightly scary, just because they had this power to say what... how good I was at 
their subject, and other people would listen to what they said, and I didn‟t like that at all. I 
was conscious of power in the classroom. And quite scared of it.  I think that‟s 
[power/powerlessness in the classroom is] one of the reasons I had to leave the European 
School, it was just because I didn‟t like this whole idea, it was getting me down quite a 
bit. 
 
My dyslexia made me feel frustration and anger. I had bad moods and “closed off” into 
myself for days at a time.  I didn‟t want anyone to kind of make a fuss about it because I 
felt that would make it worse. 
 
[At school] I was completely demotivated.  I wasn‟t going to be able to get very high in 
society or get to where I wanted (When I was younger I really wanted to be a lawyer 
[but][…] by just hearing that at that stage I thought that was my whole dream of two 
years or whatever had been... gone out of the window and that held me back, just the fact 
that I was dyslexic I could never do all that work. I remember definitely thinking that 
there was no point really, because I was dyslexic and I remember thinking there was only 
a certain point I could get to, that was C/B Grade, I would never get to an A.  So I kind of 
stopped working on that basis, and I think if I hadn‟t been dyslexic then I would have 
pushed myself further and got the better grades.  I used to leave homework to the very 
last second because I felt, it doesn‟t matter if I did it at the start or at the end, I‟d still get 
the same grade.  Indeed, I had a very constant grade, no matter how much extra work I 
put in I would usually get the same grade as doing a small amount.  I thought [assumed] 
the teachers were always completely fair.  When I started getting to fourteen, fifteen, I 
started realising that it [fairness of the teaching institution] wasn‟t as good as I had 
imagined it to be. 
 
I felt definite jealousy of my friend who got the straight As regardless of studying or not.  
I think that‟s just the way I am actually! Measuring my educational performance against 
others‟.  [If] I get 55 or something for an essay and I meet someone else who says they 
got 80, I won‟t immediately say “Oh yeah, but I‟m dyslexic”. I‟m quite happy to say that 
I‟m dyslexic; it‟s not something that worries me.  At all. 
 
I wouldn‟t say any desperately good emotions have come out of [my dyslexia].  Maybe a 
bit of self-achievement [resulted from being dyslexic] - I suppose [I felt] happiness to an 
extent when I did come out with good marks, especially in things like GCSEs where I 
never used my extra time, ummm, you know, I‟d get 25% extra time for all exams, and at 
GCSEs I went in, sat down, did them, and was always finished before time, so I‟d just 
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kind of leave when everyone else left.  Also, I remember getting higher than average 
marks back without using my extra time, in a way that was quite nice. 
 
My “Good Story”:  I remember thinking, you know, “Right, that‟s it, clearly I‟ve... I‟m 
better than half the class at this, so that‟s O.K.”  I remember instances like that when I 
thought that I was getting on, you know, beating the dyslexia, kind of thing. I didn‟t get 
the tap on the shoulder in the spelling test to leave the class with the Bad Spellers.  But 
the real Good Story:  I thought basically I was screwed in English and English Literature, 
and then I came out with Bs in both. So that was quite a happy moment because I was 
expecting much worse grades than that, I was expecting Ds and things like that, so that 
was probably a kind of moment of jubilee. I was happy with myself, I was quite 
impressed. 
 
Without a doubt [my “Bad Story”] was Mrs Spriggs my chemistry teacher in third year 
secondary; she told us he had been marking the test, and she informed the class that she 
had decided that because one of the persons‟ spellings in the class was so bad, that she 
had taken off a point of that person‟s work for every spelling mistake not to do with 
chemistry but to do with anything, and of course that was my work.  I remember being so 
angry and so upset because of that, because she was penalising me on what wasn‟t 
actually her subject. That was definitely the lowest point, I think... straight after class I 
skipped my next two classes and just went home.  I called my Mum and said “Please can 
you collect me now”.  I couldn‟t cope with that - I have never hated a human being before 
or after this individual. There was no need to know for the others in my class, we weren‟t 
in a team I‟d let down or anything. I think on a scale of 1 to 10, 10 being the worst, that 
was probably around a 6. Obviously at that point in my life that was so horribly hard ... 
the fact thats he had humiliated me in front of the class because everyone clearly knew 
that this was my work. At the time, if anyone had kicked me whilst I was down, it 
probably wouldn‟t have made any difference.   
229 
Appendix 2J – Petey‟s Story 
 
About me 
I had 15 years “out” between school and University.  I‟m Working class, I think. At 
school, I was probably somewhere in between Working and Middle class.   
 
Physically, I‟m not really clumsy, except first thing in the morning. I am left-handed but 
with mixed dominance (writing with left and catching with right) and mixed dominance 
foot. My hearing is fine, and I have good eyesight – no obvious compromised laterality in 
eyesight.  I am not tone-deaf: I can do mimicry, but I‟m not capable of judging if it‟s 
good. When I was learning Dutch, at first I was sort of making a face with it. When I got 
fluent with the language, I forgot to do the face.  
 
My problem with language 
My Language Problem is finding the right words and expressing myself in the way that I 
want to express myself. I think. It‟s a problem is with articulation:  I know what I want to 
say but struggle to express it.  I have difficulty in expressing my ideas.  It‟s also finding 
the right words and expressing myself in the way that I want to express myself – in 
writing too.   I‟ve had an Educational Psychologist‟s report ... I‟ve had tests and then a 
report said that I have Dyslexic Tendencies. Yeah.  Whatever that means.  I‟ve got no 
idea how long people have been termed dyslexic; it‟s something I‟ve only heard about 
recently.  I know a little bit about Dyslexia and it‟s quite broad, I think, I don‟t fit into 
some of the brackets.   
 
Reading 
I was a big reader but a very slow reader.  It never entered my mind why I might be 
slower than everyone else or slower than people that I know [at reading and writing]. 
 
My Ed Psych said that‟s it‟s to do with my Holding Memory; this comes into reading as 
well, I think, I‟ll read but sometimes I don‟t know what I‟ve read. My problem isn‟t 
“drifting off” when I‟m reading, like other people might.  I tune out rather than wandering 
off inattentively; I lose the discourse-level, literally lose the plot. When my Language 
Problem happens, I read all the words and they‟re just words, rather than coherent 
sentences. They just jumble. I don‟t get a message from them, I don‟t get the narrative, I 
just get a load of words.  Some pieces of writing are very complicated i.e. have several 
levels and because I have to read every word, I may miss out and just get the gist at one 
level.  I also have to read (or re-read) some pieces as a whole entity to “get the point” of 
the piece of writing concerned. 
 
Spelling 
I always leave letters out when I‟m writing. The thing that I‟m most aware of and it‟s 
continuous, it‟s never gone away is however much I write:  were and where, I have to 
stop and think about whether it‟s got an H in it or not. 
 
Writing 
I have up-down and left-right letter reversals.  My letter-reversals are less common than 
spelling mistakes and missing letters.  
 
Grammar 
On grammar, I was never brilliant, I‟ve never grasped it [grammar] at school.  But I was 
getting better, thanks to feedback on written work. I‟m doing more writing and receiving 
and acting on feedback about my grammar. 
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Speaking 
I‟d like my ideas to be in an order to make myself clear and express myself in a way that I 
would like to, but they don‟t come out in that way, they kind of… emmm… yeah a little 
bit like now, I‟m thinking, stopping, thinking, stammering, there‟s a lot of emmm… 
there‟s not fluency to it. 
 
With my Language Problem, it‟s either I can‟t recall what I want to say or it comes out 
quite jumbled.  No-one‟s actually ever said to “Sorry you‟re talking gibberish.   It‟s 
mainly something I think about myself, this notion that I‟m disjointed and 
uncommunicative.  I don‟t feel like I‟m really engaged in a conversation On the 
disjointed/uncommunicative thing, I do hear people saying “Can you explain that again?” 
or “Can you add to that?” or I‟m maybe picking up on that, a bit more, I don‟t know – 
perhaps!  I‟m not sure.  I think I‟m putting a lot of importance on the idea of being 
communicative [orally].  
 
School to Uni  
I wasn‟t easy to teach.  Only in hindsight can I see that I had a communication problem at 
school, although I didn‟t realise it then.  At school, I was regarded as a dissident, and I 
spent a lot of time outside the classroom door (owing to my communication problem). It 
was a bit strange because my actual results if you like were quite high, but my report was 
always terrible.  I think there was a little bit of pressure on me to do well at school, not a 
huge amount, not really. 
 
I had problems with my tables as well, chanting the… I thought it was quite a good way 
of learning, but it didn‟t mean anything for me, it was just chanting.  I could have been 
chanting anything.  
 
I was unaware there was anything wrong until I went onto the Access course fairly 
recently. 
 
At my school there were a lot of people having problems that weren‟t being addressed I 
just don‟t think that it was a type of school where the majority of the kids were really 
getting what it is possible to get out of an education. I think my feeling was that I was let 
down by that system, by the school, by certain teachers. 
 
My family 
My language problems were unnoticed in my family. I don‟t come from an academic 
family but my Mum has been to university since. I think my Dad might be dyslexic 
although he‟s never been [diagnosed], and he was successful despite his dyslexia.  Maybe 
even my brother [is dyslexic], as well.  My brother, like he was really good at foreign 
languages and English as well, but like in the academic world it suddenly all went wrong, 
you know, for him!  But for [my brother] […] no one said hang on it might be dyslexia… 
I don‟t think my sister has any problems with it [dyslexia] as she did well at school.  
 
I was in trouble right through school and my family knew it. My parents, they was [sic] 
concerned but not enough to make me… to make anything change, I don‟t think. I think 
my father was fatalistic about my behaviour, but I think [my mother] was more concerned 
that I had an education because she didn‟t have one herself. 
 
Strategies and remedies 
I think essay-writing has sort of helped me to really express my ideas, yeah. 
I was relatively successful, despite the bad reports, by doing things my way. 
 
I use special software, to help my dyslexia.  I use Inspiron mind-mapping – for the 
process, not so much for the product.  Also, I bounce ideas off “this guy I see once a 
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week”.  It‟s about vocalising it I think, if I get the opportunity to talk about what I‟ve 
been learning then it consolidates it. 
 
For remembering, a lot of the time it‟s the visual thing I try not just to have everything 
just in black and white print, I use a bit of colour and patterns and things like that. 
 
I know little codes (I before E …) and even made up one of my own (where>here). I 
can‟t remember my tricks and codes spontaneously but they are embedded and arise as I 
write. 
 
In the study skills workshops we discuss solutions rather than our individual problems. 
 
Self-Analysis and explanations 
I think people have a problem because they‟ve been told they have a problem, sometimes. 
With my language problems, I can “work them to advantage”. I have managed despite my 
problems because I am “really into language and the problems with language” and also 
because “I’m so interested and fascinated to work through them [problems].  
 
I have an advantage in knowing I have a problem (over people who don‟t realise and 
don‟t act on their problem).  It‟s not a “second bite of the cherry effect”, I‟m just more 
aware of problems and of the need to work through them and engage with the problems 
more. 
 
With my Language Problem, I would actually say that it‟s probably a common thing, but 
I don‟t feel that I‟ve got special needs.  I ascribe some of my language difficulties to a 
mismatch between my way of learning and the school‟s way of teaching. People learn in 
different ways and there‟s a certain way of teaching, particularly when I was at school, 
there was a way of teaching and it‟s not right for everyone. There was an imitation and 
reinforcement ethos in the school teaching I got – “we’d have to copy exactly what was 
on the board and if you couldn’t do it then you’d get into trouble” 
 
Other Languages 
I done French for a while [at school], didn‟t get on too well with that! I dropped out of 
French as soon as I was thirteen.  I wasn‟t diagnosed with dyslexia and wasn‟t 
consequently told to drop languages.  I think I learnt more French while I was in Holland 
than I did at School.   
 
I also speak Dutch.  I got on very well in Dutch learning – I think it was a matter of my 
own interest at the time- but I think Dutch is very similar to English in a lot of ways, so I 
got on well with it.  I acquired very basic qualifications in Dutch.  I really enjoyed the 
experience [of learning another language] - I thought [learning another language] was an 
amazing thing to do, so I went [away] to learn another language [in its country of use]. 
How I learnt Dutch:  “I just wanted to learn through actually doing it in the community”. 
I learned Dutch in situ by learning the rules and applying them. [I didn‟t seem to have] 
huge problems with learning those [Dutch]  rules and you just apply the rules and, yeah 
OK if you kind of get it wrong, someone tells you you‟ve got it wrong. 
  
Knowledge of my problems – that I have them, as well as the problems themselves - is a 
motivator to deal with them and “Work them out” even in the second language.  There 
was a point… there was a time when I was completely immersed in it [Dutch], when I 
was thinking in it, dreaming in it. I didn‟t learn Dutch in England, but carried on learning 
it when I got back, through my girlfriend. Despite my immersion and thinking/dreaming 
in Dutch, my expressive problem never went away. My smaller Dutch lexis wouldn‟t 
have helped with the expressive side. 
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Affect and Psychological 
I have a love of English Literature.  I think I‟ve always been interested in language. I 
have a reciprocally-influential relationship with language:  I affect it, it affects me.  My 
reciprocally-influential relationship with language is different to how it is for other 
people.  It‟s [language, i.e. reading, writing has] always been such a big part of my world 
without even realising it, but now I‟m having to use language in that‟s going to be 
assessed by people that have got rules or assessment, then – yeah it‟s become more of a 
problem. People who comment on my language use are commenting on a core aspect of 
my identity. 
 
I tune out a bit on input and also, on output.  So I don‟t always see what I‟ve written in 
my work [mistakes, e.g.]. 
 
I used to get in trouble, at school. I went to “quite a rough school”. “Perhaps there is a 
connection between things like getting into a fight and fighting other kids because of your 
frustration in the classroom, yeah maybe they are connected, I’ve never… I never really 
thought about that before, I just thought you know, boys will be boys”  
 
At school, “I was picked on, and I was made to feel stupid, and I think it probably 
affected me in quite a big way”.  Some teachers at my school nourished by sense of 
failure:  “In some of the subjects I gave up… some of it was just thinking well, I don’t 
understand it, I can’t… I can’t do it”.  I think that [wondering that this geography book‟s 
all about] came from the problem. 
 
I believe sincerely that this is how, at the time, I perceived my teachers and their 
demotivating powers. 
 
I felt both stupid AND aggressive. I was feeling a bit upset in certain areas for thinking 
that I was stupid. My frustration […] came out in sort of naughty schoolboy ways.  
 
Affectively, my Good Story was that I had been away from formal education for 15 years, 
between school and the Access Course.  My absence of 15 years from schooling to 
Access Course was all the more of a milestone, so my “Good Story” was:  passing my 
Access Course”. I passed my Access Course before diagnosis and had NO Extra Time. I 
was assessed through seen essays and unseen exams on the Access Course, including 3-
hour finals. It was a Good Story because, until then, I‟d had little or no belief in my own 
capacities.   
 
My Bad Story is the kind of general feeling of just not quite being up to it - knowing what 
I want to say and not being able to say it I felt too inarticulate to perform and explain 
before people.  I kept myself out of danger (making mistakes with language in front of 
others). I started realising that I had a problem when I hit the heavy reading load for the 
Access Course. There was a dyslexic in my class on the Access Course who knew he was 
dyslexic and got more time. The Statemented Dyslexic wasn‟t wholly how I recognised 
my own dyslexia but gave 1 or 2 more pointers. I recognised myself most fully as a 
Dyslexic after the psychologist had spoken to me. 
 
Between School and Uni 
I got no feedback from my writing, in the period between school and Uni. I wrote a lot, 
most of the writing I was doing, I was doing for myself [and didn‟t get feedback on the 
grammar etc].  Then, my Access Course tutor recommended I look into dyslexia. At 
school, I‟d never heard of dyslexia.  It wasn‟t until post-secondary that I discovered 
dyslexia. I lacked opportunities for diagnosis through assessment or critical feedback 
during my post-school, pre-university years. I can‟t think of anything concrete which 
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caused my dyslexia - Just it could be to do with the fact that I‟d gone out of the like 
academic world for such a long time.  
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Appendix 2K – Sam‟s Story 
 
General stuff about me 
I am nineteen. My first language was English.  I‟m middle class, sort of stuff.  Yeah, 
middle class. Never thought of myself as anything else. I did a gap year.  I went to India 
and to South Africa. I am right-handed. My eyes are both the same colour. I‟ve been 
given some specs once and I never really wore them. I‟ve always been relatively clumsy, 
not as clumsy as some I‟ve got some mates who are more dyslexic than me and they‟re so 
clumsy it‟s funny!  Maybe there‟s a clumsiness in the way that I projected myself, a 
clumsiness in the way that I come about, in the things that I say maybe sometimes. It‟s 
probably a mental clumsiness, sometimes.  Maybe I‟ll come out with comments and 
things that other people might not. I‟ll tell you another clumsiness: organisation, I‟m very 
clumsy at organising, all types of organisation. I don‟t think I‟m tone deaf.  A few people 
say that my accents are pretty good:  I can do quite a variety of accents! You should have 
heard me in India!  It was appalling; I spoke with an Indian accent as well! 
 
My family 
There was just a suggestion that I might be dyslexic but then it was completely eradicated 
round the dinner table.   I think dyslexia is something you‟re born with, pretty much.  Oh 
yeah it was, definitely my father who “gave me” dyslexia.  My father doesn‟t want to 
believe in dyslexia.  I think my father does find it a little bit difficult but I think also he 
makes more of an effort than me to overcome it. 
 
My father has improved a lot through years of learning and pushing himself he‟s learnt to 
deal with it whereas I‟ve probably been more lazy than him. 
 
My father doesn‟t want me to think that I‟m dyslexic, so then maybe you know, I‟ll start 
to underachieve because I‟ll think I‟m supposed to underachieve, or something like that. 
 
What my father doesn‟t realise is that Yes, I do find it difficult to read and write in 
comparison to the majority and yes maybe he did too, what he doesn‟t realise is there‟s a 
word for that and even though you can overcome it like that - or he seems to think we can 
overcome it - the word‟s dyslexia and he just doesn‟t realise I don‟t think, it‟s as though 
he doesn‟t like it. 
 
My mother always got involved, she was always trying to help me. That was really 
annoying, Mum always trying to give me these extra comprehensions and punctuations. 
Although I enjoyed some of the books my Mum read to me, reading was boring, books 
were boring. At that time I was too young to really know that I didn‟t really like reading 
because my reading was bad. 
 
I‟m sure there are maybe some forms of dyslexia that come about through the way you‟ve 
been brought up, say, if you‟d never been read to and no-one‟s ever made an effort to 
make you learn to write then you‟re going to have some form of learning difficulty, right, 
but I‟ve always had the parents who‟ve made the effort. I know this, my mother thinks 
that there are blessings to dyslexia. 
 
Both my brother and my sister read lots of books and they‟ve had exactly the same 
upbringing as me almost, so why I should have had it is just to do with me, it‟s to do with 
my personal ... feelings and the way I cope with things. 
 
My problem with language 
I don‟t really know what‟s happening with the language problem. I‟ve just always known 
that I had a problem. The [sic] sinful [simple] name for my problem would be dyslexia. 
I‟ve never actually thought it was dyslexia, I thought it was just a mild form of reading 
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difficulty.  I‟ve found it a little bit more difficult to read and write and all this ... sort of 
things. Maybe my language problem is because I rush things sometimes. When I slow 
myself down I just get frustrated. My spelling has never ever been anywhere up to 
standard - I was “noticed” at Secondary School and taken out of lessons because my 
spelling wasn‟t quite right and my handwriting wasn‟t up to scratch.  I always need to use 
a computer and spell-check.  But my handwriting, if I put an effort into it, actually can be 
really quite nice. 
 
Sometimes I find it very hard to think of the simplest words. I can have something 
perfectly worthwhile to say and I know what I‟m trying to get across, I know what I‟m 
trying to say, it‟s all straight in here but I can‟t get it across. I‟ll have the thread of what 
I‟m trying to say in my head but it‟ll come across that I don‟t have a clue what I‟m trying 
to say because I just can‟t find the correct vocabulary or means of describing it . 
 
Everybody has things that they‟re good at and things that they‟re not good at, however 
people who aren‟t good at reading and writing are noticed a lot more because reading and 
writing is a milestone in what we have to do every day. Most people have difficulties and 
mine happen to lie in reading and writing. Other people who are good at reading and 
writing also have their weaknesses but they‟re not in the sorts of things that you actually 
need to use every day. I know for sure that there are other things that I find a lot easier 
than people who don‟t have dyslexia do. 
 
My language production problem, orally, controls certain people‟s views on how 
intelligent I am.  But I don‟t remember spending any nights thinking about at [sic] my 
dyslexia problems much at all.  If people are feeling for me because I can‟t finish my 
sentences I don‟t really notice it that much. I‟d quite like to be impressing people with my 
ideas but I can‟t express them. 
 
 
Reading 
I never really read that much - because I found it difficult - so I didn‟t learn that way. My 
reading skills are slower than others‟.  Even in Primary School I started to realise that 
when everyone else was reading books, I hated reading books. I find my thoughts 
confused when I try to sort through a book; I also find my thoughts confused when I try 
… to take out certain pieces of information for an essay.  
 
I refused to read and even at night, my Mum was always constantly trying to get me to 
read like she‟d sit me down and she‟d read some book and then I‟d read some of the book 
then she‟s read some of it and then I‟d read a bit. I only really started reading books for 
myself about two years ago. That was a great day, when I finished Lord of the Rings, 
when I suddenly realised I could read, when I read my first book in one day.  But I still 
don‟t read at home here, I only read on holiday.  I reckon if I‟d read a lot more when I 
was a kid, things would be easier but I‟ve obviously found it more difficult.   
 
If I read it out loud or I move my lips when I‟m reading it goes in better, usually I‟ll have 
to read a sentence twice I do find that moving lips while reading helps me physically - but 
then I do find that also, I try not to do it.  I just heard silly things being said about people 
who move their lips when they read, so like I‟m on the Underground for instance I‟ll most 
probably try my hardest not to move my lips when I read. 
 
I can feel overwhelmed by dense readings.  Usually, I just look through the sentence 
around to try and describe what that word means. Sometimes, I‟ll just try and work it out. 
I have difficulties with timed reading in a seminar group. I‟ve had to apologise because I 
haven‟t finished reading things in time. Seeing as it takes me half an hour to read four 
pages, that‟s just overwhelming. I just get really frustrated.  
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I‟ve been told Social Anthropology does have a way of complicating things. I do come 
into contact with a lot of long words, and it does really put me off, actually. Some of the 
Social Anthropology books I get have taken me about ten minutes to have read a page - 
and I‟ve hardly understood a word of it. There‟s a LOT of technical, long words in Social 
Anthropology that just go past my head. Some words in Social Anthropology are a bit 
silly and pretentious, and I don‟t really want to know what they mean. Some words in 
Social Anthropology you can explain in just a few more words and I don‟t know why 
they just don‟t do that. I don‟t understand these books because the written language really 
isn‟t very friendly, they use these horribly complicated words. The reason I find it 
difficult to read all these long books is because there‟s so much there, sometimes, there‟s 
so much on a page I‟m just overwhelmed by it and it puts me off.  I‟d tried to read really 
fast but then I‟d realise I hadn‟t really read it, I‟d just been reading the words but not 
actually taking it in.  A lot of the time I‟ve been reading these Anthropology books and 
I‟ve have just fallen asleep. 
 
 
Writing 
I first noticed others were better than me at primary school, when I was put into one of 
the lowest spelling groups. I‟ve never really had the mind for spelling and the grammar 
behind it, it‟s just never really come easy to me.  If I really think about a word, spelling it 
in my head, I get closer and most of the time now I get the spelling. I can‟t 
simultaneously hold the whole word in my mind and spell it out without reference to the 
written- down form.  I really have to have a pen and paper and be thinking about the 
word.  I can‟t check what I‟ve written down from the sound of it.  Yes, I can actually 
spell it out in my head, but it just takes, you know, longer; I have to really sit there and 
think and work it out.  Spell “dyslexia”? I probably wouldn‟t get that right first time, 
“dyslexia” if I was to put it on the page.  “Elephant” I‟d find easy because it‟s e-l-e-p-h-a-
n-t, I mean I don‟t know if I‟ve seen that written down a lot as well, I can rely on memory 
to a certain extent, after a while.   If I know the word in my head, I know the sound of the 
word in my head, I can eventually learn to write it down, letter by letter. 
 
I have a letter-reversal problems with b‟s and d‟s specifically; capital B and D aren‟t 
strictly reversible. I always got my bs and by ds the wrong way round.  Always.  I‟ve 
always had to really think about it I don‟t have automaticity, but… well I often just... 
stop... not the way things come easy to people. The woman [gave] me a technique to 
remember my D‟s and B‟s that was a good idea but it never stuck in my head, ever, not 
while I was there. 
 
I had a problem formatting written pieces – except stories.  Written pieces were supposed 
to be a certain way, which I didn‟t know.  I still find myself getting into a muddle every 
time I try to write a long piece of writing. In essay-writing I need to look up the meaning 
of words, look up their spelling, AND keep the plan in my head.  What I‟ve noticed, 
when I came to University, was how difficult it was to write essays - but I knew that 
beforehand. I knew more that most people in that exam did;  so why have I been 
penalised by that Geography tutor just because I find it difficult to write essays?   I‟m a 
geographer, I‟m not an essay-writer. 
 
When I‟m trying to listen to what the lecturer‟s got to say, I understand what he‟s saying - 
but I never really know how to put it down in my own words on the page. I never have 
the confidence to know that the way I‟m formatting my notes is as good as it should be.  
And a lot of the time I will have listened to what he‟s said then he‟ll have gone on to 
something else and I‟ll have lost it. My notes are not very aesthetic either, so they‟re not 
very friendly to read again. My notes never look like everyone else‟s, you know?  
They‟re always scrappy and scraggly and all over the place - and I wish they weren‟t! 
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School to Uni 
The term „dyslexia‟ came into my consciousness in school. Maybe it‟s because there‟s 
always a few people who are more dyslexic than you, at these sort of state primary 
schools, that it doesn‟t get blown up out of all proportion. 
 
I got an extra tutor, before I left primary school, to try and get into secondary [public] 
school;  she was just there to help me out on these things that, you know, some state 
primary schools don‟t teach you but that you need to know for public school. 
 
After school, I heard the term „dyslexia‟ from family friends who are also dyslexic and I 
thought “Oh, I‟m dyslexic too”. 
 
My parents were quite adamant that I wasn’t told that I was different to other children. 
My parents didn‟t want a failure to make it from one year to the next to happen, „cos I 
was obviously being secluded [sic] from the rest of the class. On things like the Sciences 
and Music and Maffs [sic] and Art and French and that lot, I‟ve never really dropped 
behind in. 
 
I went to a Public Boys School [sic] where there were all these incredibly intelligent boys 
who read the dictionary before they went to bed, you know what I mean.  I didn‟t take 
English for a reason!  I took Geography A Level because I knew... I knew about the 
factuals.  
 
At Marlgate Oratory, when I went there next, nothing was done about my dyslexia, apart 
from my English teachers;  I‟ve always had really good, really friendly, lovely English 
teachers and they‟ve looked out for me. I had this “Extra English” teacher at Marlgate 
Oratory and she kind of came into context [sic] a bit - but she never really helped that 
much, she was just quite a silly old lady who was surely in it just for the money.   
 
But there was one English teacher who really inspired me to do well and like for the first 
time ever in English, I got like seventy something percent in an exam, and that was a 
great day.  My Form Tutors, my house-masters always knew that I found certain fings a 
little difficult, so they were always being particularly friendly and helpful and enthusiastic 
about what I did. I started doing Acting at school seeing as that was considered as a part 
of English for the English GCSE that was counted for a part of the English mark. I know 
there‟s people who don‟t enjoy performing; giving presentations, doing that sort of thing 
and I can imagine they must feel quite low when they can‟t do something like that.  
 
You don‟t have to do all your own extra reading at GCSE where I was, you‟re kind of 
getting spoon-fed at a public boys‟ school;  it was made pretty easy for us to pass those 
exams.  It was put on a plate for the taking and if you wanted to take it, you could.  In 
GCSE English, there were parts I could do well on - I got a B in GCSE English which 
was brilliant for me really. 
 
I was tested at Sixth Form just to get extra time „cos I knew I needed extra time, which I 
really did;  it was such a help. If you get a little more time to sort out the ideas in your 
head, you feel less pressure, then everything comes out clearer. 
 
And then there was the Geography teacher; he didn‟t like me much anyway... 
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Modern Languages 
I most definitely was better in French at school than I what was considered to be at 
English.   My average grade for English and for French would be between C and B.  
Maybe a little bit higher for French, maybe. At GCSE I got an A in French, but I only got 
a B for English.  I‟ve come out with decent grades in English for GCSE, and then 
obviously I gave it up as soon as possible. 
 
I‟ve always adapted myself quite well to speaking French and English, like all in the 
same day, and I can‟t really remember anything specific suddenly happening with my 
reading ability or my writing ability as soon as I started the French Language at 
University  
 
 
Affect and psychological 
I‟ve never actually thought of myself as really dyslexic, because my father is adamant I‟m 
not. I never really got angry about the fact that I couldn‟t read because I didn‟t like 
reading, so it didn‟t matter that I couldn‟t read. 
 
At secondary school I got a little annoyed that I had to go to these extra English lessons.  
I felt feelings of unfairness that I was like havin‟ to have to do this when other people 
didn‟t. Another annoying thing was that other people would have got a lot further than 
me. But if there‟s other people in the room,sometimes I‟ll feel real pressure to catch up 
with them. And if it‟s not interesting I‟ll lose concentration after about 10 minutes, easy. I 
have to concentrate quite hard, I can‟t just read and it will go into my head like that and 
then I‟ll be able to talk about it straight away, I need to read it and maybe highlight it. 
Sometimes I was aware of other boys‟ progress. I don‟t remember thinking about it an 
incredibly large amount but yeah, I was really making comparisons I suppose, to an 
extent; I felt a little bit low that I found it more difficult to do things than others did.  But 
I don‟t remember being ever really unhappy about it. 
 
Here at Uni, I find it difficult to say what I want to say sometimes. I think that I can‟t say 
it quite right or I sometimes feel maybe it wasn‟t a relevant point.  In seminars I don‟t 
always catch on straight away, quite often that‟ll be because I haven‟t read quite as much 
as everyone else.  No-one really understands the feelings of frustration.   Honestly, that‟s 
what annoys me so much, just finding the word that‟s so simple and I know, I can‟t think 
of them sometimes. It‟s excruciating sometimes because people will be waiting for you to 
finish your sentence but you‟re like “Oh I can‟t” and then you know everything you‟ve 
been trying to say has gone completely to waste because it‟s like you haven‟t been able to 
get it... spit it out properly 
 
When you come up to university, with this incredibly large number of people, everyone is 
really very intelligent so maybe you start to doubt your own intelligence.  I have feelings 
of inadequacy, of being inferior to people – yes, I tend to think most people are more 
intelligent than me to an extent. I don‟t think I should indoubt [sic] my intelligence as 
much as I do sometimes, but I do quite a lot.  A lot of the time, I‟d say.  I don‟t know if 
that an excuse. 
 
I do feel inferior sometimes, quite a few times, but then I‟ll suddenly come out with 
something that is quite intelligent I think.  Intelligence is how well you can write an 
essay, how witty you are, how much you know about the world, how you cope in a debate 
or in a discussion, your ideas on things, yeah, your ideas.  But intelligence for me also 
includes creativeness, if you can think of things that other people haven‟t thought of. 
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Strategies and Assistances 
I was given useful techniques like use my finger along the page and read more slowly.  
 
I look at other people‟s notes.  Other peoples‟ notes are more copious than mine.  
 
I like to try transforming my reading into pictures and imaginations inside my head. What 
I do is I just have to simplify it, I‟ll have to simplify what I‟m thinking. I have to sort of 
do some sort of role play or do something with a little bit of charisma then... then I 
usually find that I enjoy doing something like that. 
 
If I‟m trying to read and act I find it difficult, I have to pretty much learn the script before 
I can act to my full potential. No, I just can‟t sight-read in auditions, it just won‟t go into 
my head properly, the words will look muddled. I do need time to look at it first and 
really take it in and say it over in my head and learn some of the words, you know, to 
learn the sentences, learn the words, learn what I‟m going to have to say, learn the 
patterns of the sentences so that even if I don‟t read it exactly correctly I know the basics 
of what it‟s trying to say. I need to highlight it [the text], so I can come back to it, so I can 
come back and look at the relevant bits. Usually if I‟m trying to act and read I won‟t get it 
right unless I‟ve read it through quite a few times. 
 
On the negative side, at School, I‟d skip out chapters and things to get round doing more 
reading.  I would never really do the extra comprehensions, punctuations properly 
though, I‟d always find some way of getting myself out of it as far as I can remember. 
Another technique was telling [Mum] I didn‟t have to read as much as I really did. I don‟t 
think the Extra English tutor‟s “bed” thing worked at all.  Apart from the b‟s and d‟s, it 
was just little spelling mistakes, and there were no real techniques that I used to get 
around the words that I know of. 
 
When I had to do a book review, I didn‟t want people to know I hadn‟t read the book, 
„cos everyone seemed to be able to read these books so easily and I couldn‟t, I could just 
never get into them. That was always quite funny, because I‟d never read the book, I‟d 
like just read the back or I used to try and get out of doing it [by] skipping chapters or 
maybe, I don‟t know, download the book review on the computer or get my friend to help 
me.  Or they‟d say they want two pages, I‟d write half or three  quarters of a page and 
colour the rest in or find some other way of filling the space.  
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 Appendix 2L – Sandy‟s Story 
 
First, general stuff! 
My birthday was 15.8.83 so I was nearly 28 when I recorded this interview.  I don‟t 
smash things or bump into them in general, but I do have a tendency to trip over things.  I 
can‟t play football at all!  I am messy and untidy but I can have compulsions to repair 
order - I repair others‟ disorder, not my own! Physically, I am right-handed for writing, 
I‟m short-sighted in both eyes, I need extra volume on human language hearing, I‟m 
badly tone-deaf.  I can‟t mimic other people - I overestimate my accent-mimicry skills 
badly. Academic information:  I got B/C in English Lang/Lit , I took no time out between 
school and uni, but I did take a Foundation Year at Chichester College of Arts Science 
and Technology.  I have l’esprit de l’escalier, (i.e. I think up the perfect retort when it‟s 
just too late). 
 
My family and… other dyslexics 
I‟m middle class. I got read to quite a lot when I was younger; my parents picked up on 
my reading-aloud errors. One uncle and my sister are dyslexic, and my privately-schooled 
cousins were picked up as SLD.  My parents screened my school work - they advised on 
wrongness, but didn‟t correct as such.  GCSE‟s weren‟t exam-based so my parents got me 
through.  But I was persuaded to get Dyslexia testing by dyslexic friends, at Uni – and 
now, I‟m “out” as a dyslexic among friends.  I didn‟t / don‟t really “come out” as 
dyslexic, but I‟ve never really been “in” - news just travels!  I now have dyslexic friends 
who check my work. I realise the dangers of being helped with my dyslexia by dyslexics.  
In my limited experience, all dyslexics have greater or lesser “upsides”.  Which we‟ll 
come to. 
 
School and transition to Uni  
Before my diagnosis my dyslexia did cause me quite a lot of problems. I was 
undiagnosed at school – indeed, there “wasn‟t” dyslexia at my school.  The only 
“assistance” I got was handwriting lessons, at school - I was treated as having an output 
problem and a mechanical one at that.  There have been mixed expectations of me among 
my peers, at GCSE age:  I was an object of fun, mocking;   I was sidelined, disparaged, 
sous-estimé.  I was bullied because of my dyslexia.  Unknown markers marked me lower 
than known ones. I knew that I didn‟t “just” have handwriting problems.  I didn‟t think I 
was stupid but I knew other people thought I was. 
 
I was resentful of everyone else, at school. I was resentful because I seemed to have 
something intrinsically wrong with me;  my resentment was against their apparently 
natural ease with spelling.  I got away from the bullies, it didn‟t just stop or get stopped.  I 
think [the bullying was] because in some areas I was more intelligent than some of the 
people doing the bear-baiting. I selected my way out of bullying by taking A Levels and 
on upwards. I‟m not traumatised too much by it now but I “failed” A Levels (BBE!)  - I 
failed to complete my A Level papers but passed my Foundation course well.  In fact I 
passed Year 1 at Uni BEFORE taking the Dyslexia Assessment. 
 
Uni, Diagnosis and Help 
I believe my dyslexia statement is from the University, and I think I‟m “officially” 
dyslexic because my Personal Tutor picked up on this.  I didn‟t take the Dyslexia 
Assessment until end 1st year; my Year 2 difficulties weren‟t directly Dyslexia-related. 
My Dyslexia Diagnosis is a Good Story because prior to that it had been assumed that I 
was just a bit daft in the head.  I discovered an “upside”.  I‟m better at some other things 
as a result of being dyslexic:  I‟m bad at handwriting but good at genetic codes. I can 
actually translate genetic code. My coding “upside” isn‟t compensatory, it‟s more in the 
“gift” category.   
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As regards Assistances and Kit, the University gets me more photocopying and printing 
money from the Council [LEA]; Student Support organises sessions - which I can‟t attend 
as I‟m busy then.  I got a recorder and a computer with spell-checker through Assistive 
Technologies.   I‟m not keen on the “Inspiration” mind-mapping software - I have 
physical, not electronic, mapping strategies which work.  I only used the audio-recorder 
for a year - I am forgetful with the recorder itself and with the actual recording, as well as 
collecting the machine. My lecture transcriptions backed up so I stopped taping! I end up 
having to rush down things anyway I should really get down through memory. 
  
What‟s my language problem? 
My language problem is a “wiring difficulty”, I‟ve been told – it‟s been broadly 
diagnosed as Dyslexia.  It‟s more production than reception for me, this problem, and 
more angled towards the fact that I can‟t deal with sequences of things.  On the output, 
spelling side I have letter and number ordering difficulties (I miss-spell my own name, 
Daniel, at times).  Occasionally, I can‟t retrieve words (tip of the tongue phenomenon).  
Perhaps more important for me than retrieval is self-screening - I don‟t necessarily notice 
that I‟ve made that mistake and I‟ll carry on. 
 
Knock-on effects 
I make assemblage-to-output errors in reading aloud.  I innocently get the wrong words 
[unconsciously]. My dyslexia hasn‟t had an emotional effect on me, long term, but I was 
an Annoyed Person for quite a while, I had quite a bad temper and  
I once got into a punch-up. 
 
My dyslexia can be a bit of an inconvenience at times. I‟m shy and nervous in oral 
presentations, and oral presentations always bring a sense of dread.  I have an impending 
Assessed Presentation on my Dissertation; I‟m not looking forward to it! I believe my 
dyslexia makes me have word-loss during presentations, and nervousness makes me even 
more dysfluent on top of the dyslexia.  A vicious circle?  
 
Affective and allied matters 
My “Good Story” for the Interviewer was finding out I‟m dyslexic:  a good story as it 
includes realising it wasn‟t just me being stupid, there was something hard-wired into my 
brain that means I can‟t process things in quite the same way.  My Bad Story was being 
labelled as stupid for so long; being labelled as stupid made me bad tempered.  I look 
back at that [my pre-diagnosis period] and just think, “Why!?”  But now, my apparent 
success has overridden people‟s old perceptions of me. 
 
Writing 
My mistakes are most obvious with handwritten, i.e. no spellchecker inputs. I suffix 
random supernumerary letters onto words, I write half-words, I confuse “witch” and 
“which”, i.e. homophonic heterographs.  I can perceive incorrectness before I can find the 
correct output I need; and I get negative feedback from markers on defective items I 
haven‟t noticed.  This happens to me daily, and speed and pressure of work are 
contributory factors. My hand-written work has flourishes which look like extra „e‟s. I‟m 
pragmatic about errors in lecture notes, I can go back later – but sometimes I can‟t read 
my own notes! I can recover information from context in the case of my indecipherables. 
 
Reading 
I was always a big reader as a child and there were no problems and I went through all the 
reading stages like anybody else I‟ve always accidentally skipped lines when reading.   I 
accidentally re-read sections though inattention.  I‟d miss stuff if there weren‟t sometimes 
back-references to tip me off.  Accidental misreading does get a little bit annoying, but it 
isn‟t too bad: I‟m not like the readers who get nothing at all off a given paragraph. I can 
speed read for gist but not comprehension: I need 2 goes for depth reading 
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Grammar 
I find basic punctuation difficult, and I sometimes have problems with plural markers and 
suffixes.  I have speed-induced grammar errors of omission. I mishear certain words in 
my head and they don‟t make sense because I don‟t recognise them, even with a 
dictionary This mishearing in my head doesn‟t happen that often, and other people can re-
trigger the phonology of words for me then I hear them in my head and recognise them. I 
can get phonological clues about some markers which are sounded (“makes sense in my 
head”).  I don‟t have strephosymbolia as in letter-inversion but I mix fricatives and 
sibilants and i/o/u in suffixes. I know some spelling ditties (but can‟t spell my own name, 
Daniel…). 
 
Modern Languages 
Unfortunately I did both French and German, and I was absolutely terrible at them: I got 
B/C in English Lang/Lit, but only C in German and a D in French at GCSE. I‟d have to 
quite frequently resort to grammar books and dictionaries (we were taught on the 
grammar-translation model, test-as-you-go) but quite frequently, I ended up having to 
resit my language tests:  I‟d mix up past and present tenses, I‟d just cut (out) the 
pronouns.  I have remembered practically nothing of either French or German.   I didn‟t 
acquire automatically; I believe I would have learned more French / German at a younger 
age.  But I don‟t believe learning MFLs made my English worse, though. 
 
Strategies for repair and winning through 
One of my repair strategies is use of context to fill in gaps.  Another strategy is extra 
focus when reading and listening I can and do try to force-learn certain words:  instead of 
phoneme-to-grapheme I use kinetic memory to “learn” certain words.  I speed-read to 
check-as-I-go with the spelling (I can spot some salient errors visually, though my check-
as-you-go is much more atomistic when writing by hand) but I have abdicated to the 
computer spell-checker, slightly!  Other techniques:  I de-clutter visually by double-
spacing handwritten work, I recite learning ditties, …I compare myself to someone 
“worse” than me. 
  
A coda 
I‟m not broken; I don‟t need fixing. 
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Appendix 2M – The Advisors Jillie and Dave‟s Story 
 
You have read us the Informed Consent document, and we consent to this interview. 
 
What we do 
Our work is not specific to Humanities or, within that, language students. 
We‟re centrally appointed, through Student Services. We‟re centrally funded. Not 
through the Humanities School.  We‟re not paid through the School Budget, no. The 
DDA [grant] goes direct to the student through the LEA [but] it‟s passed straight to the 
SSU sometimes. There‟s kind of central policies, but each School has its own style. The 
Director of Student Support in the School is not our Manager, we work as a collaborative 
team. Sometimes Advisors move from one School to the other, well, some people have 
moved. I [JP] did to some extent, insofar as I started off split between Humanities and 
Life Science, I worked point three [0.3] in Life Sci and then came over here full time.  
 
We‟re not disciplinary in our role, definitely not, and we‟re not Police.  I think the word 
Policing is an emotive word, but for example when a student has been absent a lot they 
get a tracking e-mail which says, “You‟ve been absent a lot” then they‟re asked to see a 
Student Advisor.  You could say that that‟s... again I don‟t think policing is a good word 
for it, but it does indicate to students that someone is watching their performance, to some 
extent, for their own good, it‟s a supportive role, it‟s to help them so we‟re saying, 
“There‟s a danger here, do you want to do anything about this?” You could say the same 
with the Police in a sense, that part of their role might be to beat people up and throw 
them in prison, but partly they might also be able to pick up the old lady that‟s fallen 
down in the street, sort of thing.  So policing is a bit of an awkward term.  But you now 
we have a variety of roles in a sense they‟re all support role but it sometimes in different 
guises. 
 
We‟re there to really give a space, a psychological space to students on a one-to-one basis 
who need help – or think they need help, they may not know exactly what they need, but 
they certainly the thing they do need is the attention of the one-to-one, individual space 
where they can say what they need to say, which they are not getting in other places and 
that... I think it goes from there.  That‟s how I see it. Things happen that are quite 
disturbing, in the School, people quite often … the first people are us, as well. 
 
 
Interactions with Faculty 
There are some Academic Advisors  who frequently pop in and say they‟re worried about 
a certain student or whatever, and there‟s a good working relationship but others don‟t 
really … you get some that don‟t even reply to e-mails.  [Also, there are Academic 
Advisors who] Don‟t respond to e-mails, don‟t notice that the student‟s been missing for 
a long time,  that kind of thing - but when it works well, liaison with Academic Advisors, 
Personal Tutors as they were, it really is very effective I think, quite an effective system.  
It seems like a Care Plan but in great … not written down in great detail, that‟s Social 
Services.  But certainly it does work now, when Tutors respond as well. 
 
It would be nice if the whole thing was more kind of unified and there was more 
communication and generally a much tighter mix of approaches, I think. Possibly in other 
Schools where you get smaller Departments there is much more interaction with Tutors. 
 
We want to mention one key thing and that is the amount of response that we get by 
Faculty when students are flagged up.  I think there is some cynicism about the actual 
label [of dyslexia]. The electronic records are very often not accessed at all.  Not by a 
minority of Faculty but in effect, when you look at it, it is the majority.  And the Traffic 
Light system which is being piloted next year, maybe will solve the problem.  But 
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certainly the impression that we get at the minute is that there‟s large pockets of 
resistance to the idea of supporting dyslexic students amongst many staff. 
 
[Some tutors are] not prepared to give them specifically to certain people or whatever, 
even Heads of Department, we‟ve heard, and I‟ve been in meetings where this has been 
said quite openly, and that people do not want to do it. There‟s various reasons given for 
it and that‟s one; another one is that “My lectures are like spontaneous, I can go anywhere 
intellectually therefore I can‟t provide a bit of paper, I‟d have to type it all out”.  Another 
one is “Copyright, someone could steal my ideas and put them in a book”. There‟s 
various reasons which I think are all pretty disingenuous really because they‟re only 
asked to provide outline notes for the basic structure of their lecture, not to provide a 
painting and stuff. That is the most basic thing, is the handouts, really.  It‟s so, so 
common, students going to the SSU saying I‟m not getting handouts, I‟ve asked for them 
and I‟ve been told by this person or that person that he doesn‟t do them. He doesn‟t do 
handouts full stop. 
 
I think hand-outs and things like that are basic things you get in most educational 
institutions, you know colleges, schools and so on, it‟s just sort of good practice really to 
give people some back-up to the overall lectures.  And I think that this is the main thing 
the dyslexic students were asking for, or stuff put on electronically which is also good for 
people that are sight impaired, things like that because they can expand it and so on and 
so forth. 
 
I think there should be a lot more interest in general in the actual craft of teaching.  I 
mean some areas are worse than others.  Students get lost in all senses of the word in big 
departments, and the biggest department in this School [English] has just become bigger 
and it‟s not Student Support conducive at all.  That‟s what I‟d say, certainly I‟d say. 
 
I think Wealdston, possibly is behind most institutions on this.  I‟m not talking about 
theUniLang Centre at Wealdston, for sure, which is different, it‟s more like real teaching 
that‟s going on there but I think what we‟re talking about is more like the big Academic 
Departments where there‟s in a lot of them a kind of snobbery, ivory-towerishness to 
some of it, and some people have a kind of antagonism to the idea of teaching any student 
who‟s other than a straight public school type intellectual person, rather than broader type 
of students they think it‟s rather demeaning to have. 
 
It is quite astonishing, because they‟re actually breaking the law and you know, people 
have been told that under the DDA you should be doing this and they still say they won‟t 
do it and I think it is a burning issue. 
 
Disability:  our view 
About disability:  we understand the umbrella term “disabled” includes hidden disabilities 
and physical disabilities, and also Mental Health as well as physical and learning 
difficulties, so it‟s an umbrella term, disability.  There are Visible Physical, Invisible 
Physical, Hidden Disabilities including Dyslexia, and Mental.  Separately there are 
Learning Difficulties with no latent or obvious mental problem, more of a cognitive 
difficulty.  [Disabled students] get treated according to their needs, they don‟t all get the 
same, the Student Support Unit writes their notes down and then it‟s available 
electronically, and there‟s different things for different disabilities.  Some people that are 
flagged up  don‟t necessarily have DDA status.  [people can be flagged up] on the 
university system because they want to be flagged up, for example if they‟ve got a 
psychological condition which means they‟re claustrophobic or something, they might 
want Tutors to know that they‟d like to sit next to the door or something like that.  So 
they go on the system as a Flagged Student.  They won‟t necessarily be DDA. 
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We don‟t think we‟re required to have a position on [the existence of dyslexia], I mean if 
someone had a position that it was just a sort of middle-class version of thickness or 
something, some of the things which have come up on the television recently, if you did 
have that point of view I guess it might be a bit difficult to do the work we do. But it‟s not 
really something that I‟ve ever had a problem with.  One of my (Dave‟s) sons is dyslexic 
and I used to teach dyslexic students at one stage, so you know I‟m fairly clear about 
what I think it is, so I‟ve never really struggled with a particular position, really. We‟re 
not required to have a position, in terms of our jobs.  But I (Jillie) don‟t feel I have 
enough knowledge about the current sort of… theories to say I have a position on it 
myself.   
I do sometimes wonder about whether it really is a condition or not, but I work with what 
we have and it doesn‟t interfere with my job.  [Jillie] I think that an associated condition 
with dyslexia is often dyspraxia, which I notice more because it‟s not confined to written 
work.  Students who are very disorganised, and I feel I can distinguish between a student 
who is just a bit of a lazy student who doesn‟t like getting up and one that is constantly 
struggling to get things in a better order and can‟t.  And I think that is possibly linked to 
the written dyslexia, but I don‟t really feel I‟m enough of an expert on the condition to 
say very much about it. 
 
Referrals 
Some [students] are self-referred in the sense that they simply turn up at the door and say 
“I think I may be dyslexic”, and they haven‟t got any piece of paper or anything like that.  
Some [students] have been urged by the Academic staff, I mean that‟s quite common, a 
lot of the turn up and “One of my Tutors said to me have I looked into the idea of 
dyslexia” and … yeah that‟s a common one. 
 
[People on M.A. programmes and Ph.D.s] tend to come by self-referral.  There isn‟t 
anyone in the Graduate Centre who has that brief [of referring dyslexic students to us] 
This is an issue, really, they don‟t have Academic Advisors any more when they get to be 
Postgrads. They don‟t really have anybody, do they, they may have a Dissertation 
Supervisor when you get to Dissertation level, but there‟s the Convenor of the 
Programme. There‟s no mechanism to access us, as such, but they [postgrads] do come to 
us actually. They do, they find their own way.  I don‟t know what the percentage is but in 
this School, a fair number of the postgrads have been undergrads with us.  I‟m thinking of 
one of the people I know who was an undergrad is now a postgrad who does have 
dyslexia.  If by sheer fluke there were 100 dyslexics in the intake for 2008 as opposed to 
20 or 30, we would still have to cope but the burden would really be on the SSU. 
 
Fellow-students acting as Mentors can spot dyslexics.  One of main the points of having 
Mentors is that they‟re peers, so [students] come out with things to them that they may 
feel uncomfortable with other, say, members of staff. Occasionally one of the Mentors 
will talk to us about a student they‟ve seen in their capacity as a Mentor, they‟ve said they 
might possibly, be a dyslexic. 
 
The Student Support Unit is mainly where the one-to-one dyslexia tuition takes place.  
We refer upwards to the Student Support service and not down the other way.  But there 
is a to-and-fro of information between us and the Student Support Unit.  A dyslexic 
student who‟s not getting the help that they should be getting under the DDA will very 
often complain to the Student Support Unit rather than to us. Quite often the information 
goes to the SSU and they will e-mail to say that a student is complaining that they‟re not 
getting any of their Advance Lecture Notes or something else, can you look into it”, in 
which case usually we e-mail whoever and say could they look at what‟s happening. 
 
246 
I (Dave) help slightly sometimes with direct dyslexia diagnosis. Occasionally, not very 
often, I run back the test past them, the one that‟s got about 25-30 questions, checklist 
thing and say “Do any of these things ring a bell”. If they appear to have some symptoms 
then I refer them to SSU. 
 
The Institutional View 
There‟s no top-down, institutional view on dyslexia.  We ourselves have picked up things 
[about how the Institution feels about dyslexic students] but it‟s still difficult to say 
whether it‟s the Institution as such or particular individuals. There have at times you 
know been e-mails flying back between people in certain departments saying “Dyslexia is 
a load of rubbish”. Some Faculty say that we shouldn‟t take students who are dyslexic 
[…] these are individual points of view and there‟s as many faculty or other members of 
the University as there are points of view. I don‟t think [it‟s] totally strange, I know that 
the stuff they send out on paper and on Unimoodle it sometimes is down as SLD and 
sometimes Dyslexia. 
 
I think BG and others see it as a pretty umbrella term anyway and I think the terminology 
they use may well sometimes emanate from the particular EdPsych report that they‟ve got 
in front of them when they write it up. BG did have a kind of a bit of an e-mail sort of 
backwards and forwards with the Philosophy Department at one point, and she actually 
did write quite a long e-mail at one point explaining the fact that they “Use the term 
Dyslexia merely because that’s what they think other people understand rather than 
SLD”. 
 
It might be obvious but the Student Support Unit itself is very much pro dyslexia as a 
learning difficulty, isn‟t it.  If they weren‟t it would be a bit odd, wouldn‟t it, I suppose.  
Seventy percent of their [SSU‟s] work is dyslexia-based.  Well between sixty and 
seventy, I think .  Our work would be quite difficult to do if any of us actually thought of 
the whole thing as completely bogus, because I think we‟d be clashing quite often with 
the SSU and with other people, it would be quite awkward, I think. 
 
 
How you “become” dyslexic at Wealdston 
Dyslexia problems will really arise most commonly in the second rather than the first or 
final years, nearer to assessment and deadlines. I wouldn‟t say shortly after they get to 
University because that first period is the settling in period and a lot of the problems don‟t 
arise at that point, they‟re kind of building up if they are, aren‟t they ? To do with 
dyslexia, anyway.  On one analysis we did we did we saw that we saw more second year 
students than we saw third years or first years and off the top of my head we get people 
come up who are third year students who say they may be dyslexic and people in the 
second year and people in the first year. 
 
 
[Wealdston students “become” dyslexic] when an Educational Psychologist says they‟re 
dyslexic and the Educational Psychologists are not part of Wealdston University, they‟re 
independent.  The University pays for their test, but it‟s external and independent.  When 
the report comes back saying, yes they are dyslexic, then they‟re officially dyslexic.  
That‟s my understanding. [Students]  can get help in a broad sense when they come to us 
in whatever way they like really, whether they consider themselves dyslexic or not, and 
certainly though the Mentors they can, and you know it might be one of these in-between 
areas where the Mentor helps them with their phraseology or something, it‟s not 
specifically dyslexia help. And it is confidential. It‟s confidential with us too. If [students] 
come to us and they don‟t know if they are or not and there‟s a suspicion, possibly from 
written work, then we can refer them to the SSU. 
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It‟s an interesting question, how it is that a student gets all the way to the age of eighteen 
or nineteen, turns up at university and then is diagnosed as dyslexic.  Don‟t know if 
there‟s an answer to it!  Even postgraduates have turned out to dyslexic, so yeah, I think 
that‟s a question that needs some debate. Not all students come to us through the usual A-
Level route, we have Access Students as well.  I don‟t know to what extent their written 
level of English is excused but is allowed for in those courses, and on A Levels as well, 
that be an explanation or partly an explanation for some of it. [The question of late 
diagnosis has] come up in Central MEC, it‟s been discussed, there was a case we 
discussed some months ago a student – and this isn‟t particularly uncommon – only a 
matter of months before their Final Exams will say “Oh I think I might be dyslexic” and 
then if they get the Educational Psychologist‟s Report which says they are, and they‟re 
flagged, then they get Retrospective Impairment for their whole three years. 
 
The conversation in Central MEC took various directions but one of them was that if 
someone is diagnosed that late in the day, how seriously dyslexic can they have been 
what one might think, well it couldn‟t have been serious, more likely to have been mild 
dyslexia if they didn‟t know about it to the very last minute. 
 
 
To tell or not to tell 
Some students come to University knowing they‟re dyslexic but they don‟t make it 
known to the University. [Students] can‟t get DSA if they don‟t declare it, so they can‟t 
benefit from those additional supports. In which case the SSU wouldn‟t get the money for 
a one-to-one, because that‟s paid out of the DSA. 
 
If [students] choose not to do anything about their suspicion or whatever about their 
having dyslexia, that‟s their decision, but in that cased there‟s limited help we can give. 
Because we‟re not one-to-one dyslexia helpers. There may be a lot of students struggling 
underneath who don‟t declare their learning difficulty because they‟re not really sure 
about it or some of them even have an attitude that I suppose they don‟t feel justified in 
[doing so]… they‟ve always struggled, so they‟ll continue struggling, you know. “I take 
twice as long to read something as the next person but that‟s how it‟s always been and 
I‟m OK with it”.  I think we have to kind of accept all of it, really, we have to, you know. 
 
One of the main reasons students go to see Mentors is Study Skills help, help with essays, 
and they may be asking for help with structuring essays, how to do footnotes, referencing, 
things that we now assume that at this level they should know, but the fact is they don‟t. 
 
Dyslexia and Modern Languages 
[Regarding dyslexia and Modern languages] the assumption being if you can‟t spell, and 
order or structure your grammar in English, your first language, then how on earth can 
you do it in a second language, that‟s the assumption, isn‟t it. Dyslexia is a term in which 
the spelling might be fine, it might be some other aspect of it. It can be word order, and 
structure and grammatical structure aren‟t the same across the different languages 
anyway. In fact in some ways maybe sometimes it‟s easier, I was just beginning to think 
in some languages, other languages. 
 
This [the assumption that if you can‟t spell, and order or structure your grammar in 
English, your first language, then how on earth can you do it in a second language] is a 
gross overgeneralization and pessimistic.  I would think so. Of course there‟s a lot of 
difference between speaking a language and being able to read and write it. 
 
Dyslexics very often have skills which are in excess of other people‟s, in certain other 
directions, and I mean language is not a straightforward thing is it, there‟s all sorts of 
aspects to it, and to say that… to lump people all into one same category and say they 
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can‟t do one particular thing just seems nonsensical. I found when I was teaching some 
dyslexics that some of them were very good at learning rules and working with rules, and 
that often when I was working them I would see a sentence as a sentence naturally but 
they‟d be applying a rule - and God we‟re thinking in two different ways, they were very 
good on rules about all sorts of things, actually, a little bit kind of like Asperger‟s type of 
way of looking at things. [The Asperger‟s way of looking at things is] a kind of very 
formal way, everything is compartmentalised, they have systems for everything, some of 
them, the colour-coded thing as well, and some of them lived very well because they‟d 
internalised a whole set of rules, and that got them through everything. 
 
I‟ve always thought that the way English in taught in Junior Schools is very bad, and it‟s 
no wonder students find learning foreign languages difficult when… well basically we‟re 
not really taught our own grammar very well. [The assumptions about language learning 
in primary and maybe secondary education.] - I just think there has to be something going 
wrong in early education with that, because we… I mean we‟re not Tutors but even in our 
role, we do see even at MA level how difficult some students seem to find – and these 
aren‟t dyslexic students necessarily, I don‟t know they are or not, but students who 
wouldn‟t consider themselves dyslexic how difficult they find sometimes writing 
coherent sentences, and who don‟t know what a verb or a noun is, or a preposition or 
something like that, which, you know - obviously I‟m going back to when I learned 
English, we were taught those things and I know it‟s old fashioned, but I don‟t know how 
it‟s helped them really to be learning in other ways. 
 
If you just think in terms of a sentence, like most of us, you know when something‟s a 
sentence or not just naturally, because it doesn‟t sound right if not, but other people might 
analyse it to see whether it‟s a sentence or not, because they can‟t hear whether it‟s a 
sentence. 
 
We‟ve not come across trigger dyslexics, dyslexics who have coped well with their L1 
until attempting a L2. 
 
[Affect and learning] I mean it‟s possibly a kind of dialectical backwards and forwards 
between the two, rather than a unidirectional thing. One thing to the other. 
 
The Year Abroad 
[Students in the HUMS School] tend to go away on the whole – but they are in contact 
sometimes, you get a phone-call from Germany or something, someone‟s very unhappy 
and in terms of looking after their dyslexia needs they‟re kind of remote from us then.  
But sometimes we get a MEC case where someone has not had their support abroad and 
that‟s where it gets to MEC.  There is liaison between the ISAO* and the Institution 
Abroad, and also between Terry Johnson now, on a Mental Health basis and any student 
who is in a foreign institution who has a mental health difficulties, so we would liaise 
between... there has been a case with a student I know, and John speaks to them and then 
I might get involved then in terms of MEC evidence *(ISAO=International Study Abroad 
Office). 
 
[Dyslexic students] have to produce evidence from those [overseas] institutions 
sometimes, for MEC, and it‟s very difficult proving a negative, i.e. proving that they 
didn‟t get support.  There can be a bit of contention between what the ISAO say and what 
the student is saying about the institution‟s lack of support.  [Rather than the absence of 
support,] it‟s not the right kind of support.  I think it‟s a difficult area actually because 
there‟s an assumption on the part of the student maybe that the institution they want to go 
to will be able to give them the level of support they‟ve had here, and I think they often 
find that it isn‟t on that level. 
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[Outgoing Year Abroad students who are dyslexic] must go knowing that, or maybe it‟s 
something you can’t know until you‟re actually there, because in a sense, I think a lot of 
support is down to the relationship between individuals, the Tutor, the student… whoever 
is dealing with support issues, and if that goes wrong, then it can - with a vulnerable 
student, with a fragile student, it can create huge problems and it can be exaggerated.  But 
for that student, because they‟re in a fragile state anyway, it seems a lot worse perhaps 
than it is. 
 
If there are proactive arrangements made for students going on their Year Abroad we 
won‟t necessarily know about it unless [a Mental Health or similar advisor] informs us.  I 
don‟t think SSU would be involved at that level with the Year Abroad.  Is it involved? I 
think probably Brigitte [Diplock] or Sue Currell  [Year Abroad Directors Europe and 
North America, respectively would liaise with the Institutions.  [The year Abroad 
Directors] do contact us before a student goes, I‟m thinking of a student who I spoke to 
Sue Currell a lot about on his American Year Abroad and whether they were going to be 
able to go or not because there were issues there. 
 
I‟m not clear about how much this Institution can actually say no to a student going 
abroad if they don‟t really believe they are fit to be able to do that.  I don‟t know where 
the decision about that lies, really. 
 
This is something that intrigues me a bit - isn‟t this known beforehand, that the style of 
working in universities in Europe is not often very similar to the way… I mean maybe 
our support levels are lot higher than they are in Europe, or they see in a very different 
way.  I had a case the other day actually, this was a student at the Sorbonne, she said the 
lectures had about 300 or 400 people in and you couldn‟t hear very clearly what the 
lecturer was saying and received absolutely NO dyslexia support at all. Now isn‟t that 
communicated to students, because I would have thought that was obvious from… but 
that‟s from my life experience of seeing...  being in other cultures, but... are students 
prepared enough for that, I don‟t know.  Perhaps there‟s a kind of slight conflict insofar 
as a student might want to go to a prestigious university or a university in a particularly 
nice area but knows at the same time that that particular university or country is not that 
sympathetic to dyslexia but nevertheless they still like to go to that university. 
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Appendix 2N – The Academic Advisor Derek‟s Story 
 
What my Unit does 
In the unit I manage, there are two subject areas, Modern Languages – French German 
Spanish and Italian – and English Language courses and English Language Teaching.  
And within Modern Languages, we run an undergraduate degree programme, Single-
Honours Major and Joint Majors for those four languages mentioned, and we also run 
Open Courses, which run courses in the languages that I‟ve mentioned but in addition to 
that in many other languages besides.   
 
On the English Language side we run a large programme all year round of EFL courses, 
courses for non-native speakers of English of various kinds, we run teacher training 
courses, and we run a BA in English Language Teaching and we run an MA in English 
Language Teaching. Some of SLI teaching is directly or indirectly state funded but 
people can also come here and spend their own money. Visiting and Exchange students 
[…] join some of our English Language courses which are accredited by the University 
and can be taken for credit back in their home country. 
 
On the English Language side, there are the BA and MA which is kind of state-funded, 
but there are also Visiting and Exchange students who join some of our English Language 
courses which are accredited by the University and can be taken for credit back in their 
home country. 
 
For those on undergraduate programmes, postgraduate programmes, obviously it‟s the 
University [which accredits their course]. [For accredited but non-graduating courses] I 
suppose it‟s the University that qualifies them, although we‟re running assessments which 
are accredited and which are recognised for credits which Visiting and Exchange students 
then take back to their own countries. 
 
We run initial Teacher Training courses in Teaching English to Speakers of Other 
Languages, and those courses are moderated and a qualification is given by Trinity 
College, London.  British Council in some ways will influence the way we teach, or the 
way things are set up. Definitely.  Yes.  On the English Language Teaching side there are 
various things that we need to do to comply.  On the English Language courses, you‟re 
looking at paying customers who‟ve come… I mean we run Examination courses, sort of 
part-time courses for… I should have mentioned that before, I suppose, we run 
Examination courses to prepare people for Cambridge Examinations and for IELTS 
examinations.   
 
Our syllabuses and methodologies 
We designed the [BA in ELT] degree partly based on our experience of teacher education 
at various levels, partly looking at schemes that are out there and accredited such as the 
Certificate and the Diploma. Oh, in fact yes – in fact what we wanted to do was to 
incorporate the possibility of students obtaining the TESOL Certificate within their 
degree course, and so we worked also with Trinity College in such a way that our 
syllabus over the first two years of the BA ELT covers the Trinity College syllabus.  Our 
syllabus is more than that, it goes a lot deeper, but at least that one is included.  So if 
students are successful and if they want to be moderated, they end up after the 2
nd
 year 
with a Certificate in TESOL. 
 
We did actually discuss [where we‟re at collectively in the way we teach] a couple of 
years ago, as a staff, and we do have a document where have laid down certain principles 
that we subscribe to.  I can‟t quote from that document from memory, but I‟ve got a fair 
idea of the sorts of principles that are in there, but I would say on a day-to-day basis that 
people will use informed eclecticism.  People are pragmatic.  They will draw on a number 
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of different methodologies and techniques depending on the needs of the students in front 
of them and what those students are aiming for, and that probably is different and looks 
different for example between English Language courses and language courses for 
Modern Languages, for Undergraduates.  I think there should be [Informed Eclecticism 
on the Modern Languages side as well as the English language side], I do get the 
impression that the Modern Language teaching on undergraduate programmes is more 
traditional in nature – from what I can gather.  I think that part of Informed Eclecticism is 
that it‟s horses for courses.  Let‟s take the Cambridge exams. The examination is made up 
of several different papers.  One is the Use of English Paper, and so really, in order to 
prepare students for that examination, you have to look at the kinds of tasks, questions 
that come up and deal with those, and that would be a fairly traditional look at grammar 
structures, but also certain lexical things, not only grammar.  But the Oral for the 
Cambridge exams - which is worth a fair bit, I think it‟s worth more than the usual kind 
of cursory 5 or 10% is in the form of a conversation in pairs, with students given certain 
communication tasks to do, and so it‟s very definitely targeted at how well students can 
communicate and interact thoroughly, it would be more academic, more focused I 
suppose on grammar, reading and writing than a General English course. 
 
They (people on F/T language courses) want to come out of here having improved the 
way that they speak, write, comprehend etc., English.  They are interested in improving 
their communication skills, and not necessarily looking for a certain piece of paper.  Our 
undergraduates, obviously are aiming to get a degree qualification and while certainly 
communication - and if you like if we concentrate on spoken or aural-oral communication 
skills, those are important, but inevitably the focus is more academic in terms, people 
have to know more about the grammar, probably, of the language, and they have to be 
able to take part in seminars and write academic assignments in the Target Language. 
 
[There] is an interesting Second Language Acquisition question as to whether we could 
produce high quality Modern Language Graduates in terms of their communication skills 
without explicitly addressing the grammar of the language but I think the general feeling 
of both staff and students are comfortable with at the moment is that they do need – that 
when they‟re thinking about advanced language groups, they do feel that they need to 
address explicitly the grammar. Tutors do have to get students up to a certain standard but 
as I said before, the interesting question is whether, because it‟s really serious, in terms of 
the level that you want students to meet, whether that means that you‟ve got  to use quite 
a traditional method and that I don‟t know. It‟s not only about how much you focus 
explicitly on grammar, I don‟t think, it‟s also to do with classroom management and the 
degree to which pair and group work and … and that sort of thing is done, or whether 
there‟s a bit of sort of lecturing going on, so I think there is a difference in culture 
between… I think there are both cross-over points and a shared culture between Modern 
Language tutors and English Language tutors.  Well I suppose one can be totally honest, I 
think it‟s because [Modern Language] tutors were taught that way [rather than the fact 
that the teachers know that in the Year Abroad things are going to be done a certain way]. 
 
There are differences there, I think, between Modern Language tutors of various 
languages [but] are the differences justified?  Well, as things go at present, I‟ve taken the 
view that… to give it the benefit of the doubt and say “Yes they are”.  I think if I can just 
speak off the record for a moment, if one wasn‟t so completely taken up with sorts of 
questions we‟ve been taken up with over the past couple of years, one might have wanted 
to really address these things more than we‟ve been able to.  But you know, one doesn‟t 
really want to be talking about this sort of thing while everything seems to be working 
fine, you don‟t really don‟t want to be talking about this sort of thing when you‟re 
fighting for your life.  At the moment my view, would be that there‟ll be maybe a Spanish 
way of doing it, maybe a French way of doing it, and I‟m fairly neutral so long as it 
works. 
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On the Modern Languages side, we designed a new degree; we decided on what 
components we wanted, we decided on what learning outcomes we wanted, and we 
worked backwards from there, and through that process and everybody contributing, we 
came up with the curriculum with the courses that go to make up the programme.  Well 
what goes into [the Language side of the BA Mod Langs] is a bit of a mystery to me to be 
honest.  Except to say that we did I think have a conversation and decide that we would 
all use the ALTE levels, and so actually in theory that‟s what we should be doing, 
because each of the language courses should be pegged, and I think the curriculum 
documents say that, they should be pegged to certain ALTE levels and certainly we use 
ALTE levels for our English Language courses.  So in theory we should be able to say, 
well this course is this level and this level... I mean there is the European Common 
Framework, of course which gives detailed curriculum guidance for different levels. 
 
In the IELTS descriptors it always used to strike me as very strange that the descriptor for 
the top level – Level Nine – said “This is a level that not all Native Speakers will reach" - 
Well it‟s an educated native speaker, which I suppose you can understand in a way, for a 
qualification which is aiming to tell Universities – give Universities information about 
this person‟s language abilities.  But certainly, there is an example of a scale, or a 
reference as it were, which does refer to Native Speakers and says that the top level even 
is beyond some Native Speakers.  There is a level of pronunciation which is good enough.  
If you‟ve got people who are aiming to be diplomats or teachers of the language, then 
you‟ll want to reference that to being as native-speaker-like as possible. But otherwise we 
would use descriptions such as “Can be listened to with a certain degree of comfort and 
ease by an interlocutor”, and “Not be a strain on an interlocutor”.  So I think depending 
on why this person is learning the language and what they want to do, adequate 
communication of meaning without too much strain on an interlocutor can be, you know, 
something that you measure people by.  We are going for criteria more than absolutes, 
more than native Speaker levels. 
 
The Year Abroad and its implications 
I totally disagree that the idea of a Year Abroad is a sheer waste of time and an 
indulgence in Modern Languages Programmes.  I think the idea that you pick up certain 
things by being in the country and receiving teaching in that country is extremely 
important.  Apart from the aspect of being immersed in the language, there is more and 
more appreciation these days that the reason why we‟re teaching a language or learning a 
language in the first place is to communicate with people from cultures other than our 
own, and so there is cultural learning to take place, and a learning not only one specific 
target culture, but learning to be culturally adept and to communicate with people from 
different cultures, from a range of different cultures, and survive in a different culture.  
And I think that this is definitely one of the learning outcomes that we‟ve got on our 
modern languages degree, that people should be interculturally competent. 
 
Is there is something linguistically important, do I think, in this immersion process?   
Clearly.  It is the exposure to the language.  It‟s not exposure alone, I mean there‟s got to 
be some kind of interaction, it‟s the combination of the exposure and the interaction. 
There are relatively few things that you can say with any certainty about how people 
acquire language, but certainly the degree of exposure to the language and the 
opportunity to interact in the language in a meaningful way have certainly been shown by 
research to be significant factors in the acquisition of that language. 
 
Is there something linguistic that happens to students on their Year Abroad?  It‟s 
psycholinguistic and psychological.  Their subconscious will work on the data that 
they‟re given, some of what they learn will be conscious, it‟s the opportunity to practise, 
and it‟s also a social thing, if students are socially acculturated, if they do interact, if they 
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have friends, if they have a social group which includes speakers of a Target Language, 
then again studies have shown that this will lead to improvements in their language.  
Whereas if they are completely isolated or they don‟t mix with people from the target 
language socially, then probably they will not improve to such a degree.  The motivation 
to be part of a group is tremendously strong and I think that the studies that have been 
done on children who are thrown into a foreign language situation, when you look at their 
interactions with children round them, who are speaking a different language, you can see 
that they have all of these strategies that they use in order to be accepted.  Now I know 
that we‟re talking about adults and not children, nevertheless I‟m sure that some of those 
motivations and strategies will still be there.  Group Integrative Motivation with peers is a 
strong engine, going beyond mere learning to acquiring mechanisms slightly more.  If 
you want make the distinction – if you want to make Krashen‟s distinction between 
learning and acquisition, I would say yes, they have the opportunity to acquire. 
 
"Re-engagement of acquisition is expected in the year abroad country for adults", Yep.  I 
think it‟s not expected, it is something which possibly can be expected, but it‟s not an 
expectation as such. 
 
Issues around Disability 
[For] British students, there are certain systems in place to fund support that they need 
and that they‟re entitled to. With the Disabilities legislation We‟re obliged not to refuse 
access to our courses on the grounds of disability  - on any of our courses – British 
students, that is, or British and EU, I‟m not sure to what extent the legislation applies to 
EU, I‟m just not sure. [As regards disability], there is a grey area here between British 
students and non-British students.  Or shall we say non-Home/EU students. 
 
 In terms of our British Council accreditation, one of the things that we have to provide to 
students who are taking our Fee Paying courses is we have to provide there has to be a 
Welfare structure.  Everybody really has a welfare role and teachers do pick up 
occasionally that they think that somebody‟s dyslexic but of course it‟s always very 
difficult to know whether somebody is a dyslexic or whether their level of literacy in their 
own language is actually quite low. I would say that only students on undergraduate and 
masters‟ courses [can access the HUMS Advisors].  When students go to the Student 
Advisors here, you know they‟re thinking about Mitigating Evidence because they‟ve got 
to submit late and all the rest of it. 
 
But we had an application from a student who wanted to come on one of our Summer 
Courses, not only was he wheelchair-bound, which wouldn‟t have been a problem, but 
was blind.  And that created a problem because the Student Support Unit wanted us to 
provide the sort of support which might have been sufficient if that student had been 
attending lectures – and seminars – so just you know, blow up the lecture notes and 
photocopy these.  But of course that wasn‟t the case, he was going to be in a class, with 
other paying students, with teachers who were teaching full-time as you know – the 21 
hours a week – and using a course book for 21 hours a week, and so we tried to explain 
that really the only way that we could cope with such student [sic] was if he had a 
companion there, in the class, who could actually read out what was there.  It was clear to 
us that that was the only way that we could cope in order to be fair to the student, to be 
fair to the other students in the class, and not to overburden the teachers. And there was 
this great thing going round the houses as to whom [sic] should pay for this, he wanted to 
be on a Pre-Sessional course, that‟s right, so the question was should SLI pay for it, 
should the receiving Department pay for it, should Student Support pay for it, they said 
“No, you now, we only get money for British students”, and so in the end he actually 
didn‟t come.  But it… that case certainly pointed up the fact that there is a problem for us, 
for students who are not covered in terms of financial support. That case [the blind, 
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wheelchair-based overseas student] certainly pointed up the fact that there is a problem 
for us, for students who are not covered in terms of financial support. 
 
Dyslexia Issues 
There certainly is a dilemma if you have a dyslexic student, because you‟re supposed to 
make allowances. Obviously, if part of what you‟re assessing is whether there‟s 
agreement at the end of an adjective or something like that and you‟re looking very 
precisely for an extra E or an extra S or both, it is a dilemma I think, whether to penalise a 
dyslexic student for not observing that in written examinations, or in written work, you‟re 
being unfair on the student and not taking account of their disability.  On the other hand if 
you don‟t penalise them, you‟re penalising other students for making that mistake.  Yes, 
it‟s a dilemma.  Without a doubt. 
 
I mean obviously we‟re not supposed to be forced in any way to lower standards.  
Therefore initially, you would only accept people onto the degree programme who‟ve 
achieved a certain level of proficiency. I mean if students have managed to get as far as A 
Level, you know, then in theory they should be able to continue.  But I really think it‟s a 
question to what degree you do make allowances for things like spelling and that‟s very 
difficult when actually that‟s precisely what we‟re assessing students on. [The] idea that 
you are not required to lower standards when you accommodate a disabled student comes 
from the guidelines that we‟ve been given by the University, and I think they take it from 
the legislation in some way. 
 
What then happens if we get somebody who comes along and then goes to the Student 
Advisor and says “Oh by the way, I‟m dyslexic”, is you can‟t sort of say you cannot come 
on some courses… if somebody applies to do languages and they get the requisite 
qualifications, then obviously we can‟t refuse them, and you assume that if they could get 
that far, they can get further. They may discover they‟ve got that far despite being 
dyslexic and that, then they are assessed and all the rest of it.  
 
For a lot of the course, presumably in all Content Courses whether they are in the target 
language or not we should be able, we should be making the sorts of accommodation 
that‟s made for dyslexic students.  I think there is a problem with language courses, and 
again some of the language course is oral/aural, and I think it is a dilemma, I don‟t think I 
know what the answer is.  We do what we can in terms of making handouts clear and all 
the rest of it but I suppose the assessment is where the crunch comes, and of course there 
are different kinds of dyslexia and we‟re asked to make different kinds of accommodation 
for those people. 
 
Dyslexia and the Year Abroad 
To the statement “Learning in the target language or country works well for dyslexics as 
they have their own strategies SO we should let them go on their Year Abroad even if 
they do badly in their pre-Year Abroad exams”, I would answer I don‟t think that we 
should.  We‟ve thought about it carefully, and come to a decision that students need to be 
of a certain standard in terms of proficiency with the language before they go on the year 
abroad and we‟ve done that for their good, and I don‟t think that we should change that.  
IF we had – what I could see happening, and I suppose a conversation one could have, is 
that one actually weights assessments differently for dyslexic students, giving more 
weight to oral/aural work and less weight to written work to a certain extent.  But I don‟t 
think you could do that a huge amount, or I don‟t think you would necessarily be 
achieving the learning outcomes of the degree programme.  I think that dyslexic students 
[going on a Year Abroad] need to be warned, and they need fully aware, because if what 
they‟re going to be doing is taking University courses which involve writing, written 
assessments which they inevitably will, those assessments - they will not get any 
accommodation and they will not get any special treatment, and if they achieve low 
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marks on those assessments, that is going to impact on their degree results.  Therefore I 
think you know at the time when any student is identified as being dyslexic, I think – or 
other disabilities than that, I think that they do need to be fully advised by somebody in 
the Department about what the implications for them are. Because you can‟t expect 
somebody in the Student Support Unit to understand about Year Abroad things. If you 
become aware of the fact that someone has a difficulty, maybe that they weren‟t aware of 
before, you might say to them, “Look, at this point, do you want to change your degree 
programme, or… you know.  It just may not be the best degree programme for you.” 
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Appendix 3 – Instruments used 
 
3A – Interview Schedule – Dyslexic students 
3B – Interview Schedule – The Advisors 
3C – Interview Schedule – The Academic Director 
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3A – Interview Schedule – Dyslexic students 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
[Header throughout]: INTERVIEW SHEET  Research Questions:  1. What is a frozen adult 
language learner.  2a.  Are fossilisation descriptions mutually supportive;  2b. Ditto dyslexia definitions.  3. 
Commonalties and levels of interaction of fossilisation and dyslexia. 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
[Footer throughout:]  Yes:  feedback question with own words (their keywords, in lieu of tape counter).  
Scale that, 1-5;  rank that ?  Can you give me a for-instance;  is that what you think or what people think;  is 
this a general or a particular instance/case. 
No:  Are you saying that ([re-]interpretation)... So in summary you‟re saying that ... Any leads 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Timings +   
Respondent 
Keywords    QUESTIONS AND PROBES 
 
Introduction and description of the interview 
(theme of mature students and language issues) 
- confidentiality issue 
- explain why I can‟t lead in questions 
- parts of the interview:  this Introduction;  
Question 1:  your view of the difficulty;  
Question 2:  how do you feel about this;  
Question 3:  did you cope, and how ? Good 
Story; Bad story;  probes and discussion; facts 
and figures like age etc. for deductive working; 
your chance to add anything that this interview 
has triggered 
 
PART ONE:  
For Inductive Analysis: 
 
QUESTION 1:  Your view of the difficulty.   
Probe: Can you describe it for me?   
Checklist/Prompts:  Memory, Spelling, Writing, 
Reading, lexis retention, lexis retrieval, L1/L2 
lexical equivalents, phoneme/grapheme/phoneme 
conversion;  aural discrimination/accents;  formal 
grammar e.g. rules and principles, syntax, 
morphology 
Probe:  What do you think caused or causes 
this? 
Checklist/Prompts:  is it something in you, or 
something external to you?  Is anyone “to 
blame”?  Is this specific to you or affecting 
everyone, anyone?  Is this from nature or from 
nurture?  Is there some other cause? 
Probe:  What were the (non-affective) 
consequences or results of having the difficulty? 
Checklist/prompts:  do they still exist?  What was 
the degree of consequence (scale, please)?  What 
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time factors were involved ?  Were there social 
consequences, knock-on effects?  What other 
people were affected - family, peers, teachers 
current or past, others?  Other academic effects?  
Other language effects but don‟t lead here e.g. 
of L1 on L2 or vice-versa, linguistic 
destabilisation/regression?  (analogy of computer 
“hanging” - useful?) 
 
QUESTION TWO:  subjective, personal 
perspectives on the difficulty 
Probe: Can you describe what it feels like 
from your point of view? 
Checklist/prompts:  shame, pride, stupidity, 
intelligence, embarrassment, defensiveness, self-
anger, self-fulfilling despair/feelings of futility, 
self-blame, loss of control, loss of motivation, 
other 
Probe:  Was this a public or a private matter? 
Checklist/prompts:  did you hide the difficulty, 
deny it, get found out, compare yourself with 
others? 
 
QUESTION THREE: did you cope, and 
how? 
Probe:  did you evolve coping mechanisms, as 
opposed to clear strategies? 
Checklists/prompts:  concealment, denial, not 
coping 
Probe:  did you have your own strategies? 
Checklist/prompts:  self-organisation, back-
checking, mnemonics you developed, learning 
from mistakes, going and asking for help, did the 
minimum to get through 
Probe:  did you discover, seek out or receive 
other people‟s strategies? 
Checklist/prompts: formal study skills, back-up 
lessons (private or provided), self-checking?  
Other?  How did these help?  What did these 
help? 
 
THE GOOD STORY 
In-flight probes/qualifiers, if not disruptive of 
flow: See Footer 
Post-Probe:  e.g. this is about you in particular? 
Post-Probe:  e.g. could this have happened to 
someone else? 
Post-Probe: this is about a specific instance or a 
generalisation? 
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THE BAD STORY 
In-flight probes/qualifiers, if not disruptive of 
flow: See Footer 
Post-Probe:  e.g. this is about you in particular? 
Post-probe:  e.g. could this have happened to 
someone else? 
Post-Probe: this is about a specific instance or a 
generalisation? 
 
PART TWO:  
For Inductive Analysis 
 
DEDUCTIVE/PRE-CODING QUESTIONS 
(Alphabetical) 
Clumsiness 
Dominant hand 
Eyesight 
Eye colour (same?) 
Age 
Years out of formal language work before mature 
studies 
Amusia / reported tone-deaf 
Actually tone-deaf (National Anthem) 
Mimicry skills, accents 
Hearing 
What social class would you say you were 
Top grade for English Language 
Top grade for Foreign Language 
 
PART THREE:  
For Inductive Analysis 
 
INTERVIEWEE FEEDBACK 
Probe:  has anything been left unsaid? 
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Appendix 3B –  
 
Interview Outline - The Student Advisors 
 
These were the questions on my Interview Sheet: 
 
1. Informed Consent 
 
2. Recording begins - permission to proceed? 
 
3. The SA role in general;  autonomous or School or Uni managed? 
 
4. The SA role in particular - disabled students 
- dyslexic students 
- same DDA status? 
- Post- Statementing / referral 
 
5. How do dyslexic students come to SAs - self-referral, SSU referral, many 
types  
 
6. Is there ever a Diagnostic role of SAs?  i.e. can you spot a dyslexic 
student, yourselves ? 
 
7. Dyslexia position required - i.e. there‟s dyslexia because students are 
dyslexic, or vice-versa, or it doesn‟t matter ?  Is there an orthodoxy or 
counter-orthodoxy, e.g. Learned Helplessness, Seligman (1975, 1992), or 
Gift of Dyslexia, Davis (1997), others? 
 
8. Dyslexic and reporting via Wealdston Direct.  Do some entries say 
“dyslexic” and others refer to “dyslexia-like difficulties”?  Are there in 
fact differences in approach or intervention? 
 
9. Confirm intervention levels - SAs intervene locally e.g. at School level, 
whereas SSU intervenes at Uni level and directly with the student ?  
Limited to undergrads ?  All-comers, or caseload ?  Cinderella-ish 
activity? 
 
10. Disability, crime and punishment - dyspraxic, disorganised, attention-
deficitous etc. students with dyslexia diagnoses - exhort, or punish, or? 
 
11. Any views on HOW some students can arrive at Uni THEN be diagnosed 
as dyslexic? 
 
12. Any views on WHAT TYPE of students (gender, age, class, other 
variables) these are who have slipped through the net? 
 
13. Money - does DDA money attaching to a student e.g. from their LEA 
reach the SA system, directly or indirectly ?  (Comparative case of 
Assistive technology appraisals). 
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14. True or false:  no student is legally dyslexic at Wealdston until Wealdston 
agrees that they are (i.e. the Institution “makes” students dyslexic). 
 
15. True or false:  Student Advisors cannot and will not help “in” (rather than 
“out”) dyslexics, i.e. there‟s no confidentiality. 
 
 
Wider questions 
 
16. Dyslexics and Modern languages. Comment these statements for i) content 
and ii) typicality: 
 
16A “You‟d have thought they‟d just not bother to try” 
16B “I‟m dyslexic in English but I picked up Dutch when I lived over there, I 
just learned the rules - and used them” 
16C “It was only when I had to do Russian from scratch on my MA in Applied 
Linguistics that I worked out I‟m actually dyslexic”. 
 
17. Affect and learning - own experiences as SAs - which leads which ?  Bad 
affect > bad learning or vice versa (vicious downward spiral). 
  
18. (off the top of your head) Presenting problem with dyslexics - broadly 
50/50 between Academic difficulties and Affective difficulties, or 
different proportion ? 
 
19. Is there a typical time i.e. just before Year 1 exams when there is a “peak 
period” for support and/or diagnosis of dyslexics ? 
 
20. What is SA support, if any, for students (esp. dyslexic ones) on a Year 
Abroad, or is this handled via SSU and OISA
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 ? 
 
 
 
Letter from the Vice Dean of International Relations, Faculty of Arts, 
University of Madrada
52
, included as Jille and Dave made reference to it 
concerning the Year Abroad (emphasis added) 
 
Estimada Amelia, 
Escribo en relación al caso de la alumna MJP.  En la actualidad, la Universidad de 
Madrada no contempla ni tiene regulado ningún tipo de normativa para este tipo 
de discapacidad.  De hecho, es el primer caso que conozco en la Facultad de 
Filosofía y Letras.  Por este motivo, no puedo garantizar ningún trato especial a 
Mary-Jane Phelps dado que no estamos autorizados para modificar o alterar las 
normas que mencionas en tu mensaje;  bien por estar reguladas por de instancias 
superiores (las que afectan a la biblioteca etc.), o porque afectan a la dedicación 
des profesorado (tiempo extra en exámenes, criterios de calificación, etc.).  En 
                                            
51 This is the Officefor International Study Abroad, which deals with ERASMUS, British Council 
and Junior Year Abroad (North American) visits and exchanges, and also teaching practice and 
Work Placement issues.  Its funding is partially external, e.g. through European Union sources. 
52 People and place names have been altered as previously. 
262 
cualquier caso, estad seguros que, en el caso de que decida venir, prestaremos a 
MJP la mayor ayuda posible siempre que no afecte a las normas de la 
Universidad.  Por favor, te ruego que se lo hagas llegar para que lo tenga en 
cuenta antes de tomar la decisión.  Cordialmente, Cordelia Jesus Fernandez de 
Ortiz. 
 
Dear Amelia 
I‟m writing in connection with the case of your student MJP.  At the present time, 
the University of Madrada is neither about to nor has it implemented any settled 
policy regarding this type of disability.  In fact this is the first example of such a 
case that we have come across in the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters. For this 
reason, I cannot guarantee any special treatment for Mary-Jane Phelps, given that 
we are not authorised to modify or alter the regulations which you mention in 
your letter, whether these are derived from higher authorities (regarding e.g. the 
library and so forth), nor as regards teaching time (extra time in examinations, 
criteria for exam success, etc).  Whatever the case, if she decides to attend our 
university, please be assured that we shall offer all assistance possible provided 
that it does not alter university regulations.  Please ensure that this is conveyed to 
her so that she can be mindful of it before she takes her decision.  Yours, CJF de 
O
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Appendix 3C - Interview Schedule - The Academic Director 
 
These were the questions on my Interview Sheet: 
 
1. Informed Consent 
 
2. Recording begins - permission to proceed? 
 
3. Describe the activities of the UniLang Centre. 
 
4. Who funds what - Joe Public, private individuals ...? 
 
5. Qualifications and who grants them. 
 
6. Is there a central ethos or methodology - we‟ve done grammar-translation model, 
audiolingual 50s and 60s, functional-notional syllabus, the communicative 
syllabus, proceduralism - where are we at collectively? 
 
7. What do the qualifying/certifying bodies expect - esp. when they‟re inspecting 
and franchising etc? And thru‟ exams? 
 
8. MFL vs EFL methodologies - same?  
 
9. In EFL and MFL where do the internal syllabuses come from, where these 
courses aren‟t validated externally.  
 
10. Role of Native Speaker levels - referenced to NS proficiency or referenced to 
criteria e.g. can write a letter correctly. 
 
11. If not then what is the role of direct teaching? 
 
12. Learning “in the target language culture” - worthwhile and a selling point? 
 
13. Mod Langs and year abroad - “sheer waste of time and an indulgence”?  
 
14. If not how do students “pick up” stuff on their YA - something clicks in, 
automatically?  
 
15. So re-engagement of acquisition is expected in the year abroad country, for 
adults? 
 
Disability and related 
 
16. How to deal with disability - what‟s the obligation:  take all comers, if they‟re 
funded? 
 
17. Paradox or dilemma of being unable to refuse disabled students and unable to 
discriminate against them in marking etc. 
 
18. Difference dyslexic / other disabled - i.e. their own fault if they try and do 
something they‟re disabled at? 
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19. Agree/disagree? “Learning „in the target language/country‟ works well for 
dyslexics, as they have their own strategies - so we should let them go even if 
they do badly in pre-YA exams.   
 
20. Practical question - does UniLang Centre co-fund Student Advisors?  (BA, MA 
programmes) 
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Appendix 4 – A Table of NVivo 8 labels derived in the 
 Thesis and their explanatory sub-descriptors encoded in  
the NVivo 8 electronic models. 
 
Only the FIRST occurrence of each label is sub-described, hence no reference is 
made e.g. to Model 4 or Model 8, as they simply reconfigure, realign and interpret 
earlier labels. 
 
Model LABEL SUB-DESCRIPTOR 
1 AUTOMATICITY AS 
UNREALISED 
EXPECTATION 
I expected automaticity because others have it, 
but I didn't reach it. 
 NEGATIVE 
AUTOMATICITY: 
„AUTOMATIC‟ SELF-
DOUBT 
I 'automatically' doubt my capacities and, in a 
self-fulfillling reaction, fail to reach automaticity. 
 LOSS OF AUTOMATICITY 
– „TUNING OUT‟ 
Just when I think I am reaching automaticity, I 
become distracted and 'tune out' , i.e. lose the 
flow. 
 SERIAL-AND-PARALLEL 
AUTOMATICITY 
UNAVAILABLE 
I can do things (e.g. learn items) either in tandem 
(parallel) or one-after-the-other (serial);  but not 
both, in an „exponential‟ way. 
2 AUTOMATICITY OF 
UPTAKE 
I absorb linguistic and metalinguistic information 
„mindlessly‟ - but permanently and 
exponentially. 
 SPONANEOUS, 
NATURALISTIC 
ACQUISITION 
Without prompting or coaching or using 
dedicated teaching materials I can uptake and and 
in addition, process (e.g. store, compare, 
categorize, sort, retrieve) linguistic information 
in a permanent way. 
 AUTOMATICITY OF 
OUTPUT (FLUENCY?) 
I can assemble and output linguistic data without 
conscious planning and without seeming to have 
consciously planned it. 
3 INTERACTIVE, CREATIVE 
EXPONENTIALITY 
I can handle (input, output) linguistic information 
including novel (untutored and unplanned) 
utterances or text of my own or other people's 
creation, or any mixture of these, and use these 
inputs and outputs to 'grow' my language use in 
content and perfomance. 
 TRANSCENDENCE OF 
„CHUNKING‟ 
I can rise above using fairly unanalysed chunks 
of language (e.g. holophrases), and/or using such 
chunks either in parallel OR serially towards 
parallel AND serial. 
 DE-AUTOMATION  Loss of automaticity or of progress towards 
automaticity, for various reasons. 
 STRATEGIC MICRO-
PLANNING 
The reverse of 'transcendence of chunking':  I 
descend towards making the best out of units and 
holophrases - as a deliberate (conscious) strategy. 
5 PROXY AUTOMATICITY The assumption that others will understand – 
automatically – for me. 
 AUTOMATICITY OF 
MEMORY (SEAMLESS 
RECALL) 
I can recall things effortlessly and with e.g. no 
hesitations or tip-of-the-tongue phenomena. 
 PRE-ASSEMBLAGE 
AUTOMATICITY 
I can automatically (i.e. not deliberatively) 
assemble items before outputting them. 
 SEMANTIC 
AUTOMATICITY 
Not specifically lexical, i.e. not anomia;  but 
offering unprompted access to the meaning of 
intrasentential elements. 
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 INTERLOCUTOR 
SUSTAINED 
AUTOMATICITY 
De-automation doesn‟t kick in so long as 
automaticity is sustained by an interlocutor (i.e. it 
might, when lecturing, presenting, monologuing 
unidirectionally. 
 ELECTIVE DE-
AUTOMATION (SELF-
SCREENING) 
My de-automation (q.v.) results from self-
screening for accuracy in preference to 
automaticity. 
 OVER-WRITING 
(GROUND-HOG DAY) DE-
AUTOMATION 
Automaticity does not evolve because linguistic 
information is over-written by new items 
effortfully acquired. 
 NARRATOLOGICAL-
DISCOURSAL 
AUTOMATICITY 
One form of automaticity is that exponentially, 
the more narrative-types and discourse-types I 
encounter, the more I know of them and the less 
these impinge on my uptake or output of 
language. 
 CONATIVE DE-
AUTOMATION 
My will to automaticity lacks, or has been 
jeopardised or lost.  Not to be confused with 
„demotivation‟. 
6 METALINGUISTIC 
KNOWLEDGE 
My linguistic knowledge (overt and covert) about 
the language(s) I am acquiring or have acquired, 
and about human language in general. 
 OVERT, DESCRIPTIVE 
GRAMMAR-TEACHING 
Deliberate teaching of grammar which I have 
received,  probably of the „grammar-translation 
model‟ variety, with its covert assumptions that 
description and analysis are necessary precursors 
to growingly spontaneous uptake, extension and 
stability. 
 PARTIAL AUTOMATICITY 
(SUB-AUTOMATIC RULE-
INTERNALISATION) 
My memory and cognition allow quantities of 
language (including foreign) to be internalised, 
though probably for monologic outputs in 
restricted fields and functions. 
 RELATIVE 
AUTOMATICITY 
I (as an Advisor) believe that some forms of 
automaticity are easier to acquire -  so 
conversely, dyslexia may simply mask 
interlinguistic difficulty. 
 PARTIAL AUTOMATICITY 
(WITH ADVISOR-DENIED 
DYSLEXIA) 
Partial automaticity again but as a „dyslexia 
professional‟ I would deny this is Dyslexia at all, 
because "They've made it so far, haven't they?" 
 EARLY STAGE 
„LANGUAGE AUTISM‟ 
I am 'as though' autistic in the early stages of my 
L2 acquisition (or even L1, discounting  e.g. 
symbolic/kinetic language). 
 FAILURE OF PRAGMATIC 
GRAMMAR JUDGEMENTS 
I can't (even) judge whether my grammar use is 
correct or not. 
 OVERGENERALISATION 
OF (THE LITTLE) 
ACQUIRED 
I have internalised very little in the way of 
Metalinguistic knowledge AND what I have 
internalised has been overgeneralised. 
7 „AFTER‟ PROFICIENCY, 
A.K.A. „NOT YET‟ OR 
„WHOLE POINT‟ 
PROFICIENCY 
I will acquire this proficiency AFTER a Year 
Abroad, i.e. the 'whole point' of the YA is to 
acquire it, as I am „not yet‟ proficient. 
 „BEFORE‟ PROFICIENCY I must acquire this proficiency BEFORE a Year 
Abroad, i.e. the purpose of the YA is to use and 
reinforce what I have already acquired. 
 EXPOSURE AND 
INTERACTION MODEL OF 
(RE-)ACQUISITION 
I (the Academic Director) believe that acquisition 
of  language requires exposure to language (and 
therefore, not ontogenesis) combined with 
interactions (which will be further and further 
under the acquirer's control).  Acquisition isn't 
automatic and/or irresistible. 
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 ONLY „ASPIRATION‟ 
GP/MLAP – RE-LAUNCH 
ONLY „POSSIBLE' 
I (the Academic Director) also believe that 
acquisition of language is only an aspiration, a 
'possible' so we shall teach Modern Languages 
for General Purposes or Modern Languages for 
Academic Purposes and hopefully, it will stick.  
If it does, you get a Year Abroad, to improve it 
even more.  Acquisition isn't automatic and/or 
irresistible. 
 
 
 
 
